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1 Introduction
Maurice Crul, Jens Schneider and Frans Lelie
1.1 Introduction
Immigration and the subsequent integration of newcomers is one of the
foremost challenges for European cities. The integration of children born
to immigrant parents in countries of migration is critical, for this second
generation, as they have come to be known, constitutes a growing share of
metropolitan youth today. Research on the second generation is particularly
pertinent because it can respond to many universal questions concerning
integration.
With an extra push from the late-2000s’ financial crisis, the public de-
bate has taken a dramatic shift against immigrants and their children. In
Europe, the so-called threat of Islam is being put on the political agenda
by one populist party after another. Their popularity in the Netherlands
helped produce a minority government that, since 2010’s parliamentary
support agreement, has had to rely on votes by the downright anti-immi-
grant Party for Freedom (PVV). The PVV’s vetoing power enables this
party to highjack the topic of migration and integration, normalising bold
anti-immigrant discourse that links unemployment, crime and Islamist ex-
tremism with immigrants and their children. In 2011, we saw an extreme –
and hopefully rare – expression of the depth of anti-immigrant anxiety in
Norway. The right-wing zealot who took the lives of 77 people, mostly
teenagers attending a Norwegian Labour Party youth camp, claimed that
he wanted to root out the next generation of social democrats and their im-
migration politics. This xenophobic predilection is even pronounced in the
most strongly assimilationist country of Europe. France’s anti-immigrant
voice is Marine Le Pen, the popular leader of the Front National who has
gained prominence in the political arena. Meanwhile, though relatively
moderate leaders, Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom and
Germany’s Chancellor Merkel both recently declared that multiculturalism
has failed. Social Democratic Party (SPD) member Thilo Sarrazin, a former
board member of the German Federal Bank, amplified Merkel’s statement
in a controversial book, arguing that Muslim immigrants do not want to in-
tegrate and are happy to fall back on criminality and welfare instead. This
debate echoes worries about the emergence of a Parallelgesellschaft, a
‘parallel society’ in which two million people of Turkish descent are seen
as living detached from the wider German society.
What is actually happening to immigrant young adults is therefore of
paramount concern to the democratic states of Western Europe. Are the
media’s voices correct when they assert that major sections of immigrant
communities are failing to integrate and therefore endangering social cohe-
sion? Is the classical assimilation theory wrong about ethnic, cultural and
social distinctions becoming less relevant as immigrant ethnic groups be-
come more like the majority – and as the majority, in turn, evolves as it ab-
sorbs new groups? Is the fact that not all immigrants and their children ‘as-
similate’, or that some even resent the host society, a sign that multicultur-
alism has failed?
In theory, the second generation should have the same life chances as
children of native-born parents. Thus, the relative position of the second
generation with regard to important issues such as education and labour
force participation is viewed as a robust measure of group integration on
the whole. Older children born to Europe’s first labour migrants are now
finishing their educational careers and beginning to enter the labour market
in considerable numbers. The time is ripe for a first real assessment of
second-generation integration. In this book, we investigate how the integra-
tion of the second generation is progressing in crucial domains such as edu-
cation, labour market, social relations, religion and identity formation.
1.2 The survey
In keeping with the framework of the TIES project, the TIES survey com-
pares the second generation across fifteen cities in eight European coun-
tries. To be clear: second generation refers here to children of immigrants
who were born in the immigration country, have pursued their entire edu-
cation there and were between eighteen and 35 years old at the time of in-
terview, during 2007 and 2008. The second generation in our sample are
the children of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and the former
Yugoslavia.1 Alongside the second generation, we interviewed a group of
respondents whose both parents were born in the survey country.2 In this
volume, we refer to these respondents as ‘the comparison group’ rather
than use a term like ‘native’ or specific demonyms, such as ‘German’ or
‘French’. There are two reasons for this. First of all, according to our defi-
nition, second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians are
also ‘native’: they, like their comparison group peers, were born in the sur-
vey countries and did not immigrate. Secondly, by far, most of our second-
generation respondents possess citizenship of the country where they were
born and still live, thus being ‘German’ or ‘French’ themselves.
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Immigration being primarily an urban phenomenon, it made sense for the
project to be undertaken in metropolitan areas. The fifteen cities we thus
surveyed were (given in no particular order): Paris and Strasburg (France);
Berlin and Frankfurt (Germany); Madrid and Barcelona (Spain); Vienna
and Linz (Austria); Amsterdam and Rotterdam (the Netherlands); Brussels
and Antwerp (Belgium); Zurich and Basel (Switzerland); and Stockholm
(Sweden). In most cities, our focus fell on two second-generation groups
and a comparison group. In the Netherlands and Belgium, the two second-
generation groups comprised Turks and Moroccans. In Germany, Austria
and Switzerland, they comprised Turks and former Yugoslavians. For vari-
ous reasons, the French and Swedish teams only focused on second-genera-
tion Turks and a comparison group. The Spanish team only focused on sec-
ond-generation Moroccans and a comparison group. In each country, we
aimed to interview 500 persons from each ethnic group and 500 persons
from the comparison group in two cities. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the
survey respondents.
Part and parcel to our project was a standardised questionnaire that
could be used in all eight countries. Each module was designed by special-
ists from corresponding disciplines. The representation of many kinds of
expertises on our research team facilitated sound development of the sur-
vey in a cross-disciplinary manner. Understandably, this endeavour re-
quired months of debate and negotiating among the team members. But
the approach worked. It produced an extensive questionnaire – taking our












Sweden Stockholm 251 0 0 250 501
Germany Berlin 253 0 202 250 1,412
Frankfurt 250 0 204 253
Netherlands Amsterdam 237 242 0 259 1,505
Rotterdam 263 251 0 253
Belgium Brussels 358 311 0 301 1,717
Antwerp 244 246 0 257
France Paris 248 0 0 174 851
Strasbourg 252 0 0 177
Spain Madrid 0 250 0 250 1,000
Barcelona 0 250 0 250
Austria Vienna 252 0 253 250 1,437
Linz 206 0 242 234
Switzerland Zurich 206 0 235 202 1,348
Basel 248 0 191 266
Total 3,268 1,550 1,327 3,626 9,771
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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respondents an average of one hour and fifteen minutes to complete – and
that, in turn, gave us a very rich dataset.
The TIES questionnaire consists of twelve modules3 for respondents to
complete. They are as follows:
– Module A: Personal details
– Module B: Educational trajectory
– Module C: Labour history
– Module D: Partner(s)
– Module E: Parents and siblings
– Module F: Housing and neighbourhood
– Module G: Social relations
– Module H: Gender roles and child-care
– Module J: Identity, language and transnationalism
– Module K: Religion and religiosity
– Module L: Personal income and partner’s income
– Module M: Written question sheet (for more sensitive questions), which
respondents complete at the end of the interview.4
1.3 Aims
The first ambition of the TIES project was to provide a systematic cross-
national comparison of the second generation in Europe. This kind of inter-
national, comparative and empirically grounded research into integration
processes is still very rare, not least because it is technically very compli-
cated and almost no infrastructure exists for such work.
Most existing comparative European research on integration has focused
on immigrants as a whole. The heterogeneous categories ‘immigrants’ and
‘children of immigrants’ make it difficult to assure truly international com-
parability. Studying specific ethnic groups with the same starting position
– i.e. members of the second generation whose parents come from the
same country of origin – facilitates cross-national comparison. The fact that
we can compare the same ethnic group with the same starting position in
different countries gives us the opportunity to study the receiving context
in integration processes. The prime objective of the TIES project is to ana-
lyse the relative effects of specific city and national contexts in promoting
or hampering the integration of the second generation. As such, our coun-
try teams endeavoured to gather information on national and local institu-
tional arrangements in school and the labour market, citizenship policies
and anti-discrimination measures. Meanwhile, the TIES survey provided
contextual information on the topics of school segregation, selection ages
in education, school tracking, discrimination, housing segregation and the
warmth of relations between the groups.
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1.4 Publications and policy documents
As far as results go, the first step of the research teams was to produce
country reports based on the surveys in each of the countries. All reports
can be found on the TIES website (http://www.tiesproject.eu). The Dutch
report5 was published in 2008 in the peer-reviewed IMISCOE-Amsterdam
University Press Series; the French, German, Swedish, Spanish and Swiss
reports are expected to follow suit in the same series.6
Our findings have also been synthesised for two internationally compa-
rative publications. The book you now read draws exclusively on the TIES
results. Also available is a book comparing the results of similar surveys
on the second generation in New York, Los Angeles and Europe. Transat-
lantic in scope, The Changing Face of World Cities: Young Adult Children
of Immigrants in Europe and the United States7 presents cooperative work
by American and European researchers in various thematic chapters on ed-
ucation, labour market, neighbourhoods, citizenship and identity.
From its inception, the TIES project prioritised the production of policy-
relevant knowledge and, moreover, to communicate that to policymakers,
migrant organisations and other relevant actors at local and national levels
across Europe. As such, we published policy briefs and reports8 dealing
with both levels. In particular, the Open Society Institute commissioned
our policy brief on outcomes of the second generation vis-à-vis education
and transition to the labour market.9 This was presented at the international
TIES stakeholders’ conference, held in 2009 in Amsterdam, where discus-
sions were held with researchers, policymakers and NGOs from all the
cities in which the survey was realised.
1.5 Overview of the chapters in this volume
We designed this volume in the same collaborative spirit guiding the TIES
questionnaire and the TIES dataset. Thematic teams coded and recoded the
international data, analysing that which was relevant to their particular inter-
ests from the national surveys. This analysis is the crux of the thematic chap-
ters: education, labour market, family formation, identity and religion. Each
chapter’s first-listed author served as team coordinator for the topic at hand.
The chapters strive to give an overview of the main results of the TIES
survey for each topic. It should be noted, too, that we requested all the-
matic teams to focus on second-generation Turks, in particular. This group
proved to offer the most generalisability for the sake of cross-country com-
parison. With a population exceeding four million, people of Turkish de-
scent are the largest migrant group in Europe. We would therefore be re-
miss to exclude second-generation Turks in any assessment of integration
in Europe. The analysis of their position is the backbone of this book.
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The volume is divided in two parts. The first section describes the de-
sign of the TIES project and our theoretical approach. As argued in chapter
2, the project’s international comparative framework demands a new theo-
retical perspective in which the national and local integration context takes
centre-stage. The ‘integration context theory’ (see also Crul & Schneider
2010) introduced here endeavours to correct the blind spot currently handi-
capping other theories – especially those in the predominant American as-
similationist theory – that problematically disregard the local and national
integration contexts. In our view, contextual differences must take into ac-
count structural aspects of institutional arrangements, such as the integra-
tive nature of education systems, how the transition to the labour market
manifests, how welfare arrangements around paid work and care work are
organised, legal frameworks and housing. Our design selection is the direct
result of a theoretical focus on the importance of the integration context. In
chapter 3, we elaborate on our comparative sampling of the second genera-
tion, namely by identifying the same groups across the fifteen cities in
eight countries. In chapter 4, we give the reader more details about the
characteristics of the sampled second-generation groups and their parents
in each city. We focus, in particular, on the Turkish second generation for
the aforementioned reason.
The second section of this volume discusses the outcomes for different
themes, each chapter following our theoretical emphasis on pathways and
trajectories. Chapter 5 details the complete educational careers of our re-
spondents. We show results from preschool onwards, up until the transition
to the labour market. Chapter 6 discusses the working careers of our re-
spondents. Following the pathways of the second generation into adulthood
leads us to family formation in chapter 7. Chapter 8 on identity probes into
respondents’ feelings of belonging and what impact they have on their
lives. Chapter 9 on religion examines the role played by respondents’ faith
(or lack thereof). The authors of these last two chapters tap into the pre-
vious chapters’ findings on education, labour market and family formation,
using these outcomes as independent variables to explain trends and varia-
tions between second-generation groups across countries.
The final chapter of this volume relates outcomes across thematic fields.
Here we have no choice but to underscore the importance of the integration
context. For this purpose, we restrict ourselves to second-generation Turks,
even more narrowly focusing on children of low-educated parents.
Although it is useful to analyse people of the same ‘ethno-national’ origin
who belong to the same generation, looking at children from this group
who also grew up in the same socio-economic milieu across countries
yields far more insights. As we found, this analysis best indexes the dispar-
ities between countries, thereby enhancing the potential for cross-country
comparability. Our reward is a clear view – perhaps the clearest one yet –
on the crucial differences that sprout from the integration context.
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Notes
1 For ease of readability, throughout this book we use the term ‘second-generation for-
mer Yugoslavians’ or ‘former Yugoslavian second generation’ to refer to the children
of immigrants from the successor states of Yugoslavia who participated in the TIES
survey.
2 Because we only know where the parents were born, we acknowledge that the com-
parison group could possibly also include members of the third generation.
3 Questions from modules A through L were read aloud to the respondent by the in-
terviewer, who inputted answers directly into a computer program. Module M – con-
cerning sexuality, conflicts with parents and other more sensitive issues – was
handed to the respondent on paper, so he or she could answer these questions in
writing rather than orally.
4 By ‘interview’, we refer to the whole session, involving conversation and completion
of a questionnaire that took place between the TIES survey interviewer and the
respondent.
5 A full-length file of The Position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam: The TIES Study in the Netherlands can be read and down-
loaded at http://oapen.org/search?identifier=340071.
6 A full-length file of The Russian Second Generation in Tallinn and Kohtla-Jarve: The
TIES Study in Estonia can be read and downloaded at http://oapen.org/search?
identifier=403859.
7 The Changing Face of World Cities: Young Adult Children of Immigrants in Europe and
the United States, edited by Maurice Crul and John Mollenkopf (www.russellsage.
org/publications/changing-face-word-cities).
8 For further reading, see the Publications section of the TIES website
(http://www.tiesproject.eu).
9 TIES Policy Brief ‘The Second Generation in Europe: Education and the Transition




2 Comparative integration context theory
Participation and belonging in diverse European cities
Jens Schneider and Maurice Crul
2.1 Introduction
In the last fifteen years a great deal of research about the second generation
has appeared in academic journals and books. These publications have
stirred a wider theoretical debate about assimilation and integration.
Scholars in the United States have been at the forefront of studies produc-
ing both research results and theoretical models on the subject of the sec-
ond generation. Europe’s scholars are now catching up, starting to respond
to the theoretical notions produced within the North American context, no-
tably where the US-born children of Mexican and Asian immigrants domi-
nate discussion about the second generation. In Europe, these groups are,
as a whole, ethnically very varied, the largest populations therein having
parents who either come from former European colonies or were recruited
as labour migrants. Compared to those in the US, Europe’s labour migrants
have notably less diverse economic backgrounds. Not all, but most, had
come from countryside villages and hardly had any schooling.
2.2 New and segmented assimilation theory
In the US, a number of scholars have argued that the linear model of as-
similation is less likely to correspond with today’s more complex reality
(Portes & Rumbaut 2005) due to fundamental economic changes in society
since the formulation of classical assimilation theory, alongside the grow-
ing diversity of immigrants in terms of social class and nationality. New
theoretical perspectives emerged during the 1990s in the US to reflect this
view, beginning with Gans’ (1992) concept of ‘second-generation decline’
and Portes and Zhou’s (1993) theory of ‘segmented assimilation’. Both
ideas expressed a fair degree of pessimism for the future of some US-born
immigrant youth, positing that they could face what Portes and Zhou de-
scribed as ‘downward assimilation into the urban underclass’, with
permanent poverty being a distinct possibility. Compared to the era in
which immigration to the US was mainly by ‘white’ Europeans, today we
see racial and ethnic discrimination against visible minorities and, on top
of that, narrowing labour market opportunities for the second generation.
Whereas earlier migrants and their descendants could more confidently as-
pire to upward mobility within working-class jobs, the advent of an hour-
glass economy – with fewer middle-ranking posts – has meant fewer op-
portunities and incentives for less well-educated members of the second
generation. Although more historically grounded studies on both sides of
the Atlantic caution against painting a rosy picture of seamless integration
of pre-World War I immigrants and their descendants (Lucassen 2005;
Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco 2001; Waldinger & Perlman 1998), the
persistence of racism and today’s polarised labour market are seen as fac-
tors potentially leading to a group of disenchanted native-born youth of im-
migrant descent, especially those who have grown up in socially isolated,
depraved neighbourhoods (Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 2005).
The central idea of segmented assimilation theory is that there is more
than one way to become part of American society (Portes & Rumbaut
1996, 2001). Although this, per se, is not questioned by them, authors of
‘new assimilation theory’ state that the dominant stream remains ‘straight-
line assimilation’ – perhaps not pertaining to the second generation in all
regards, but indeed applicable to their children, the third generation (Alba
& Nee 2003: 271-292). A major study of the second generation in New
York City confirms this, and even speaks of a ‘second generation advant-
age’ (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters & Holdaway 2008). Yet, beginning as
early as 1997, there has been much debate about obvious, substantial stag-
nation among some second-generation Mexicans, one of the largest and
fastest-growing groups of immigrants to the US (Rumbaut 2005).
Advancing and stagnation need not be mutually exclusive. Among the
second generation in the US, the dominant current is upward mobility,
though there are also sub-groups who lag behind. Both trends are visible
and need to be addressed. The idea that people ‘assimilate’ into more mar-
ginalised sections of society is useful to understand that second-generation
integration may take different forms. Whereas through education and, to a
lesser extent, in the workplace, there is the potential for ‘formal accultura-
tion’ (Gans 1992), the second generation’s more informal experiences out-
side school or work could in fact prove more significant, especially if such
individuals have been left disillusioned by poor schooling or low-paid,
low-status employment. This is notably the case when immigrant parents,
due to poor language skills and limited knowledge of the host society, are
unable to ‘direct’ and assist the integration of their children – a process that
has been described as ‘dissonant acculturation’ (Portes 1997).
On a more optimistic note, the theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ also
suggests that socio-economic advancement does take place, but with the
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second generation upholding the traditions and values of the immigrant
community. This is juxtaposed with the classical model of integration into
‘white, middle-class America’, arguing that immigrant youth do not need
to sacrifice the cultural for the economic. Values and beliefs are no longer
relegated to a position below the material and financial rewards of socio-
economic advancement. Upward mobility through ethnic cohesion, as
Portes and Zhou (1993) observed in the Punjabi Sikh community of
Northern California, contests classical assimilation theory. Despite the
humble social origins of many Punjabi immigrants, and in the face of overt
racial discrimination by local white residents, theirs is mostly a story of
economic success. The Punjabi second generation respected parental and
community values, and did not adopt, as some parents feared, any form of
‘oppositional culture’ that would have adversely affected their education
(Gibson 1989).
Parents resisting the ‘Americanisation’ of their young children, a stance
that segmented assimilation theory has shown to be one possible path for
upward mobility among Asian groups, may result in ‘classical assimilation’
(in the sense of ‘becoming successful’ in the American society), once the
youngsters reach adulthood and access the middle class. Tracing longer
life-courses and into adult life, rather than focusing on only a particular
part of the trajectory, could help scholars soften some claims of segmented
assimilation theory.
Further explanations of differences in outcomes for various ethnic
groups are found in the dynamic interplay between structure, culture (of
which ethnicity is a significant part) and personal agency. This is particu-
larly apparent at the local level. One locality compared to another may
well display highly differing patterns of second-generation integration for a
variety of reasons: school quality and funding, availability of post-educa-
tional opportunities, the incidence of crime, level and nature of familial
and community support networks, degree of ethnic cohesion, local politics
and the role of local stakeholders. All these variables potentially affect
how younger residents in a particular area develop and adapt their personal
aspirations and future expectations.
Zhou (2005), for example, illustrates how the interplay of cultural and
structural factors at the local level can affect mobility patterns. She distin-
guishes between ethnic enclaves and underclass ghettos in the US, both of
which nonetheless display high levels of segregation by ethnicity, race and
social class, and suffer from poverty, poor housing and a scarcity of well-
paid jobs. Yet a distinction is found in ethnic enclaves, where the strength
of social ties and networks facilitates social organisation and is also condu-
cive to upward mobility; meanwhile, such connections appear to be much
weaker in ghettos. Zhou’s study of New York’s Chinatown portrays a com-
munity with a strong sense of its ethnic identity, formed and promoted
through the community’s various economic, civic and religious
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organisations. Some come in response to specific structural needs of the
residents (e.g. for employment, information and advice), while others en-
hance the community’s social ties and help establish social norms (e.g. that
education is to be highly valued). These ties – Putnam (1995, 2000) called
them linking ties – may cut across social class and provide access to re-
sources that improve opportunities for socio-economic mobility. In other
words, ethnicity interacts with structure to help explain how and why some
localities develop strong social ties and networks that make up social capi-
tal while other localities do not, despite a common lack of financial and/or
human capital. Important is the concept that one form of capital can lead
to the creation or enhancement of another, e.g. that social capital gets trans-
lated into the personal skills and abilities that make up human capital, es-
pecially when a community prioritises the education of future generations
(Coleman 1988).
Yet, social capital is by no means uniformly experienced in a positive
way. For some, a community’s close social ties and networks can pose lim-
itations on personal freedom, pressures to conform and an overbearing
sense of control over an individual’s future plans and ambitions. Dissent
from social norms can entail isolation from family and friends, not to men-
tion stigmatisation by other community members. For those who step out-
side the confines of a tightly knit community, social capital – or lack there-
of – is commensurate to the risk of social exclusion (see Portes 1988; Crul
& Vermeulen 2003b).
2.3 The relevance of American assimilation theories for how we
study the European second generation
How do theories discussed in the previous section translate into the
European context? Research on ethnic groups in Europe has repeatedly
drawn upon the theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ to help describe the
integration and mobility patterns of the European second generation (Crul
& Vermeulen 2003a; Heckmann, Lederer & Worbs 2001; Penn & Lambert
2009). The focus has particularly been on the theory’s two alternative
‘modes of incorporation’: downward assimilation and upward mobility
through ethnic cohesion. In some ways, this reflects the growing disparity
between, on the one hand, immigrant youth who are performing well and,
on the other, the relatively high numbers of low-educated immigrants in
unstable employment conditions. Over-representation in lower levels of
education and higher drop-out rates appear to be a characteristic of the
Turkish and Moroccan second generations in Europe, although those fig-
ures do often conceal that a majority of them is doing well in both school
and transition to work. Ethnic minority groups in Europe, in general, dis-
proportionately reside in more deprived areas, where schools are more
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likely to have fewer resources, more disciplinary issues and a quicker staff
turnover. This echoes some of the notions in the downward mobility var-
iant of segmented assimilation theory. Residential areas in European cities,
however, cannot, be compared in scale nor in terms of their social prob-
lems with US ghettos, where the potential for downward assimilation is
seen as greatest (Portes & Zhou 1993).1
The American concept of downward assimilation is too striking in its
pessimism and too definitive in its claim that this is a permanent feature of
certain immigrant communities. Like second-generation Moroccans or
Turks, even those who are considered as doing less well than children of
other ethnic groups are still upwardly mobile compared to their parents.
Furthermore, the data show that it is not simply a case of one ethnic group
outperforming another. There are also signs of polarisation within ethnic
groups that need to be explained. Indeed, an important critique on the
theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ is that it fails to pay sufficient attention
to internal differences within ethnic groups (Crul & Vermeulen 2003b).
The American theoretical debate about the integration of the second gen-
eration, moreover, seems to have had a persistent blind spot for the impor-
tance of the national context in which the second generation is trying to
move forward. Its emphasis has been on comparing different ethnic groups
in the same national context (Portes & Rumbaut 1996; for some of the
most important studies, see Kasinitz et al. 2008; Portes & Rumbaut 2001).
There have been relatively few studies in which the integration of
American children of immigrants is compared with the integration of chil-
dren of immigrants in other countries (exceptions are the studies of Faist
1995; Alba 2005; Mollenkopf 2000). As Reitz (2002) argues for from a
Canadian perspective, North American researchers must pay more attention
to the national context in which immigrants and their children live and
work.
The significance of the national context for integration pathways has re-
ceived more attention in Europe (Crul & Vermeulen 2003a; Doomernik
1998; Eldering & Kloprogge 1989; Fase 1994; Heckmann et al. 2001;
Mahnig 1998). Research in Europe is easily more cross-national, given the
proximity of many countries, which, although economically linked, are
nonetheless structured very differently. In the European context, it is there-
fore more obvious to look at the effects of these differences (which, how-
ever, does not mean that most research in Europe would be comparative
across countries). One of the most important European contributions to the
international theoretical debate on integration has been to bring in the na-
tional context as a crucial factor for integration.
A transatlantic comparison has triggered questions about the US-centered-
ness of the American theoretical frameworks (Crul & Holdaway 2009; Crul
& Schneider 2010). Are differences in outcomes for the various ethnic
groups in the US not partly a reflection of American institutional arrange-
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ments in school and labour markets or the specific characteristics of main
ethnic groups in the US? If a group lives in a poor neighbourhood in a large
American city with low-quality public schools (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly &
Haller 2009: 1081; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco & Todorova 2008: 88-
145), its children will have few chances to enter university, let alone a presti-
gious school. Extreme differences in the quality of schools are a characteris-
tic feature of American institutional arrangements in education (Crul &
Holdaway 2009). To a significant extent, the empirical results in US studies
reflect the specific American approach of integrating children into educa-
tional institutions. These observations should caution us against transferring
American assimilation theory to other national contexts. Even if in other
countries we find similar segmented outcomes, the mechanisms and institu-
tional settings behind them will most probably be very different than those
described by segmented assimilation theory. The challenge for European re-
searchers is to formulate a theoretical framework that better reflects the
Continent’s institutional realities, its particular migrant groups and their
characteristics. In short, needed is a theory that also takes into consideration
the importance of the specific national (and, for that matter, local) integra-
tion contexts.
A similar argument about the US-centeredness of American assimilation
theories can be made for the influence of national discourses on the formu-
lated ideals of assimilation in both the public and the academic debate.
Implicitly (or even explicitly) formulated ‘ideals of integration or assimila-
tion’ differ greatly across countries. We should be aware that in the US de-
bate, the notion of ‘assimilation’, i.e. becoming similar to the ‘mainstream
population’, is built on the necessity of a country formed by immigrant
groups of many origins to create common denominators and identifiers. In
Scandinavia, by contrast, the tradition of a strong welfare state and the
ideal of overcoming inequalities motivate the main end goals of integra-
tion. In France, the republican model, with its relatively radical egalitarian
view of citizenship, poses yet another normative integration goal. A good
example of how this works in practice is found in religion. While strong
particularistic ethnic and religious institutions are often considered an im-
portant stepping stone for assimilation in the US, France presents the most
dramatic case for contrast, with religion being largely looked at with great
scepticism (Foner & Alba 2008). This also has implications for how assim-
ilation indicators are chosen and how they are judged.
2.4 A theoretical framework for studying the European second
generation
The theoretical framework we lay out in this section was primarily devel-
oped while working with the TIES data. On the one hand, it looks at the
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second generation as active agents of change in cities. On the other hand,
it investigates the importance of integration contexts and how they help or
obstruct the second generation in claiming their place and position in cities.
We formulate our theoretical notions partly in contradistinction to some
premises of the aforementioned American assimilation theories.
An established group in the city
American assimilation theories are mostly based on research on the broad
category of children of immigrants. In fact, in the US, this category usually
includes the native-born children of immigrants as well as those who arrive
together with their parents (i.e. the so-called ‘in-between’ or ‘1.5’ genera-
tion).2 The term ‘second generation’, in the strict demographic sense, only
refers to those born in the country of immigration, and we believe that it is
important to clearly distinguish these two groups. Second and in-between
generations differ radically in at least one central aspect: the second gener-
ation is born into the society of immigration and, unlike their parents and
children of the in-between generation, they have no migration experience.
They do not need to adapt to a society that is new to them. In both the US
and Europe, they are also overwhelmingly citizens of their country of resi-
dence. As Schinkel (2007) points out, for the second generation there is no
such place as ‘outside’ of society.
This is an important point for the theoretical debate. If the second gener-
ation does not need to integrate or assimilate into society, the opposition
commonly established between ‘the society’ (also referred to as ‘the na-
tives’, the ‘autochthonous’ population and ‘residents’) versus immigrants
as ‘newcomers’ does not apply to the second generation. We are not deal-
ing with clearly defined groups of insiders versus outsiders (cf. Glick-
Schiller & Wimmer 2002).3 Second-generation youngsters are members of
the society from the day they are born. As such, we can look at the second
generation as being part of, or participating in, a plurality of social organi-
sations (Luhmann 1989) – for example, their families, neighbourhoods,
schools, peer groups, work units or organised free time and leisure activ-
ities (sports clubs, etc.). Following the work of Zhou (2005), we propose
that the integration of the second generation should be studied in the local
context of schools, neighbourhoods and workplaces.
Pursuing this line of inquiry often radically changes our perspective on
integration. As our surveys revealed, young people from the second gener-
ation are frequently the most established group in the neighbourhoods of
Europe’s large cities today. The TIES data predominantly show biographi-
cal continuity – many were born, grew up and still live in the same city. In
contrast, many of our respondents of native-born parents had moved from
other parts of the country to the major cities in order to study or work. As
a result, upon analysing attachment at the neighbourhood level, we
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generally find a stronger involvement among the second generation than
among peers with native-born parents (see chapter 8 in this volume). This
raises new questions about participation and belonging from a societal per-
spective. A student of native-born parents who moves into a cheap and eth-
nically diverse working-class city neighbourhood will still need some
adapting to this new environment – especially if coming from a small town
or the countryside, environments usually much less diverse in many ways.
This brings us to our second point. All young people, be they children
of immigrants or native-born parents, need to find their place in the social
organisations crucial for ‘survival’ in society (see e.g. Bommes 2005;
Schinkel 2007: 130ff). In larger European and American cities, this in-
cludes the need to cope with an environment that is increasingly multi-
ethnic and ‘super-diverse’ (Vertovec 2006). And in some areas (e.g. certain
neighbourhoods or school or working environments), this can prove more
difficult for children of native-born parents than for the second generation.
The importance of the ethnic group as an analytical category
Segmented assimilation theory is strongly built around differences in social
and cultural capital between ethnic groups. Although critiquing the concept
of the ‘ethnos’ as a static homogeneous unit, coming from anthropology
(Barth 1969; Cohen 1994) is now widespread in the social sciences, much
migration research still implicitly assumes that the actions and views of mi-
grants and their children are all motivated by the migration experience and/
or their ‘ethnic heritage’.4 Again, looking particularly at the second genera-
tion, we think that this is debatable. To illustrate our point, here is a profile
from the case study of Naima.
Naima is a young unmarried woman of Moroccan descent who
studies Spanish and French linguistics in Amsterdam. The young
woman speaks Dutch with a slight Amsterdam accent, where she
was born and raised. Moroccan Arabic is her mother tongue; with
both parents originally from the north of Morocco, the language
spoken at home was always Moroccan. Especially when talking on
her mobile phone with Moroccan friends and family, she frequently
switches to Arabic – not least because it also allows for more pri-
vacy in public situations. Naima still lives with her parents in the
same neighbourhood where she grew up – partly because it allows
her to save money on rent, but also because she feels comfortable
in the area. In the FIFA World Cup 2006, her favourite football
team was the Netherlands, but if Morocco had qualified, her loyalty
would, as she made clear, have been with the Moroccan team.
Naima is ‘well integrated’ in a variety of different social organisa-
tions, for example, her family, the neighbourhood, the university
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and a mentor project where she works to help out disadvantaged
children in school. Other domains could be added, for example, the
secondary school where she is currently doing an internship. She
wears a headscarf and is engaged to a first-generation Moroccan
man who graduated from university in Morocco.
Naima opposes the idea that she is first and foremost seen as Moroccan
simply because she is the child of immigrant parents. Many, if not most, of
her attitudes and actions are not based on this fact. In many ways, she re-
sembles a ‘typical’ Dutch university student. The most important factors
driving the majority of her actions are her age, her generation, her gender
and a high level of education. In many other aspects, she certainly is also
‘Moroccan’, though this category becomes problematic when used non-
specifically as a sort of explanatory passepartout.
Naima belongs to the growing group of highly educated individuals
within the Moroccan community in the Netherlands. Thanks in part to their
entrance into professional careers, the second generation is embracing new
roles and identities. Naima’s aspiration to become a secondary school
teacher is a strong identifier.
From the perspective of culture and identification, our case study offers
a much more ambiguous picture. Naima is a native speaker in Dutch and
Arabic, which both serve as important, ever-present means of communica-
tion in her daily life. She strongly identifies as Moroccan yet, without
apparent contradictions, feels Dutch as well. Now, again we ask: what does
this mean for her identification as a young woman living in the Nether-
lands? Dominant mainstream perceptions and public discourses in most
Western countries implicitly or explicitly operate with normative settings
here: it is clearly preferred to be well-educated and not unemployed, to
wear no headscarf, to have ‘native’ friends and to not marry someone from
Morocco. But to conclude that Naima’s attitudes and actions are primarily
motivated by her ethnic background is premature. She also strongly identi-
fies as an emancipated woman who, out of her own volition, wears a head-
scarf for religious reasons. Other meaningful social and cultural categories,
such as youth, political and bohemian cultures, can also be important for
the second generation. While the first generation’s origin is an almost all-
encompassing identity (both ascribed and prescribed), this is not true for
most of the second generation.
The idea of ‘super-diversity’, presented by Vertovec (2006), describes
the growing diversification within and among city dwellers. We would add
that super-diversity is also becoming visible across ethnic lines, sometimes
challenging existing ethnic hierarchies – for instance, second-generation
Turkish doctors in Amsterdam hospitals servicing elderly patients who
come from lower- or middle-class non-migrant families.
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Migration research chooses survey respondents because they belong
demographically to a certain ‘group’, our intention being to compare them
to groups reflecting other demographic characteristics. This is also one of
the ways we look at the TIES survey data. However, we are aware that
any definition of a ‘group’ merely operates as a departure point for analy-
sis. To explain differences with this a piori definition is, in a worst case,
tautological (see e.g. Latour 1999: 71). Moreover, taking the ‘group’ hy-
pothesis simultaneously as explanans and explanandum tends to obscure
the fact that the degree of variation within a ‘group’ (as much as other lines
of differentiation, for instance, education level and gender) may be more
relevant.
‘Remaking the mainstream’
Contemporary cities are subject to a gigantic turnover of the population.
Statistically, in many of them, almost the entire population is replaced
within less than one generation.5 While most of Europe’s cities have been
multi-ethnic for a long time – or even since their foundations as modern
cities – it is a relatively new phenomenon we see in which the formerly
clearly defined ethnic majority group is becoming a minority group, like
other ethnic groups. In many European cities, the majority of the popula-
tion under age twelve is of immigrant origin. The authors of the Immigrant
Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) study point out
that non-Hispanic whites still represent a sizable number (although only
when taking all European groups together), though this group has actually
become just one of the many ethnic minority categories in the city. This
new situation challenges standard notions of ‘mainstream’ and ‘majority’.
That they are losing their numeric majority position in the younger co-
horts of larger cities does not mean that the ‘majority group’ will necessa-
rily also lose its status as the most dominant in social and economic terms.
Nonetheless, Alba (2009) shows how, in the long run, the demographic de-
velopment of cities does also challenge its ‘ethnic hierarchy’. Alba sug-
gests that, in the future, ‘the mainstream’, simply for demographic reasons,
will incorporate non-white groups as well. From our point of view, a new
vocabulary is needed to describe this new diverse urban reality.
The highly educated second generation are often found working in city
administration, education and social work. These jobs give them, to some
extent, the chance to influence city policies and politics (Crul, Pazstor &
Lelie 2008). These individuals therefore definitely play an important role
in ‘remaking the mainstream’. Their group size, however, differs greatly
across cities and countries as much in Europe as in the US.
American assimilation theories start with the assumption that the second
generation is integrating into certain segments of society or still needs to
integrate into the mainstream. The term ‘segmented’ explicitly refers to
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separate sections in society for immigrant groups and their children, mean-
ing either a marginal ethnic underclass position or a self-chosen protective
ethnic community life separate from the mainstream. These differing path-
ways are the result of each ethnic group’s unique characteristics and re-
spective reception context.
But the second generation in Europe is living in a neither segmented nor
assimilated reality. Their reality is the super-diversity of big and increas-
ingly also smaller cities. They can claim different positions depending on
specific contexts and circumstances. The big city reality, for instance,
makes it possible to claim a more emancipated and self-determined posi-
tion for highly educated second-generation women. This comes up against
their largely conservative communities whose mores run counter to female
self-identities as students and working women. At the same time, the sec-
ond generation also feels strong enough to claim a religious identity even
in the face of a largely secular majority population, thus showing how
Islamic life in all its diversity has also become an established part of the
big cities. This new approach to integration is rooted in the second genera-
tion’s status as an established group claiming its own position in the city
and in a world where the majority group is losing its numeric dominance
and the capacity to impose assimilative pressure on members of other eth-
nic groups. It is also rooted in the fact that parents’ grip on the second gen-
eration is especially weak among its successful members; thanks to welfare
state arrangements, these young people can move up on the social ladder
and through the educational system (including higher education!) almost
without financial support of the parents. It is mostly the unsuccessful group
that depends on their own family and ethnic community.
2.5 Comparative integration context theory: Theoretical and
methodological implications
We have thus far discussed the second generation as active agents of
change in cities. But as this volume shows, the second generation does not
claim its participation and belonging in all cities in the same way. As such,
we find it useful to look at integration contexts and their status as either
helping or hindering individuals from taking up certain positions. We argue
that participation and belonging of the second generation in European
cities is highly dependent on the integration context.
Integration contexts are affected by differing institutional arrangements
in education, the labour market, housing, religion and legislation. Mean-
while, the social and political contexts are especially important for social
and cultural participation and belonging. Part and parcel of the integration
context is the diversity of today’s European cities, as discussed in the pre-
vious section. Young people from all ethnic groups – including those we
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formerly considered the ‘majority group’ – need to integrate into a diverse
and super-diverse city youth population with various familial and biograph-
ical backgrounds and longer or shorter histories of living in the city.
We seek to address the importance of local and national contexts in
which young persons – whether immigrants themselves, members of the
second generation or of native-born parents – must find a place and posi-
tion. This is no new topic: the US theories deal extensively with context,
for example, with different modes of incorporation (e.g. Portes et al. 2009)
and neighbourhoods (e.g. Kasinitz et al. 2008: 150-158). In general, na-
tional school systems and access conditions to the labour market are also
analysed for their differentiating effects on children across ethnic groups
and social classes, though not as part of the system’s idiosyncrasy – some-
thing that generally comes to the fore only in comparisons across national
school or labour market systems.
Taking the institutional arrangements of a country for granted or as a
given can seriously affect the way we perceive problems of participation
and belonging among the second generation. Comparing different ethnic
groups in the same local or national contexts automatically sets the focus
on the immigrant groups themselves: why do some underperform as com-
pared to the ‘native’ group, but others do not? The seemingly most logical
explanation is culture and class. While we are not saying that these explan-
ations are unimportant – far from it – they tell us only part of the story.
In his book Warmth of the Welcome, Reitz (1998) underscores the effect
of different institutional settings for immigrants in Canada, Australia and
the US. We take the liberty of bringing Reitz’s argument a step further in
the European context, where institutional arrangements are much more di-
verse than in Reitz’s three countries. For the sake of illustration, we con-
centrate on one key institution: education. As an example, we can trace
second-generation Turks’ predominantly disadvantaged educational situa-
tion in Germany to their low socio-economic background – to a significant
degree though not fully. The remainder is then usually attributed to cultural
differences. But if we compare second-generation Turks across several
European countries, as we do in chapter 5 of this volume, we see that they
are doing much better in other countries than they are in Germany.
Differences in outcomes across countries also remain when we include the
analysis controls for parental education, as shown in the same chapter.
Variation between countries can be well explained by the different edu-
cational institutional arrangements. As demonstrated in this volume, influ-
ential factors include: school starting age, age of first track selection, the
upward permeability within secondary education and the existence of a
long or indirect route to higher education through the vocational column.
In Germany, compulsory school starts at age six – later than most
European countries – and, in most regions, children are selected into the
academic or vocational column at age ten, after only four years of joint
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learning in primary school. In countries like the Netherlands, this selection
occurs after eight years and, even when selected into the lower qualifying
tracks, many students still manage to reach higher education through the
vocational column (albeit at the cost of three extra years of education). In
Germany, a vocational route to higher education also exists, but it is not
seen – or, for that matter, used – as an alternative to the same extent.
These two aspects of the institutional arrangements in German education
thus already determine, to a large degree, the low educational position of
second-generation Turks in Germany.
We should be aware that institutional contexts differ greatly from coun-
try to country in Europe (or even from city to city in a given country),
even though the normative debate is similar. Consider, for example, the
comparable ideas found in Germany and France when it comes to learning
the majority language as a second language at an early age. Yet, the gener-
al institutional arrangements for second language learning are very differ-
ent, with obvious implications for outcomes in school. This holds true the
other way round: there is still a lot of variation between national integra-
tion policies and, on another level, government rhetoric across countries,
ranging from multiculturalism to right-wing populist and assimilative stan-
ces. However, on the city level, we frequently observe rhetoric-independ-
ent, pragmatic ways in which state agencies and societal institutions assess
the specific necessities of dealing with immigrants and their children, as
well as with the cultural diversity of their clientele (Heckmann et al. 2001;
Vermeulen 1997; Vermeulen & Stotijn 2009). For this reason, we advocate
the assessment of actual practice alongside the study of public discourse
and national integration policies.
Understanding participation in key institutions in different European
cities requires two principal perspectives. At the societal level, it means
looking at the national and local institutional arrangements that facilitate or
hamper participation and access, thus reducing or reproducing inequality.
‘Failed participation’ can thus be conceived as an indicator of obstacles to
access and participation, for example, the late starting age of compulsory
schooling, which has a disproportionately negative effect on children of
immigrants. Here, we turn the common academic and policy approach to
‘integration’ on its head. The question is not why individuals fail to partici-
pate, but why institutions fail to be inclusive.
A second level looks at the agency of individuals and groups, actively
expanding options for themselves and making choices, challenging given
opportunities and structural configurations. For example, in the German
half-day primary school system, it is expected for parents to actively help
their children with homework. In the complex Dutch school system, infor-
mation about the school system is of crucial importance. Across contexts,
we thus see subjective and objective options for individuals to gain access
and to claim participation, depending on different individual and group
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resources (i.e. economic, social and cultural capital). Comparative integra-
tion context theory allows us to study both perspectives, scrutinising the
actual practices of both institutions and individuals or groups.
The context of social and political discourse
Independent from its impact on policies and institutional practices, govern-
ment rhetoric also influences political and social climates. This directly af-
fects immigrants’ and their children’s quest for a place and position in the
immigration society. On one hand, integration practices are shaped and
pre-structured by specific institutional contexts, including legal aspects
(e.g. citizenship regimes and policies) and institutional arrangements (e.g.
in education and the labour market). On the other hand, integration practi-
ces are shaped by rules and ‘habits’ – in the sense of Bourdieu’s habitus –
by establishing and taking care of social relations and social interaction in
a given societal setting (Bourdieu 1977, 1984).
Relevant to this, we distinguish three basic discursive contexts: political
discourse; the social discourse of everyday communication and interaction;
and media discourse. The political climate and implicit or explicit stereo-
types and hierarchies of groups have a constant effect on ‘feelings of be-
longing’. In addition, institutional arrangements can have discursive qual-
ities. Citizenship regimes, for example, are frequently reflected in everyday
discourses on the national belonging of groups and individuals (Schneider
2007). The term ‘belonging’ entails the possibility of simultaneousness,
different forms of belonging in different contexts and possible changes
over time. ‘Belonging’ comprises both the individual and institutional lev-
el: from an individual perspective, the challenge is to find a widely unques-
tioned place and position. Belonging in the sense of ‘functional identities’
(see e.g. Devereux 1978: 137ff) means the ability to develop social rela-
tions along ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ties (Granovetter 1973) in many different
social contexts. From an institutional perspective, the second generation is
likely to experience boundaries that are ‘brightened or blurred’ (Alba
2005) by institutional arrangements, public and social discourses and inclu-
sionary or exclusionary attitudes of groups or individuals. ‘Group factors’
can be part of the boundary-making process, too, especially when there is
a cultural and/or group dynamic promoting or preventing belonging and
participation. Group factors are, however, never static or fixed: no group in
any context is immune to external influences. The effects of these influen-
ces are generally most noticeable in the second generation (see e.g. Alba &
Nee 2003: 215).
The discursive context represents a complex field, whereby a constant
tension is found between the second generation’s personal feelings of be-
longing and the political, media and social representations of their position
in society. The wider dominant discursive context in most European
32 SCHNEIDER & CRUL
countries presents a serious challenge here because it overemphasises eth-
nic background as the main signifier in all societal contexts. Depending on
the degree to which belonging of second-generation groups to the local or
national community is discursively called into question, ambiguity and hy-
bridity seem adequate responses within the heterogeneity of European
cities. Although ‘national identity’ is increasingly embraced and claimed
by the second generation, this label is therefore problematic. At the same
time, we see how local identity can be a sort of substitute for national iden-
tity. Differences between national and local senses of belonging underscore
the ‘discursive legitimacy’ of specific labels. In all TIES survey cities, lo-
cal belonging is more easily self-ascribed than national belonging for the
second generation; this is not the case for the comparison group.
In sum, we argue that participation and belonging in diverse European
cities greatly depends on differences in integration contexts, including in-
stitutional arrangements (in education, the labour market, housing, religion,
legislation), and differences in the social and political context.
Comparative integration context theory: Methodology
Our methodological starting point is to see how people deal, in practice,
with the challenges of finding a place and position in this new diverse ur-
ban reality. Here, we borrow from Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’, namely,
the importance of studying concrete practices in societal fields by individu-
als, groups and institutions in different contexts and over time. So, instead
of trying to fit the empirical complexities into pre-formulated models, we
build our insights from the actual, real-life practices and options of indi-
viduals and groups.
In most research, ‘integration’ is measured only by the present state of
things or a final outcome in a specific domain. Examples include the high-
est education level diploma or a currently held job. This approach makes it
difficult to link outcomes with institutional arrangements. After all, present
states and final outcomes are the results of underlying processes over time.
Rather, an analytical emphasis on process transforms the endpoint’s either/
or distinction between ‘success’ and ‘failure’ into a more nuanced se-
quence of ups and downs. It uncovers in-between pathways, bifurcating at
specific points during education or labour market careers. For instance, the
educational results of second-generation Turks in the Netherlands are aver-
age, as compared to other countries. A ‘classical’ theoretical conclusion
would say that the Dutch school system is thus not very selective.
However, looking at school trajectories reveals that the Netherlands’ edu-
cational system is, in fact, one of the most selective systems, streaming pu-
pils into vocational versus academic tracks as early as age twelve and then
offering some repair for the early selection with the long route through the
vocational column. Judging only end results would obscure the stringent
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selection processes in the transition from primary to secondary education.
Only by bringing in the process it is possible to link outcomes at different
school career stages to institutional arrangements, such as early selection
and the possibility to rise from lower to middle vocational education and
on to higher education. Process is the crucial methodological link to opera-
tionalise our theoretical assumptions.
2.6 Final remarks
As prior outlined, the influential segmented assimilation model is largely
designed on the differences in educational outcomes of in-between and sec-
ond-generation youngsters across different ethnic groups. This volume fur-
thers a belief that education is the key to outcomes in the second genera-
tion overall. The TIES study enhances this picture by showing how differ-
ences in educational outcomes within the same ethnic group across
countries are also vast. While ethnic group characteristics form the most
pivotal axis in the segmented assimilation model, the ethnic group is not
the main driving force in our study. Rather, it is the integration context and
its interplay with resources in the ethnic community. For instance, school
systems offer different windows of opportunities at various stages for pa-
rents to support their children’s educational careers. But the opportunities
offered in schools for lower-class children with an immigrant background
are very different from each other, and the type of involvement that parents
are asked for is crucial in determining outcomes.
Institutional arrangements in education, the labour market, housing and
the law are all important in shaping the integration pathways. Parents di-
rectly affect their children’s integration, but the effect is also negotiated in
the interplay between what institutions demand of parents and what parents
are able to do. Social and political discourse at the national level plays an
important role, but so does what is happening at the city level where sec-
ond-generation youth interact with other ethnic groups. The ethnic com-
munity plays a role insofar as what resources it can provide to individuals
and how this enables or restricts their behaviour. The model combines what
Reitz (2002) has called the ‘importance of host societal institutions’ and
what Zhou (2005) has observed about the local-level interplay between
communities, opportunity structure and individual agency.
The chapters in this volume show ample proof for the importance of the
integration context through institutional arrangements in all analysed
domains. This applies to education, the labour market and the legal statuses
of second-generation respondents, but also to conditions for family forma-
tion, religiosity and the formation of identity. Institutional arrangements in
all fields have a huge impact, often dwarfing differences based on group
characteristics – even between the children of immigrants and their peers of
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native parentage. For this reason, it is of particular importance to look for
relevant lines of differentiation across and within groups of respondents.
Notes
1 This pessimistic outlook for people residing in ‘ghettos’ has been the source of some
recent criticism. Waldinger, Lim and Cort (2007) find that despite the otherwise
gloomy predictions, second-generation Mexicans are now integrating into ‘working-
class’ America – another form of non-downward second-generation integration.
2 See, for instance, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) and
Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) study.
3 Another problem with the rather static notion of insiders and outsiders is its presup-
position that ‘the people’, ‘the nation’ and ‘the state’ would all fall within the same
boundaries. It neglects, as theorists of transnationalism have pointed out, the rela-
tionships and constant movements of individuals across nation-state borders
(Waters & Levitt 2002).
4 Practically all the comparative research on various immigrant groups in one national
or local context takes the ‘group hypothesis’ more or less for granted. Admittedly,
this is difficult to avoid because quantitative work, in particular, must create analyti-
cal units in order to make comparisons. We should nevertheless be aware that these
units, in any case, are analytical artefacts, whose relation to reality must be well
considered.
5 Accessible through the population registers in many municipalities, annually regis-
tered moves to and from a city provide sufficient information in this regard. The
phenomenon has a similar magnitude in the US and is constantly changing the
‘ethnic landscape’ in a similar way.
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3 Research methodology
George Groenewold and Laurence Lessard-Phillips
3.1 Introduction
Mainly under ‘guest worker’ policies, Turkish, Moroccan and former
Yugoslavian immigrants in the 1960s began to constitute sizeable diasporic
communities in many European cities. They formed families and had chil-
dren born in the country of immigration. The so-called second generation
has now come of age and is well represented among adolescents and
young adults in the European Union.
The TIES project’s methodological objective was to obtain statistically
representative information on integration-related topics from second-gener-
ation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians in fifteen cities:
Amsterdam, Rotterdam (the Netherlands); Antwerp, Brussels (Belgium);
Paris, Strasbourg (France); Barcelona, Madrid (Spain); Basel, Zurich
(Switzerland); Linz, Vienna (Austria); Berlin, Frankfurt (Germany); and
Stockholm (Sweden). Our envisioned strategy was to survey the second
generation using probability sampling, as this provides a theoretical basis
from which to infer objectively to the entire populations of second-genera-
tion Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavians in the selected cities. This
also meant facing constraints similarly encountered when sampling other
minority populations (cf. Groenewold & Bilsborrow 2008). These include:
– Lack of readily available sampling frames from which to sample mem-
bers of minority groups, including the second generation;
– Tendency of minority groups to concentrate in particular regions and
parts of cities;
– Scarcity of members of minority groups in the general population.
This chapter discusses the TIES research methodology. The following sec-
tions address the envisioned model sampling strategy, and sampling frame
availability and constraints for each participating country and city. We then
present summaries of country-specific sampling designs and strategies. Our
conclusion entails a discussion about problems encountered in the sam-
pling of the second generation, our adopted solutions and repercussions for
the statistical representativity of the collected data.
3.2 Model sampling strategy
The IMES-NIDI project coordination team began by agreeing on a straight-
forward general sampling strategy to be presented to the collaborators. The
individual national institutes would then adapt the model to fit local condi-
tions in terms of available sampling frames (see section 3.3) and financial
constraints. The first step was to formulate eligibility criteria. We decided
to set the age range for all study groups at eighteen to 35, while group
membership was to be determined by birth in the survey country to at least
one parent who was born in the country of ethnic origin (Turkey, Morocco
or former Yugoslavia). Also sampled in each city would be a comparison
group comprising members in the same age range who were born in the
survey country and whose both parents were born in the survey country.
For instance, the group of Turkish respondents included children of
Kurdish immigrants born in Turkey. Conversely, the comparison group in-
cluded children whose parents were born in the survey country, but whose
grandparents were born abroad, e.g. in a survey country’s former colony.
The second step was to formulate a general sampling strategy. In each
city, members of one or two second-generation immigrant groups and of a
comparison group were to be randomly sampled from a suitable sampling
frame and interviewed. The target sample size of each group was set at
250 successful interviews. Within cities, respondents of all groups were to
be sampled from the same spatial context (e.g. neighbourhood) to ensure
parity across the broad social and economic characteristics of the context.
Technically speaking, respondents were to be selected in multiple steps, by
first sampling neighbourhoods with probabilities proportional to estimated
numbers of second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavian
residents and then sampling fixed numbers of respondents within sampled
neighbourhoods. This decision was made a priori to ensure that a sufficient
number of neighbourhoods be sampled in each city, in turn allowing for a
multi-level analysis of neighbourhood effects at a later stage. Depending
on whether the aim was for two or three study groups, the objective was
thus to successfully interview a total of 500 or 750 persons per city, amount-
ing to 1,000 or 1,500 respondents per country.
Setting equal target sample sizes for each study group implied that each
person would be given the same selection probability in the sample of re-
spondents. In real life, dealing with the general population, the situation
proves quite different: study groups differ in size, so selection probabilities
also differ. Because the actual population of potential comparison group
members in cities is generally much larger than that of the second genera-
tion, the chance of selecting a comparison group member from its reference
population is much slimmer than the chance of selecting a member of the
second generation. Furthermore, non-response rates between cities, neigh-
bourhoods and study groups are likely to differ, which has an ex post effect
40 GROENEWOLD & LESSARD-PHILLIPS
on selection probabilities. To deal with these two factors, so-called compen-
sation weights can be computed and used for all analyses. Such weights en-
sure that the selection probability of all respondents, irrespective of group
membership and spatial location, will be the same. One subsequent effect is
that the response of each interviewee is weighted to its proportionate repre-
sentation in the responding population. Another effect is that outcomes of
statistical significance tests are influenced (Cochran 1997; Kish 1965; Lee,
Forthhofer & Lorimor 1989; Purdon & Pickering 2001). The use of weights
is of particular importance for comparative analysis (ESS 2004, 2007) in-
volving respondents from different cities and countries.
To allow for the ex post calculation of compensation weights, country
teams and cooperating survey bureaus were given specific instructions.
They were asked to carefully detail procedures used when sampling study
group members in cities and neighbourhoods and to document who had
been home-visited, who refused to participate and which replacement re-
spondents were added during field-work. Country teams were asked to
adapt this model sampling strategy to reflect differences in local sampling
frames and interviewing conditions.
3.3 Sampling frames
Ideally, we expected up-to-date municipal population registers to be avail-
able and accessible to researchers in each city. We hoped such a register
would offer a database of all documented city residents’ personal records
consisting of: name, sex, current address, date of birth, birthplace, father’s
birthplace and mother’s birthplace. We found, however, that this optimal
situation – one that would permit a sampling of the second generation di-
rectly via register details – existed in only a couple survey countries (the
Netherlands, Sweden). In others (Belgium, Germany, Switzerland,
Austria), population registers were available though did not offer sufficient
access. This was either due to rules and regulations concerning privacy
(e.g. Belgium) or lacking enough details to unambiguously identify the
second generation, notably parents’ birth countries (Germany, Switzerland,
Austria). In France, it proved almost impossible to access or, for that mat-
ter, identify suitable sampling frames. Keeping records of a person’s ethnic
affiliation is subject to strict rules of privacy and even contradicts the state
philosophy that all legal residents are considered first and foremost French.
A similar situation exists in Spain, where municipal records do not permit
the identification of persons belonging to the second generation.
Similarly, other potential sampling frames, such as telephone directories,
electricity company customer files and national labour force surveys
(LFS), do not offer sufficient and/or relevant details permitting identifica-
tion of the second generation (Klevmarken, Swensson & Husselius 2005).
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Telephone directories only reflect a select part of the population; certain
groups are often underrepresented due to some persons exclusively owning
a mobile telephone with an unlisted number, not owning a telephone what-
soever or not consenting to having a listed number. Although large-scale
nationally representative panel surveys such as the EC/ESF European
Social Survey (ESS) and EC/UNECA’s Gender and Generation Project
(GGP) permit identification of the second generation, the actual numbers
of second-generation respondents is too small for meaningful statistical
analysis.
The TIES research teams in Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland
decided to join forces, collectively developing a strategy in which existing
registers and/or directories (see section 3.4 for details per country) served
as the basis for onomastic analysis on persons’ forenames and surnames.
These lists of names were thus used to determine persons’ probable ethnic
origin and subsequently derive city- and ethnic group-specific sampling
frames. The quality of the frames was then examined by taking name sam-
ples from the list and screening the persons through a short interview.
This strategy proved to have highly accurate results for Turkish fore-
names and surnames, though less so for Yugoslavian-sounding names.
Meanwhile, in France it was inappropriate for establishing a sampling
frame for the Moroccan second generation because this group could not be
singled out from the similarly named Tunisians and Algerians who live in
their communities; this study group was therefore excluded. We acknowl-
edge that the onomastic approach has some shortcomings. For instance, it
remains uncertain which percentage of the entire second-generation Turks,
Moroccans and former Yugoslavians are actually covered in such syntheti-
cally derived lists of names and address. Another problem is that Turkish
and Moroccan women who marry a person from another ethnic group and
take on his surname may go undetected (Humpert & Schneiderheinze
2009).
3.4 Country-specific sample designs and implementation
Between April 2006 and December 2008, the TIES teams developed and
implemented country-specific sampling strategies. They led to 6,145 suc-
cessful interviews with second-generation respondents and 3,626 compari-
son group respondents – a total of 9,771. The ensuing section describes the
principal characteristics of country-specific surveys and sampling strat-
egies. Main survey statistics are presented in table 3.1. Our data presenta-
tion is based on the sequence in which the surveys were designed and im-
plemented: first in the Netherlands and somewhat later in Belgium,
Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France and Spain.
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The Netherlands
For the Netherlands, second-generation Turks and Moroccans and members
of a native comparison group were sampled in Amsterdam and Rotterdam.
Comparison group members were sampled in the same neighbourhoods as
the second-generation groups. Minimum total effective sample size was set
at 1,500 persons. Independent random samples of equal size were taken in
cities (750) and in study groups (250). The municipal population registers
served as sampling frames because these personal records comprise infor-
mation permitting the identification and classification of residents accord-
ing to age, sex, birthplace and parental birthplaces (BPR 2006).
What follows is a summary of the sampling method. As a first step, in
each city, neighbourhoods were sampled with probabilities proportional to
the sum of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan neighbourhood resi-
dents. To determine how many neighbourhoods were to be sampled, we
decided a priori to set cluster size to 30 respondents (3 groups x 10
persons). This number was a compromise between our desire to secure a
fair number of respondents from each study group in the neighbourhoods
and to secure a sufficient number of neighbourhoods for sampling.
Neighbourhood sampling was guided by the systematic selection method
(Kish 1965), whereby a neighbourhood could be sampled more than once,
depending on the number of second-generation Turkish and Moroccan resi-
dents. Effectively, cluster size was increased to a factor four (4 x 30 = 120
respondents) because research into non-response rates in comparable stud-
ies suggested that high non-response rates could be expected in the field
(e.g. Stoop 2005). Initially, 6,000 addresses (= 4 x 1,500) were thus
sampled from the municipal population registers. By the end of the field-
work, non-response among second-generation respondents appeared higher
than expected, so an additional 271 records were sampled from the regis-
ters. Of the total 6,271 addresses actually sampled from the registers,
4,999 proved valid. Discrepancy was mostly due to more than one eligible
person living at the same address or so much time having elapsed between
the sampling and the interview that the eligible person had moved. In the
former scenario, we selected the eldest eligible household member (Kish
1965).
Sample design weights were derived and corrected for differential non-
response rates across neighbourhoods and study groups. Furthermore, se-
lection bias was examined by comparing age, sex and marital status char-
acteristics of non-respondents with those of respondents. This was possible
because the personal records of all sampled persons (non-respondents and
respondents both) offer such information. Our finding was that non-re-
sponse bias seems slight in terms of the compared characteristics
(Groenewold 2008).
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Ultimately, 738 persons, a total slightly below our target, were success-
fully interviewed in 23 of Amsterdam’s 90 neighbourhoods. In 24 of
Rotterdam’s 77 neighbourhoods, 767 persons were successfully inter-
viewed, slightly above our target of 750. Overall, the response rates were
low: 30.1 per cent in Amsterdam and 29.2 per cent in Rotterdam (see table
3.1 for variation across study groups).
Belgium
In Belgium, second-generation Turks and Moroccans and members of a
comparison group were sampled in the same neighbourhoods. Our aimed
minimum effective sample size was set at 1,650 – that is, 900 successfully
interviewed respondents in Antwerp’s ten districts (3 groups x 300 re-
spondents) and 750 respondents in Brussels’ nineteen communes (3 groups
x 250 respondents). Like the Netherlands, Belgium maintains a national
population register. However, in 2005, a modification to privacy regula-
tions made the register effectively inaccessible to researchers.
As such, our objective was to derive a sample of respondents of compa-
rable ages and levels of education from all study groups, whereby the
probability of respondent selection would be proportional to the presence
of second-generation target groups in a particular neighbourhood. Because
the availability of sampling frames differed in Antwerp and Brussels,
somewhat variant sampling strategies had to be pursued in the two cities.
In the case of Antwerp, access was obtained from personal records in
the population registers of the city’s ten districts. Anticipating some non-re-
sponse, net target numbers of respondents for each target group were
scaled-up. The scaled-up target samples of second-generation Turks (667)
and Moroccans (668) were sampled with probabilities proportionate to
their distribution over the statistical sectors with each district, thus essen-
tially reflecting their actual geographical distribution over the city.
Allocation of the scaled-up target sample (701) of comparison group mem-
bers to districts and statistical sectors called for another tactic. In a first
step, the target sample was subdivided over the ten districts according to
the prevalence of combined totals of second-generation Turks and
Moroccans residing in districts. In a second step, district allocations were
allocated to statistical sectors according to the prevalence of second-gener-
ation Turks and Moroccans residing in these sectors. A main difference
from the designs for Amsterdam and Rotterdam is that the Dutch primary
sampling units (PSU) were neighbourhoods, while in Antwerp they were
statistical sectors sampled within each of the city’s ten districts.
A suitable sampling frame of names and addresses was absent in
Brussels, but information on numbers and spatial distribution of members
from the three study groups was available. The first step here was to devel-
op a sampling frame of Brussels’ street segments. In a second step, street
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segments were independently sampled for each second-generation study
group, with selection probabilities proportionate to the respective numbers
of second-generation members living in them. Sampling and interviewing
comparison group members was guided by the same philosophy as our re-
search in Antwerp. Street segments were sampled with selection probabil-
ities in proportion to the combined numbers of second-generation
Moroccans and Turks residing there. The research team gained access to a
listing of addresses from a commercial database supplier (who uses the in-
formation for direct marketing purposes) with information on residents
(age, nationality and name, from which we inferred whether the individual
might be of Turkish or Moroccan background). On the basis of this infor-
mation, we could identify the second generation and members of the com-
parison group as well as their addresses. Based on estimates of expected
non-response and misclassifications in addresses, the number of target ad-
dresses for interviewing was scaled-up for second-generation Turks (250 to
1,110), Moroccans (250 to 1,114) and comparison group members (250 to
952). The scaled-up number of respondents’ addresses was then sampled,
the eligibility of persons living there was screened and, if appropriate, they
were then interviewed. If more than one eligible person was living at the
same address, we selected the eldest eligible household member. Sampling
these respondents in the selected street segments was done by the simple
random sampling without replacement (SRSWOR) method. Due to the
field-work’s slow progress – a result of the mediocre quality of our avail-
able address list – we decided to switch to a semi-quota sampling ap-
proach. Now interviewers were allowed to search for the first eligible po-
tential respondent they could find in the same or adjacent street segment,
thus distorting the initial probability sampling strategy.
These distortions occurred in both Antwerp and Brussels, prompting a
decision not to derive probability weights (corrected for non-response rate
variation), but rather to resort to the computation and application of com-
pensatory weights. The weights were derived by comparing age and sex
distribution of the respondents in the three study groups to that of compa-
rable persons in Brussels and Antwerp, as covered by the Belgian censuses
in 1991 and 2001 (Swyngedouw, Phalet, Baysu, Vandezande & Fleisch-
mann 2008).
Sweden
Sweden’s study groups comprised second-generation Turks and members
of a native comparison group. Due to financial constraints, sampling goals
were set at successfully interviewing just 250 persons in each group who
live Stockholm County. The Swedish TIES team subcontracted sampling
issues and field-work to the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics
(Statistiska Centralbyrån, SCB). This cooperation proved advantageous in
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that the project gained direct access to one of the best-maintained popula-
tion registers (Wallgren & Wallgren 2007; Swedish Tax Agency 2007) for
sampling purposes and to teams of seasoned sampling experts and inter-
viewers. The Swedish population register comprises the name, address,
date of birth, sex, birthplace and parental birthplace of all Swedish citizens.
One disadvantage of twinning was that the project proposal had to be
screened and approved by various government agencies.
In the first sampling step, a subset of the population register database
was created by selecting records only of persons who, as of January 2007,
were between eighteen and 35 years old, were currently living in
Stockholm County, were born in Sweden and whose both parents were ei-
ther born in Turkey or in Sweden. In a second step, this subset database
was sorted according to parental country of birth in order to create two
strata. Stratum 1 thus comprised persons whose both parents were born in
Turkey, while stratum 2 comprised persons whose both parents were born
in Sweden. From each stratum, a simple random sample of 250 personal
records was drawn and the persons were subsequently home-visited and in-
terviewed. Thus, unlike the sampling strategy in other countries (see sec-
tion 3.2), this selection method did not aim to sample comparison group
members coming from the same neighbourhoods as our second-generation
Turkish respondents.
During the field-work, refusal and non-response rates were high. As it
turned out, second-generation Turkish women refused to be interviewed by
male interviewers. In general, second-generation Turkish men were reluc-
tant to participate: they often refused to be interviewed at home or, if an in-
terview was fixed at a neutral location, they would not show up to the ap-
pointment. This unexpectedly low overall response rate of 42 per cent
made it necessary to draw a second sample from the register. The second
sample anticipated high non-response rates by drawing a sufficiently large
sample: 2,250 names of second-generation Turks and 750 names of mem-
bers of the comparison group, whereby the variation in group sample sizes
reflected the different expected non-response rates. Once we achieved the
targeted 250 interviews, the field-work was terminated.
The sampling approach and a careful documentation of how field-work
proceeded permitted a derivation of sample design weights. These were
calibrated to account for differences in the characteristics of respondents
vis-à-vis non-respondents. Similar to the situation in the Netherlands, basic
socio-economic characteristics (i.e. age, sex, educational attainment, in-
come group, marital status, group size within the general population) were
available in the population register, thus allowing the two groups to be
compared. Differences were analysed, leading to the derivation of a so-
called calibration weight for all respondents. This weight was subsequently
combined with initial sample design weights, resulting in one single cali-
brated sample design weight for each respondent. The sum of the
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calibrated design weights by group reflects both study groups’ relative size
within the general population of Stockholm County.
Austria
The study groups for our sampling in Austria were second-generation re-
spondents from the country’s two largest immigrant groups, Turks and for-
mer Yugoslavians, as well as a comparison group of respondents of native-
born parentage. We selected two rather contrasting cities. Vienna, with a
recorded 1.7 million inhabitants in 2007, is much larger than Linz, with its
population of 190,000. Although a person’s migrant status is recorded in
Austrian municipal records, parental birthplace is not. The status of mi-
grant also changes once full Austrian citizenship has been acquired so that
children of immigrants holding an Austrian passport do not continue to be
classified as persons with a migration background. Existing administrative
records were therefore unsuitable as a sampling frame for the second gen-
eration. Moreover, Austrian privacy protection laws generally prevent so-
cial scientists from accessing administrative records.
Fortunately, the Austrian team managed to secure cooperation from both
cities. The municipal administrations provided forenames and surnames of
all inhabitants in the age range of eighteen to 35. These names were then
screened by a survey bureau specialised in onomastics, permitting the deri-
vation of an ethnic classification and identification of second-generation
study groups. However, different types of ‘frame pollution’ appeared to be
present. For instance, on screening respondents at their doorsteps in Linz,
interviewers found that 13 per cent of persons with names identified as
‘Yugoslavian’ and 8 per cent with names identified as ‘Turkish’ did not be-
long to their presumed ethnic groups.
Once an appropriate sampling frame was constructed, the objective was
set to the general TIES model sampling strategy of successfully interview-
ing a total of 1,500 respondents, i.e. 250 per city and per study group. As
existing figures on non-response were unavailable for these study groups, a
buffer of names and addresses four times the above-mentioned target num-
bers was created. In the case of Linz, with its much smaller numbers of
second-generation residents, this factually boiled down to home-visiting all
persons with a seemingly Yugoslavian (835) or Turkish (315) name in the
database.
While the second generation in both cities was approached by means of
a simple random sample (without replacement) straight from the list of
names and addresses, the sampling of comparison group members occurred
in a different manner. The address of each successfully interviewed sec-
ond-generation respondent was taken, literally, as the starting point for
identifying a comparison group member living nearby. Using the random
route method (Kish 1965), the fifth street address following the address of
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the interviewed second-generation respondent was screened for the pres-
ence of an eligible comparison group member. If present, the person was
interviewed. If more than one eligible person was present, eldest household
member (Kish 1965) was selected and interviewed. If absent or if the per-
son refused to be interviewed, a new random route was pursued until an el-
igible comparison group member could be located.
Response rates do not differ much between groups and cities, hovering
around 40 per cent, except for Turkish respondents in Linz, where the re-
sponse rate was about 70 per cent. An onomastic respondent selection
strategy does not permit the derivation of conventional sample design
weights. To ensure resemblance of the TIES survey population with that of
the representative reference population, so-called post-stratification weights
were derived. The nationally representative 2008 LFS was used to derive
these weights by comparing the distribution of TIES respondents and LFS
respondents according to city of residence, ethnic group, age, sex and edu-
cational attainment. Thus, the TIES survey population was modelled to re-
semble the LFS population in terms of the aforementioned characteristics.
Switzerland
Second-generation Turks and former Yugoslavians and a comparison group
of native parentage constituted our study groups in the agglomerations of
Zurich and Basel, also the main settlement areas for the two immigrant
groups. In Switzerland, the number of residents with a migration back-
ground is difficult to determine because administrative records do not re-
cord parental birthplace or whether Swiss nationality has been gained by
birth or naturalisation. Population figures (see appendix 3) were therefore
estimated on the basis of the 2000 Swiss census and the times series of re-
corded numbers of immigrants by origin in the central aliens register.
Similar to their Austrian colleagues’ approach, the Swiss team thus built
sampling frames for each of the three study groups using available munici-
pal registers. Municipal registers in Basel and Zurich consist of a system
of commune-level personal registers interlinked across cities. A survey
bureau was subcontracted to develop a sample design in consultation with
the Swiss team. This incorporated use of the same computer software that
was successfully used in Austria to derive sampling frames (Humpert &
Schneiderheinze 2009). The onomastic method was applied to commune-
level population registers to identify all persons in the age range eighteen
to 35 with forenames or surnames linguistically akin to Turkish and
Yugoslavian names.
As a preparatory activity for designing the sampling strategy, we ana-
lysed the 2000 census in order to determine the spatial distribution of the
three study groups within the boundaries of the two city agglomerations.
An important finding was that the two immigrant groups appeared to live
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in specific areas within Basel and Zurich. This implied that the TIES mod-
el sampling strategy had to be adapted. In other words, though feasible in
other countries, the sampling design being developed could not a priori
guarantee that members of all three study groups in Switzerland would be
sampled in the same area (e.g. communes or neighbourhoods).
In a first step, two strata consequently had to be defined in each city. The
Turkish stratum and the Yugoslavian stratum thus each comprised all com-
munes in a city in which at least twenty members of the respective study
groups resided. Communes with smaller numbers were excluded. The ob-
jective was to sample 250 respondents in each stratum. This was realised
by first drawing a sample of communes and then sampling a fixed number
of study group members within each sampled commune. If a particular
commune was selected in both strata, a fixed number of Turkish and former
Yugoslavian respondents was sampled and interviewed in that commune.
In a second step, we determined the numbers of communes and respond-
ents of each study group. The aforementioned analysis of the spread and
prevalence of study group members over the city and communes at the
time of the 2000 census led to our conclusion that the optimal situation
would be five Turkish respondents in each of 50 clusters (5 x 50 = 250)
and six former Yugoslavian respondents in each of 42 clusters (6 x 42 =
252). This strategy implied that the target sample of 250 comparison group
members was to be redistributed over the two strata according to the ratio
of clusters to be sampled from the two strata (i.e. 136 in the Turkish stra-
tum, 114 in the Yugoslavian stratum).
Our third step was to sample communes and respondents. This was
achieved by applying the systematic selection method (Kish 1965;
Cochran 1977). It provided a convenient way to allocate the 50 and 42
clusters to a cumulative list of communes in each stratum. Application of
the method leads to self-weighing samples in each stratum and each city.
Communes with high numbers of target group members have higher proba-
bilities of being selected than those with smaller numbers; communes with
the highest numbers could be selected more than once through multiple
clusters (i.e. multiple batches of five or six respondents). Once subset com-
munes were sampled by this method and the number of persons to be inter-
viewed was known, commune authorities were requested to provide access
to their commune registers, allowing researchers to identify and sample
names and addresses of potential respondents from each study group.
The success of the Swiss sampling strategy depended heavily on cooper-
ation from commune authorities. As it turned out, not all were cooperative.
Some sampled communes thus had to be replaced by ones with a similar
proportion of relevant second-generation residents. Furthermore, as non-
response turned out to be high (see appendix 3), similar to the situation in
other countries, it was necessary to repeatedly sample from the same name
register in sampled communes. In some communes, the list of names was
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eventually depleted and names had to be selected from other communes,
thus distorting the sample design. These sources of errors, among others,
complicated the derivation of sample design weights and, to an unknown
extent, jeopardised statistical representativity of the data in Basel and
Zurich.
Germany
Second-generation Turks and former Yugoslavians as well as members of a
comparison group of native parentage were also the subjects of the TIES
surveys in Berlin and Frankfurt. Similar to the situation in Austria and
Switzerland, no readily available representative sampling frames were fea-
sible via population registers in Germany. Although coverage and quality
of German municipal population registers are good, personal records do
not offer all information required for identifying the second generation.
In cooperation with the Austrian and Swiss TIES teams, the German
team also pursued an onomastic approach (Humpert & Schneiderheinze
2009) to develop appropriate sampling frames for the three study groups.
Once the municipalities of both cities had cleared the project and expressed
their support, the details of all native-born eighteen to 35 year olds in the
population registers could be obtained. These lists comprised 725,040 per-
sons in Berlin and 121,374 persons in Frankfurt. Apart from name, ad-
dress, sex and age, each personal record included the person’s place of
birth (though not of the parents) and citizenship status. In the case of
Berlin, the onomastic software classified 5 and 1 per cent of the records as
being second-generation Turks and former Yugoslavians, respectively. For
Frankfurt, this turned out to be 7 and 4 per cent, respectively. Little over
50 per cent of the records in both cities were classified into the stratum of
the comparison group of native-born parentage. This constituted the popu-
lation universe from which statistically representative random samples of
names were taken in each city separately. Contrary to the stratified multi-
stage sample designs for cities in Austria and Switzerland, simple random
samples of 250 names were taken straight from the deduced sampling
frames of names of each study group. This deviates from the general TIES
strategy of insofar as possible sampling all study groups residing in the
same neighbourhood.
Similar to experience in other countries, adolescents and young adults in
the three study groups proved difficult to contact and to convince to partic-
ipate in an interview. For each city, two sampling waves involving the
names of 750 and 1,000 persons, respectively, were required to draw a suf-
ficient number of names and addresses to achieve the targeted number of
250 successful interviews in each study group.
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France
Identifying second-generation Turks in Paris and Strasbourg was difficult
due to lacking access to suitable sampling. France’s most recent census and
municipal population registers have no record of parents’ country of birth.
Similar to the approach followed in the German-speaking countries, the
French team therefore pursued the onomastic identification procedure to
build a sampling frame of names and addresses of the second generation.
The sampling frames in both cities were based on telephone directories.
In total, 10,658 names were identified as Turkish: 7,823 in Paris and 2,745
in Strasbourg. Shortcomings of the frame used in France are similar to those
experienced in the German-speaking countries, though were compounded
by the aforementioned exclusionary tendency of telephone directories.
The sampling frame was established on the basis of postcode areas in
each city with probabilities proportional to the number of Turkish names
listed as residents in the area. The first stage consisted of a telephone
screening among a sample of respondents from the target group. This
screening, which consisted of a few basic questions (age, sex, individual
and parental country of birth), was intended to quickly determine whether
sampled persons did indeed belong to the intended target group and, if so,
whether other target group family members were living within or apart
from the contacted household. If all criteria were met, the names and ad-
dresses were included in a list of potential respondents for the main survey.
The sampling frame was updated to include family members as potential
respondents, i.e. via the snowball method, frequently used to identify and
interview respondents (Kish 1965).
Including a screening stage was advantageous in that it permitted our
collecting basic socio-demographic information, including that of persons
who would later refuse the main interview or could not be contacted for
follow-up. Background characteristics of both respondents and non-
respondents were later used to inflate compensation weights for variation
in non-response rates between postcode areas and study groups.
A list of names and addresses of members of the comparison group in
the age range was compiled during the screening of sampled second-gener-
ation Turks in the selected postcode areas. The comparison group was sub-
sequently sampled by postcode area, as was done for second-generation
Turks.
The first stage of our field-work yielded response rates (here calculated
as the number of successful interviews out of overall eligible individuals) of
25 per cent for second-generation Turks and 37 per cent for the comparison
group. In the first stage of the sampling, the number of respondents was too
low. A second stage was thus implemented, mainly through re-contacting
individuals who had agreed to participate but were unavailable at the time
of field-work, re-contacting initial refusals and using snowball sampling.
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Spain
In Spain, our groups of interest were second-generation Moroccans in
Madrid and Barcelona and a comparison group of native-born parentage in
both cities. The lack of recent suitable sampling frames meant having to
pursue three separate identification and selection strategies. The first was a
sample provided by the Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE), though
this one only included a few fitting cases.
The second strategy involved identifying districts within Madrid and
Barcelona according to their share of resident Moroccans, regardless of
their generational status, and allocating a set number of interviews to each
district (proportional to the size of the Moroccan population in the district).
Interviewees were then sampled from streets surrounding the centre of a
given district. Respondents from the comparison group were selected in
the same districts and in the same proportion. A drawback to this method
is that during the initial identification stage, it was not possible to distin-
guish naturalised Moroccans from the comparison group. This might have
underestimated districts with a high proportion of naturalised Moroccans
(and hence the second generation).
A third method, used in Barcelona towards the end of the field-work pe-
riod, involved asking Moroccan immigrant organisations for the names of
potential interviewees.
In the case of Spain, an appropriate sampling frame could thus not be
established. Potential respondents had to be identified in the field by inter-
viewers who went in search of them, i.e. via the snowball method (Kish
1965). Data collected via this method for both study groups in Madrid in
Barcelona, however, cannot claim statistical representativity.
Concluding this section, table 3.1 presents some basic statistics of the
TIES surveys conducted in the eight participating countries.
3.5 Conclusions
The TIES project used the survey instrument to collect data on various di-
mensions of integration from second-generation Turks and former
Yugoslavians and comparison group members of native parentage in fifteen
cities in eight European countries. Our objective was to collect statistically
representative data for these target groups, all the while acknowledging that
certain constraints had to be overcome. First, we had to identify our target
group members; from there, create a sample; next, contact all the persons;
and, last but not least, secure their collaboration.
To support the coordinators of the TIES country teams, notably in the
initial phase of the project, meetings were held to discuss potential survey
sampling approaches and how to overcome technical, logistical and
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Table 3.1 Size estimates of reference populations, numbers of successfully
interviewed persons and response rates, by country, city and study group
The Netherlands Belgium Sweden Austria
Amsterdam Rotterdam Brussels Antwerp Stockholm Vienna Linz
Population
Turkish 5,088 6,941 18,575 1,480 5,723 13,125 5,432
Moroccan 8,649 4,117 61,155 4,506
Yugoslavian 26,269 3,817
Comparison 102,491 71,288 275,505 217,623 60,845
Sample
Turkish 237 263 244 358 251 252 206
Moroccan 242 251 246 311
Yugoslavian 253 242
Comparison 259 253 257 301 250 250 234
Response rate (%)
Turkish 29.9% 30.5% 31.5% 63.5% 32.0% 40.0% 70.0%
Moroccan 25.9% 24.2% 30.6% 55.9%
Yugoslavian 38.0% 38.0%
Comparison 40.1% 34.8% 31.1% 55.8% 54.0% 43.0% 42.0%
Total 31.1% 29.2% 31.0% 58.4% 42.0%
Switzerland Germany France Spain
Zurich Basel Berlin Frankfurt Paris Strasbourg Madrid Barcelona
Population
Turkish 4,967 4,706 35,363 8,456 n.a. n.a.
Moroccan n.a. n.a.
Yugoslavian 14,737 4,827 6,477 4,477
Comparison 709,290 321,104 388,343 61,725 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sample
Turkish 206 248 253 250 248 252
Moroccan 250 250
Yugoslavian 235 191 202 204
Comparison 202 266 250 253 174 177 250 250
Response rate (%)
Turkish 38.2% 46.7% 31.2% 24.8% n.a. n.a.
Moroccan n.a. n.a.
Yugoslavian 29.7% 45.9% 22.1% 22.9%
Comparison 41.2% 48.4% 25.7% 24.3% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 36.0% 47.5% 26.4% 24.0%
Notes: The Netherlands: Population estimates derived from municipal population register
(d.d. 1 April 2006). Belgium: Technical report; no information on size of comparison group;
response rates in Brussels based on first sampling wave. Sweden: Response rates based on
first sampling wave. Austria: Austrian Labour Force Survey weighted estimates; estimates
for Linz unavailable and pertain to Voralberg region as a whole.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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financial constraints when surveying the second generation. For one, a
model sampling strategy was offered to help country teams start develop-
ing a strategy that would take their specific local conditions into considera-
tion. This model design assumed the availability of suitable sampling
frames.
As it turned out, truly suitable sampling frames were only available for
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Stockholm. These cities offered the
luxury of up-to-date population registers containing personal records neces-
sary to define the second generation. Moreover, these databases, albeit with
certain restrictions, were accessible to the research community. A notable
advantage here was being able to know the size of the actual second gener-
ation reference population for which the TIES survey results aim to be rep-
resentative. That all study groups could be directly sampled from the regis-
ters was also beneficial.
Circumstances were less favourable in other cities, where even an esti-
mated size of the second-generation reference population could not be de-
rived (see table 3.1). The implication was that the a priori probability of se-
lection of a respondent could not be determined, which is a necessary con-
dition for probability samples (Cochran 1977). Therefore, creative and
innovative, albeit partial, solutions to this problem had to be developed. In
the case of Brussels, for example, area sampling was implemented by sam-
pling street segments from the main residential areas, followed by the
screening of street addresses, and subsequently sampling and interviewing
eligible respondents. In Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France, the na-
tional TIES teams made concerted efforts to develop the required sampling
frames. Their innovative approach allowed the names and addresses of
eighteen to 35 year olds in each city to be collected and compiled. From
there, onomastic software was used to analyse the lists and, in so doing,
derive sampling frames for each TIES study group. From these frames,
probability samples of group members were taken, leading to survey data
that were statistically representative for the reference population in the
name lists. In the absence of a readily available and/or up-to-date popula-
tion register, sampling frames derived in this way are probably the next
best option. The approach’s main – and inevitable – drawback is that the
study populations are likely to deviate from the actual reference popula-
tions, especially if the deviation is caused by the systematic omission of
persons with certain characteristics. Consequently, survey results can only
claim statistical representativeness for persons included in such type of
sampling frames.
Response rates were generally low in all countries, ranging from 22 per
cent among second-generation former Yugoslavians in Berlin to 70 per
cent among second-generation Turks in Linz. The majority of the TIES
survey target audience proved difficult to contact in the first place and dif-
ficult to pin down for an interview. Low response rates raise doubts about
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whether responding persons can represent non-respondents in terms of per-
sonal characteristics and measured attitudes and opinions. For Amsterdam,
Rotterdam and Stockholm, this could be examined more closely because
basic information on non-respondents was available in population registers.
This information revealed that age, sex and marital status differences be-
tween responding and non-responding persons proved to be slight, lending
support to claim statistical representativity of the collected data in these
cities.
In the French cities, basic personal characteristics were collected during
a large-scale eligibility screening of persons included in the constructed
sampling frames. After the survey, non-respondents and respondents were
compared with respect to age, sex and educational attainment. The conclu-
sion was that in both study groups – second-generation Turks and compari-
son group members – non-respondents were more likely to be men and
had a lower level of educational attainment than respondents. To preserve
statistical representativity, compensation weights were thus derived for
dealing with this bias, giving higher weight to lower-educated and male
respondents.
For the German, Swiss and Austrian cities, this kind of sampling frame
information was unavailable, but the survey contained a question for the
interviewers to answer after each successful interview concerning how dif-
ficult it was to get in contact with the respondent. The continuum of resist-
ance model (Lin & Schaeffer 1995; Stoop 2005) asserts that late respond-
ents can be considered as proxies for unobserved non-respondents.
Comparison of age, sex and educational attainment of easy-to-reach with
difficult-to-reach respondents in these cities revealed that: 1) in German
cities, difficult-to-reach respondents of Turkish origin have slightly lower
levels of education; 2) in Austrian cities, difficult-to-reach respondents of
both study groups are more often males and have a lower level of educa-
tion; 3) in Swiss cities, the two types of respondents did not appear to dif-
fer in terms of age, sex or educational attainment. This analysis was also
applied to the responses of study groups in the Dutch and French cities.
Results confirmed earlier conclusions that non-respondents and respond-
ents do not seem to differ much according to age, sex or educational attain-
ment profile. In the case of Sweden, the survey did not collect information
required for this analysis.
From these reflections, we conclude that appropriate procedures were
followed insofar as was possible and feasible. We found indications that,
despite fairly high non-response rates, non-response bias in most cities
may not be too problematic. In light of constraints encountered in the field,
the data collected and compiled by the TIES project probably reflects the
best one might expect to retrieve from second-generation study groups.
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4 The TIES respondents and their parents
Background socio-demographic characteristics1
Laurence Lessard-Phillips and Christopher Ross
4.1 Introduction
As the TIES project has affirmed, socio-demographic characteristics of mi-
grants and their descendants across Europe vary greatly. We see this both
in terms of individuals as well as their families. Our survey has also
revealed such differences among respondents who share common ethno-
national origins. The aim of this chapter is to give a first descriptive over-
view of all TIES respondents – including the comparison groups – detail-
ing their age, citizenship status, household composition alongside pertinent
socio-demographic information about their parents.2 We describe here to
what extent parental characteristics of second-generation respondents may
diverge from their respective cities’ comparison groups. A particular com-
parative focus on second-generation Turks across countries is reflected in
this chapter, as it is elsewhere in this volume, because this group is numeri-
cally and visibly present in seven of the eight participating survey coun-
tries and thus forms a substantial part of our overall sample. For this rea-
son, a separate paragraph under each theme is dedicated to information
specifically about them and their parents.
The first section examines select demographic characteristics of our re-
spondents themselves. The second section focuses on their parents.
4.2 Respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics
Age distribution
Immigration patterns vary across receiving countries and immigrant
groups. Naturally, this has resulted in varied waves of migration and differ-
ent immigration peak periods. This also affects age distribution patterns
among second-generation respondents from diverse origins. We contend
that age is an important factor when studying the timing – and for that mat-
ter, mere presence – of crucial life course transitions, such as entry into the
labour market and union formation. Figures 4.1a through 4.1o show the
mean age and confidence intervals of the TIES respondents at the city lev-
el, separated by gender.3
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The figures show that age gaps exist between comparison and second-gen-
eration groups in almost all cities, with the latter being, on average, young-
er than the former. We can attribute this to the relatively recent arrival of
the second generation’s parents in most countries and the fact that,
according to our definition anyway, the second generation is necessarily
born in the survey country. To illustrate with an example, if a Turkish or a
Moroccan mother arrived in the survey country in 1980, her first locally
born child could have been, at most, 28 years old during the survey.4
But as the figures also show, considerable differences exist between sec-
ond-generation groups. Respondents of Turkish descent are somewhat
younger than those of former Yugoslavian descent in Frankfurt and
Vienna, but of comparable age across other cities. Respondents of
Moroccan descent are substantially younger than those of Turkish descent
in the Dutch cities. In the Belgian cities, there is no consistent pattern, and
variation exists across cities and gender.
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b offer a closer look, showing the mean age of sec-
ond-generation Turkish groups across the TIES cities. Substantial discrep-
ancies in age distributions appear. Turkish second-generation men are old-
est in both Belgian and German cities and in Stockholm. This could be
due to the fact that, on average, parents arrived here earlier – and in some
cities much earlier – than elsewhere. At the other extreme, their counter-
parts are particularly young in Paris, which can at least partially be linked
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to the later migratory flows to France. This fits within the existing body of
literature on the French second generation (see e.g. Simon 2003).
But we also find – perhaps for similar reasons – some substantial differ-
ences between cities within countries. This holds particularly for the mean
age of second-generation Turkish men in Paris as compared to Strasbourg;
in Austria, the difference between Vienna and Linz is also relevant.
City-specific age differences among second-generation Turkish women
(figure 4.2b) are not as pronounced. One striking result is that our respond-
ents from this group in the Belgian cities were not significantly older than
most of their peers in all other cities except Vienna (Brussels), Basel
(Brussels) and Paris (Brussels and Antwerp). Their counterparts in the two
German cities have significantly higher mean ages than those in Vienna,
both Swiss cities and Paris. For men, a similar picture appears in
Stockholm. And again, Turkish second-generation women in Paris are the
youngest of all cities.
Citizenship
Another important aspect differentiating the second-generation experience
is the citizenship status of its members. These outcomes across cities are
heavily influenced by past and current citizenship legislations at the nation-
al level. Considering the openness of citizenship regimes and access to na-
tionality, we ranked the TIES countries according to existing typologies.
We found that Sweden and Belgium are among the most open regimes,
with high levels of access to nationality. Germany and Austria have the
considerably most restricted access. The other countries fall somewhere in-
between (Castles, Schierup & Hansen 2006; MIPEX 2007; Michalowski
2009; Goodman 2010). Examined elsewhere in this volume is the extent to
which citizenship impacts other outcomes, such as unemployment figures
(chapter 6) and feelings of national belonging (chapter 8).
Table 4.1 shows the citizenship status reported by our second-generation
respondents. Many have dual citizenship, being the dominant status for
groups in Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. In Germany,
France, Spain and Austria, the majority of the second generation only
holds citizenship of the survey country. The distribution of these two trends
across the countries, however, is not uniform, but rather the result of dispa-
rate citizenship policies.
In Austria, the majority of the Turkish and the former Yugoslavian sec-
ond generations held only Austrian citizenship. Dual citizenship is rare,
being something not typically allowed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985).
A still relatively high percentage of respondents indicated that they only
hold the citizenship of their parents’ country of origin, a status more com-
mon among the former Yugoslavian group.
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In Switzerland, two statuses prevailed. First was dual citizenship, which
was only introduced in 1992 (Fibbi, Lerch & Wanner 2007). Second was
citizenship of the parents’ country of origin. This is true for both the
Turkish and the former Yugoslavian second generations. The proportion
Table 4.1 Respondents’ citizenship (in %), by ethnic group and sex
Second generation
Turks Moroccans former Yugoslavians
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Austria Survey country only 82.9 86.9 - - 76.2 79.9
Vienna/ Dual citizenship 3.3 2.9 - - 3.5 0.4
Linz Country of parents only 12.9 9.4 - - 18.9 18.2
Neither 1.0 0.8 - - 1.3 1.5
N 210 245 - - 227 264
Belgium Survey country only 22.5 23.0 39.7 47.0 - -
Brussels/ Dual citizenship 73.6 74.0 53.3 48.3 - -
Antwerp Country of parents only 3.9 3.0 6.2 3.5 - -
Neither - - 0.8 1.3 - -
N 333 269 242 315 - -
Switzerland Survey country only 8.1 11.8 - - 16.7 25.8
Zurich/ Dual citizenship 58.5 67.7 - - 52.2 55.3
Basel Country of parents only 32.5 20.5 - - 30.1 18.4
Neither 0.9 - - - 1.0 0.5
N 234 220 - - 209 217
Germany Survey country only 50.8 55.2 - - 68.9 68.1
Berlin/ Dual citizenship 31.0 31.0 - - 17.9 23.3
Frankfurt Country of parents only 18.2 13.8 - - 13.3 8.6
N 242 261 - - 196 210
Spain Survey country only - - 52.0 53.7 - -
Madrid/ Dual citizenship - - 44.5 40.2 - -
Barcelona Country of parents only - - 3.5 5.7 - -
Neither - - - 0.4 - -
N - - 254 246 - -
France Survey country only 61.5 69.1 - - - -
Paris/ Dual citizenship 35.8 26.6 - - - -
Strasbourg Country of parents only 1.8 3.9 - - - -
Neither 0.9 0.4 - - - -
N 218 282 - - - -
Netherlands Survey country only 31.4 43.0 56.5 51.0 - -
Amsterdam/ Dual citizenship 62.4 51.9 36.2 40.9 - -
Rotterdam Country of parents only 6.2 4.7 7.3 6.9 - -
Neither - 0.4 - 1.2 - -
N 242 258 246 247 - -
Sweden Survey country only 33.1 53.5 - - - -
Stockholm Dual citizenship 65.3 45.7 - - - -
Country of parents only 1.6 0.8 - - - -
N 124 127 - - - -
Note: Columns total 100% within countries.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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holding only survey country citizenship was markedly lower than that for
any other country. It was, however, substantially higher among the former
Yugoslavian respondents than for those of Turkish descent.5 The low pro-
portion of survey country citizenship among the second generation is
directly linked to the legal challenges associated with naturalisation in
Switzerland (Fibbi et al. 2007).
As in Austria and Switzerland, a good proportion of second-generation
respondents in Germany only holds the citizenship of their parents’ country
of origin. The rates are on par with those of Austria, but are much lower
than in Switzerland. Unlike their Austrian peers, respondents of Turkish
descent are more likely than those of former Yugoslavian descent to only
hold citizenship of their parents’ country of origin.
Just a tiny minority of second-generation respondents in France,
Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden only holds the citizenship of their
parents’ country of origin. Our respondents in Belgium, the Netherlands
and Sweden are more likely to hold dual citizenship than only survey
country citizenship. In France, we see the converse: French citizenship
abounds. Notably, second-generation Turks in Belgium and the
Netherlands more often hold dual citizenship than do second-generation
Moroccans.
The variation in citizenship status among our respondents seems to abide
by past and current citizenship legislation. It is only the disparity between
the German and Austrian rates of dual citizenship that is somewhat surpris-
ing, given the similarities in their citizenship regulations. The source of this
incongruity is unclear: it could be an artefact of a sampling bias – although
we have no reason to believe in the occurrence of a systematic bias of such
magnitude (see chapter 3) – or it could be related to Germany’s less strict
prevention of de facto dual citizenship. (Some people report attaining dual
citizenship by formally renouncing their Turkish nationality in order to ob-
tain German nationality. Once they have received a German passport, they
then reacquire their Turkish nationality, which in the eyes of the Turkish
state can indeed be combined with another.)
Household composition
Another important characteristic to examine is the composition of the
household in which the respondents lived at the time of the survey. Table
4.2 shows that second-generation respondents were more likely than the
comparison group to not have formed their own household and still live
with their family (i.e. their parents or other relatives). We assume that this
difference is mainly due to age distribution disparity, with second-genera-
tion respondents being typically younger than those from the comparison
groups.
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At the same time, second-generation respondents were also more likely
to have left the parental home to move into their own household in order
to live with someone else (described in the questionnaire as ‘Own house-
hold, living with others’). The other individual was usually a partner or
spouse, and the intention was to form their own family. This tendency
holds true across cities and ethnic groups, most notably when it comes to
female respondents. By contrast, many more respondents in the compari-
son groups left the parental household to live on their own.
Figure 4.3 highlights the household compositions of the Turkish second
generation across countries. Except for in Germany and the Netherlands,
about half of them still live with their parents. The two most extreme cases
are France and Germany, with only 29 per cent of Turkish second-genera-
tion men still living with their parents in the two German cities and 75 per
cent of them in the two French cities. Second-generation Turks in
Germany – men, especially – also most often live on their own without a
partner and without anyone else. The fact that respondents in the French
cities more often still live with their parents is unsurprising, given their rel-
ative youth (especially in Paris). What is remarkable, however, is that
many more female respondents than males no longer live with their pa-
rents, irrespective of age. This might have something to do with family for-
mation patterns.
Figure 4.3 Household compositions of second-generation Turks (in %), by country and gender
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Siblings
An individual’s number of siblings is often cited as an important factor im-
pacting socio-economic outcomes for children (see e.g. Chiswick’s (1988)
child quality investment hypothesis). Figure 4.4 shows the mean number
of siblings for the various groups at the country level.6
We observe that Moroccan respondents have the most siblings, with mean
rates being similar in Belgium and the Netherlands, though substantially
lower in Spain. Turkish respondents have more siblings than the respective
comparison groups, yet the differences are not as great as for Moroccans. In
some countries, such as Switzerland and France, the difference in sibling
numbers between the Turkish second generation and the comparison group
is not very high. Sibling numbers among former Yugoslavians respondents
is similar to that of the comparison group respondents.
The families in which the Turkish second generation grew up had, on
average, three to four children. In fact, we see that sibling numbers are often
similar across the cities. This is notably the case in Austria, Switzerland,
Germany and France. On the other hand, their counterparts in Belgium, the
Netherlands and Sweden have a slightly higher mean number of siblings.
The descriptive statistics in this section have shown us compositional dif-
ferences between the second-generation groups with regard to age, house-
hold composition and sibling numbers. Along with citizenship status, these
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critical factors help us gain a clearer sense of the types of respondents be-
hind the TIES data.
4.3 Parents’ socio-demographic characteristics
We now turn to the socio-demographic characteristics of the TIES respond-
ents’ parents, who are no doubt major actors in their children’s socialisation
process. Our focus is double-lensed, so to speak. First, we look at circum-
stances particular to the parents as immigrants, such as the timing of their ar-
rival in the survey country and their citizenship status. Second, we examine
parental characteristics also analysable in the comparison groups, such as
highest level of education and occupational status. These observations help
lay bare the differences in the groups’ respective socio-economic origins.
Timing of arrival
Timing of the immigrant parents’ arrival is an important factor, as it in-
dexes the economic, political and social circumstances under which they
migrated. Whether having arrived as a labour migrant (the case for most
migrants prior to the 1980s), as a refugee or as part of family reunification
(mainly the case for women), an individual’s migration history can provide
useful background information.
The overwhelming majority of the second generation has two immigrant
parents from the same country of origin (see table 4.10 in appendix). These
figures are well over 80 per cent in all countries, except for former
Yugoslavians in Germany, who seem to have a slightly greater proportion of
mixed immigrant parentage. It is thus crucial to examine a respondent’s fa-
ther’s and mother’s timing of arrival separately. Figures 4.5a and 4.5b show
the period in which fathers and mothers immigrated, divided into three cate-
gories: prior to the 1970s; during the 1970s; and from the 1980s onwards.
The migratory flows of fathers and mothers show that most immigrant
parents arrived in the survey country prior to 1980. This corroborates the
general finding of labour migrants’ arrival to the TIES countries. Further
affirming this trend is the fact that mothers arrived later than fathers, which
is consistent with marriage migration and family reunification patterns,
even if some women were recruited for labour in labour migration pro-
grammes, albeit in a smaller proportion (Stalker 2002; Kofman 1999).
In some countries, migratory flows appear to be more recent. In fact, re-
spondents’ parents in the Swiss, Spanish and Austrian cities arrived later
than those residing in the other cities. German and, albeit to a lesser extent,
Dutch figures indicate early migration flows (notably of immigrant father
and some mothers in the 1960s). Immigrant parents in the French and
Swedish cities overwhelmingly arrived in the 1970s. The effect of varied
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arrival timing can be seen in the age range differentials of the respondents
in these cities (see section 4.3).
Looking distinctly at Turkish parents’ migration (table 4.3), we find
some variation across countries, most of which is in keeping with the exist-
ing literature about Turkish migratory flows to Europe. Earlier migratory
patterns (mostly of fathers) are observed in countries that had labour mar-
ket agreements with Turkey in the 1960s: Germany (1961); Austria,
Belgium, the Netherlands (1964); France (1965); and Sweden (1967)
(Akgündüz 1995; Aybar, Özgöker & Akman 2008). The resulting pattern
is consistent with family reunification patterns: 1) the majority of Turkish
migrants were men and 2) women largely came through family reunifica-
tion. Yet, female guest workers were also quite numerous in Germany and
Austria prior to the 1970s (Mattes 2005; Herzog-Punzenberger 2003),
which can also help explain some of the high proportions of immigrant
mothers arriving prior to 1970.
Citizenship status
The citizenship status of the respondents’ parents is presented by country
as well as separately for mothers and fathers in table 4.4. As the table
shows, we find considerable cross-national variation in parental citizenship,
a status that is highly influenced by national legislation.7 Discrepancies be-
tween mothers and fathers in terms of citizenship are, however, not very
big.
We see that in Austria’s two survey cities, Turkish parents either hold
the survey country’s citizenship or that of the country of origin. Dual citi-
zenship is common only among one fourth of the immigrant parents.
Country of origin citizenship is most common among former Yugoslavian
fathers.
In Belgium, the majority of immigrant parents holds dual citizenship,
while a good share of both fathers and mothers only holds citizenship of
their country of origin. This proportion is slightly higher for Turkish pa-
rents than Moroccan parents, and is higher among mothers.
A very small proportion of immigrant parents in Switzerland only holds
Swiss citizenship, which is in accordance with past and current legislation.
A somewhat greater share of parents from former Yugoslavia only holds
Swiss citizenship.
In Germany, most Turkish parents only hold Turkish citizenship. A plu-
rality of Yugoslavian parents holds dual citizenship. About a quarter of the
parents from both groups only holds German citizenship.
By contrast, in both cities in France and in Stockholm, the overwhelm-
ing majority of Turkish parents only holds the citizenship of their country
of origin.8
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Table 4.3 Turkish parents’ year of immigration (in %), by city
Father Mother Father Mother
Austria France
Vienna < =1969 15.4 11.1 Paris < =1969 20.3 10.7
1970-1979 49.7 43.2 1970-1979 64.1 58.9
>=1980 34.9 45.7 >=1980 15.6 30.4






N 195 199 N 64 56
Linz < =1969 19.8 10.9 Strasbourg < =1969 19.5 7.6
1970-1979 54.5 51.3 1970-1979 69.5 76.2
>=1980 25.7 37.8 >=1980 10.9 16.2






N 167 156 N 128 105
Switzerland The Netherlands
Zurich < =1969 21.2 9.8 Amsterdam <=1969 22.2 6.7
1970-1979 53.0 47.6 1970-1979 62.2 67.6
>=1980 25.8 42.7 >=1980 15.6 25.7






N 151 143 N 180 179
Basel < =1969 15.9 7.0 Rotterdam <=1969 28.3 11.4
1970-1979 42.1 43.5 1970-1979 55.7 60.0
>=1980 42.1 49.5 >=1980 16.0 28.6






N 195 186 N 212 210
Germany Sweden
Berlin < =1969 49.8 28.1 Stockholm < =1969 24.4 9.3
1970-1979 32.4 54.2 1970-1979 55.8 70.5
>=1980 17.8 17.7 >=1980 19.8 20.3






N 213 192 N 217 227








Note: Results are unweighted.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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Table 4.4 Parents’ citizenship (in %), by group
Second-generation
Turks Moroccans former Yugoslavians
Father Mother Father Mother Father Mother
Austria Dual citizenship 19.6 22.7 . . 22.9 27.2
Vienna/ Survey country only 46.7 42.4 . . 26.9 38.8
Linz Country of origin only 32.9 34.0 . . 48.8 32.2
Neither 0.8 1.0 . . 1.4 1.8
N 392 406 . . 432 441
Belgium Dual citizenship 58.0 55.7 60.0 56.4 . .
Brussels/ Survey country only 4.1 4.1 10.4 12.7 . .
Antwerp Country of origin only 37.8 40.2 28.5 30.3 . .
Neither 0.2 - 1.1 0.6 . .
N 588 560 527 495 . .
Switzerland Dual citizenship 34.0 38.7 - - 37.2 42.9
Zurich/ Survey country only 1.3 2.4 - - 8.7 12.7
Basel Country of origin only 63.1 58.7 - - 46.6 36.2
Neither 1.6 0.2 - - 7.5 8.2
N 447 450 - - 414 417
Germany Dual citizenship 23.6 28.0 - - 39.4 43.0
Berlin/ Survey country only 22.0 18.5 - - 25.5 26.4
Frankfurt Country of origin only 51.9 51.0 - - 34.4 29.8
Neither 2.5 2.5 - - 0.8 0.8
N 478 482 - - 381 379
Spain Dual citizenship - - 45.3 48.6 - -
Madrid/ Survey country only - - 4.3 4.5 - -
Barcelona Country of origin only - - 49.9 46.1 - -
Neither - - 0.5 0.8 - -
N - - 373 399 - -
France Dual citizenship 25.1 21.6 - - - -
Paris/ Survey country only 2.9 4.2 - - - -
Strasbourg Country of origin only 72.0 73.6 - - - -
Neither - 0.6 - - - -
N 490 473 - - - -
Netherlands Dual citizenship 62.3 63.7 61.9 61.5 - -
Amsterdam/ Survey country only 5.5 4.6 4.8 4.9 - -
Rotterdam Country of origin only 32.0 31.0 32.4 32.5 - -
Neither 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.1 - -
N 472 474 457 449 - -
Sweden Survey/other country* 16.0 18.3 - - - -
Stockholm Country of origin only 84.0 81.7 - - - -
N 237 241 - - - -
Notes: Columns total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.
*For Sweden, only information about holding citizenship of the parental country of birth
was collected. Survey country citizenship is thereby derived from this information.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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The majority of both the Turkish and Moroccan parents in the
Netherlands holds dual citizenship.
In Spain’s two survey cities, the citizenship status of immigrant parents
is polarised between dual citizenship and citizenship of the country of
origin.
Focusing solely on the parents of the Turkish second generation unveils
interesting patterns in citizenship statuses. With the exception of Sweden,
the countries with more open systems have much higher rates of dual citi-
zenship among parents than the restricted ones, which show greater rates
of country of origin citizenship. This is consistent with the patterns out-
lined in this chapter’s ‘Citizenship’ section.
Educational level
Parents’ level of human capital – the skills and resources that an individual
possesses, often measured via education (Coleman 1988: S109) – is an im-
portant explanatory factor for the outcomes of all children. Research on the
second generation has emphasised the significance of large disparities in
parental human capital between immigrants and non-immigrants. This is
especially relevant in the European context, as most of the labour migrants
come from low socio-economic backgrounds, thus putting them at an extra
disadvantaged starting position in their receiving society (Crul &
Vermeulen 2003).
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the distribution of the highest education
achieved by the parents. Based on a nationally comparable classification of
educational credentials,9 the levels are separated into three categories: 1)
attended no school at all, a religious school only or primary school only;
2) attended some secondary school; 3) attended post-secondary school and/
or achieved a higher level of education. The figures show the educational
attainment of fathers and mothers separately.10
The most obvious feature in figures 4.6a and b is that the parents of the
comparison group have much higher levels of education than those of any
second-generation group. This is true for both fathers and mothers. This is
hardly surprising when we consider the general schooling levels offered in
the sending countries, the immigrant parents’ mainly rural background and
the state of rural development in Turkey, Morocco and the former
Yugoslavia from the 1960s through to the1980s.11 Such a discrepancy may
be instrumental in explaining many of the disparities between the second
generation and the comparison group, and will be explored in more detail
in subsequent chapters of this volume.
Within the second-generation groups, parental education levels are most
comparable among Turks and Moroccans. The former Yugoslavian parents
tend to be, on average, better educated, though they have not reached edu-
cational parity with the comparison group’s parents.
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Figure 4.6a Fathers’ education levels (in %), by city and group
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Figure 4.6b Mothers’ education levels (in %), by city and group
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Source figures 4.6a and 4.6b: TIES 2007-2008
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In Austria’s two survey cities, approximately 30 per cent of fathers from
the Turkish and former Yugoslavian group have low levels of educational
attainment. The proportion with low educational attainment is even higher
for Turkish mothers. The fathers and mothers of the comparison group are
hardly represented at the lowest level, and quite a high percentage has at-
tained post-secondary education – more than double that of the second-
generation groups’ parents. Yet, we still see a gender discrepancy in paren-
tal education within the comparison group, where mothers have lower at-
tainment, especially at the tertiary level.
Low levels of parental education are quite pronounced in the two cities
in Belgium. Almost half of the parents of the second-generation respond-
ents fall in the lowest category, with an even lower attainment among the
mothers.
In Switzerland, educational attainment among Turkish parents is much
lower than that of comparison group parents and former Yugoslavian pa-
rents. Even in instances when Yugoslavians have, on the whole, reached
higher levels than the comparison group, the Yugoslavian fathers fall short.
Interestingly, Yugoslavian mothers’ educational attainment is relatively
similar to that of comparison group mothers.
The contrast between the Turkish parents, the Yugoslavian parents and
the comparison group parents is even more striking in Germany. More than
70 per cent of our respondents report having fathers and mothers who had,
at most, only finished primary school. Just a very small group (the slim-
mest percentage in all categories) had post-secondary education. This find-
ing appears to be linked to origin and cohort effects, i.e. Turkish migrants
in Germany come from more remote regions of origin and have relatively
earlier arrival timing. Yugoslavian parents’ educational credentials prove
similar to that of the comparison group.
In France, the educational differences between the parents of the Turkish
second generation and the comparison group are sizeable, with a high pro-
portion of Turkish mothers and fathers having only attained lower levels.
Though substantial, these differences are not as remarkable as in Germany.
In the Netherlands, parents of the Moroccan second generation have the
lowest education levels. Generally speaking, the proportion of immigrant
parents with post-secondary education is higher here among fathers than
mothers, though not as high as in some other countries.
The difference in the distribution of educational credentials between the
parents of the second generation and the comparison group in Sweden is
quite noteworthy. The latter’s parents have much higher levels than the im-
migrant parents.
Table 4.5 highlights the variation in educational levels among Turkish
parents. Even if the differences in educational attainments across cities are
not very pronounced, we can see how most parents have low levels of edu-
cation. This is especially notable in Brussels, Berlin, Frankfurt, Paris
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(mothers only), Strasbourg, Amsterdam and Rotterdam – where well over
50 per cent of the parents in these cities have a low level of education. In
Linz, the proportion of parents with tertiary education is quite high, as is
the case specifically for fathers in Vienna, Zurich, Basel, Paris and
Stockholm. Also salient is the variation across cities at the lowest level:
while in Vienna, Zurich, Basel and Stockholm, this category for Turkish
parents is practically, if not simply, non-existent, more than a quarter of the
fathers in Berlin reached no level of education higher than this. The same
goes for almost a third of the fathers in Frankfurt and around half the moth-
ers in these cities.
Occupational status at respondents’ age fifteen
The occupational status of the second generation’s parents by and large re-
flects their low levels of education.12 An overview of both fathers’ and
mothers’ work situations at the time our respondents were fifteen years old
provides insight into the resources present in the family when respondents
were growing up. Figure 4.7a shows the fathers’ mean scores (as well as
their confidence intervals) according to the International Socio-Economic
Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) (see Ganzeboom & Treiman 2003).
Immigrant fathers have much lower mean ISEI levels than those of non-
immigrant fathers in all cities. The gaps between the second generation’s
fathers and the comparison group’s fathers are small in Madrid, Vienna
(for former Yugoslavians) and Frankfurt, but quite big in the Belgian,
Swiss, French, Dutch and Swedish cities. In addition, the immigrant fa-
thers’ ISEI level varies within a smaller range across the cities than it does
for comparison group fathers. In general, Moroccan and Turkish fathers
have the lowest mean ISEI scores. In Vienna, discrepancies between for-
mer Yugoslavian and Turkish fathers are the greatest.
Before examining their occupational status, we first need to know how
many of the mothers were actually economically active. Table 4.6 shows
that in all cities a substantial number of immigrant women was in fact eco-
nomically inactive. This is notably the case for Turkish mothers in the
German and Dutch cities.
Mothers of the comparison group more often worked when their chil-
dren were fifteen years old than did mothers of the second-generation
groups. At the height of family unification, the labour force participation
rate of women in all host countries was higher, if not much higher, than
that of women in Turkey (Jaumotte 2003). This statistic partly explains the
overall higher labour market participation of comparison group mothers.
Worth noting, however, is the high level of working immigrant mothers
in the Swiss cities, where their number equals that of the comparison group.
The proportion of working mothers is, on average, much higher among
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former Yugoslavians. Moreover, in all cities (except Stockholm), a higher
level of economic activity corresponds with a higher mean ISEI score.13
It is worth noting that some of the Turkish mothers were labour migrants
themselves and had already worked in Turkey. A case in point here is
Linz: over 40 per cent (see table 4.7) of these mothers had worked prior to
migration. This is consistent with the fact that Austria had a high demand
for female labour (Herzog-Punzenberger 2003). As table 4.7 shows, few
immigrant mothers, however, held a job prior to migrating to the survey
countries. In Berlin, for example, this applies to only 2.6 per cent of
Turkish mothers.14
We now turn to the occupational status of women who did work when
their children were fifteen years old. Discrepancies between women are not
as big as between men. While mothers’ average ISEI levels are lower, the




Austria Vienna Worked 7.0 - 37.9
N 199 - 169
Linz Worked 40.5 - 19.4
N 148 - 144
Switzerland Zurich Worked 17.2 - 31.1
N 134 - 151
Basel Worked 15.0 - 32.3
N 180 - 130
Germany Berlin Worked 2.6 - 29.0
N 151 - 124
Frankfurt Worked 13.1 - 21.1
N 145 - 114
Spain Madrid Worked - 25.0 -
N - 12 -
Barcelona Worked - 12.4 -
N - 89 -
France Paris Worked 27.3 - -
N 55 - -
Strasbourg Worked 11.4 - -
N 105 - -
The Netherlands Amsterdam Worked 19.9 10.1 -
N 201 208 -
Rotterdam Worked 9.0 6.8 -
N 234 219 -
Sweden Stockholm Worked 16.9 - -
N 231 - -
Notes: Colums total 100% within countries. Results are unweighted.
Source: TIES 2007-2008



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































90 LESSARD-PHILLIPS & ROSS
disparity between the second generation and the comparison group is
smaller (and sometimes not significant). Though notable differences still
remain in the French and Swedish cities, none is significant in the mean
ISEI between these two groups in the Swiss cities or in Frankfurt. The dif-
ferences are also quite small in Vienna (for former Yugoslavians), Linz,
Berlin and Madrid. Lesser variation between women can partly be
explained by the fact that comparison group mothers’ ISEI mean levels are
sometimes low, too. Another important explanation is that ISEI figures
only take into account individuals who were employed (thus necessarily
excluding individuals either unemployed or inactive).
Regional origins
Finally, we look at Turkish parents’ distribution in the provinces of origin,
specifically where they themselves lived at age fifteen (for an overview of
Moroccan parents’ regions of origin, see table 4.9 in appendix).15 In most
countries, the origins are spread over various provinces, with no single
place or area dominating the emigration scheme per country or city.
Exceptions to this, however, are Belgium and Sweden: almost 30 per cent
of the Belgian respondents’ parents came from the province of Afyon; al-
most 40 per cent of the Swedish respondents’ fathers in Stockholm come
from the city of Konya.
In Austria, Switzerland, Germany and France, the main city of origin is
Istanbul. Ankara is a common region of origin in Austria and Germany.
Most of the respondents’ parents in Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands
(and, to some extent, France) come from Central Anatolia. Aside from
those coming from more urban regions, the mixture in Germany is more
diverse, with parents originating from the Aegean, Mediterranean and
Southeastern Anatolia provinces. In France, Turkish parents mostly come
from Central Anatolia and the Aegean provinces. In Switzerland, the
Aegean and Mediterranean, Eastern Anatolia and Marmara provinces are
most represented.
As we can see, there is also considerable overlap between the survey
countries in terms of provinces of origin. In this respect, however, Sweden
is an exception, as parents here come from other provinces (mostly
Southeastern Anatolia and the Black Sea region). Implicit here is the fact
that Turkish immigrants to Sweden are more diverse in their ethnic as well
as religious origins, with an increased presence of Christian Turks and
Kurds. Given that we are dealing with a different immigrant population,
this could potentially have a major impact on our Swedish results, not to
mention the conclusions we might draw from them.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter endeavoured to flesh out our understanding of the TIES
respondents. Acquiring knowledge about the actual composition of our
sample was an important first step in analysing our data and in order to
subsequently understand our results. Our respondents’ socio-demographic
characteristics displayed rather high rates of variation, reflecting conven-
tional wisdom concerning differences between the second generation and
the comparison group. As we make clear in other chapters in this book,
such incongruity can potentially impact outcomes for all groups and dispar-
ities between them.
Considerable variation between second-generation Turks and their
parents across cities was apparent. Among other observations, we found
differences in the respondents’ age distribution (Paris’ Turkish second gen-
eration is especially relatively young). This, in turn, influenced outcomes
of respondents’ household composition across countries. We also found
that second-generation Turkish women more often than men live outside
the parental household in their own newly formed households.
The parents of the Turkish second generation tend to be overwhelmingly
low educated, with the exception of those in Paris, Linz and Stockholm.
Some variation in the mean ISEI level between second-generation Turks’
parents is also visible across countries. In some cases, the difference be-
tween Turkish mothers across cities is substantial, being related to incon-
gruities in their level of economic activity.
As observed through the TIES survey, the second generation – and espe-
cially Turks and Moroccans among them – tend to be, on average, younger
than their comparison group peers. They tend to come from more modest
educational and socio-economic backgrounds, points of particular concern
that compelled the TIES team to select comparison group individuals from
similar backgrounds (mainly via neighbourhood selection). Yet, the socio-
demographic characteristics outlined here show that a discrepancy remains
between the groups. This disparity could affect – if not explain – differen-
ces in various life course outcomes. One of the challenges this book thus
sets out to examine is the extent to which their disadvantaged starting posi-
tion is something the second generation will be able to transcend.
Notes
1 Production of this chapter would not have been possible without the useful gui-
dance and help of Liesbeth Heering and Nienke Hornstra at NIDI.
2 All information about the TIES second generation in this chapter is used to describe
the main characteristics of the TIES respondents. Weights were not used because
our goal is mainly descriptive. Hence, the results outlined in this chapter should not
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be assumed to be representative of the targeted second-generation groups at the city
level (for more details about methodology, see chapter 3).
3 The appendix also includes a breakdown of gender, by group and city; see table 4.8.
4 Sampling variation might provide another explanation for the observed differences
in age, though previous studies have found that the second generation tends to be
relatively young (see Heath, Rothon & Kilpi 2008).
5 This could also be due to the higher proportion of former Yugoslavian second-gen-
eration respondents with only one immigrant parent (see table 4.11 in appendix).
6 By ‘country level’ we refer to the composite outcomes of a country’s two survey
cities.
7 Answers are based on reported rather than actual citizenship for the respondents.
8 Up until 2001, Sweden did not officially allow individuals going through the natura-
lisation process to hold dual citizenship (Government Offices of Sweden 2010). The
estimates here are based solely on responses to the question of whether or not
respondents held citizenship of the country in which they were born. Because it is
assumed that those without birth country citizenship by default hold Swedish citi-
zenship, these numbers might overestimate the prevalence of Swedish citizenship.
9 For details on educational levels and degrees, see EDU codes in chapter 5’s
appendix.
10 Credentials of the parents of the second generation and those of the comparison
group were not always perfectly comparable. Figures 4.6a and b do not assume
equivalence of credentials though do give an indication of discrepancies in their dis-
tribution. This is important to bear in mind and will be addressed in greater detail
in chapter 5.
11 For the main regions of origins of Turkish and Moroccan parents, see tables 4.9 and
4.10 in appendix.
12 It is assumed here that the non-transferability of skills, something typically experi-
enced by immigrants when settling in the host society, might affect low-educated
migrants less than more highly educated ones.
13 In Stockholm, many Turkish mothers worked, though not necessarily in jobs corre-
sponding to their level of education.
14 Differences may be due to our only few observations, which came as a result of large
numbers of missing answers to this question.
15 We must bear in mind that parents might have migrated internally (or even exter-
nally) before arriving to the survey countries. Insofar as this information is relevant
for our purposes, it should be interpreted with the knowledge that where a parent
lived at age fifteen is not necessarily the only place he or she has known prior to
emigrating.
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Table 4.10 Moroccan parents’ province of usual residence until age 15 (in %)
Mothers
Belgium Spain The Netherlands
1 Nador 33.9 Tangier 22.3 Nador 25.9
2 Tangier 16.1 Tetouan 20.9 Al Hoceima 17.1
3 Al Hoceima 14.2 Casablanca 13.3 Tetouan 7.0
4 Oujda 10.9 Marrakesh 9.0 Oujda 6.5
5 Tetouan 4.1 Nador 6.9 Tangier 5.5
6 Meknes 3.2 Larache 5.1 Casablanca 5.3
7 Casablanca 3.2 Al Hoceima 3.7 Chefchaouen 4.5
8 Agadir 2.6 Fes 3.4 Ouarzazate 4.0
9 Fes 1.7 Rabat-Sale 2.8 Meknes 3.8
10 Marrakesh 1.5 Taounate 2.3 Taza 2.8
91.4 89.7 82.4
Fathers
Belgium Spain The Netherlands
1 Nador 34.7 Tangier 23.3 Nador 28.5
2 Tangier 15.7 Tetouan 18.6 Al Hoceima 19.4
3 Al Hoceima 14.1 Casablanca 12.6 Oujda 7.7
4 Oujda 11.0 Marrakesh 9.1 Tetouan 6.7
5 Tetouan 4.4 Nador 7.8 Ouarzazate 4.8
6 Casablanca 3.2 Larache 6.4 Chefchaouen 4.6
7 Agadir 2.6 Al Hoceima 4.0 Tangier 3.8
8 Meknes 1.8 Rabat-Sale 3.5 Casablanca 3.8
9 Marrakesh 1.6 Fes 2.4 Taza 3.1
10 Fes 1.4 Taounate 2.0 Meknes 2.6
90.6 89.8 84.9
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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5 School careers of second-generation
youth in Europe
Which education systems provide the best
chances for success?
Maurice Crul, Philipp Schnell, Barbara Herzog-Punzenberger,
Maren Wilmes, Marieke Slootman and Rosa Aparicio Gómez
5.1 Introduction
We begin this chapter with some profiles of respondents to the TIES sur-
vey, namely, three young women of Turkish descent living in Paris,
Frankfurt and Amsterdam. The women’s parents all came from small vil-
lages in the countryside of Yozgat, a province in central Turkey, which is a
major sending area for Turkish emigrants. The mothers had all gone only
to primary school, while the fathers each had attended an additional few
years of secondary school. These stories exemplify differences in school
careers for young second-generation Turkish women in the different
European cities we studied.
First there is Kaya, an unmarried Turkish-French woman who was 22
years old at the time of the TIES survey in France. Living in Paris, at age
three, she went to école maternelle,1 followed by the local primary school
where, according to her estimation, half the children came from immigrant
families.2 She never had to repeat a year and, at age eleven, continued on
to a collège, a lower secondary school, in her neighbourhood. In this
school, three quarters of the children were of immigrant descent. Again,
she did not have to repeat years and obtained her BEPC diploma, after
which she continued in the first year of a lyceum technologique, an upper
secondary school. At age seventeen, she received her baccalaureate degree
and then moved on to a higher vocational education institution where, at
age 21, she got her Bachelor’s degree. At that point, Kaya stopped her
studies because, as she put it, she was satisfied with her results. Upon leav-
ing school, she was first unemployed, though after eight months she found
a professional job as a social worker. Kaya represents a large group of
female respondents of Turkish descent in our Paris survey.
Turning to Frankfurt, we meet Aysa, a Turkish-German twenty year old
at the time of the TIES survey in Germany. Aysa did not go to
Kindergarten and so only began school at age six. She went to a neigh-
bourhood primary school in which about three quarters of the children
were from immigrant families. She repeated a year once and thus finished
primary school at age eleven. She received no recommendation for a spe-
cific track and went to Hauptschule for lower vocational education, which
she completed, getting her diploma at age sixteen. At that point, she did
get a recommendation for Fachoberschule, an upper secondary vocational
track. Instead, she chose to leave school altogether. Marriage was the rea-
son Aysa gave for not continuing her studies. An actual marriage, to her
cousin, took place two years after she left school. Before starting her own
family, she did household work at her parents’ home. At the time of the
survey, she had no job and was taking care of her first child. Aysa repre-
sents a considerable group of Turkish second-generation women in the
Frankfurt sample.
Fatma, a Turkish-Dutch young woman from Amsterdam, was also
twenty at the time of the TIES survey in the Netherlands. She did not go
to preschool and began school at age four. Fatma went to her neighbour-
hood primary school in which half of the children were of immigrant de-
scent. She did not repeat any years and left primary school at age twelve.
Her school’s recommendation was to attend MAVO, the middle-level track
of lower secondary school. She followed this advice, obtaining her MAVO
diploma at age sixteen without any delay. Fatma then got a recommenda-
tion to continue on to MBO, middle vocational education, during which
she completed a three-year course and, by age nineteen, graduated.
Although she was advised to continue on to HBO, higher vocational educa-
tion, she instead left school. Like Aysa, Fatma’s reason for not continuing
was marriage. Fatma found a job immediately after leaving school and sub-
sequently got married. At the time of the survey she was working part-
time.
Education is one of the most crucial indicators for assessing the overall
position of the second generation. This chapter thus presents an overview
of the survey’s main educational findings for the Turkish, Moroccan and
former Yugoslavian second generation and for the children of native
parentage (the comparison group) in each of the fifteen cities we re-
searched. We compare school results for each ethnic group across countries
and cities and investigate educational gaps with the comparison group. We
find large variation across the different second-generation groups, within
the second-generation groups in different cities and between the second
generation and the youth of native parentage. The differences among the
Turkish groups across countries and cities are especially interesting and
surprisingly large.
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The second part of the chapter focuses on comparing second-generation
Turkish respondents across thirteen European cities whose parents have
similar low educational backgrounds (having completed, at most, lower
secondary school). We use the theoretical framework and methodology of
the internationally comparative integration context theory introduced in
chapter 2 in order to explain differences in school level outcomes in and
among countries and cities (see also Crul & Schneider 2010). Our point of
departure, based on distinctions made by Kerckhoff (2001; see also Crul &
Vermeulen 2006; Werfhorst & Mijs 2010), was to assume that more open
educational systems in countries like Sweden and France (Alba & Silber-
man 2011; Alba & Fournier 2007; Bayram 2009; Brinbaum & Ceballa-
Boada 2007; Kirszbaum 2009; Meurs 2008; Penn & Lambert 2009; Simon
2003; Westin 2003) are better suited to include the children of Turkish im-
migrants in higher education than the more stratified school systems of
Germany and Austria (Bacher 2003, 2005; Faist 1995; Heckmann, Penn &
Schnapper 2001; Herzog-Punzenberger 2003, 2005, 2007; Unterwurzacher
2007; Weiss 2007; Worbs 2003). Belgium and the Netherlands, with their
more mixed systems, would fall somewhere in between (Crul & Doomer-
nik 2003; Crul & Vermeulen 2006; Crul & Schneider 2009; Dagevos et al.
2007; Phalet & Heath 2010; Neels 2000; Timmerman, Vanderwaeren &
Crul 2003). We also assumed that more vocationally oriented systems
would probably do a better job retaining this more vulnerable group in the
educational system (Crul & Vermeulen 2003; Kerckhoff 2001). Our empir-
ical data do indeed show a strong effect of the integration context. The out-
comes, however, show a much more complex reality than we predicted
based on these general school system characteristics.
The main differences in school level outcomes between countries and
cities are found at both ends of the educational ladder. For this reason, we
made a typology based on the percentages of early school leavers and the
percentages of higher education students. We roughly distinguish four
types of outcomes: fast upward mobility (second-generation Turks in
Stockholm and Paris); polarisation (second-generation Turks in the two
Dutch cities, Brussels and Strasbourg, comprising a large group that expe-
riences fast upward mobility yet simultaneously quits education too soon
to qualify for a professional diploma); slow mobility (second-generation
Turks in the two Swiss cities, where the main trend is to pursue apprentice-
ships without a strong upward trend towards mobility); and low mobility
(second-generation Turks in the two German cities, the two Austrian cities
and Antwerp, where three quarters of students are either in the apprentice-
ship system or leave school early). We show that the four different out-
comes are the result of interaction between varying school system charac-
teristics and attributes typical of Turkish parents with low levels of educa-
tion. On the negative side, this includes the challenge of providing children
practical help with their homework; positively, we see how some parents
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have a strong drive to push their children ahead through education (see
also Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco & Todorova 2008; Kasinitz, Mollen-
kopf, Waters & Holdaway 2008). To unravel the complex puzzle of differ-
ent school outcomes at the two extremes – early school leaving and higher
education attendance – we analyse what opportunities schools offer to sec-
ond-generation Turkish students as well as what they demand in terms of
parental involvement in school. We evaluate this at the three most impor-
tant selection and transition points in education: the transition from primary
to secondary education and, more specifically, selection between academic
and vocational tracks in secondary school; the transition to apprenticeships;
and the transition to tertiary education. How the transition to apprentice-
ships is organised is important when studying outcomes of the early school
leaving indicator. Across the countries, we also find that differences in ter-
tiary education attendance are brought to light by opportunities and prob-
lems that students encounter when entering tertiary education, be it via an
academic or a vocational track.
5.2 Educational systems
National educational systems are, apart from educating, thought to serve
two purposes in modern nation-states. One is cultural and political homog-
enisation; the other is social stratification. In the first instance, differences
in the population stemming from a person’s family background and indi-
vidual personality should be diminished in order to create a national cul-
ture, a common understanding of citizenship and civil society (see
Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano & Vertovec 2004). In the second in-
stance, educational institutions serve as a ‘sorting machine’ to stratify a so-
ciety’s population (see Kerckhoff 2001). Western European societies, such
as those covered in our research, have highly comparable distributions of
occupations. The entrance ticket into the labour market is usually an indi-
vidual’s educational credentials. Interestingly enough, educational creden-
tials are often more difficult to compare across countries than occupations.
Differences in the type of credentials are expressive of institutional struc-
tures’ national variation, something which shapes the educational process.3
This section concentrates on three elements that all the analysed school
systems share and on three that quite differ. Starting with the commonal-
ities, we discuss: 1) compulsory education, 2) the three sequential steps of
primary, secondary and tertiary education and 3) a differentiation between
vocational and academic tracks.4
Every school system has a compulsory phase aimed at securing the basic
skills individuals need to survive in society and, quoting from the World
Declaration on Education for All, to supposedly ‘… develop their full ca-
pacities, to live and work in dignity, to participate fully in development, to
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improve the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions, and to con-
tinue learning’ (Eurydice 2002a: 13). While all countries have compulsory
schooling,5 their starting age ranges from five to seven, and the number of
requisite years ranges from nine to twelve. To illustrate, this means that
compulsory education ends at age fifteen in Austria, at age fifteen or six-
teen in Switzerland and Germany, at age sixteen in Spain, France and
Sweden and at age eighteen in the Netherlands and Belgium (Eurydice
2010a).
Another structural characteristic all national educational systems share is
the division into primary, secondary and tertiary education. While primary
education is compulsory in all systems, secondary education is obligatory
only up to a certain age. Primary education consists of four to eight years
of schooling. Consequently, secondary education starts and also ends at
different ages. In most countries, secondary school is divided into a lower
and an upper secondary part. Whereas lower secondary education is often
referred to as the second stage of basic education,6 the degree of specialisa-
tion in upper secondary education increases. The last of the three main di-
visions is tertiary or higher education, usually starting at age eighteen or
nineteen.
A third dimension found in all national educational systems is a division
into programmes or tracks that are either more practically or more theoreti-
cally oriented. As we will see later, how the vocational track is incorpo-
rated into the school system logic differs a lot across countries. To cite the
two extremes: on one end, there is no differentiation in the upper secon-
dary education degree, as is the case in Sweden where everyone gets a
gymnasie diploma, no matter which courses he or she has taken. On the
other end, there are the German-speaking countries, which differentiate stu-
dents at age ten according to tracks, thus resulting in highly differing final
degrees. Such a system is mostly geared to effectively place students into
the labour market. A student’s credentials in this system closely predict his
or her future position in the labour market.
We now turn to differences between educational systems. Though we ac-
knowledge their importance, we do not discuss at length the number of
contact hours in school (preschool and half-day versus whole-day school-
ing); the degree of curriculum standardisation, if there are obligatory finan-
cial contributions for the parents; or the topic of private versus public
schools. The following paragraphs do, however, discuss three topics that
emerged as being most important in our comparison: 1) the age at which
children first become involved in educational institutions, 2) the pathways
through the system and 3) the nature and effects of the tracking systems.
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Starting age of compulsory schooling and preschool attendance
The age at which compulsory school begins varies by country, as does the
extent of most children’s previous experience with public education. Most
countries in the TIES survey begin primary school at age six, with the ex-
ceptions of the Netherlands, being at age five, and Sweden, at age seven.
The decisive difference, however, lies in early childhood education and
care. While Sweden requires schooling only at age seven, in 2006, 78 per
cent of all Swedish children aged 1-3 were in fact in some sort of pre-
school institution (Eurydice 2010b: 3). In France, the compulsory school-
ing starting age is six, but in 2007-2008, all children aged 3-6 (and 23 per
cent of children aged two) attended nursery school (Eurydice France
2009a: 2). Even in the Netherlands where the compulsory starting age is
five, in 2008, 99 per cent of all four year olds attended primary school
(Eurydice Netherlands 2009b: 2). In Germany and Austria, the percentage
of children aged 3-6 in institutions of education and preschool was re-
ported to be 91 per cent for 2009 and 94 per cent for 2010 (Eurydice
2011: 76; Statistik Austria 2011: 23). Interestingly, in 2005-2006, only 66
per cent of all three year olds in Austria were in a care facility (Statistik
Austria 2011: 23), thus being much less than the share of even younger
children in Sweden. While there is now increasing convergence in the
TIES countries towards more – and earlier – inclusion of young children in
institutions of education and care, we see much greater diversity in the
past, including those years in which our respondents were at the corre-
sponding ages. As a reminder, our data is collected from young adults be-
tween eighteen and 35 years old who would have attended early childhood
education and care facilities from 1970 to 1990.
Preschool facilities across countries have different purposes and mis-
sions, which are reflected in the very terms used to name them. In Austria
and Germany, they are Kindergärten. Spain refers to them as ‘children’s
education’. France calls them ‘maternal schools’. The Netherlands sends
young children to ‘basic education’. In Sweden, they are known as ‘pre-
schools’. In countries like France, their educational role is explicit and en-
forced. In others, including Austria and Germany, day care was not under-
stood as falling within the educational realm until recently, and it is not the
Ministry of Education that oversees this. These differences also reflect na-
tional cultures and perceptions regarding the better environment for young
children – either the family or an institutional education – and this view is
also reflected in whether or not parents tend to place their children in a
public institution before compulsory schooling. Based on the TIES data,
we see that immigrant families completely adjust to the institutional struc-
ture and behaviour prevalent in their immigration country.
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The way through the system
It is clear from the countries presented in this chapter that the transition
from one year to another, or from one level to another, also varies consid-
erably. In the German-speaking countries, the transition from one year to
another is not automatic, but actually tied to subject-specific grades. If pro-
ficiency in one or more subjects is deemed insufficient at the end of the
year, the student can be held back from advancing to the next year. The
student then has little choice but to repeat the year (or leave that school for
another, where the student may try to advance to the next year or enter into
another, usually lower, level of education). If he or she has already com-
pleted the requisite years of schooling, the student can exit the educational
system altogether. In some countries, the likelihood of repeating a year for
students with a migration background is significantly higher than for stu-
dents without one.7 Some will consequently fulfil the obligatory number of
years of attending compulsory schooling before having even reached the
final year in lower secondary school. On leaving, they have no valid
school certificate beyond that of primary school. While in Belgium repeat-
ing a year is a regular phenomenon, in the Netherlands it is less so, espe-
cially in primary school. In France, a student’s performance evaluation on-
ly takes place at the end of a completed stage (for instance, lower secon-
dary school), and the teacher’s decision for a student to repeat a year can
be appealed by parents (Eurydice 2009a: 4). In Sweden, on the other hand,
repeating a year of compulsory schooling does not exist.
Another difference in the way through the system is the transfer from
one phase to the next: primary to lower secondary; lower secondary to
upper secondary or vocational training; and upper secondary to vocational
training, the labour market or tertiary education. There are four main mod-
els for these transfers (see Eurydice 2002a: 13). The first can be described
as ‘no requirements’, i.e. transfer is more or less automatic, such as in
Sweden where primary and lower secondary educations together form one
structure called the grundskola. In the second model, a phase must be com-
pleted before the student can advance to the next, as is the case with the
transfer from primary to lower secondary in France and Spain. The third
model holds that a phase must be completed and educational recommenda-
tion must be issued by a teacher or another school official who designates
the specific kind of school the student should attend next, as is the case in
the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Switzerland. The fourth model re-
quires a specific certificate for students to proceed, as is the case in
Belgium’s transition from primary to lower secondary school. We will
return to the element of selectivity connected to this transfer in some sys-
tems, i.e. the so-called tracking method.
The way the transfer from lower secondary to upper secondary or voca-
tional training is organised also differs a lot across countries. In Sweden,
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the transition from lower to upper secondary schooling happens more or
less automatically. In other countries, one needs information and personal
contacts to navigate the transition successfully. Placement in academic
upper secondary schools is sometimes competitive and, for placement in
the vocational education and training sector (VET), an apprenticeship is
sometimes necessary. Each year sees many more applications for appren-
ticeships than actual places are available. This puts children of immigrants,
especially, in a disadvantaged position.
Tracking
As described in the beginning of this section, educational systems have
two main functions in the modern nation-state: homogenisation and stratifi-
cation. While primary school mostly performs the task of cultural homoge-
nisation, the secondary and tertiary phases essentially act as sorting ma-
chines for the labour market. One of the most important mechanisms in
this is tracking. Though we emphasise the role of formal tracking through-
out the chapter, we are aware of the fact that there is also informal tracking
in educational systems, be it in the way courses are combined, or simply
by virtue of the prestige of an individual school.8
Tracking formally or informally groups children into separate classes or
schools through its various emphases on academic or more vocationally
oriented knowledge. The allocation process is based on test results or the
recommendations of teachers. Tracks usually determine opportunities to
access subsequent educational or training institutions and to specific seg-
ments of the labour market. The idea behind tracks is twofold: first, for op-
timal teaching results the learning abilities of children in a single class
should be as equal as possible; second, separate tracks are believed to ap-
propriately prepare students for more or less determined sections of the
labour market. In the German-speaking countries, the vocational specificity
of the opportunities afforded by the school system is most pronounced. At
the other end of the spectrum, Sweden has no tracking until the end of
compulsory schooling. In between is a continuum, with the Netherlands
closer to the German-speaking countries and Belgium closer to France and
Sweden.
In half the survey countries, the first selection happens at the lower sec-
ondary level. Especially in the German-speaking countries, the allocation
to different routes happens very early, at age ten. The exception is in
Berlin, where the first selection happens at age twelve, as is the case in the
Netherlands. The detrimental effect of early selection on the full develop-
ment of students’ potentials and subsequent prospects has been repeatedly
proven (e.g. OECD 2005: 50-62), though it must be noted that there is also
variation across countries with early selection. Among the countries in our
survey with differentiated lower secondary education in different schools,
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the least differentiation is found in Austria, having only two tracks using
the same curriculum. All the others have had three or even more. The num-
ber and designation of tracks have an impact on the pathways later on. In
Austria, the permeability between the two tracks in lower secondary is not
particularly large; after completion of the non-academic track, however,
many students choose to continue in education streams that do give access
to university. In countries where the least demanding track is one out of
three or four possibilities, streaming into tertiary education is usually low.
In the German-speaking countries there are four separate paths of voca-
tional education and training (VET), with varying contents and credentials.
In Austria, 80 per cent of young people in tenth grade attend a vocational
education or training path, which proves how attractive it is to students
(Tritscher-Archan 2009: 26). In 2005, 61 per cent of young people in
Germany were reported as enrolled in VET (OECD 2005). One of the
VET paths is the apprenticeship system,9 which comprises 40 per cent of
sixteen- to eighteen-year-old Austrians (Tritscher-Archan 2009: 30) and
two thirds of the youngsters at the post-compulsory level in Switzerland
(Moret & Fibbi 2006: 11). The high proportion of young adults here con-
veys how central these tracks are for the German-speaking countries. In
the non-German-speaking countries it is mainly children with learning and/
or behavioural problems who are recommended for these tracks. In bigger
cities, these tracks are highly segregated, often catering to a majority of im-
migrant students. These tracks usually carry little prestige and students
sometimes only stay in them to comply with compulsory schooling regula-
tions (Moldenhawer, Miera, Kallstenius, Messing & Schiff 2009: 8). It is a
challenge to compare the various kinds of vocational training across
European countries, since their schooling experiences differ highly and
lead to different positions in the labour market.
5.3 Educational positions of the TIES respondents
Overview of school level outcomes
We first describe the last or – should the respondent still have been in
school at the time of the survey – current educational status of the TIES
respondents.10 Because our survey group is between eighteen and 35 years
old, a substantial number of the young adults is still in some sort of educa-
tion. In many countries this is particularly the case for our second-genera-
tion respondents. The number of students still in school, however, varies
not only among groups, but also for the same ethnic groups across cities.
To give an example: while more than half the Turkish respondents in Paris
were still enrolled in education, this only applied to 10 per cent of their
counterparts in Berlin. This disparity can be attributed in part to the vary-
ing age distribution across the countries and in part to the differing average
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length of educational careers across cities. In France, more second-genera-
tion Turks continue into post-secondary education; in Germany, many stop
after completing lower vocational education (Hauptschule or Realschule).
This, of course, has an effect on the percentages of students who are still
in school. As we see in table 5.1, this effect is also notable in the compari-
son group, i.e. the children of native parentage.
With about a third of respondents still in school, it is not easy to assess
the educational position of the second generation. If we simply exclude
those still in school, we arrive at a serious underestimation of school out-
comes because many are still enrolled, particularly those pursuing higher
education. It is those students who had already left school at the time of
the survey who more often have short educational careers. For instance, if
we consider only the results of those who had already left school in
France, we find that almost a quarter has achieved a diploma from collège
(lower secondary school) or less. But if we look at those respondents still
in education, we find that only one person was still in collège. At 68 per
cent, the overwhelming majority was in post-secondary or tertiary educa-
tion. To do justice to both trends, we include the highest-level diploma for
those who had already left school and the present educational level for
those who were still in school.11
As such, the results presented in tables 5.2 a through c differ to certain
degrees from national survey results that are solely based on acquired
school diplomas (e.g. Brinbaum & Cebolla-Boada 2007; Alba et al. 2007).














Austria Vienna 19.0 54 13.8 36 25.1 74
Linz 29.6 70 17.0 71 27.4 73
Belgium Brussels 23.2 59 34.8 81 39.0 104
Antwerp 20.7 74 16.1 49 16.7 40
Switzerland Zurich 37.2 79 29.7 77 44.9 82
Basel 45.0 104 42.6 84 38.0 102
Germany Berlin 10.6 26 11.6 34 14.7 36
Frankfurt 14.7 41 11.7 29 9.5 27
Spain Madrid 33.2 83 42.4 106
Barcelona 26.8 67 31.6 79
France Paris 60.0 139 28.0 54
Strasbourg 31.1 77 40.0 67
Netherlands Amsterdam 47.1 98 54.8 120 34.8 93
Rotterdam 39.5 98 53.3 135 31.0 79
Sweden Stockholm 22.7 50 20.9 47
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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To continue with our French example, more than half of Paris’ second-gen-
eration Turks, as shown in table 5.2 a, are in the post-secondary education
category (because we include those who were at the time still studying in
post-secondary education), though less than a quarter already possessed a
post-secondary diploma. Using the highest diploma as the only indicator
results would thus overlook an important aspect of this age cohort’s reality.
The four tables detail the educational levels our respondents have at-
tained. To enable a comparison across the fifteen cities, we devised a cod-
ing system specifically for this dataset.12 The codes are constructed to do
justice to both the variation across school systems and the comparability
across the countries in this study. The results shown are weighted accord-
ing to group characteristics (age and gender) at the city level. For Germany
and Austria – though not for Switzerland – we had to combine students
from both short and longer apprenticeship tracks because they could not be
separated out.
The tables uncover some of the differences in school systems across
European cities as described in the first part of the chapter. In the lowest
part of the tables, the figures show that many students go into special edu-
cation, thus suggesting that this is particularly well developed in Belgium.
The concentration of integrated tracks in France and Sweden is the result
of postponing selection into different tracks until after lower secondary
school. After compulsory schooling (usually by the end of lower secondary
school), students either secure an apprenticeship or continue into upper
secondary school. In Germany, Austria and Switzerland, the apprenticeship
system receives the bulk of second-generation youth. At the highest level,
we distinguished between higher vocational education and university. Most
of the second-generation youth is found in the first category, which is more
practically oriented and probably offers better job opportunities, though al-
so has less prestige.
Tables 5.3 a through d show the five school level categories we created.
Reducing the international variation to five levels enables us to better com-
pare outcomes across the European cities and allows us to test school level
outcomes for significant differences across cities and by gender.
A first general observation from the school level tables is that only a
small proportion of the second generation in our survey occupies a rung at
the very bottom of the educational ladder. Respondents who did not finish
lower secondary education and therefore hold only a primary school diplo-
ma are few. The exception is Belgium, due to the relatively large share of
pupils in special education. The group that attained a lower secondary di-
ploma but stopped at that is larger and varies in size from city to city and
group to group. But most second-generation youngsters in our survey ac-
tually continued studying beyond the end of compulsory schooling, which
is usually upon completion of lower secondary school. They either contin-
ue into an apprenticeship track, a short middle vocational track or a
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Table 5.3b Educational level (in %) of second-generation Moroccans in five levels,
by city
Belgium Spain The Netherlands
Educational level Brussels Antwerp Madrid Barcelona Amsterdam Rotterdam
Primary school and
special education
8.3 7.5 7.2 18.2 7.2 9.1





21.5 45.7 24.6 26.8 41.0 46.5
Upper secondary
academic track
15.2 4.7 24.4 13.0 1.5 0.8
Post-upper secondary
or tertiary
39.3 26.4 6.4 13.0 31.9 27.1
N 239 309 235 231 242 251
Significance 0.000 0.001 n.s.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Table 5.3c Educational level (in %) of second-generation former Yugoslavians in
five levels, by city
Austria Switzerland Germany
Educational level Vienna Linz Zurich Basel Berlin Frankfurt
Primary school and
special education
4.4 2.4 0.4 0.9 3.7 0.9





39.5 61.1 71.6 62.6 65.4 66.9
Upper secondary
academic track
16.6 16.7 10.2 10.6 8.6 6.7
Post-upper secondary
or tertiary
25.3 15.9 10.8 17.3 8.3 12.4
N 253 242 234 190 202 204
Significance 0.000 0.002 n.s.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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vocational upper secondary school. The most successful students enter the
academic track in upper secondary school, which we find in all survey
countries’ school systems.
There are big differences between countries and cities at the highest lev-
el. In the countries with the best results, between one quarter and one third
of the second generation can be found in post-secondary or tertiary educa-
tion. On average, about one in five of all second-generation respondents in
the eight TIES survey countries is in higher education or had already ob-
tained a post-secondary or higher education diploma. This in itself is an in-
teresting finding because many of these second-generation youngsters have
parents with little schooling. They have thus taken a huge step in terms of
intergenerational mobility.13
We also analysed the role of country-versus-city effects, i.e. whether
school level outcomes significantly differ between two cities within one
country. Significant variation between cities alerts us to possible differences
between each city’s groups or the school context. For second-generation
Turks, we found significant differences between cities in three countries:
France, the Netherlands and Austria. These are mostly the result of Turkish
parents being somewhat better educated in Paris, Amsterdam and Linz. In
France, however, there are also different school policies regarding selection
and tracking. For second-generation Moroccans, we found a significant dif-
ference in school level outcomes in Brussels and Antwerp. This, again, is
partly the result of parental characteristics and partly the result of differen-
ces in school policies regarding selection and tracking. In the case of the
former Yugoslavian second generation, significant differences between the
two cities are found in Austria and Switzerland, but not in Germany.
Over the last decade, the trend in many countries has been for girls to
demonstrate better school outcomes than boys. Does this trend also apply
to the second generation? We looked at differences between males and fe-
males for all three second-generation groups in all cities. We found no sig-
nificant difference in school outcome levels between second-generation
Turkish males and females in any of the thirteen cities. Nor did we find
any gender differences for the second-generation former Yugoslavians in
the six cities where they were interviewed. Only in Antwerp did we see
that second-generation Moroccan females are doing significantly better
than men (p < 0.01), the former being especially better represented in post-
secondary education. Looking back to the situation in the 1980s, females
of the in-between generation were more likely to lag behind their male
peers (Crul 2009; Crul & Schneider 2009). Today, females have reached
equal educational positions.
The tables on educational outcomes indicate that differences between the
comparison group and second-generation groups are considerable and can
be found in all thirteen cities.14 Since the parents of the second generation
mostly attended school at the lowest level while parents of the comparison
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group generally attended school at much higher levels, it is difficult to
compare the two groups’ parental educational background in a meaningful
way. To get some indication of the possible differences, figure 5.1 com-
pares children of parents who attended school at the middle level. In all
groups, this group sufficiently represents to make a proper comparison.
Figures 5.1 a through c show school level differences for respondents
with parents who only had secondary schooling. In the following three fig-
ures, we compare second-generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugo-
slavians with the comparison group. A bar above the line indicates an
overrepresentation of the second generation and a bar under the line indi-
cates underrepresentation.
With only one exception, we do not see any significant overrepresenta-
tion of second-generation youth at the very lowest level of the educational
range (primary school). The largest significant overrepresentation is at the
middle level (apprenticeship and upper secondary and vocational oriented).
This is especially true for second-generation Turks. The most widespread
underrepresentation for all three groups is at the level of higher education,
where we find many more students of the comparison group in post-
Figure 5.1a School level differences between second-generation Turks and
comparison group with parents who attended secondary school only












Vienna  Linz Brussels Antwerp Zurich Basel Berlin  
Frankfurt Paris Strasbourg Amsterdam Rotterdam Stockholm 
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Figure 5.1b School level differences between second-generation Moroccans and
comparison group with parents who attended secondary school only
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Figure 5.1c School level differences between second-generation former Yugoslavians
and comparison group with parents who attended secondary school
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secondary or tertiary education than the children of immigrants. Gaps in
post-secondary and higher education are very similar across cities. Second-
generation youth are performing at lower levels than children of native pa-
rentage, even when their parents have similar educational background char-
acteristics. Their parents’ immigrant background puts them at an extra dis-
advantage in almost all school systems.
The effect of parental educational levels on school outcomes
Parental educational level can usually explain a large part of school out-
comes. In the case of Turkish and Moroccan parents, educational level is
overall very low. About half the parents went no further than primary
school. The second-largest group (about 40 per cent) went to lower secon-
dary education for a few extra years. We grouped parents’ educational level
into three categories: 1) primary school only, 2) some lower secondary ed-
ucation and 3) some upper secondary education or more beyond that. We
also analysed parental education effects separately for fathers and mothers.
Looking across all countries, we see that both cities in Germany and both
in Austria displayed the strongest educational level effects of Turkish fa-
thers’ education (Berlin p < 0.01; Frankfurt p < 0.01; Vienna p < 0.01; Linz
p < 0.01) and Turkish mothers’ education (Berlin p < 0.01; Frankfurt
p < 0.01; Vienna p < 0.05; Linz p < 0.01). We found similar effects for the
second-generation former Yugoslavians in these four cities. This supports
general knowledge derived from other studies that German and Austrian
school systems are more stratified and have a strong class- and origin-
based selection of students (e.g. OECD 2006).
Figures 5.2 a through c present the effect of the fathers’ education on
the attained educational levels of Turkish second-generation respondents in
Austria and Germany. Children of fathers with, at most, primary school are
represented by the blue line; children of fathers with lower secondary
school, the red line; and children of fathers with upper secondary or terti-
ary education, the green line. The five educational outcome levels for the
second-generation Turks are represented in the horizontal bar: primary and
special education; lower secondary education; apprenticeship or something
similar; academic upper secondary; post-secondary and tertiary. The graph
clearly demonstrates that children of parents with very low levels of educa-
tion also have the worst school outcomes. This group is particularly large
in Germany.15
In most of the fifteen cities, we found no significant differences in out-
comes between children of parents who have had, at most, primary school
and children of parents with lower secondary schooling, be it just some or
completion of the level. This is an important finding because a large major-
ity of the second-generation respondents come from families in these two
categories. Thus, differences are often not significant when analysing the
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Figure 5.2a School level of second-generation Turks in Vienna (according to five
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Figure 5.2b School level of second-generation Turks in Linz (according to five
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Figure 5.2c School level of second-generation Turks in Berlin (according to five
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Figure 5.2d School level of second-generation Turks in Frankfurt (according to five
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effect of parental educational level. At the same time, this finding obscures
the fact that in many cases children of more highly educated parents do
much better than the rest. However, the group with more highly educated
parents is very small in the Turkish samples of the TIES survey.
Parents’ low educational levels prove a serious obstacle for the educa-
tional career of their second-generation children especially in post-secon-
dary and tertiary education. The second-generation children of more highly
educated parents follow a very distinct pattern, their school outcomes in
fact being more similar to the comparison group.
5.4 School level outcomes and integration school contexts:
A typology
This second part of the chapter concentrates on comparing second-genera-
tion Turks across seven countries. In the previous section, we saw that the
children of more highly educated Turkish parents have a very distinct
school outcome pattern, resembling that of the comparison group. To make
the Turkish groups more comparable across the cities, we excluded re-
spondents with more highly educated parents from the following analyses.
The cut-off point for parental education is upper secondary school or high-
er. However, this is overall quite a small group. We thus only compared
Turkish respondents whose parents went to secondary school for a few
years at most (i.e. lower secondary school). Between half and two thirds of
our Turkish second-generation respondents do come from families with
low or very low educational credentials.16
Since differences between second-generation Turks across European
cities mostly occur at the extreme ends, we constructed a typology to pri-
marily capture a sense of the proportions of early school leavers and of
higher education students.
According to an EU definition, early school leavers are students who ex-
it school with only a lower secondary school diploma or even less (OECD
2005: 25-36). As a percentage of the total sample, table 5.4 shows how
many of our respondents fit this category.17
The percentages of early school leavers among second-generation Turks in
the Dutch, Belgian, German and Austrian cities are high to very high.18 We
find the lowest percentages in Stockholm, Paris, Zurich and Basel. The com-
parison group follows a similar ranking pattern across the cities. In
Stockholm, only very few second-generation Turks leave school early; this is
also true for the comparison group, though even fewer Swedes of native pa-
rentage leave school early. In the two Dutch cities, early school leaving is a
huge problem not only among second-generation youth, but also for the com-
parison group. This seems to be a general rule, also applicable to other school
indicators: if the comparison group experiences difficulties in certain
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educational phases, we see a sort of multiplier effect for the second genera-
tion, who experience the same difficulties albeit at exponentially higher rates.
Figures given at the beginning of the chapter, in figures 5.2 a through d,
conflated respondents in post-secondary education with those in tertiary ed-
ucation. For this typology, we restrict ourselves to those in tertiary
education.19
Table 5.5 Second-generation Turks in higher education who have low-educated
parents (in %, N), by city
Countries Cities % N Sign
Austria Vienna 13.4 21
Linz 17.9 19 n.s.
Belgium Brussels 24.8 27 0.014
Antwerp 13.7 29
Switzerland Zurich 19.5 17 n.s.
Basel 11.7 14
Germany Berlin 5.3 9 n.s.
Frankfurt 4.6 7
France Paris 52.2 71 0.000
Strasbourg 28.8 51
The Netherlands Amsterdam 27.7 43 n.s.
Rotterdam 26.1 42
Sweden Stockholm 32.0 29 n.a.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Analysing the relationship between early school leavers and tertiary educa-
tion indicators, we can roughly distinguish four typical integration path-
ways in the field of education.
Table 5.4 Early school leavers among second-generation Turks with low-educated
parents (in %, N), by city
Countries Cities % N Sign
Austria Vienna 36.9 58
Linz 25.5 27 n.s.
Belgium Brussels 34.9 38 n.s.
Antwerp 29.9 63
Switzerland Zurich 11.5 10 n.s.
Basel 14.3 17
Germany Berlin 35.7 61 n.s.
Frankfurt 30.3 46
France Paris 10.3 14 0.012
Strasbourg 20.9 37
The Netherlands Amsterdam 23.2 36 n.s.
Rotterdam 28.6 46
Sweden Stockholm 9.0 8 n.a.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Table 5.6a Four possible outcomes based on percentages of early school leavers and
higher education students
High % early school leavers Low % early school leavers
High % higher education Polarised mobility Fast upward mobility
Low % higher education Low mobility Slow mobility
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
1 Low mobility
Second-generation Turks in the two German and Austrian cities and
Antwerp: the largest part (over three quarters) is in the vocational track
or in the apprenticeship system and a very large group leaves school
early.
2 Slow mobility
Second-generation Turks in the two Swiss cities: the majority of the
Turkish second generation successfully enters the apprenticeship sys-
tem. There are relatively few early school leavers.
3 Polarisation
Second-generation Turks in the two Dutch cities and Brussels and
Strasburg: the trend is a significant share of respondents experiencing
strong upward mobility and an almost equally big share leaving school
early.
4 Fast upward mobility
Second-generation Turks in Stockholm and Paris: since access to higher
education is less dependent on parental or other background character-
istics and few students leave school early, the second generation experi-
ences a generalised strong upward social mobility in relation to their
parents’ generation.
Table 5.6b A school outcome typology for second-generation Turks with low-
educated parents







Germany 33.1 61.9 5.0 Low mobility
Austria 32.3 52.5 15.2 Low mobility
Belgium Antwerp 29.9 56.4 13.7 Low mobility
Switzerland 13.0 72.0 15.0 Slow mobility
Belgium Brussels 34.9 40.3 24.8 Polarisation
Netherlands 25.9 47.2 26.9 Polarisation
France Strasbourg 20.5 50.7 28.8 Polarisation
Sweden 9.0 59.0 32.0 Fast upward
France Paris 10.3 37.5 52.2 mobility
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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5.5 Explaining differences across Europe: How school system
characteristics interact with family resources and support
This section analyses the school careers of early school leavers and tertiary
education students in more detail. We endeavour here to identify relevant
factors influencing the sizeable differences across countries and cities. The
TIES survey identified not only final educational outcomes, but also all the
steps in between, starting with preschool. We use this uniquely gathered
information to show in greater detail where the school careers of second-
generation Turkish youth start to differ across countries and groups. In par-
ticular, we look at three crucial selection points in the educational systems.
Only by viewing the entire school career are we able to link educational
results directly with differences in school institutional arrangements. For
instance, the final educational results for second-generation Turks in the
two Austrian cities and Antwerp are almost the same. However, we see
that how school careers developed in the two national contexts could not
be any more different. In the Austrian case, the relatively low performance
of the Turkish second generation is the result of their low participation in
preschool and early selection after primary school. In Antwerp, it is the re-
sult of high dropout rates and being downstreamed in upper secondary
school. Yet this crucial systemic difference only becomes visible when we
reconstruct the entire school careers in detail.
The same is true for the importance of family resources. School systems
differ in terms of both the intensity and the type of role parents are ex-
pected to play during the various school phases. In some systems, parents
are expected to play a large role in primary school, whereas in others, their
role is more important in the second part of the school career. Explanatory
models testing the effect of parental characteristics as the dependent varia-
ble on their children’s final educational level do show a culminating effect
of parental support over a period of fifteen to twenty years. This can poten-
tially include positive and negative effects during different time periods.
Statistically, they may have the effect of levelling each other out. In the
Netherlands, for instance, we see that some second-generation Turkish chil-
dren are able to reach higher education because their parents provide them
practical support, namely, help with their homework during primary
school. Others reach higher education even though their parents could not
help them at this level; they become successful on a longer alternative
route because they have persisted at school. The influence of parents’ prac-
tical support on their children’s final educational outcome will look less
strong as a result because both children with and without support have ulti-
mately reached higher education. Looking at their school careers not only
as a whole, but at each individual phase, enables us to identify the impor-
tance of family resources at the respective school phases. This brings to
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the fore how differences in school systems affect school careers and how
the systems interact with family resources.
Parental involvement in school
The TIES survey addressed a number of questions about both parental and
sibling involvement in school. We asked about parents helping with their
homework and controlling the time spent on it, talking about school and
meeting with their teachers. We also asked two questions about help from
elder siblings. Since the educational levels of parents in the reduced sample
are very similar (because we excluded more highly educated parents), we
expect differences in parental and sibling involvement in school to explain
some of the remaining differences in school outcome levels.
We introduce the most important school involvement indicators briefly
by presenting outcomes across countries. We only present the two extreme
ends. Figure 5.3a shows that about two thirds of the parents rarely or never
helped their children with homework; this is a very large group. In general,
it is not so much that parents are not interested in school – because most do
talk about it with their children – but that parents are not able to help due
to either a language barrier or not understanding the homework’s content.
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Alternatively, parents may control the time children spend on homework.
For this, they do not necessarily need to understand its content. They can,
for instance, prevent children from watching television before finishing their
homework. About a quarter of the parents often controlled the time spent on
homework. Later in this chapter, we will see that these two different types
of parental involvement have different effects on school outcomes.
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Figure 5.3b How often low-educated parents of second-generation Turks controlled
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A third possible level of parental involvement is talking about school. For
this, parents need even less knowledge of schoolwork content. As a result,
the number of parents who talk with their children about school is much
larger; fewer parents rarely or never talk about school. The only exceptions
here are parents in Germany, which was particularly the case when a moth-
er had little knowledge of the German language.
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Tracking within secondary school: Institutional arrangements in preschool
and primary school and how their role interacts with family resources
In all countries, the most important selection point arose when it was time
for tracking into academic tracks that are distinct from middle and voca-
tional tracks in secondary education. As described in section 5.1, in most
countries the timing of the selection is at the beginning of secondary edu-
cation. Exceptions are France and Belgium, which select only after lower
secondary school. In Sweden, selection takes place at the end of grund-
skola (primary school), which includes the lower part of secondary school.
We first look at the group of respondents best positioned and prepared
to continue into higher education: those following academic tracks. There
are large differences between the countries and cities with regard to the
share of second-generation Turkish pupils found here. Half of second-
generation Turkish children in Paris were entering an academic track, com-
pared to only a bit more than one in ten in Frankfurt or Berlin. In
Switzerland, we could not make a meaningful distinction in our data be-
cause in most cases the respondents went on to follow a combined middle
and academic track.
Table 5.7 Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) in academic tracks
in secondary school (in %, N), by city
Countries Cities % N Sign
Austria Vienna 19.7 31
Linz 15.1 16 n.s.
Belgium Brussels 50.5 99 0.018
Antwerp 65.3 62 0.018
Switzerland Zurich n.a. n.a. n.a.
Basel n.a. n.a. n.a.
Germany Berlin 10.5 18 n.s.
Frankfurt 12.5 19 n.s.
France Paris 62.9 83 0.000
Strasbourg 39.4 65 0.000
The Netherlands Amsterdam 23.2 36 n.s.
Rotterdam 23.6 38 n.s.
Sweden Stockholm 52.9 45 n.a.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Access to the academic tracks is significantly different between cities in
two countries, France and Belgium. In Strasburg, significantly more pupils
get a recommendation to follow a vocational track than in Paris. About 90
per cent in both cities follow this advice. We checked the background of
these collège students to see if such characteristics could account for the
difference. But even when taking only those students who did obtain a
collège diploma and never repeated a year in primary school, we still saw
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significantly more students in Strasburg than Paris being advised to follow
a vocational track.
We also analysed whether teachers in Strasburg were targeting Turkish
students, in particular. This hunch was supported by the fact that we saw
no similar trend for the comparison group. It appears that teachers in
Strasbourg did more often have a vocational route in mind when advising
students who are of Turkish descent and a lower-class background. The
Turkish communities in Paris and Strasburg differ in terms of their relative
size within the two cities. In Paris, Turks represent a rather small group
among many other immigrant groups, but in Strasburg they are the largest
immigrant group. In the Alsace region, of which Strasburg is both capital
and principal city, the Turkish community is the most visible minority,
known for its presence in construction and manual labour. This recognised
working-class image of the Turkish community may well have affected
teachers’ views on the Turkish second generation. It seems, however, that
this is slowly changing. Among our respondents, the younger cohorts
(eighteen to 25 year olds) were less often advised to follow a vocational
track than the older cohorts (25 year olds and up). As a result, the gap be-
tween Paris and Strasburg is gradually closing.
The varied outcomes in Brussels and Antwerp are also due to different
advising policies. In Antwerp, significantly more children were recom-
mended for lower vocational education (BSO). But also within the aca-
demic track, significantly more Turkish pupils in Brussels (48.8 per cent)
than Antwerp (18.9 per cent) were recommended to continue into the gen-
eral academic track (ASO) and not the technical academic track (TSO). As
is generally the case, TSO pupils more often do not continue into higher
education after upper secondary school. In the long term, the different ad-
vising policy leads to significantly fewer students of Turkish descent being
in higher education in Antwerp. In contrast to France, this difference in ad-
vising policy between the two cities is also visible in the comparison
group. But, as in Strasburg, the younger cohorts in Antwerp were less
often advised to follow vocational tracks than the older cohorts. As such,
the gap between Antwerp and Brussels is slowly closing.
Vocational tracks can be identified in each country, but some distin-
guish between levels. The following tables present outcomes for only the
lowest vocational tracks in secondary school. For this reason, we exclude
France and Sweden, where such lower vocational secondary tracks do not
exist.
More than three quarters of second-generation Turks in Austria are
tracked into Hauptschule (while the other 18 per cent in Vienna and 24 per
cent in Linz follow the academic track). This is partly because there are
only two tracks available in Austria, whereas in most countries there is an
additional middle track between the lower vocational track and the aca-
demic track. In the two Swiss cities as well, more than half of second-
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generation Turks are found in lower vocational tracks. In Antwerp, signifi-
cantly more children are sent on to the vocational BSO track than in
Brussels.
Table 5.8 Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) in lowest vocational
tracks in secondary school (in %, N), by city
Countries Cities % N Sign
Austria Vienna 75.8 119 n.s.
Linz 82.1 87 0.008
Belgium Brussels 29.4 32 0.008
Antwerp 44.5 94 n.s.
Switzerland Zurich 55.2 48 n.s.
Basel 54.2 65 n.s.
Germany Berlin 40.8 69 n.s.
Frankfurt 35.5 54 n.s.
The Netherlands Amsterdam 23.9 37 n.s.
Rotterdam 32.3 52 n.s.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
A number of general school system differences described in the beginning
of the chapter explain the large differences in tracking outcomes across
Europe. We highlight the two most important for our respondents: age on
entrance into early education and care facilities and age at which first se-
lection takes place.
As shown above, the age at which children are expected to enter educa-
tion and care facilities is very different across Europe. The systems in the
German-speaking countries are characterised by a relatively late entrance in-
to educational institutions, while our Turkish second-generation respondents
in the two French cities were the youngest to enter education: almost 90 per
cent went to école maternelle at age two or three. In Belgium and France al-
most all children of all groups go to preschool. In the German-speaking
countries sample the average starting age is much later, while in the Dutch
sample the average is four years old. The mean age for entering school
among second-generation Turks in Stockholm is three. However, Sweden is
the country with the widest range: some children began barne, a combina-
tion of preschool followed by kindergarten, at a very early age, while others
stayed home until the beginning of compulsory schooling at age seven.20
Looking at the comparison group, we see the same trend across coun-
tries and cities (see appendix 5). The starting age in each country is mostly
dependent on national policies based on beliefs and norms about what is
considered a ‘good age’ to enter preschool. However, we find that second-
generation Turkish respondents in all countries except Sweden tend to start
preschool later than the comparison group, and they are also more likely
not to attend preschool whatsoever. The differences with the comparison
group are most pronounced in the Austrian cities. There is also a
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remarkable difference between the two Austrian cities themselves: second-
generation Turks in Linz went to Kindergarten 1.5 times more often than
their peers in Vienna.
Table 5.9 Age of entrance into an educational institution among second-generation
Turks with low-educated parents
City < 3 3 4 5 6 7 8 Unknown
Vienna 1.9 1.3 21.0 12.1 47.1 15.9 0.6 0.0
Linz 3.8 14.2 24.5 20.8 31.1 2.8 0.0 2.8
Brussels 18.4 63.1 3.9 5.8 8.7 0.0 0.0 n.a.
Antwerp 23.1 69.7 5.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 n.a.
Zurich 0.0 0.0 4.6 67.8 18.4 8.0 1.1 n.a.
Basel 0.0 0.0 14.7 62.9 16.4 4.3 1.7 n.a.
Paris 4.4 78.7 11.0 4.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 n.a.
Strasbourg 2.8 90.4 5.1 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 n.a.
Berlin 0.0 33.3 29.8 12.9 9.4 12.9 0.0 1.8
Frankfurt 0.0 43.4 28.3 7.9 6.6 12.5 0.0 1.3
Amsterdam 1.9 11.0 73.4 9.7 3.9 0.0 0.0 n.a.
Rotterdam 1.9 5.0 83.2 7.5 1.9 0.6 0.0 n.a.
Stockholm 37.5 12.5 12.5 15.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 12.6
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
In Belgium and France, preschool attendance is common among all groups.
In the other countries, preschool attendance varies between and within
groups. In Germany and Austria, this results in many second-generation
youngsters not going to preschool. These variations in starting age mean
that the second-generation Turkish respondents began their educational
careers in very different ways. In France, they began to learn French in an
educational environment at the age of two or three, during the phase in de-
velopment that is most open to learning a new language. In Switzerland
and Austria, they entered education, on average, two years later and ac-
cordingly had more difficulty learning German as a second language.
In countries where there is considerable variation in preschool attend-
ance (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden), we can analyse the
effect this has on streaming into academic tracks. In both Germany and
Austria, we find a significantly positive effect (p < 0.05) of preschool
attendance on academic track selection in secondary school.
Another relevant aspect of the first selection is how many years have
passed between entering educational facilities and the streaming into differ-
ent school tracks. This is significant not only for the sake of exposure to
the majority language, but also for increased opportunities to acquire skills
necessary for higher academic levels. If we take the mean age our respond-
ents entered school and the formal selection age in each country, the situa-
tion proves most favourable in France, Sweden and Belgium, with eleven
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to twelve years of common education under a student’s belt before any
selection is made.
At the other extreme, the situation is least favourable in Austria,
Germany and Switzerland, with a period of only five to seven years of com-
mon education prior to selection. This is not only rather short but, combined
with the fact that the majority of schools in the German-speaking countries
were only half-day, it thus further limits the amount of contact hours be-
tween teachers and children. Kindergarten and preschool attendance were
not particularly encouraged when our respondents were young, one reason
being that considerable costs were involved. Compulsory schooling in these
countries begins only at age six. This means that considerable shares of re-
spondents were in an educational institution, learning the German language
and other academic skills, for only four years before, at age ten, the most
important decision on their future school careers was made.
Table 5.10 Years between start of education and tracking among second-generation
Turks with low-educated parents







Austria 4.9 10 5.1
Belgium 3.0 14 11.0
France 3.1 15 11.9
Germany 4.2 10 to 12 5.8/7.8
The Netherlands 4.0 12 8.0
Sweden 3.1 15 11.9
Switzerland 5.2 12 6.8
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
A combination of late start and early selection diminishes the opportunity
second-generation Turkish children in Germany have to enter Gymnasium.
At the other end of the spectrum, in countries with an early start and a late
selection (France, Sweden and Belgium), about half the second-generation
Turkish respondents followed the academic track. Their counterparts in the
Netherlands, located precisely in the middle range of years in education be-
fore selection, also rank in the middle with regard to the percentage having
pursued the academic track.
The school system mechanisms behind tracking differ greatly across
Europe. As a result, we also expect family characteristics to have different
effects. Because many children in Germany and Austria did not go to pre-
school, they did not learn the second language in an institutional environ-
ment before starting primary school, as is the practice for many children in
Belgium and France. As such, the parents have more responsibility for
helping their children learn German as a second language. Many second-
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generation Turkish children thus came into primary school with low profi-
ciency in German. The short time span between starting and selection ages,
forced them to try to overcome the language gap quickly. In addition,
Turkish parents in Germany and Austria are expected to play a very active
role during the primary school years. Children only attend school for half-
days and are thus mostly expected to do homework in the afternoon under
the guidance of their parents. Independently from each other, we tested six
different aspects of parent and sibling school involvement to see how they
influenced academic track access as the dependent variable. We tested
whether outcomes were significant based on a three-answer scale: 1) very
often/often, 2) sometimes or 3) rarely/never.
As shown in figure 5.4, only a very small group of parents was actually
able to help with homework in a practical way, and what parents were able
to do in terms of homework support was not very effective in most cases.
Therefore, only in Austria do we see practical homework help’s small sig-
nificant positive effect (p < 0.1) on tracking; in all other countries, the
effect is not significant. Because of their own low level of education and
second language difficulties, most parents were unable to give support that
really made a difference. The result of this is, however, quite different
across the countries. In Germany, only one in ten of the pupils whose
parents were unable to help with homework nevertheless went to
Gymmasium. In countries like Belgium and France, still more than half of
those similarly lacking parental support made it into an academic track.
Controlling the time children spent on homework – something parents
could do even without much content comprehension – seems to have been
a more effective strategy. This is a highly significant factor in Austria
(p < 0.01), Germany (p < 0.01) and France (p < 0.01). In Germany, chances
for second-generation Turkish children to enter an academic track dropped
to almost zero (only 6 per cent) when parents did not control time spent on
homework. By contrast, about a quarter of the children of parents who did
exercise control made it into Gymnasium. In Austria, the same applies to al-
most a third, even though this percentage is still much lower than in most
other countries. As expected, the respondents in Germany and Austria were
most dependent on practical help and control by parents. We see a similar
pattern when it came to talking about school and meeting with teachers.
Again, we find significant effects only in Austria (talking about school
p < 0.01; meeting the teacher p < 0.01) and Germany (talking about school
p < 0.1; meeting the teacher p < 0.05). Pupils whose parents were less active
concerning school matters experienced seriously reduced opportunities in
these two countries. The same applies to the effect of an elder sibling talk-
ing with respondents about school or helping with homework, being again
only significant in Austria (talking about school p < 0.05) and Germany
(helping with homework p < 0.05; talking about school p < 0.01). In
Austria, slightly more than a quarter of children with a sibling who often
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talked with them about school entered an academic track. The number is
less than 10 per cent for those children whose siblings rarely or never talked
about school with them.
Sweden is an interesting case for contrast because here parental involve-
ment items negatively correlate with performance in school. It seems that
Turkish parents more often controlled homework (p < 0.05) and talked about
school (p < 0.05) – or felt the need to do so – when children did not perform
well. The average or above-average student apparently did not need the ex-
ercise of such control to be prompted to follow an academic track.
In Stockholm, the tracking process is much more determined by actual
learning abilities. This allows not only pupils with the most supportive and
best-educated families to pursue an academic track, but also bright and
average-level children from disadvantaged families. In other words, paren-
tal involvement manifests very differently across the seven countries. To
show this graphically, we singled out children whose parents did not help
with nor control homework. In Sweden, Belgium and France, this did not
have an effect on the share of those going into academic tracks. In
Germany, on the other hand, without this kind of family support it was al-
most impossible to enter an academic track. The Austrian and Dutch cases
fall somewhere in between.
Figure 5.4 Second-generation Turks in an academic track with low-educated
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To a considerable extent, the tracking mechanisms across countries deter-
mine the school level outcomes in our typology. The place occupied by
German and Austrian Turks at its low end is largely determined by the
late start in school and the early selection – a situation that requires a lot
of practical support from parents, though which many are not able to
give. In contrast, the fast upward educational mobility typical for most
Turks in Paris and Stockholm is, in large measure, determined by the
much more open school systems that do not rely on practical support
from parents.
Early school leavers: Institutional arrangements in the transition to the
apprenticeship system and family resources
The tracking that takes place in secondary school has a huge effect on fu-
ture school career. We see this most clearly when looking at early school
leavers. The chance of becoming an early school leaver is much greater
when a pupil is tracked into a lower vocational track compared to a middle
track or an academic track. The most extreme case is Germany, where low-
er vocational pupils are 25 times more likely to become early school leav-
ers than pupils following an academic track.
The relationship between lower vocational education and leaving
school early is different across countries, but is significant in all cases.
Table 5.11 shows only lower vocational pupils and the percentage among
them who became early school leavers. The fourth column gives the per-
centage for the comparison group. These two groups, which in theory are
both selected according to the same learning abilities (lower vocational
track), have very different chances of becoming early school leavers. The
chances for second-generation Turks to become early school leavers are,
Table 5.11 Early school leavers who attended lower vocational education in
secondary school among second-generation Turks with low-educated
parents and comparison group (in %, N), by city
Countries Cities Turkish second generation Comparison group
Austria Vienna 41.2 17.0
Linz 28.7 11.2
Belgium Brussels 43.8 50.0
Antwerp 36.2 29.4
Switzerland Zurich 7.5 3.1
Basel 14.0 7.1
Germany Berlin 52.9 28.6
Frankfurt 50.0 35.4
The Netherlands Amsterdam 36.2 31.3
Rotterdam 40.0 33.3
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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in almost all cases, much greater. In Austria, Switzerland and Germany,
countries that rely most on the apprenticeship system, twice as many sec-
ond-generation Turks become early school leavers than the comparison
group. In the Netherlands and Belgium, the likelihood for pupils in lower
vocational education to become early school leavers is high in both
groups.
In most cases, early school leavers stop after compulsory school.
However, a smaller group even drops out during lower secondary school.21
Dropout in lower secondary school is most prominent in the Netherlands,
Belgium and France.22 An important effect of early tracking in the
Netherlands and Belgium is the marginalisation of the lowest vocational
track as compared to other lower secondary school tracks. This is under-
lined by the similarly high percentage of early school leavers in the com-
parison group following this track. Children with learning and behavioural
problems tend to be concentrated here. Children in lower vocational educa-
tion are usually placed in separate schools or school buildings. In these
schools in the big cities, children of immigrants are highly overrepresented,
thus yielding the label ‘ghetto schools’. Half the second-generation Turkish
respondents following these tracks in the two Dutch cities and about a third
in the two Belgian cities went to schools with 75 per cent or more pupils
of immigrant origin. Dropout rates in these schools are very high. Parents
of native descent try to avoid sending their children to these schools.
Children of native parentage who do end up in these schools are often
from very disadvantaged backgrounds. Three quarters of parents in the
Dutch and Belgian groups went to, at most, lower secondary school – a
very low level of education compared to other native-born parents in our
survey.
Students who do finish a lower vocational track are usually streamed in-
to another middle or upper vocational track, with or without hands-on ex-
perience via an apprenticeship in a company. The transition from lower
secondary school to an apprenticeship track marks the end of compulsory
school. For this reason, the step taken after compulsory school is crucial.
Some students do not continue into further education for various reasons;
others are unable to get an apprenticeship or drop out of middle vocational
education. In all three cases the result is early school leaving.
The numbers of early school leavers differs immensely between coun-
tries and cities. The following paragraphs briefly discuss the most relevant
differences in the school systems. Sweden, being the country with the low-
est percentage of early school leavers, merges primary and lower secondary
educations into one school, grundskola. This eliminates the so frequently
problematic transition from primary to lower secondary school. Every extra
transition to be made, as we will see in other countries, results in more pu-
pils leaving school early. This seems to be a first explanation for lower per-
centages of early school leavers in the Swedish sample. Moreover, in the
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lower part of Swedish secondary school, pupils with different learning abil-
ities are grouped together in the same classes. After grundskola, all chil-
dren are expected to continue onto gymnasie (from age fifteen to eighteen),
where children of all levels still remain together. Pupils may be tracked
along different programmes within gymnasie, but they study at the same
school in the same building. This means there are no separate (or, as is
often the case, marginal) lower vocational schools, as there are in the
Netherlands or Belgium.
Switzerland is the other country with quite low percentages of early
school leavers. Here, early school leaving is not nearly as high as in
Germany or Austria, despite a similar school system and similarly high
shares of pupils in lower vocational education. Analysing school careers
here shows how in Switzerland the transition into an apprenticeship is
eased by the so-called Brückenangebot, which coaches them for entrance
into such a position.
We see that the transition from Hauptschule to an apprenticeship is
highly problematic for second-generation Turks in Germany and Austria.
One out of three students does not make it into such a position directly
after school. These are vulnerable students who left lower secondary edu-
cation, supposedly lacking the capacities and skills to enter an apprentice-
ship – a big problem when there is tight competition for securing such a
position. This is handled differently in Switzerland. Here, students do not
completely drop out of the system at this point, but are placed in the
Brückenangebot, where they receive coaching to prepare them for an
apprenticeship. In three quarters of the cases this works well, especially
considering that it concerns the most vulnerable group. The Brückenange-
bot works almost equally well for second-generation Turks as for the com-
parison group, notably also because it enjoys a good reputation among the
employing companies. Prospects look different in Germany, where suppos-
edly comparable programmes serve as little more than a ‘parking spot’ for
youngsters who are still of compulsory schooling age.
Interestingly, those countries with the best-developed vocational trajecto-
ries produce the highest percentages of early school leavers. This is some-
what paradoxical. Early tracking (beginning as young as age ten) is de-
signed to put children, as soon as possible, into tracks that match their
skills and abilities. For second-generation Turks, this does not seem to
work accordingly.
In Germany, the transition from Hauptschule to an apprenticeship track
seems to be the most problematic. Here, only a bit more than one third of
second-generation Turks makes it directly into an apprenticeship, while at
the same time an even larger share does not continue with any formal edu-
cation after Hauptschule.
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Figure 5.6 Hauptschule to apprenticeship tracks among second-generation Turks

























Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Figure 5.5 Brückenangebot to apprenticeship tracks among second-generation Turks
















Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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With almost 40 per cent of second-generation Turks going through
Hauptschule in Germany, there is a large group of early school leavers.
Also, the continuation rates for second-generation Turks are much lower
than for the comparison group, wherein about a quarter does not continue
after Hauptschule. This is also a sizable group, but still only half as many
as among the second-generation Turks.
The picture totally changes if the pupils spent their lower secondary edu-
cation in a Realschule (Germany’s middle level in secondary school). As
many as three quarters of the second-generation Turks in this track went
directly into an apprenticeship. Here, the group that is unsuccessful in
making this transition is much smaller (10.5 per cent), and the disparity
with peers in the comparison group almost vanishes. Among other things,
this demonstrates the very difficult position Hauptschule students face
compared to Realschule students in competing for apprenticeships. Having
a much larger share in Hauptschule than their comparison group peers,
second-generation Turks are thus at a greater disadvantage.
Early school leaving is either the result of dropping out or not continu-
ing with one’s studies beyond the lower secondary education diploma. We
expect the parents to play an important role in the decision of whether or
not to continue further studies at this young age. Again, we tested the
seven parental and sibling involvement strategies for children who started
in the lower vocational track (Hauptschule, VMBO in the Netherlands or a
comparable level in other countries) and continued studying. We then com-
pared them to those who became early school leavers in Germany, Austria,
the Netherlands and Belgium – the four countries most plagued by early
school leaving. We included the mothers’ ability to speak the majority lan-
guage because it, too, appeared to be an important factor.
Yet, only Germany and Austria showed strong significant effects.
Parental help with homework is – highly – significant only in Germany
(p < 0.01). Parental control over the time spent on homework is significant
in both Germany (p < 0.01) and Austria (p < 0.05). Parents talking about
school with their children is significant in both Germany (p < 0.01) and
Austria (p < 0.05). Regularly meeting with teachers is not significant in
Germany, though it is in Austria (p < 0.05) and the Netherlands (p < 0.05).
An elder sibling talking about school with a younger sibling is highly sig-
nificant in Germany (p < 0.01) and only weakly significant in the
Netherlands (p < 0.1). In Germany, only 12 per cent of Hauptschule stu-
dents whose parents often controlled time spent on homework became
early school leavers; when parents never exercised such control, it climbed
up to 62 per cent. We see similar large discrepancies for help with home-
work and talking about school. Having or lacking parental support is thus
extremely important for explaining early school leaving among pupils who
went through Hauptschule in Germany and Austria. Since many parents
actually did not give this kind of support to their children, the effect on
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early school leaving is considerable compared to other countries. The
mother’s ability to speak the majority language also makes a significant
difference in Germany (p < 0.01) and Austria (p < 0.1). Children whose
mothers speak German well are five times more likely to continue studying
after Hauptschule than children whose mothers do not.
It is remarkable that parental involvement has no significant effect on
early school leaving in Belgium or the Netherlands. We thus see how the
effects of parental support are very different across countries.
For all countries but Belgium, the TIES survey also inquired into rea-
sons for respondents not to continue their studies. Table 5.12 shows that
both pull factors (wanting to earn money and to get married) and push fac-
tors (not wanting to go to school anymore) affect early school leavers. The
pull factors are most prominent in the Netherlands and the push factors, in
Germany.23 An aversion to school is expressed quite strongly in the early
school leaving group, especially in Germany and Austria. A substantial
group of second-generation Turkish girls also gave marriage as their reason
to stop studying. The percentages, however, differ between countries. The
fact that Austrian compulsory school stops by age fifteen explains why in
both cities early school leavers are still very young (four out of the five left
school at age sixteen). This probably also explains why Austria has a lower
percentage of females who cite marriage as the main reason to stop school
than does the Netherlands.
Table 5.12 Second-generation Turks’ reasons for early school leaving after acquiring
a lower secondary school diploma (in %), by country
Austria* Germany The Netherlands
Satisfied 13.5 11.3 17.2
Don’t want to go to school anymore 42.3 56.3 20.3
Work 19.2 28.8 26.6
Work (males only) 14.3 45.0 37.0
Marriage (females only) 4.2 17.5 29.7
*A number of early school leavers go to the Polytechnikum after Hauptschule to finish com-
pulsory education.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
We also have information on what early school leavers did directly after
leaving school. The patterns are strongly gendered. In Germany, 60 per
cent of the females lived at home doing housekeeping for their own or
their parents’ households. Males were much more geared towards the la-
bour market, though only 3 per cent immediately found a job. In Austria,
half the females did household work directly after leaving school; only 12
per cent immediately found a job, and another 18 per cent were actively
looking for a job at the time of the survey. Among the males, 40 per cent
immediately found a job and another third was actively looking for a job.
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In the Netherlands, the pattern also proved gendered, though much less so
than in Germany and Austria. Only a quarter of the women did household
work immediately after they stopped school. More than a third started
working immediately; another 20 per cent was looking for work. Of the
males, two thirds started working immediately after leaving school, and an-
other quarter was actively looking for a job. In Belgium, half of the fe-
males and three quarters of the males started to work immediately after
leaving school. Less than 10 per cent of the females did household work
right after school.
If we combine reasons for leaving school early with information on what
these respondents did after leaving school, we begin to get a fuller picture.
In Germany and Austria, many young women helped out in their own fam-
ily household and then got married afterwards, setting up their own house-
holds. The fact that their parents were not talking much about school with
them probably had to do with the lack of expectation for daughters to con-
tinue studying and to earn an income. In Germany, of the 33 married fe-
males who left school early, 24 married someone to whom they were intro-
duced by their parents or through their parents’ network. Seven females
married a relative. In Austria, nineteen of the 34 married females who left
school early were first introduced to their spouses through their parent’s
network. Thirteen females married a relative. It seems that in Austria and
Germany many females who left school early are pretty much following
the traditional gendered pathways of their mothers.
In the Netherlands and Belgium, females are, on average, older when
leaving school, as compulsory school ends, respectively, at the ages of
seventeen and eighteen. This seems to give females more room to escape
traditional gender role expectations, as we find that many more enter the
labour market. The fact that in Germany and Austria pupils can stop
school so early also has an effect on their decision not to enter the labour
market.
For males, the picture is far more difficult to read. In the Netherlands
and Belgium, they enter the labour market in big numbers. Starting to work
is also given as the main reason for not continuing studying. To a lesser
extent, this is also true for Austria. But in Germany, only a few immedi-
ately enter the labour market. Perhaps this is unsurprising, considering their
young age, but it raises a serious question: why, without any real alterna-
tive, did the young men not continue their education? One possible answer
is that they were unable to find an apprenticeship. This is probable, as
about two thirds of second-generation Turkish males in the two German
cities expressed having experienced discrimination while looking for a job,
as did three quarters in the two Austrian cities.
In Germany and Austria, second-generation Turks must choose to either
continue their schooling or to actively seek an apprenticeship – largely on
their own – at the young age of fifteen or sixteen (the end of compulsory
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school). At this point, in the middle of puberty, a large part is no longer
motivated to go to school. In families where there is no clearly expressed
positive attitude towards educations, the risk of early school leaving dra-
matically increases. The Swiss system of Brückenangebot shows how this
risk can be compensated for by a proactive approach on the part of schools
and labour market institutions.
In France and Sweden, most pupils do not need to make any decision
about school continuation before the end of upper secondary school, at
age eighteen or above. Not having to make the choice earlier means that
there is also less risk of early school leaving. Across the countries, chil-
dren from families with similar background characteristics encounter very
different risks of becoming early school leavers. In Germany and Austria,
about half the children whose parents rarely or never talk about school or
meet with their teachers becomes early school leavers. In France this is
the case for only one out of five children. In Switzerland it is only one out
of eight.
Early school leaving is one of the two indicators in our typology. As a re-
sult of the high level of early school leaving in the two German and two
Austrian cities and Antwerp, we have placed second-generation Turks in
these cities together in the low-mobility typology. This outcome is a
Figure 5.7 Early school leavers among second-generation Turks with low-educated
parents who rarely or never talk about school or meet with their
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Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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combination of two factors: first, a result of many children being tracked
into Hauptschule or BSO; second, a result of the problematic transition to
an apprenticeship or upper secondary school at a very young age. The high
degree of institutional risk factors in Germany and Austria makes for an
unfortunate match with family risk factors in the Turkish communities.
Institutional arrangements in the transition to tertiary education and family
and individual resources
Differences in percentages of students on academic tracks in secondary
education between the countries and cities are significant. As already dis-
cussed, this can mostly be explained by differences in terms of access to
academic tracks. In most cases in the German-speaking countries, chances
for higher education are already considerably reduced by the early selec-
tion that occurs at age ten or twelve. The school systems in Sweden,
Belgium and France offer considerably more opportunities for children of
very low-educated parents to access an academic track. Despite the fact
that academic tracks generally aim to lead pupils directly into tertiary edu-
cation, two relevant phenomena are to be observed here: on the one side,
pursuing an academic track is no guarantee for actually entering tertiary
education afterwards. Conversely, we find quite a lot of students in tertiary
education who did not come from an academic track. This is particularly
true for our second-generation Turkish respondents, but it also differs quite
strongly across countries and cities.
Table 5.13 shows how many of the students who were streamed into an
academic track in secondary education actually ended up in tertiary educa-
tion.24 The percentage of students entering into higher education from an
academic track differs a lot across countries and cities.
Table 5.13 Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who reached








Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
The reasons students do not make it into tertiary education differ from
country to country. In some cases, downstreaming in secondary school is
considerable; in other countries, it is because students do not continue into
tertiary education after finishing academic upper secondary school. Below
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we concentrate on Belgium and Sweden, two countries with relatively
large groups of second-generation Turks in academic tracks in secondary
school and much smaller numbers in tertiary education.
Downstreaming from an academic track to a vocational track occurs
most often in Belgium. After the initial selection between ASO, TSO and
BSO, a further selection takes place in transitioning from the second to the
third cycle in secondary school. Some of the ASO and TSO pupils end up
in BSO, and others drop out of school altogether. We compared ASO and
TSO pupils who reached higher education with those who did not.
Repeating a year in secondary school turns out to be the strongest predictor
for not continuing into tertiary education. Children who repeated a year
were three times more likely to not continue into tertiary education. When
pupils must repeat in Belgium they are simultaneously advised to drop to a
lower school track. This so-called ‘waterfall’ system is largely responsible
for the downward trend. Parental support is very important for children’s
survival along the academic track. Children whose parents talk about
school and meet with their teachers are twice as likely to continue into ter-
tiary education. We saw in the previous section how, for the first selection,
family characteristics made little difference in Belgium. In the second half
of secondary school, however, these family resources begin to play a much
more prominent role, similarly to other countries.
The way the transition from upper secondary school to tertiary education
is organised also has an important impact on how many students reach ter-
tiary education. In France and the Netherlands, almost all students who re-
ceive an academic diploma from secondary school continue into tertiary
education. Belgium and Sweden are outliers because of the large groups of
students with an academic secondary school diploma who do not automati-
cally transfer into tertiary education. While in France and the Netherlands,
the transition does not really involve a deliberate choice, in Belgium and
Sweden, it seems to. In Stockholm, more than a quarter of second-genera-
tion Turks do not continue into tertiary education after gymnasie. Another
20 per cent continue into a sort of non-tertiary adult education. This is true
for pupils in all gymnasie programmes, though especially for those in voca-
tional ones, and it applies much more to males than females. Also, about
half the students with a TSO diploma (the vocational track in upper secon-
dary school) in Belgium do not continue into tertiary education. Many
more second-generation Turkish youth than children of native parents in
Sweden and Belgium stop after upper secondary school. The fact that in
these two systems a continuation to tertiary education involves a real
choice works out negatively for the children of Turkish immigrants. In
middle- and upper class-families, there are expectations for children to at-
tend university from the very beginning. This differs in immigrant families
in which a gymnasie or TSO diploma is already a major step forward, com-
pared to what their parents’ have achieved. In these families, pursuing
SCHOOL CAREERS OF SECOND-GENERATION YOUTH IN EUROPE 147
tertiary education competes with the opportunity to work and earn one’s
own income. It seems that the decision of whether or not to continue
school is largely made by the eighteen year olds themselves.
In the Netherlands and Austria, the percentage of second-generation
Turks in tertiary education is actually higher than for academic tracks in
secondary school. This means that a considerable group enters tertiary edu-
cation through upstreaming and continuing their studies after middle voca-
tional education. Table 5.14 presents the percentage of tertiary students
who started out in a vocational track in secondary school.
Table 5.14 Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) in higher





Austria Belgium The Netherlands France Germany Sweden
Respondents 52.5 30.7 45.9 10.5 25.0 19.2
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
The Dutch system is very selective at the beginning of secondary school,
creating a division of pupils into different tracks as early as at age twelve.
But this early selection is somewhat mitigated by the many opportunities
to stream up into pre-academic tracks and tertiary education. Almost half
the second-generation Turks have taken this alternative route to tertiary ed-
ucation. In the group of native parentage, this applies to only half as many
students (20 per cent). Once on the alternative route, mechanisms for sec-
ond-generation Turks and the comparison group are no longer that differ-
ent. For both groups, about three quarters take a route through middle vo-
cational education (MBO), which is three years longer than the direct route;
about one quarter enters through upstreaming during upper secondary
school (HAVO), which takes only one year longer than the direct route.
Compared to children on the direct route, these students generally have
parents with very low levels of education (often only primary school or no
education at all). They also live in more cramped houses and have less
space to do their homework. They also less often reported having elder sib-
lings already in tertiary education who could help them out with school.
The indirect route seems to be an alternative for students from families
with very low cultural capital.
The Austrian case is interesting to contrast with the Dutch one because
pupils who move up from the non-academic track in Austria do not experi-
ence a similar delay in getting a degree that gives them access to univer-
sity. In Austria, at the end of lower secondary education, the students com-
ing from Hauptschule can switch directly to AHS Oberstufe, the upper
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secondary academic track lasting four years (comparable to HAVO/VWO in
the Netherlands), or they continue on to BHS, the upper secondary voca-
tional track lasting five years. Both provide a diploma to enter university.
The pathways of successful students are very different. In Sweden and
France, the group that makes it into tertiary education is much larger and
much more diverse. An early exposure to institutional learning and late se-
lection make it possible for many ‘above-average students’ from disadvan-
taged backgrounds to reach higher education on a direct route without ma-
jor delays. In the Netherlands, above-average students who are persistent
enough also get a chance to enter higher education through a longer or al-
ternative route. But in the two German cities, we find that even the bright-
est children can barely achieve entry into the higher education system if
their parents are poorly educated. The German school system is so selec-
tive at all important transition points that virtually all children of lower-
educated Turkish parents are driven away from the academic track.
5.7 Concluding remarks
The position of the second generation at school highly differs from country
to country. In all cases, however, the second generation still lags behind
their peers of native-born parents. The main differences with the compari-
son group occur at extreme ends of the educational spectrum. More sec-
ond-generation youngsters are early school leavers and fewer are able to
access higher education. The vocational track receives the majority of the
second-generation youth in our survey, between half to three quarters being
found there. Some only get as far as the first step and become early school
leavers, while others climb the ladder higher and finish an apprenticeship
that gives access to middle-level positions in the labour market. There is,
however, also a considerable group of second-generation youth found in
post-secondary or tertiary education. About one in five of our second-gen-
eration respondents was still studying in tertiary education or had already
obtained a higher education diploma. Second-generation females in most
cases closed the gender gap up to the highest level. Access to tertiary edu-
cation is one of the areas where country and city variation is largest. This
means that in some cities the second generation is already quite visible in
higher education institutions, while in others this group is still very small.
A substantial part of second-generation students in tertiary education has
taken an indirect route through the vocational track into higher education.
The indirect route provides a ‘second chance’ especially for those school
systems that select children early. We see that the second generation is us-
ing these indirect routes much more often than the comparison group.
Based on comparative integration context theory, we predicted that sec-
ond-generation groups of the same ethnic origin would perform very
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differently across countries and cities. The detailed information on school
outcomes and school careers does indeed show that the challenges faced
by second-generation Turks are very different across countries and some-
times even between cities within the same country. Educational institution-
al arrangements are a main driving force behind school level differences.
An obvious example is the starting age for school and preschool. In
France, learning the second language is a much smaller challenge than in
Austria, where the average age on entering an educational institution is
three to four years later. Most second-generation children in France begin
learning French by age three, when their peers of native-born parents are
also still in the beginnings of language learning. In Austria, only entering
an educational institution at age six or seven means that children of
Turkish immigrants already lag considerably behind in their German lan-
guage skills, compared to the children of native parentage.
Our results also show large differences across countries concerning the
importance of the vocational track and how transitions to an apprenticeship
and from upper secondary school to post-secondary education are organ-
ised. All these variations combined lead to substantial difference in attained
educational levels across countries and cities. Comparing the school level
outcomes for second-generation Turks across the seven countries in the
TIES survey, we distinguished four typical outcomes: fast upward mobility,
polarisation, slow mobility and low mobility. Based on our analysis of the
three primary selection and transition points in the school careers of sec-
ond-generation Turks in the seven countries, we can summarise the most
significant institutional arrangements to determine the four outcomes, as
seen in figure 5.8.
Influential institutional factors can roughly be brought together under
the heading of ‘preparing practices’. In early childhood education and care
facilities, second-generation youth have the opportunity to learn the lan-
guage of instruction (assuming that it is not spoken at home), to the extent
that they will be comfortable and capable enough to learn using that lan-
guage in primary school. Late selection gives second-generation youth ex-
tra time to prepare for high-stakes testing. Upstreaming in upper secondary
school affords an extra opportunity to move up the educational ladder after
the first selection point. All these institutional arrangements influence
tracking in secondary school.
For early school leaving, the main focus is on students who fall in the
vocational column. The original idea behind tracking in secondary school
(and the main objection to a more comprehensive approach in school oth-
erwise) is that different tracks would create a learning environment best
adapted to students’ varying abilities and skill levels from an early age.
However, this is not the case. Early tracking often leads to marginalised,
highly segregated school streams, with many social problems concentrated
in one school type. As a result, children on vocational tracks have a much
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higher chance of leaving school early than pupils in other tracks. While the
transition within the academic tracks from lower to upper secondary school
is almost automatic, many second-generation pupils in the vocational
tracks do not make the transition to an apprenticeship, in which case most
become early school leavers. Only the Brückenangebot in Switzerland pro-
vides a positive example of how to ease this transition.
School systems are also organised differently in the transition to tertiary
education. In most countries, students are expected to continue to higher
education after Gymnasium or lyceum, but in some countries this is not au-
tomatic. Another main difference is the availability of an alternative route
through the vocational column. Upstreaming through the non-academic
column provides, at least in some countries like in the Netherlands, a sec-
ond chance to pass high-stakes testing at a later stage, when the students
are better prepared to succeed.
Figure 5.8 Important institutional arrangements in school according to the school
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In general, we see that specific characteristics of the school systems are
magnified for the second generation by contrast to the comparison group.
If school systems produce a lot of early school leavers, children of immi-
grants are among the groups most affected. Or, if downstreaming is an im-
portant feature of the school system, this proves to be an even stronger
mechanism for the second generation. The same is true for school system
features like upstreaming or the long route. They work equally well, if not
even better, for the second generation as for the comparison group. We
coin this the multiplier effect.
Different school systems demand different levels of parental involve-
ment. Some types of support are easier than others for parents with low
levels of education. In primary school in Germany and Austria, parents are
expected to provide practical support and to control the time children
spend on homework. Should they not attend preschool, the parents are also
responsible for their children’s German language proficiency. This results
in an unhappy marriage of lacking family resources and demands of the
school system. Yet, more ‘egalitarian’ systems exist that require the parents
to intervene only when children show more severe learning and behaviou-
ral problems. The Swedish system, especially, shows how the average pu-
pil can succeed without much parental involvement.
Based on our findings, we can create a school integration context typol-
ogy for children of low-educated immigrants that can be used for interna-
tional comparative research. We identified four types of school integration
contexts that range from very favourable to very unfavourable. The most
favourable school integration context is an inclusive context in which im-
migrant children’s learning abilities are the primary factor in placement
into academic tracks and where immigrant parents’ lower educational lev-
el is not a hindrance, per se. At the opposite end of the spectrum in the
most unfavourable exclusionary integration school context, whereby the
lower-class background of the immigrant parents prevents most children
from entering tertiary education, but also makes the transition to an
apprenticeship problematic for lower-class immigrant children. Among
children whose parents offer little or no school support, many become
early school leavers. An inclusive vocational school integration context,
in contrast, provides a smooth transition to apprenticeships. The route to
higher education, however, is still blocked for most children of lower-
educated immigrant parents. Finally, in the permeable integration school
context, there exist many opportunities to stream up, but also to be
streamed down. This leads to highly polarised outcomes. Parents’ support
or lack thereof can thus be crucial; so is persistence among the students
themselves.
Boudon (1974) introduced a useful distinction when determining differ-
ences in children’s school career courses that stem from different class
background. Primary effects describe differences in academic performance;
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secondary effects describe different choices in educational career when per-
formance levels are the same. If we compare the four types, the primary
effects (driven by the parents’ own education) are largest in an exclusion-
ary integration school context. Here, Turkish parents with very low levels
of education are usually unable to offer the help needed in this school sys-
tem. Secondary effects loom large in integration school contexts that
involve crucial choices. The points at which decisions must be made prove
important here, too. Decisions at an early age are much more influenced
by parents, while later in life decisions are much more frequently made by
the student. In an exclusionary integration context, choices must be made
early, for instance, with regard to preschool attendance and continuation
after compulsory school at age fifteen or sixteen. In an inclusive and per-
meable school integration context, these decisions need only be made by
age eighteen or older. In this last case, the students’ own motivations and
goals gain more currency.
The national school systems offer various windows of opportunity at dif-
ferent stages for parents and elder siblings to support children in school.
Immigrant parents are better equipped for some challenges than others. As
a result of both the integration context and the agency of parents, we see
the second generation performing more successfully in education in some
countries than in others.
Notes
1 An explanation of the different schools and levels per country is given in table 5.15
in the appendix.
2 The respondents were asked to estimate the share of immigrant children in the
schools they attended.
3 The great variation in national educational structures across the European Union
could well diminish during the next decades.
4 The educational systems in many countries have undergone structural changes,
either since our respondents attended school or during their school careers. Older
respondents may have thus experienced somewhat different institutional settings
than the younger ones.
5 The option to home-school children is regulated differently across the countries.
The share and nature of private and public schools also differ greatly in the coun-
tries covered.
6 As explained in the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
1997 (UNESCO 1997: 9).
7 In Austria, the share of students of a Turkish migration background at the end of
compulsory schooling (aged fifteen) who have repeated one or more years is 30 per
cent, while the share among students of a former Yugoslavian background is 18 per
cent. This figure drops to 13 per cent among students with no migration background
(see Breit 2009: 142-144).
8 As Kerckhoff (2001: 14) has pointed out, a student’s individual choice is not only af-
fected by formal structures, but also the normative influences of functional
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communities. Together the three elements – structures, functional communities, indi-
vidual choices – affect the trajectories through the educational system and on the la-
bour market in all societies, even though ‘... nature, extent, and timing of their effects
vary’.
9 Over the course of three years, apprentices have two places of learning: four days a
week at the enterprise itself and one day at school. Successfully attaining an appren-
ticeship certificate at the end of this period means the student possesses a full pro-
fessional qualification, which, depending on the profession, can translate into higher
earnings than credentials gained on an academic track in upper secondary schooling
would yield. However, the academic track is still seen as more prestigious, leading
to university access and more promising careers in the long run.
10 Results presented in the tables are weighted against characteristics of the different
ethnic groups in the city population (for a detailed explanation of the weights, see
chapter 3).
11 By effect, this leads to a certain degree of overestimation of educational attainments
because some of these students would have dropped out of their present level. On
the other hand, some of those who were still in education would have continued on
to an even higher level. In the French survey, for instance, about a third of these re-
spondents were still in secondary education and many were bound to move up to
some form of post-secondary education. We suppose that, on average, conflation of
the highest diploma with current level of schooling produces the most realistic re-
presentation of our respondents’ educational attainment.
12 The details of this coding system are described in appendix 5.1.
13 Looking at results, we need to be cautious because early school leavers are usually
slightly underrepresented in surveys. Our survey in France was able to identify the
educational level of respondents who refused to participate; here we did see that
early school leavers were somewhat underrepresented and higher education students
were a bit overrepresented.
14 The comparison group in our survey is purposely sampled in neighbourhoods
where the second generation is settled. While for the second generation, we aimed
to interview a representative sample at the city level, this was not the aim for the
comparison group. In some cities, neighbourhoods where the second generation
lives have high percentages of students, whereas in others, the predominant non-im-
migrant population is working-class. As a result, the socio-economic background
characteristics of the comparison group differ considerably across cities.
15 Outcomes for the other two second-generation groups show similarly large impacts
of parental educational level in Germany and Austria.
16 Mostly recruited for unskilled labour in the 1960s and 1970s, the parents frequently
entered the host countries as guest workers coming from rural areas.
Overwhelmingly, the parents were educated in their home countries, namely, in vil-
lages with limited schooling opportunities.
17 It is difficult to fit the Belgian case into the international comparison because, un-
like in any other country, secondary education is divided in three parts, rather than
two. We can either base our Belgian figures on the first cycle (years 1 and 2) as this
is the official threshold for early school leaving, or we could include the second cycle
(years 3 and 4), which comes closer to the duration of lower secondary education in
most other countries. Using the latter basis, the percentage of early school leavers is
much larger and matches that of the Dutch case. We selected this broader definition
of early school leaving, including the second cycle, even though it means having to
overestimate early school leaving in Belgium vis-à-vis other countries.
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18 We see similarly high outcomes for second-generation Moroccans in the Dutch and
Belgian cities. The outcomes for the second-generation former Yugoslavians in
Germany and Austria look a bit more promising than those of their Turkish peers.
19 This excludes, in particular, a group of post-secondary (non-tertiary) respondents in
Belgium, who were doing an extra sixth year after upper secondary school.
20 The reader should take into account that the starting school age of our sample of
eighteen to 35 year olds reflects the situation in kindergarten and primary school in
the 1970s and 1980s.
21 In the Dutch case, a quarter of the second-generation Turkish students who dropped
out of lower secondary school had interrupted their school attendance in the
Netherlands during primary school to go to Turkey for a period lasting more than
three months. This decision, one made by their parents, has had a huge negative ef-
fect on their school careers in the Netherlands.
22 This is less clear-cut in France, where those who have no lower secondary diploma
usually did finish collège, albeit without a diploma. It is questionable if they should
actually be categorised as drop-outs.
23 Unfortunately, for the German-speaking countries we did not include the answer ca-
tegory ‘Not able to find an apprenticeship’. In hindsight, we realise this was probably
a major reason for many students not to continue.
24 Excluded from the analysis are respondents who are still in school and previously
followed an academic track in secondary school but are not yet in tertiary education.
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Appendix
For the purposes of sound cross-country comparison, we designed a coding
system. Though based on the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED) system, we included more detailed categories of the
TIES survey countries’ education systems. We refer to this toolkit as the
EDU codes. Especially challenging was the fact that some countries have
separate vocational tracks after lower secondary school, while others keep
the vocational track within upper secondary education. Our criteria for cod-
ing students within an internationally comparable scheme are similar to
that of the ISCED: we thus look to the next potential step in education to
which a current track provides access. The steps in the coding table follow
the logic of a hierarchy from lower to higher. Distances between the steps,
however, are not equal.
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6 Assessing the labour market position and its
determinants for the second generation
Laurence Lessard-Phillips, Rosita Fibbi and Philippe Wanner
6.1 Introduction1
There is ample research evidence about the economic hardship that immi-
grants and their families face (see e.g. Kogan 2006; OECD 2007, 2008).
The most predominant reasons for such hardship include the low starting
position of unskilled and low-skilled migrants and, especially for more
highly educated migrants, a lack of skills transferability upon migration.
An evaluation of the second generation’s position in the labour market
gives insights into the extent to which labour market disadvantages found
in the first generation are reproduced in the subsequent one. The labour
market integration of the second generation, along with education, helps to
determine the quality of structural integration processes. Our research
seems to suggest that disadvantages are still present in the second genera-
tion, though this is mostly due to lower levels of human capital and lower-
status social origins. Yet, there are also disadvantages unaccounted for by
these factors that vary according to their specific context of integration.
A major goal of this chapter is to assess the level of labour market inte-
gration. We focus on second-generation Turkish respondents because, as a
group, they offer the most generalisability for a cross-country comparison.
Specifically, we focus on the extent to which they have reached parity with
the comparison group vis-à-vis labour market features such as labour force
participation, unemployment, occupational status and mobility. A compari-
son benchmark like this is important for examining in how far the second
generation, as a whole, reaches various positions within the labour market
and may move at a different pace from the comparison group. This allows
us to measure, to a certain point, their level of labour market integration.
Examining these differentials, we hone in on, as Heath and Cheung (2007)
refers to them, possible ethnic premiums and ethnic penalties that remain
once individual and human capital factors are taken into account. We look
primarily at city-level differences since they comprise the aggregate level
of our data. Beyond the comparison with respondents of native descent,
we investigate the impact of individual, structural and institutional factors
on the labour market outcomes for second-generation Turks across cities.
We explore the effect of differences in institutional arrangements between
cities, taking into account the impact of individual characteristics of the
respondents.
This chapter allows for an examining of multiple labour market out-
comes in a simultaneous, comparative perspective and thus contributes to
an empirical literature still in its infancy. In the following sections, we out-
line areas in which second-generation Turks demonstrate success, or lack
thereof, in the labour market, and where further research is still needed.
6.2 An overview of studies on labour market integration among
immigrants and their descendants
Theoretical approaches dealing with the integration of the second genera-
tion can be separated into two strands: those attempting to describe the
overall extent of labour market integration; and those focusing more specif-
ically on important determinants, either at the micro- or macro-level. Both
will be briefly discussed here.
Studies that focus on the second generation are deeply rooted in classical
assimilation theory (Park & Burgess 1921; Warner & Srole 1945; Gordon
1964), which starts from the notion of moving-up in three generations:
‘from peddler to plumber to professional’ (Suro 1998). Central to this
approach is the idea of an individual path that gradually leaves behind eth-
nic and ascriptive identities and allows for advancement on the labour mar-
ket. A similar optimistic strand, the immigrant advantage theory (Kasinitz,
Mollenkopf, Waters & Holdaway 2008), stresses motivational factors in
explaining the powerful resilience of second-generation children and thus
their capacity to avoid the pitfalls of social reproduction. Yet, some argue
that even if empirical evidence appears to show some intergenerational
progress, second-generation outcomes are not as positive as the above the-
ories foresee, or they differ in progress according to immigrant origin. The
unfulfilled promises of various assimilation theories for certain immigrant
groups undermine its presuppositions. This is when other frameworks are
useful that emphasise fewer – or slower – successes in second-generation
outcomes.
Structural approaches focus on the labour market segmentation for first-
generation immigrants, often pointing at open or covert discrimination that
nails the second generation down to similar structural positions as their
parents (Barth & Noel 1972; Parkin 1979; Castles & Kosack 1985). The
theory of segmented assimilation is a good example of a theoretical frame-
work attempting to expand on classical assimilation theory (see e.g. Portes
& Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes & Rumbaut 2001). It emphasises the
way in which individual, family and contextual factors affect the extent
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and magnitude of assimilation processes. The new economic sociology,
with its focus on the social construction of economic processes, provides
other insightful theoretical advancements. The embeddedness of economic
processes (Tilly & Tilly 1994) calls attention to the importance of social
ties and cultural belonging in which economic behaviour is rooted. This
can differ according to the immigration status influencing the economic be-
haviour of immigrants and their children.
Most theoretical approaches see the labour market as an important entry
point into the host society. Yet, there is disagreement over the extent to
which the second generation, upon entering the labour market, is encoun-
tering structural barriers within society. That is, above and beyond individ-
ual barriers already accumulated from having lower educational qualifica-
tions or lower-status social background. Beyond these very broad theoreti-
cal frameworks, important contributions to unravel the types of deter-
minants that help, or hinder, integration into the labour market can be
found in comparative analyses of transitions from school to work as well
as of labour market outcomes. As much for the overall population as for
immigrant groups, these analyses have demonstrated the importance of
individual factors such as human capital – including education and labour
market experience – (Becker 1964; Chiswick 1978; Chiswick & Miller
2002), sociocultural differences (Kalter & Granato 2007), social networks
(Granovetter 1983; Lin 1999; Waldinger 2003), social class (Duncan 1969;
Heath, Mills & Roberts 1992; Heath & McMahon 2005), religious affilia-
tion (Lindley 2002) and citizenship status (Heath, Rothon & Kilpi 2008).
The impact of these factors is often reproduced in the second generation,
though not necessarily to the same extent across all groups (Heath &
Cheung 2007).
This chapter focuses on the presence, or absence, of labour market dis-
advantages or advantages once human capital and individual-level demo-
graphic characteristics are taken into account. Using the terminology of
Heath and Cheung (2007), we speak of ‘ethnic penalties’ if ethnic disad-
vantage is still present and of ‘ethnic premiums’ if ethnic advantage is
present. Remaining disadvantages in the second generation could indicate
the presence of discrimination in the labour market (see Simon 2003). But
there are also other individual factors, such as the lack of effective social
networks or any of the elements mentioned in the prior paragraph, which
could explain some remaining differentials. We focus on citizenship and re-
ligion as two factors that could account for some remaining differences
and could indicate the presence of specific types of discriminatory
practices.
There are also a number of structural and institutional factors that might
affect second-generation integration. These factors probably have a differ-
ent impact across contexts. A comparison of immigrants from the same
country of origin, who share similar structural positions in the social
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stratification of their countries of settlement, allows us to highlight the role
of various ‘exogenous’ contextual factors in shaping labour market out-
comes. According to Müller and Gangl (2003), the transition into the
labour market is influenced by the interaction between individual-level and
human capital characteristics, the structure of the labour market and the
structure of the education and training systems – i.e. the opportunities for
entering the labour market (see chapter 5 in this volume; Crul &
Vermeulen 2003; Aybek 2008).
The special added value and simultaneous challenge of international
comparisons is that societal or institutional arrangements may substantially
vary from one country to another. In this case, alongside individual and
group factors we need to capture key elements of policies and macro-level
characteristics that might influence the labour market outcomes. In our
study of institutional arrangements – namely, the labour market opportuni-
ties of young people and, in particular, of second-generation Turks – we
therefore include contextual features whose impact on unemployment is
well documented (Smyth, Gangl, Raffe, Hannan & McCoy 2001; Breen
2005; Wolbers 2007). They include anti-discrimination policies to ensure
equal chances on the labour market and more or less extensive systems of
vocational education and training (VET). In relation to labour market com-
petition, we also look at the share of young people in the total population.
The indicators used are given in table 6.1 and subsequently explained.
Table 6.1 Indicators of contextual factors
MIPEX-D1 VET2 DEM 15-24/25-543
Austria 42 3 0.27
Belgium 75 1 0.29
Switzerland 33 3 0.27
Germany 50 3 0.28
France 81 1 0.30
The Netherlands 81 2 0.28
Sweden 94 2 0.33
Sources:
1 Migrant Integration Policy Index: Niessen et al. (2007)
2 Vocational and Educational Training: Müller and Gangl (2003)
3 Relative share of young persons: Gomez and Leiner (2008)
We rely on the Migrant Integration Policy Index II (MIPEX II) to outline
the impact of immigrant-related policies. MIPEX is a comparative index,
benchmarking policies aiming at the integration of migrants in 25 EU
member states as well as in three non-EU countries in 2007 (Niessen
2007). A first key area covered by MIPEX is the labour market. Various
facets of labour market policy are considered, such as access to labour
market for first-generation immigrants and their rights as workers. Yet, this
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may not be most relevant for the second generation. Rather, the dimension
taken into account here is the normative framework of anti-discrimination
measures on the labour market, MIPEX-D, as this particular index is
known, expresses levels of anti-discrimination measures on a scale of 1 to
100 (from very low to very high), thereby capturing how legislation helps
guarantee equal opportunities in economic, social and public life for all
members of the society. It is assumed that high anti-discrimination protec-
tion reduces the unemployment rate. As shown in the first column of table
6.1, the MIPEX-D score is high for Sweden, fairly high for France and the
Netherlands, but very low for Switzerland, Austria and, to a lesser extent,
Germany (Niessen 2007). These countries thus offer considerably fewer
guarantees for equal opportunities, presumably pushing more vulnerable
groups, including the second generation, into a more precarious labour
market position.
The development level of a vocational and educational training (VET)
system is also examined here. Research has clearly linked educational sys-
tem features to labour market entry (Konietzka 2008; Andersen & Van de
Werfhorst 2010). Classification of the importance of the VET system is
shown in the second column of table 6.1. We expect a VET structure to
have various impacts on labour market outcomes. In countries that operate
with extensive vocational training systems at the upper secondary level
(Austria, Germany and Switzerland), the total proportion of young people
not progressing beyond compulsory education is relatively low (some 15
per cent), and it is believed that individuals going through vocational train-
ing will have a smoother school-to-work transition, albeit still within the
realm of lower-level occupations. On the other hand, countries that operate
with general, rather than vocational, qualifications at the upper secondary
level (such as France and Belgium) have a higher proportion of young peo-
ple progressing beyond compulsory education. And yet, they enter the la-
bour market with more general, less specialised vocational qualifications –
something that could negatively affect their opportunities for accessing the
labour market (Müller & Gangl 2003).
Demographic factors may also affect unemployment. Gomez-Salvador
and Leiner-Killinger (2008) find a positive correlation between the share of
young people in the total population and the youth unemployment rate: the
smaller the share of young people in the population, the lower the risk of
their being unemployed. This is assumed to affect the second generation in
the same manner as the whole population. The share of young people in
the population is given in the third column of table 6.1, presenting the ratio
of the 15-24 age group on each active individual between 25 and 54 years
old.2
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Current empirical evidence
Research into the overall comparability of the second generation’s out-
comes, gleaned primarily from a review of existing studies, shows that sec-
ond generations from non-European backgrounds – including Turks – have
higher risks of unemployment. Furthermore, we see ethnic penalties in
many countries, such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the
Netherlands (Heath et al. 2008). Nation-specific research allows us to see
the extent to which the second generation, on the whole, is disadvantaged
at the national level. This also helps us take a comparative perspective on
factors that can explain the labour market position of second-generation
Turks, in particular.
– In the Austrian context, second-generation Turks are found mainly at
the low end of the occupational hierarchy. They have difficulties enter-
ing highly skilled jobs, but they also have quite low levels of unem-
ployment (Herzog-Punzenberger 2003; Kogan 2007). Ethnic penalties
are present for them in terms of unemployment and lower returns to ed-
ucation (Kogan 2007; Liebig 2009).
– In Switzerland, access to employment for second-generation Turks
seems subjected to discriminatory practices, with naturalisation not nec-
essarily being beneficial for employment outcomes (Fibbi, Lerch &
Wanner 2006, 2007).
– In Germany, there seems to be quite important intergenerational prog-
ress in economic activity for Turkish second-generation women, even if
their levels of activity are lower than that of the native population. On
the whole, however, this generation experiences disadvantages in terms
of employment, and they tend to earn less (Worbs 2003; Kalter &
Granato 2007; Schurer 2008; Liebig 2009). Moreover, second-genera-
tion Turks have, albeit with some exceptions, lower returns from educa-
tion with regard to occupational attainment (Kalter & Granato 2007).
– In Belgium, second-generation Turks have the lowest levels of econom-
ic activity (albeit with the strong intergenerational progress for women)
and high levels of unemployment. They are underrepresented in higher
occupational classes (Timmerman, Vanderwaeren & Crul 2003; Phalet
2007; Liebig 2009), but show good returns to education, albeit gener-
ally of a low level. Their access to highly skilled jobs is especially
challenged in Brussels, yet at the same time their unemployment is
lower here than elsewhere in Belgium (Phalet 2007; Phalet & Heath
2010).
– In France, the second generation tends to have higher rates of unem-
ployment (Simon 2003; Meurs, Pailhé & Simon 2006), with Turks, es-
pecially women, being most vulnerable (Silberman, Alba & Fournier
2007). Access to citizenship does not appear to have any significant ef-
fect on employment. Second-generation Turks are quite segregated in
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specific occupational sectors; men, especially, do not hold high-status
occupations (Meurs et al. 2006; Silberman & Fournier 2007).
– In the Netherlands, the transition into the labour market is especially
difficult for second-generation Turks, who show the worst labour mar-
ket outcomes (and quite high levels of unemployment) compared to
other ethnic groups (Crul & Doomernik 2003; Van Ours & Veenman
2004; Tesser & Dronkers 2007). Moreover, both men and women ap-
pear to have quite low labour force participation rates compared to their
peers (Crul & Doomernik 2003; Van Ours & Veenman 2004; Tesser &
Dronkers 2007).
– Research in Sweden has shown that second-generation Turks have low-
er probabilities of employment and lower levels of earnings (Rooth
2003; Westin 2003; Behtoui 2004; Behrenz, Hammarstedt & Månsson
2007).
Recent empirical evidence thus clearly shows that second-generation Turks
lag behind their peers of native parentage in labour market outcomes. Still,
a good proportion of the literature misses in-depth statistical analyses of
such outcomes, either due to the lack of available data or small sample
issues. Sometimes, studies also fail to disambiguate one ethnic group from
others in the second generation. This chapter hopes to remedy this gap by
providing an even-handed outlook on the labour market integration of
second-generation Turks.
The national and local context at the time of survey
To determine the conditions under which the TIES respondents entered the
labour market, the market situation should be assessed at the time of the
TIES survey and, more generally, within a historical perspective. Figures
6.13 to 6.16 in the appendix present statistics from the online database
Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) of the International Labour
Organization (ILO 2010). They show the level of ‘labour force participa-
tion’3 from 1990 until 2008 for men and women, for all working-age indi-
viduals (15-64 years old) and, in particular, for young people (15-24 years
old). The figures show that labour force participation has remained more
or less constant for young people, which is lower than for working-age
men and women. Among working-age individuals, Switzerland and
Sweden have the highest participation rates for both men and women,
whereas Switzerland and the Netherlands have the highest rates among
young people. Belgium and France appear to have the lowest participation
rates, both in the total working-age and young populations. Unsurprisingly,
labour force participation for women is lower than for men in both groups,
though it differs less amongst young people.
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Turning to the level of unemployment (as shown in figures 6.17 and
6.18 in the appendix), we see that there was more disparity in unemploy-
ment during the mid-1990s. The unemployment rates in 2007 are lower
and ranged between 3 and 9 per cent, after a small peak between 2003 and
2006. The countries with the highest levels of male unemployment in 2007
were Germany, France, Belgium and Sweden. Unemployment rates in
Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland were amongst the lowest. Across
the TIES countries, the unemployment rate for women has been higher
than for men, although there appears to be convergence towards the men’s
rates in recent years. As of 2007, women’s level of unemployment, along
with its range, was similar to that of men. Some gaps in unemployment ap-
pear to be more marked for women in Belgium and France. Only in a few
instances is unemployment lower for young people than adults. In general,
however, youth unemployment has tended to be higher than adult unem-
ployment, and tended to be much higher for young men than young
women.
Table 6.2 Activity and unemployment indicators at the city level (in %)
Economic activity Youth economic
activity
Unemployment rate Proportion of
unemployed youth
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Vienna 76.5 63.5 52.6 46.6 9.3 8.4 17.9 15.4
Linz* 80.0 68.0 64.8 58.0 7.4 6.5 11.0 11.1
Brussels 67.2 52.6 35.6 32.2 17.5 16.6 27.8 31.0
Antwerp 73.1 56.1 43.7 40.7 10.0 10.7 18.6 21.9
Zurich† 88.5 78.6 67.1 67.4 n.a. n.a. 5.8 5.2
Basel n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Berlin 76.7 67.7 50.3 45.8 21.1 16.7 23.5 18.3
Frankfurt 77.2 64.0 45.3 43.0 10.2 7.6 14.2 7.1
Paris 80.3 73.2 37.1 35.2 11.1 11.6 15.9 12.6
Strasbourg* 72.2 61.0 29.5 24.6 9.4 9.8 20.0 19.4
Amsterdam 79.3 69.4 59.0 64.1 7.9 6.5 12.5 6.9
Rotterdam 74.8 61.3 58.8 57.7 9.7 8.9 20.8 16.7
Stockholm* 76.4 74.8 44.0 45.0 3.6 2.9 3.6 3.0
Notes: Urban indicators for 2003-2006 period unless otherwise indicated
* Values for 1999-2002 period
† Values for economic activity for 1999-2002 period
Source: Eurostat Urban Indicators (Eurostat 2010)
Information about the levels of economic activity and unemployment at the
city level is presented in table 6.2. The results are based on the Urban
Audit Database of Statistical Office of the European Communities
(Eurostat 2010) for the period 2003-2006.4 The information at the local
level shows that economic activity was either lower or similar to the na-
tional averages, with lower rates usually found in the main cities. This was
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also coupled with higher levels of unemployment (a common characteristic
for large urban centres), again mostly found in the capital cities. The gener-
al patterns, especially with regard to the labour market characteristics of
young people, follow the national trends, though they also indicate that
more economic hardship is to be expected in bigger urban centres. The lo-
cal labour market contexts in which many TIES respondents entered the la-
bour market was thus rather unfavourable.
6.3 Main results: The labour market positions of second-
generation Turks
Methodology
We now examine the labour market position of second-generation Turks,
namely their labour force participation, unemployment rates, occupational
status and mobility. Attention is also briefly given to their transition into
the labour market after leaving full-time education and to perceived levels
of discrimination in finding employment. Most of our analyses compare
outcomes of second-generation Turks to those of the comparison group as
a way to measure how far the second generation has advanced on the la-
bour market compared to their peers with native-born parents. Some further
analyses focus only on second-generation Turks in order to analyse differ-
ences across the TIES cities.
In each of the sections, the analyses are performed on a sub-sample of
respondents who have already left the school system: that is, respondents
who have completed their schooling or whose combination of current study
and work status indicate that they are fully participating in the labour mar-
ket. In our analyses of unemployment and occupation status, further sam-
ple selections were made: only economically active individuals in the
labour force at the time of survey were analysed for unemployment, where-
as only individuals currently in paid employment were used in the analyses
of occupational status and mobility.
The analyses are based on a series of (non-weighted) logistic regressions
at the ‘country’ level (i.e. aggregating the participating cities within their
respective countries).5 Standardised6 and unstandardised regression coeffi-
cients are presented to allow comparison across models within our city
samples (Winship & Mare 1984; Mood 2010). For the comparative analy-
ses of second-generation Turks, predicted probabilities7 are calculated for
each city, separately for men and women.8 As we saw in chapter 4, the
second-generation respondents have varying age distributions across cities
and, in some of them, the proportion of individuals still in school is quite
large. Some of the results could in fact be driven by these circumstances,
rather than indicating actual differences in labour market outcomes.
Appropriate controls are introduced to deal with this issue in the best way
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possible. For statistical purposes, the analyses separate the groups by city
as follows: the comparison group in the main city; Turks in the main city;
the comparison group in the secondary city (the reference category); and
Turks in the secondary city. The motivation for using these categories is
mainly to ensure within-aggregate comparisons while also accounting for
composition effects. Individuals from the comparison group in secondary
cities were chosen as the reference category (except in Sweden) mainly be-
cause secondary cities – being smaller urban centres – tend to show higher
rates of labour force participation as well as lower unemployment levels
(with some exceptions, as previously mentioned). In all analyses, multiple
comparisons of the city-group coefficients are given to provide the reader
with an idea of differences for various outcomes considered within-city
(comparing the second generation with the comparison group) and within-
group (comparing the second generation across cities).
The first model (gross effects model) controls for basic compositional ef-
fects: age and gender. For the analyses of unemployment and occupational
status and mobility, we introduce partnership status as an extra control var-
iable in the gross effect model because it is deemed an important factor in
shaping respondents’ outcomes, especially women. The second model (net
effects model – human capital) includes controls for respondents’ educa-
tion and, with regard to the occupation-related analyses, age at first labour
market entry (capped at eighteen years old) to assess the presence, or ab-
sence, of ethnic penalties and premiums. In all analyses, the effect of the
respondents’ religious affiliation was also tested for second-generation re-
spondents. The impact of citizenship status is only analysed for Austria,
Switzerland and Germany because these countries show relevant differen-
ces in citizenship status distribution. In the analyses of unemployment, we
also test the impact of institutional arrangements. In this case, the samples
were pooled together and analysed for the second generation and the com-
parison group separately.9
The main independent variables in the analyses and their distribution
across the basic sub-sample are shown in table 6.14 in the appendix.
Despite some local variation, of those who had left school, second-genera-
tion Turkish respondents in our sub-sample generally tend to be younger
and to have lower levels of education than their comparison group peers.
They are predominantly religious (i.e. Muslim), and the large majority
holds citizenship of the survey country (albeit in lower proportion in the
Austrian, Swiss and German cities), if not dual citizenship. Given the age
structure of the TIES sample and the fact that our analyses specifically tar-
get respondents no longer in school, our sub-sample tends to have lower
levels of education; those with higher levels are most likely to still be in
some sort of higher educational institution and are hence excluded from
our analyses.
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Entry in the labour market and current labour force participation
We first present some figures on the transition of our main groups into the
labour market upon completion of their studies. These numbers indicate
potential difficulties encountered on entering the labour market. Table 6.3
summarises the time period in months between leaving full-time school
and entering the labour market for the second generation and the compari-
son group.











Vienna Mean 3.88 4.11 Frankfurt Mean 6.15 4.00
Std dev 4.63 6.00 Std dev 7.38 6.31
N 138 138 N 160 202
Linz Mean 4.88 3.53 Paris Mean 4.25 4.38
Std dev 5.47 4.04 Std dev 6.04 6.09
N 122 142 N 101 111
Brussels Mean 4.43 2.36 Strasbourg Mean 3.56 3.38
Std dev 7.52 5.14 Std dev 5.81 5.92
N 147 121 N 152 102
Antwerp Mean 2.77 1.82 Amsterdam Mean 2.10 1.70
Std dev 6.17 4.87 Std dev 4.06 3.94
N 251 250 N 119 177
Zurich Mean 1.70 1.71 Rotterdam Mean 1.79 1.48
Std dev 3.43 4.33 Std dev 3.68 4.15
N 135 135 N 145 175
Basel Mean 2.96 2.50 Stockholm Mean 5.06 4.31
Std dev 5.65 4.59 Std dev 6.15 4.41
N 149 168 N 66 68
Berlin Mean 5.99 5.79
Std dev 7.50 7.64
N 155 161
Notes: Includes all out-of-school respondents who gave a valid answer to this question (i.e.
who found a job after finishing their studies), capped at 36 months
Weighted results
Unweighted N
Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in means between second generation
and comparison group.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
On average, most cities’ results do not appear to indicate that second-gen-
eration Turks have experienced a more difficult transition from school to
work. Exceptions are Linz, Brussels and Frankfurt.10 Linear regression
analyses of time it takes to secure a first job (not shown) do not yield many
significant gross differentials or net differentials for the second generation,
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but rather show that Brussels’ second generation has had more difficulties
in its transition to the labour force regardless of actual human capital. In all
other cases, the level of education plays an important role in explaining dif-
ferences in the transition, with lower levels making the transition more dif-
ficult and upper secondary or apprenticeship programmes and tertiary edu-
cation usually reducing the time it takes to find a first job.
The next indicator examined is labour force participation (i.e. economic
activity). We examined whether the second generation participates in the
current labour force in similar numbers as the comparison group. This is
actually the case for second-generation Turkish men. That their rates of eco-
nomic activity are not very different from the comparison groups is unsur-
prising because they are likely to leave school earlier than their peers of
native-born parentage. In the youngest age group ( < 25 years old), the pro-
portion of economically active second-generation men is higher than for
comparison group men, which reflects their early school-leaving tendencies.
By contrast, differences in economic activity among women are more
pronounced. As table 6.4 shows, in Vienna, Brussels, Antwerp, Frankfurt,
Paris, Strasbourg, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Turkish second-generation
women have significantly lower levels of economic activity than their com-
parison group peers. Breaking the results down by age groups allows us to
see that the level of economic activity is lower in the Turkish second gen-
eration at all ages, though the differences are most pronounced among
prime working-age women (25-35 years old).
Given the gender differences in economic activity, we also briefly exam-
ined the reasons behind men’s and women’s levels of economic inactivity,
which differ from each other. For women, the main reason was childbear-
ing and child-rearing; for men, it was being without paid employment and
not looking for work. The impact of partnership and presence of children
on women’s levels of economic activity is presented after an overview of
the situation for all respondents.
We now turn to the analyses of economic activity for the whole sample.
Table 6.5 shows the gross and net standardised coefficients (controlling for
respondents’ level of education) of economic activity of all respondents for
the city groups.11 The results refer to the likelihood that a group is eco-
nomically active: negative coefficients indicate a lower likelihood, whereas
positive coefficients indicate a greater likelihood. Statistically significant
differences with the reference group have been highlighted, as well as
within city and between-group differences.
The likelihood of being economically active is negative for second-genera-
tion Turks in almost all cities. The gross effects are significant for Turks in
all cities except Linz, Basel, Zurich and Stockholm. There are also differ-
ences between the two Austrian cities, with Vienna’s second generation
being less likely economically active than Linz’s.
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With regard to net effects, differentials for the second generation are re-
duced, but significant negative differences still remain in some cases. The
difference between the second generation and the comparison group disap-
pear in Frankfurt, Strasbourg and Paris. Here, human capital thus accounts
for the difference. But this is not necessarily the case in all cities.
Figure 6.1 shows the predicted probabilities of economic activity for
Turkish second-generation men and women with the same level of educa-
tion (secondary school) in the various TIES cities. The cities appear in de-
scending order according to the predicted probabilities of economic activity
for men. We see that second-generation Turkish men have the highest pre-
dicted probabilities of economic activity in the Swiss and Dutch cities; the
lowest are in Strasbourg, Paris and Vienna. Yet overall, these differences
are not very large. Looking at the predicted probabilities for women, we
see much greater levels of variation. The picture is the same at the top and















48.6 80.8 Frankfurt Economi-
cally active
67.0 84.7
N 106 78 N 128 139
Linz Economi-
cally active
83.6 89.5 Paris Economi-
cally active
80.5 >90 (SC)
N 67 90 N 58 60
Brussels Economi-
cally active
74.9 91.9 Strasbourg Economi-
cally active
80.1 >90 (SC)
N 66 92 N 101 60
Antwerp Economi-
cally active
70.7 96.2 Amsterdam Economi-
cally active
70.6 89.4
N 140 125 N 80 90
Zurich Eeconomi-
cally active
90.7 89.1 Rotterdam Economi-
cally active
67.6 92.4
N 66 73 N 85 92
Basel Economi-
cally active
90.4 92.4 Stockholm Economi-
cally active
85.2 93.4





Notes: Includes all out-of-school respondents who gave a valid answer to this question
Weighted results
Unweighted N
SC = residual unweighted cell value < 5; result not reported
Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in proportions between second genera-
tion and comparison group.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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the bottom: second-generation Turkish women in the Swiss cities have the
highest predicted probabilities of economic activity; those in Vienna have
the lowest. But this is where similarities end, as the variations in economic
activity do not follow the same pattern as for men. The smallest gender
gaps are found in the Swiss and Swedish cities and the biggest in Vienna
and both German and Dutch cities.
The impact of religious affiliation and citizenship status for the second
generation is, on the whole, small. But as table 6.6 shows, second-genera-
tion Turks who identify as Muslim in Austria and Germany do have signif-
icantly lower log odds of labour force participation. In Germany, moreover,
not holding the survey country citizenship also appears to be a significant
Table 6.5 Differences in levels of female economic activity between the second






within between within between
Vienna comparison group -0.37 -0.35
Linz Turkish -0.11 ü -0.09 ü
Vienna Turkish -0.70 ü ü -0.63 ü ü
Brussels comparison group -0.16 -0.16
Antwerp Turkish -0.81 ü -0.62 ü
Brussels Turkish -0.69 ü -0.53 ü
Zurich comparison group 0.13 0.07
Basel Turkish -0.22 0.27
Zurich Turkish 0.07 0.38
Berlin comparison group 0.01 0.10
Frankfurt Turkish -0.42 ü -0.22
Berlin Turkish -0.53 ü -0.62 ü
Paris comparison group 0.02 0.02
Strasbourg Turkish -0.71 ü -0.50
Paris Turkish -0.63 ü -0.50
Amsterdam comparison group -0.05 -0.30
Rotterdam Turkish -0.71 ü -0.45 ü
Amsterdam Turkish -0.68 ü 0.47 ü
Stockholm Turkish -0.02 -0.01
Source: TIES 2007-2008
Notes: Y-standardised regression coefficients
Differences within: Statistical difference between groups within survey city
Differences between: Statistical difference between Turkish groups across cities within same
country
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disadvantage when entering the labour market; this is not the case in
Austria or Switzerland (even if the coefficient is also negative here).
As expected, our Turkish female respondents tend to be more frequently
economically inactive than their male peers. But due to childbearing and
persistent gender roles, this is also a common feature in the respective
comparison groups. The question is whether partnership status and having










Notes: Y-standardised regression coefficients
Bold indicates significant coefficient (at 0.05 level).
Source: TIES 2007-2008
Figure 6.1 Predicted probabilities of economic activity for second-generation Turks,
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a child have a similar impact on second-generation and comparison group
women. Looking solely at the gross effects (see table 6.16 in the appen-
dix), second-generation Turkish women in Vienna, Antwerp, Brussels,
Frankfurt, Berlin, Paris, Strasbourg, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are more
often economically inactive than women in the comparison group. But in
most of the cities (exceptions being Antwerp and Rotterdam), the differen-
ces are reduced to a non-significant level once family formation is taking
into account; this is the effect of second-generation Turkish women getting
married and their becoming mothers at younger ages and more frequently.
Of the two family formation indicators, having a child has significant nega-
tive impact on economic activity. Only in Germany does partnership,
alone, have a negative impact on female economic activity. 12 Our findings
indicate that childbearing is the most important explaining factor to under-
stand the low labour force participation of second-generation Turkish
women. Another factor to consider is women’s choice – whether their own
or a forced one – to not enter the labour market.
Figure 6.2 shows the predicted probabilities of economic activity for
second-generation Turkish mothers who are either partnered or single. The
cities are given in a decreasing order of predicted probabilities for single
women. Women with a partner generally have lower predicted probabilities
of participating in the labour market, with the exception of the two French
cities and Stockholm. It has been argued (Soehl, Fibbi & Vera Larrucea
Figure 6.2 Predicted probabilities of second-generation Turkish mother’s economic
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2012) that differences in the gaps can be explained by the respective coun-
tries’ varying welfare state arrangements. The French and the Swedish wel-
fare states promote a dual-breadwinner model for families, favouring the
labour market participation of women by supplying full-day child-care. On
the contrary, the gap between single and partnered women is widest in
Germany and Austria, where the welfare system is more conservative in re-
lation to gender roles.
Analyses of economic activity shown thus far indicate that some differ-
ences between the second generation in some places and the respective
comparison groups remain once human capital characteristics are taken in-
to account. The family formation situation explains some of these remain-
ing gaps in the economic activity of female respondents. However, some
cities’ remaining differences are most likely contingent on differences in
the wider integration context – e.g. welfare state regimes and the availabil-
ity of child-care facilities, including for younger children.
Unemployment
We now expand our analysis to unemployment levels in the economically
active population. The unemployment rate is calculated according to the
ILO criteria: respondents without a job but looking for one as a percentage
of all economically active respondents (ILO 2005). The analyses focus on
the gross and net second-generation differentials, the impact of citizenship
status and the way in which institutional arrangements are likely to affect
both the second generation and the comparison group.
We first look at the unemployment rate of the second generation and the
comparison group, broken down by the main independent variables (tables
6.7 and 6.8).13 The overall unemployment rate for second-generation Turks
is 17 per cent; more than twice as high as the unemployment rate observed
among the comparison group (almost 7 per cent). The variability of the un-
employment rate by country, however, is pronounced: Belgium and
Switzerland represent the two extremes with the unemployment rates being
lowest in Switzerland and highest in Belgium for both the Turkish and the
comparison groups. This is consistent with other results presented above.
In all countries except Germany and Sweden, the unemployment rates for
second-generation Turks are significantly higher than for the comparison
group, applying to men and women alike. In the two German cities, there
are no differences in the unemployment rate of the second generation and
comparison group. The female unemployment rate is higher for second-
generation women in the Belgian and Dutch cities and in Stockholm. Age
groups show some significant differences between the descent groups, but
the proportions mainly confirm that unemployment is more common in the
younger cohorts and that the gap tends to be more pronounced in the older
cohorts.
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As expected, unemployment rates go down with higher educational lev-
els. In all cities except Stockholm, low school achievements go hand in
hand with high risks of unemployment, regardless of ethnic origin. In con-
trast, significant differences according to origin exist for youth with an
upper secondary education degree in the Austrian and French cities. There
are no differences between the second generation and the comparison group
in unemployment rates for those educated at the VET level. Finally, sec-
ond-generation Turkish holders of tertiary credentials run significantly
higher risks of being unemployed than the comparison group members with
tertiary credentials in Belgium, Switzerland the Netherlands and Sweden.
This could be due to many factors, including greater competition with the
majority population in these countries for more highly skilled jobs.
We also examined unemployment rates according to religious affiliation
and citizenship status. In France we found a significant difference in unem-
ployment rate vis-à-vis religious affiliation. The citizenship status of
second-generation Turks appears to matter for unemployment in Austria
and Switzerland, the two countries where there is a noticeable percentage
of non-naturalised second-generation respondents (see chapter 4).
Respondents not holding survey country citizenship have higher rates of
unemployment than those who hold the citizenship of their residence
country.
Figure 6.3 shows the great variation of unemployment rates across cities.
The gap between the two origin groups is widest in Amsterdam and
Zurich; intermediate in Linz, Paris, Rotterdam and Stockholm; and very
limited in Berlin and Basel. With the exception of France and the
Netherlands, the unemployment rate tends to be lower in the smaller cities
than the main cities. In Basel, Berlin, Frankfurt and Stockholm, the gap be-
tween origin groups is statistically not significant.
Again, we focus on the gross effects and the net effects of human capital
to measure possible ethnic penalties. The regression analyses reveal many
gross effects (see table 6.16 in the appendix) for second-generation Turks.
In particular, we see a higher likelihood of unemployment than among the
comparison group in the reference cities: Linz, Vienna, Antwerp, Brussels,
Zurich, Rotterdam and Amsterdam. But in all these cities, much of these
differentials also remain statistically significant once we look at net effects,
indicating that belonging to the Turkish group entails an ethnic penalty.
One of the possible factors for this could be could be discrimination on the
labour market.
The impact of the different control variables is also worthy of examina-
tion. The net effects model shows that women have a higher risk for unem-
ployment in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. Being older signifi-
cantly diminishes risks of unemployment in Germany, France and Sweden.
Controlling for the respondents’ education shows the importance of pursu-
ing training beyond the compulsory level. In all countries, unemployment
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risks are statistically significantly higher for those respondents who were
early school leavers – meaning the compulsory level was the highest com-
pleted (see chapter 5). In Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands, voca-
tional training at the post-compulsory level was also not enough to protect
respondents from higher risk of unemployment. By contrast, respondents’
educational achievement in France does not seem to affect unemployment
risks.
















Turkish second generation Comparison group
Source: TIES 2007-2008
On the basis of these controls we can calculate predicted probabilities of
unemployment for second-generation Turkish men and women at the city
level in relation to the reference category of the comparison group in the
secondary city. Figure 6.4 shows the probability of unemployment in a
model that controls for gender, age, partnership status and education of
respondent.
Within the same country, differences between cities for the second-gen-
eration Turks – even if large between cities in France, Switzerland and
Germany – are not statistically significant. There are, however, certain
groups whose predicted probabilities are significantly different from their
peer groups across cities. While naming all significant differences would
yield a long list of group differences, there are some of noteworthy inter-
est: the lower predicted probabilities of unemployment for men in
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Stockholm as well as for men and women in Basel; and, at the opposite
end, the higher probabilities of unemployment for men and women in
Brussels. Despite the apparent unbalances, gender differences in fitted
probabilities of unemployment are also not statistically significant within
cities. Hence, the contexts of local labour markets seem to play an impor-
tant role with regard to unemployment probabilities.14


































We further developed our analyses by testing the impact of religion and cit-
izenship status. In none of the seven TIES survey countries where second-
generation Turks were surveyed did religious affiliation result in higher
risks of unemployment. The effect of citizenship, however, is visible. As
table 6.9 shows, not holding the survey country citizenship significantly in-
creases the likelihood of unemployment for second-generation Turks in
Switzerland and Germany. These results confirm previous analyses on the
socio-economic outcomes of the second generation in Switzerland (Fibbi et
al. 2007) and Germany (Salentin & Wilkening 2003). The analysis focuses
on the three German-speaking countries because, as mentioned earlier, only
here do we find relevant numbers of Turkish respondents who do not hold
their birth country nationality.
We now turn to a last set of unemployment-related analyses in which we
test the impact of the wider societal context. Do similar institutional ar-
rangements and demographic factors in several countries lead to similar
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labour market outcomes in the second generation and the respective com-
parison groups? Table 6.10 presents two models, confirming the prior ob-
served influence of respondents’ age and educational achievement. But it
also shows that once context is accounted for, the impact of gender on un-
employment risks varies by origin group: second-generation Turkish wom-
en have significantly higher risks of unemployment than their male coun-
terparts, but this is not the case in the comparison group.
An educational system with an extended vocational training system sig-
nificantly reduces unemployment risks for the second generation. Yet, it
has no significant effect on the likelihood of unemployment of the compar-
ison group. This result confirms the findings of Müller and Gangl (2003),
Table 6.9 The impact of context on unemployment
Turkish second generation Comparison group
b/se Std coeff b/se Std coeff
Woman 0.43** 0.22 0.03 0.02
(0.13) (0.17)
Age -0.05** -0.02 -0.04 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Partnership status
with partner -0.70*** -0.36 -0.79*** -0.39
(0.16) (0.20)
Education
Lower secondary 1.23*** 0.63 1.60*** 0.80
(0.20) (0.27)
Middle vocational secondary 0.64*** 0.33 0.70** 0.35
(0.19) (0.26)
Tertiary education 0.14 0.07 -0.35 -0.18
(0.23) (0.26)
Country context:
MIPEX antidiscrimination legislation -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Extended VET system -1.07* -0.55 0.45 0.23
(0.52) (0.69)




N 1,942 2,122 2,122
Pseudo-R2 0.08 0.10 0.10
Source: TIES 2007-2008
* p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note: The reference categories are as follows: ‘No partner’ for partnership status, ‘Upper
secondary vocational track or apprenticeship (3 or 4 years) and Upper secondary academic
track’ for education. ‘Lower secondary’ refers to students with at most this level of educa-
tion. ‘Middle vocational secondary’ refers to students completing a short middle vocational
education or apprenticeship.
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who analysed general youth unemployment and argued that the VET sys-
tem is specifically beneficial for the second generation.
Concerning the youth ratio, the coefficient signs confirm the hypothesis
that the younger the age cohorts, the higher the unemployment risks, but
this effect is only found within the comparison group. However, there
could be an issue of limited statistical significance due to the fact that the
indicator adequately represents the country average, but it is less satisfac-
tory at the city level and specifically for the second generation.
Anti-discrimination legislation does not appear to have an impact on sec-
ond-generation unemployment risks. To explain why the second generation
does not seem to profit from such legislation, we may consider the meth-
odological weakness of the MIPEX index since it only measures legislative
actions and not their actual implementation. An alternative approach to the
Table 6.10 Self-reported experiences of discrimination while job-seeking for second-
generation Turks (in %)
Vienna None 52.3 Frankfurt None 32.1
Incidental 37.5 Incidental 55.5
Systematic 10.2 Systematic 12.4
N 107 N 137
Linz None 18.2 Paris None 62.4
Incidental 64.7 Incidental 29.1
Systematic 17.2 Systematic 8.5
N 105 N 85
Brussels None 47.8 Strasbourg None 37.3
Incidental 42.3 Incidental 39.3
Systematic 10.0 Systematic 23.4
N 114 N 114
Antwerp None 55.3 Amsterdam None 66.9
Incidental 33.0 Incidental 24.9
Systematic 11.7 Systematic 8.2
N 188 N 89
Zurich None 61.7 Rotterdam None 53.5
Incidental 33.0 Incidental 32.1
Systematic 5.3 Systematic 14.4
N 115 N 113
Basel None 62.0 Stockholm None 61.9
Incidental 31.2 Incidental 25.4
Systematic 6.8 Systematic 12.7






Notes: Includes all currently employed out-of-school respondents
Weighted results
Unweighted N
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role of discrimination would be to look at the perceived experiences of dis-
crimination from our respondents. Table 6.11 endeavours to capture the ex-
tent to which the second generation felt unfairly treated or discriminated
against on the basis of their ethnic background when job-seeking.15 The
survey question producing these results elicits subjective information,
which is influenced by all sorts of individual and contextual factors, in-
cluding personal and public awareness of the issue of discrimination. In
other words, reported discrimination depends on personal experiences
though is also framed by the public debate.
Unfavourable treatment experienced while job-seeking is widely self-re-
ported by second-generation Turks. In all cities, at least one respondent in
three who was confronted with such an experience attributed it to his or
her ethnic background. In Frankfurt, Strasbourg and Berlin, this was the
case for more than half the respondents. Amsterdam, Stockholm, Basel and
Zurich had the highest numbers of respondents – almost two thirds – re-
porting never having had a negative experience in this regard. At least in
Switzerland, this was certainly also connected to the fact that unemploy-
ment figures are so low that virtually everyone finds a job.
On the other hand, it is the second-generation respondents in the secon-
dary cities who seem to report more origin-based discrimination. This is
especially the case in Strasbourg, Rotterdam, Linz and Frankfurt. The re-
sult contrasts with the lower unemployment rate we found in almost all the
secondary cities. We thus observe interesting city differences within the
same country despite the same regulatory and discursive national frame on
discrimination issues. When looking at gender differences, men report
more experiences of discrimination than women.
Occupational status
This section examines occupational attainment focusing firstly on the extent
to which the second generation is able to achieve high levels of occupation-
al attainment in relation to the comparison group. Secondly, we look at in-
tergenerational social mobility – between the respondents and their parents
– examining the extent to which social reproduction over generations is
similar or different in the second generation, as compared to respondents of
native parentage.
All analyses are based on the occupational positions of respondents who
are not in full-time education and employed at the time of the survey. The
occupational status is measured on the basis of the Erikson-Golthorpe-
Portocarero (EGP) classification scheme.16 Due to small sample sizes, the
EGP classes were recoded into three categories: executives and professio-
nals (classes I and II); intermediate (classes IIIa, IIIb and IV); and blue col-
lar (classes V and above). Mobility, here defined as whether a respondent’s
current class is higher than that in which the highest parental occupation
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falls, was calculated using the five-category class scheme, in order to allow
for more variation. The categorisation of the parents was derived from in-
formation about parental occupation when the respondent was fifteen years
old.17
Table 6.11 Difference in occupational status between the comparison group and
second-generation Turks (in %), by city and sex
Men Women Men Women
Vienna Executives,
professionals
7.3 28.4 Berlin Executives,
professionals
34.5 17.2
Intermediate 22.1 -20.6 Intermediate 8.8 -3.6
Blue-collar -29.4 -7.7 Blue-collar -43.3 -13.6
N 134 94 N 177 121
Linz Executives,
professionals
16.8 8.8 Frankfurt Executives,
professionals
24.5 17.6
Intermediate 12.8 6.6 Intermediate 3.0 -6.5
Blue-collar -29.5 -15.4 Blue-collar -27.5 -11.1
N 113 120 N 139 177
Brussels Executives,
professionals
3.4 24.6 Paris Executives,
professionals
36.5 15.7
Intermediate 16.8 -1.6 Intermediate 5.8 -15.4
Blue-collar -20.2 -23.1 Blue-collar -42.4 -0.3
N 129 93 N 96 96
Antwerp Executives,
professionals
13.8 18.2 Strasbourg Executives,
professionals
29.8 41.5
Intermediate 2.3 -16.6 Intermediate -12.1 -0.5
Blue-collar -16.1 -1.6 Blue-collar -17.7 -41.1
N 234 180 N 97 112
Zurich Executives,
professionals
8.7 8.1 Amsterdam Executives,
professionals
22.8 37.5
Intermediate -8.0 -16.3 Intermediate -11.9 -43.5
Blue-collar -0.7 8.2 Blue-collar -10.9 6.0
N 122 115 N 122 111
Basel Executives,
professionals
16.8 23.1 Rotterdam Executives,
professionals
43.8 23.2
Intermediate -2.9 -8.5 Intermediate -10.6 -18.1
Blue-collar -13.9 -14.6 Blue-collar -33.2 -5.2








Notes: Includes all employed out-of-school respondents with a valid occupational coding
Coefficient in bold indicates significant difference in proportion between the second genera-
tion and the comparison group
Weighted results
Unweighted N
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The distribution of the respondents across occupational statuses is shown
in table 6.11. The table shows the difference in proportion in occupational
status between second-generation Turks and comparison group by sex for
each city. Positive percentages indicate a higher proportion of comparison
group members in a category; negative percentages show higher numbers
of Turkish respondents there. Numbers in bold show that differences are
statistically significant ( < 0.05).
In almost all cities, second-generation Turks have a significantly lower
proportion of members in the highest occupational category. This applies
roughly for men and women alike, albeit with some exceptions (Turkish
men are better represented in this category in Vienna, Brussels, Strasbourg
and Amsterdam; women are better represented as such in Linz, Berlin,
Rotterdam and Paris). The table also shows the extent to which Turkish
men are particularly overrepresented in the lowest occupational category.
We now turn to examining occupational attainment more closely with
separate logistic regressions of low (i.e. blue collar) and high (i.e. execu-
tive and professional) occupations performed by country. The net effects
models have an additional control for the age at which each respondent
held his or her first job as our proxy for labour market experience.18 The
following figures show the effect size based on the odds ratios of the
standardised coefficients on a logarithmic scale. Effects to the right of the
axis imply greater odds of being in a particular occupation (low/high),
whereas effects to the left of the axis indicate lower odds (reference: the
comparison group in the respective second city).
As expected, with regard to the gross effects (figure 6.5), second-genera-
tion respondents tend to be more likely to hold low-level occupations than
the comparison group.
Figure 6.6, however, shows that the higher likelihood of low-level occu-
pations is considerably reduced when controlling for the human capital of
the respondents. Significant results remain for second-generation Turks in
Frankfurt, Berlin, Zurich and Amsterdam. In the last two cities, the likeli-
hood of low-level occupations is even lower for the second generation than
the comparison group. However, due to sample size issues these results
should be taken on board with some caution.
Among the different control variables, level of education is the most im-
portant, as expected. Higher levels of education – together with labour market
experience – significantly reduce the likelihood of a low-level occupational
status. We also tested the impact of religious affiliation and citizenship in the
models, but did not find any significant results. These two factors therefore
do not seem to play a role in further reducing or increasing ethnic differentials
with regard to low-level occupational attainment in our analyses.
Figure 6.7 again looks at differences between second-generation Turkish
men and women across cities by showing the predicted probabilities of
low-level occupational attainment for the net effects model. For men, the
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Figure 6.5 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in low-level occupations
(gross effects on a logistic scale)
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^ = within-city difference
* = within-second generation difference
Source: TIES 2007-2008
Figure 6.6 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in low-level occupations
(net effects (human capital) on a logarithmic scale)
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^ = within-city difference
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Source: TIES 2007-2008
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cities with the highest predicted probabilities of low-level occupational at-
tainment are Brussels, Antwerp, Berlin and Frankfurt. The lowest predicted
probabilities are in Linz, Zurich, Vienna and Amsterdam. Women in
Brussels and Antwerp have the highest predicted probabilities of low-level
occupational attainment among their group, followed by their peers in
Berlin and Stockholm.
Figure 6.7 Predicted probabilities of low-level occupational attainment among














Second-generation Turks in the Belgian and German cities tend to have
higher predicted probabilities of low-level occupational attainment after
controlling for individual characteristics. A concentration of the second
generation in these sectors of employment could well be due to labour
market segmentation. This is consistent with earlier research showing that
the German labour market is highly segmented and offers very few oppor-
tunities for mobility, especially for immigrants, regardless of their origin
(Constant & Massey 2005; Kogan 2004).
Turning to second-generation differentials in high-level occupations re-
veals a largely inverted picture (see figure 6.8). But again, these differen-
tials are dramatically reduced once human capital characteristics are taken
into account (see figure 6.9). Educational background is mainly behind the
second-generation respondents’ more difficult access to high-level occupa-
tions, as expected.
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Figure 6.8 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in high-level occupations
(gross effects on a logarithmic scale)
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Source: TIES 2007-2008
Figure 6.9 Odds ratios of second-generation Turks being in high-level occupations
(net effects (human capital) on a logarithmic scale)
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Once more, the levels of human capital do not impact as profoundly in the
German cities. The only significant difference is present between second-
generation Turks and the comparison group in Berlin. Although the signifi-
cance levels are not strong, one can see that even with the controls, the
magnitude of the effects remains negative for the second generation.
Figure 6.10 compares and contrasts the predicted probabilities of sec-
ond-generation Turkish men and women attaining a high-level occupation
in their city. The cities are classified according to the decreasing order of
men’s predicted probabilities.
Figure 6.10 Predicted probabilities of high-level occupational attainment among














The most interesting result here is that – when compared to figure 6.7 –
higher probabilities of high-level attainment do not always go hand in hand
with lower probabilities of low-level attainment, and vice versa. Second-
generation Turkish men and women in Switzerland have the highest pre-
dicted probabilities of holding high-level occupations. This might appear
surprising given the educational attainment of second-generation Turks in
those cities, which is low. Closer examination of those currently employed
(those in our target sample for these analyses) shows that they tend to be
highly educated, whereas individuals with lower levels of education tend
more often to be unemployed or inactive. This is an interesting dual out-
come that shows more promising prospects – for those who make it onto
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the labour market. At the low end of the distribution are men in Berlin,
Stockholm, Antwerp and Rotterdam, who show quite low predicted proba-
bilities of high-level occupations. The picture for women is similar, but the
gap between the cities with the highest predicted probabilities levels (Basel
and Zurich) and the lowest (Strasbourg and Stockholm) is greater in the
case of women than men.
A last aspect we examine is intergenerational mobility. We analyse to
what extent the second generation is able to avoid reproducing the low so-
cial starting position of their immigrant parents (see chapter 4). Table 6.12
shows the proportion of respondents who are upwardly mobile, i.e. those





Men Women Men Women
Vienna Upwardly mobile 49.1 66.6 28.3 31.3
N 55 44 72 46
Linz Upwardly mobile 31.1 42.0 33.2 18.0
N 54 45 51 71
Brussels Upwardly mobile 50.3 54.0 10.6 25.6
N 73 22 38 56
Antwerp Upwardly mobile 47.0 73.6 32.1 36.5
N 100 53 112 107
Zurich Upwardly mobile 39.9 46.0 17.8 24.5
N 61 53 60 61
Basel Upwardly mobile 35.7 52.8 26.3 28.3
N 71 57 78 72
Berlin Upwardly mobile 34.7 57.3 34.3 21.1
N 72 45 80 67
Frankfurt Upwardly mobile 34.9 45.9 25.3 34.5
N 42 61 75 100
Paris Upwardly mobile 64.4 67.2 26.3 21.2
N 41 40 50 52
Strasbourg Upwardly mobile 51.7 50.8 27.6 24.8
N 52 59 37 50
Amsterdam Upwardly mobile 50.6 66.7 35.9 29.6
N 24 24 64 58
Rotterdam Upwardly mobile 31.6 70.1 38.5 43.0
N 40 20 57 68
Stockholm Upwardly mobile 41.9 37.8 18.5 25.9
N 63 46 53 62
Notes: Includes all employed out-of-school respondents with a valid occupational coding
Weighted results. Unweighted N.
Bold indicates significant difference (at 0.05 level) in proportions between second genera-
tion and comparison group.
Italics indicates a significant difference in proportion between the second generation across
cities.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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whose current occupational status is higher than their parents’ (measured
here as the highest parental occupation). Given the generally very low level
of education and occupational attainment among the Turkish immigrant pa-
rents (see chapter 2), it is unsurprising that the rates for upward occupa-
tional mobility are higher in the second generation than the comparison
group – in many cases, significantly higher. But the table also shows that
second-generation women tend to have higher rates of upward mobility
than their male peers (except in Strasbourg and Stockholm). If we com-
pared them to their mothers, the jump in occupational status would be
much greater. On the other hand, it should be taken into consideration that
we are only looking at women who are active on the labour market here.
The table does not reflect the much higher proportions of economically in-
active women over men.
Figure 6.11 shows that the gender gap in mobility plays out quite differ-
ently in the different cities. It is smallest in Strasbourg and highest in
Antwerp and Rotterdam. Overall, we see great variation in the rates of up-
wardly mobile women, with the difference in proportion being almost 40
percentage points between the city with the highest proportion of upwardly
mobile women (Rotterdam) and 22 percentage points in the city with the
lowest proportion of upwardly mobile men (Berlin).
Figure 6.11 Percentage of upwardly mobile second-generation Turks, by sex
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In most cases (except Rotterdam), the coefficients of upward mobility
are quite high – and significant – for most second-generation respondents,
though the gross effects are smaller than the net effects (see table 6.13a
and 13b). This either indicates that at similar levels of human capital and
labour market experience, the second generation is more successful at
moving upwards than its peers with native-born parents, or that other un-
measured aspects could explain the differences. Even if they are not di-
rectly comparable, the coefficients are smallest in the German cities, de-
spite their showing a propensity for more upward mobility for the second
generation. Many low-educated individuals have smaller levels of upward
mobility, but the negative impact of low levels of education is not consis-
tent across countries. Nor, for that matter, is the impact from having
achieved upper levels of education. Second-generation Turkish women in
some countries have higher levels of upward mobility then men.19
As figure 6.12 shows, the highest predicted probability levels of upward
mobility for second-generation Turks are found in Paris, Vienna,
Strasbourg and Amsterdam, while Brussels and Stockholm show the lowest
levels for men and Stockholm and Linz for women.
Figure 6.12 Predicted probabilities of upward occupational mobility for second-


































Even if not all the groups appear to experience upward mobility to the
same extent, which could be partly explained by differences in their pa-
rents’ socio-economic levels, the overall picture is such that most second-
generation groups show considerable upward occupational mobility. This
can be seen as a very positive outcome given the fact that, at their young
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age, they have not even reached their ‘occupational peak’. Yet, we must
think about the extent to which this level of mobility could also be driven
by other factors, such as changes in the occupational structure, which could
simply indicate some type of cohort effect being at play. This would re-
quire more in-depth analyses in line with classic mobility studies, given
that our approach here was a very basic one.
6.4 Conclusion
We framed our analysis of second-generation Turks on the labour market
within the ethnic penalty approach. Identifying the importance of remain-
ing differentials, once individual level characteristics are controlled for, di-
rects the focus at the impact of factors outside ‘typical’ determinants for
differentials, among which is discrimination. The discussion of the results
concerning second-generation Turks, in particular, maps areas where edu-
cational credentials are not sufficient for closing the gap between the sec-
ond generation and the comparison group. As a matter of fact, despite a
seemingly smooth transition into the labour market itself, some ethnic pen-
alties remain when the labour market outcomes of the second generation
are more closely analysed. Most differentials between second-generation
Turks and the comparison group, however, seem to be a result of the sec-
ond generation’s lower levels of human capital. Hence, education has a
major albeit not all-encompassing influence on these differentials.
We began by analysing the labour force participation of our respondents.
Net labour market participation differentials appeared for second-genera-
tion Turkish women in the Belgian cities and in Rotterdam, despite con-
trols for partnership status and the presence of children. Also, religious af-
filiation and citizenship appeared to affect the overall economic activity of
the second generation in Austria, Germany and, though to a lesser extent,
also Switzerland.
Concentrating on respondents in the labour force, we accounted for three
crucial labour market outcomes: unemployment, occupational attainment
and intergenerational mobility.
Unemployment differentials proved quite frequent. They especially con-
cerned second-generation Turks with lower education credentials, but occa-
sionally even extended to those who had completed apprenticeships.
Controlling for educational background, we found that ethnic penalties per-
sist for the second generation in the Austrian, Belgian and Dutch cities as
well as in Zurich. Lack of local citizenship was identified as a major factor
negatively influencing employment chances in Switzerland and Germany –
this is in line with previous findings.
Beyond individual factors, we analysed how contextual factors, such as
institutional arrangements and demographic circumstances, impact the rate
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of unemployment. In contexts where educational systems have extensive
vocational tracks, risks of unemployment were reduced for the second gen-
eration. Yet, we also saw how educational attainment at that level did not
lead to high levels of occupational status. We did not find any effects of
whether anti-discrimination measures do or do not exist at the national lev-
el. There may be a beneficial impact on the labour market outcomes for
immigrant workers, but not necessarily for the second generation.
Employed second-generation youth experience difficulties in obtaining
adequate returns on their educational investment. Net differentials in low-
level occupational status appear mainly for second-generation men in the
two German cities as well as in Amsterdam, a finding consistent with
Kogan’s research (2004). Even if successful at finding employment, their
frequent channelling into the low-skilled labour positions can be regarded
as a key indicator of the labour market segmentation. On the other hand,
as expected, differentials in high-level occupational status are well ac-
counted for by educational achievement.
The second generation seems able to avoid intergenerational social re-
production vis-à-vis occupational status. Second-generation Turks experi-
ence strong intergenerational occupational mobility, and at considerably
higher levels than their comparison group peers. Considering their own pa-
rents’ already low-level education, youth of immigrant descent can hardly
experience downward mobility. The gender gap among second-generation
Turks, however, shows that the strong upward occupational mobility is not
yet automatic for all. For as long as they enter the labour market, women
have higher probabilities for upward occupational mobility and evasion of
low-level occupations. This is probably the result of pre-existing gender
biases in the labour market whereby women are better positioned to exploit
society’s shifts from an industrial to a service economy.
What can our results contribute to the debate between the two main
strands on second-generation integration? Do they rather subscribe to the
assimilation strand or do they point to stagnation? The answer to these
questions has major scientific consequences and policy implications. The
main differentiator between the two theoretical strands is the explanatory
role of educational achievement for a variety of labour market outcomes. If
educational achievement is an exhaustive explanans for observed differen-
ces, then supply-side variables reliably account for them: in this case, the
analysis should concentrate on factors impacting the second generation’s
educational achievement. Should this not be the case, then demand-side
variables should account for the observed differences. Further analyses are
needed to elucidate explaining factors on the demand side of the labour
market.
Qualifying the situation of second-generation Turks is difficult, the pic-
ture being extremely complex. The presence of ethnic penalties indicates
that various factors are at play in determining labour market outcomes
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beyond educational achievement and individual agency. Ethnic penalties
for second-generation Turks appear in the labour market participation of
women in Belgium and the Netherlands; in risks of unemployment in
Austrian, Belgian and Dutch cities; and in low-level occupational status in
the German cities. Persisting disadvantageous outcomes of second-genera-
tion Turks are notably observed in occupational attainment in Frankfurt
and Berlin. They point to the existence of a considerably segmented labour
market.
Although we only analysed a particular sub-section of the second gener-
ation – those in urban centres across different countries – our results
proved consistent with the sparse existing research. In sum, it is not their
entry to the labour market that appears problematic for second-generation
Turks, but their acquiring a favourable position in it. This finding was al-
most consistent across all TIES countries.
The heterogeneous patterns we found require further investigation per-
taining to respondents’ cultural background as well as to the importance of
institutional factors. For the time being, they raise pertinent questions about
modes of incorporation and the demand-side of the labour market.
Notes
1 With gratitude, we acknowledge the useful feedback and help provided by many col-
leagues: Nienke Hornstra, Tineke Fokkema and Liesbeth Heering at NIDI; Marco
Pecoraro at SFM; the editors of this volume, as well as the members of the various
national TIES teams.
2 Figures for EU countries are taken from Gomez-Salvador and Leiner-Killinger
(2008); figures for Switzerland and Sweden are the authors’ own calculations based
on data from Statistics Sweden (2010) and the Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2010).
3 Labour force participation is defined as ‘a measure of the proportion of a country’s
working-age population that engages actively in the labour market, either by work-
ing or looking for work’ (ILO 2005).
4 The Urban Audit Database only provides data for three-year periods rather than an-
nual statistics. This is why the period covered by the Eurostat data is shorter than
that of the ILO. In instances when data were unavailable for the most recent period,
we used latest available information.
5 Detailed regression tables for the analyses are not presented here, but their digital
versions are available at http://imiscoe.org/index.php?option=com_content &view=
category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=35.
6 Y-standardised coefficients are used, which implies that the coefficient is divided by
the ‘estimated standard deviation of the latent variable’ (Mood 2010: 73).
7 Although average marginal effects could have been used in this instance (see Mood
2010), predicted probabilities were calculated for ease of understanding.
8 In producing the predicted probabilities, unless otherwise indicated, continuous con-
trol variables (such as age) are held at the mean, while dummy and categorical vari-
ables are held at the reference category.
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9 The analyses were not performed for the other outcomes because we did not see suf-
ficiently strong theoretical bases for them.
10 Some differences could be due to second-generation Turks who hold Turkish citizen-
ship probably having been delayed entry into the labour market by compulsory mili-
tary service.
11 Detailed regression tables for the analyses are presented in digital versions of tables
6.17 through 6.37 available at http://imiscoe.org/index.php?option=com_content
&view=category&layout=blog&id=30&Itemid=35.
12 Interaction terms between the city groups and the family formation variables were
examined, but very few were significant and thus led by small sample size.
13 Note that some figures given in the tables are based on small values of unemployed
individuals. Results should thus be interpreted with caution.
14 This applies to individuals in terms of age (mean), partnership status (no partner)
and education (general upper secondary education).
15 Given that this question was only asked of employed respondents, the data cannot
be forcibly applied in analyses using the full sub-sample.
16 The EGP class scheme was derived from the International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO-88) (Ganzeboom & Treiman 1996, 2002).
17 There are a few caveats to this approach, for example, a certain lack of detail with re-
gard to the respondents’ occupations and being confined to post-migration parental
occupation at only one point in time. Yet, this is the most detailed analyses of occu-
pational attainment and mobility the TIES data make feasible.
18 We excluded all ‘employment’ before age eighteen, i.e. summer jobs, apprentice-
ships and internships. Given the small numbers, we were unable to run separate
analyses by gender, though interaction effects were examined and did not yield sig-
nificant results.
19 Interaction effects were examined but did not yield any significant results.
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7 Union formation and partner choice
Christelle Hamel, Doreen Huschek,
Nadja Milewski and Helga de Valk
7.1 Introduction
Partner choice and union formation are important events in the lives of
young adults. The specific choices involved in these events are determined
by a range of factors. For example, research indicates that social homog-
amy plays an important role in partner choice. The timing of union forma-
tion is, moreover, strongly correlated with people’s educational level and
other social background characteristics. At the same time, common social
patterns in partner selection and union formation do change over time and
in the succession of generations. Two of the most significant changes to
occur across Europe in recent decades are a considerable postponement of
entry into union and parenthood and the marked decline of formal mar-
riage. On one hand, these changes are linked to rising numbers of people
in pursuit of higher education, thus leading to an older average age for
completion of the educational career. On the other hand, there has been a
widely acknowledged transformation of norms and values vis-à-vis sexual-
ity and marriage. Though such trends vary by country (Sobotka &
Toulemon 2008), they are quite well documented for Europe. The transfor-
mation first gained visibility in Sweden during the late 1960s, having grad-
ually spread to Western Europe, Southern Europe (Prioux 2006) and, more
recently, Eastern Europe (Atkinson & Marlier 2010). Prior research reveals
gender differences in union formation behaviour, pointing out how women
start unions earlier than men and choose partners who are, on the whole,
slightly older than themselves (Kalmijn 2007; Liefbroer & Goldscheider
2006).
Unlike our knowledge about general trends in the European population,
data concerning partner choice and union formation patterns among young
adults of immigrant origin in Europe is limited. And that is despite – if not
a very impetus for – widespread ‘folk’ ideas about immigrants, for exam-
ple, their large, overly-populating families, their ‘conservative’ family val-
ues and their rules for partner choice, specifically for young women. The
children of immigrants – a generation born and raised in Europe – find
themselves in a clearly different set of circumstances than their parents.
These mothers and fathers comprising the first generation came as married
couples or by large majority chose a partner from their country of origin
upon founding a family. By contrast, the second generation’s link with
their parents’ country of origin is not mediated by the personal experience
of migration. Yet at the same time, these young adults find themselves in a
position distinct from their peers with native-born parents. That is, the sec-
ond generation’s ‘marriage market’ also includes their parents’ country of
origin. Links created through regular visitations (for example, on holidays
or for family gatherings), create opportunities for them to find potential
partners there. Having two country contexts in which to find a partner also
ushers in different sets – two at least – of norms, values and practices.
In many societies, union formation choices and related attitudes towards
family are among the core values (Lesthaeghe 2000) transferred from pa-
rent to child (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007). Marriage among children raised
in the country of immigration thus often becomes a particularly crucial is-
sue in immigrant families, with the second generation being required to ne-
gotiate differences between their parents’ cultural preferences and their
own. Union formation patterns in Turkey and Morocco are markedly dif-
ferent from those in Europe in several respects. Marriage is practically uni-
versal in Turkey and Morocco. While marrying age remains low in Turkey
(HUIPS 2004: 91), Morocco’s has risen sharply in recent decades
(Ouadah-Bedidi & Vallin 2000). The situation in former Yugoslavian coun-
tries differs less from that in North-Western Europe. Communism’s col-
lapse and the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s and early 1990s dra-
matically affected family life in Central and Eastern Europe. For one, it led
to the lowest fertility rates in Europe. The economic crisis following the
political developments, together with the end of family support policies
and changes in family values, resulted in a dramatic decline in marriage
and childbearing within marriage as well as a substantial increase in un-
married cohabitation and extramarital childbearing (Philipov & Dorbritz
2003). An interesting question for us to consider now thus concerns the
union and family formation behaviour of the second generations of immi-
grant origin in Western Europe. How and to what degree are they reflec-
tions of their parents’ countries of origin versus their own countries of
birth? How do they represent the two respective cultures? And how do
they mirror or deviate from actual circumstances in the ‘motherland’?
Most available studies on children of immigrants do not allow us to dis-
tinguish between first and second generations, nor do they have a compara-
tive focus across immigration countries or origin groups. The present chap-
ter aims, therefore, to fill part of this gap by analysing the Turkish,
Moroccan and former Yugoslavian second generations in comparison to
their peers with native-born parents. We specifically focus on the transition
to first union: its timing, the prevalence of different types of union
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(marriage or cohabitation), the partners’ origins and socio-demographic
characteristics and the share of transnational or mixed unions. We endeav-
our to unravel how socio-economic and migration background characteris-
tics interact with decisions by the second generation regarding union for-
mation. How and to what extent are their union formation choices affected
by structural constraints, by the local or national context in which they live
and/or by individual preferences? Observed variation between countries
and between cities is discussed in relation to the history of Turkish,
Moroccan and former Yugoslavian migration, as well as the size of the
marriage market in each country. We assess to what extent young adults of
immigrant parentage follow common paths of union formation in their pa-
rents’ country of origin or take other routes. We also look at the common-
alities and differences between young adults of Turkish, Moroccan and for-
mer Yugoslavian descent and their peers of non-immigrant parentage in se-
lected European cities.
7.2 Transition to first union
Union formation in Morocco, Turkey and former Yugoslavia
Entry into partnership is one of the key markers for the transition to adult-
hood. The Turkish and Moroccan and, albeit to a lesser extent, former
Yugoslavian parents of respondents to the TIES survey come from places
where, unlike Western countries, marriage is virtually universal and unmar-
ried cohabitation remains rare (Locoh & Ouadah-Bedidi 2010). In
Morocco, sexual activity outside marriage is considered prostitution; un-
married cohabitation is hence illegal. Unmarried people who engage in
sexual intercourse can be jailed under article 490 of the Moroccan penal
code, even though the law is rarely invoked today. Despite major improve-
ments in women’s rights, recent reforms to Moroccan legislation – notably
in 2004 to the personal status code, the Mudawana (see Zoglin 2009) –
have basically left this situation unchanged.
In Turkey, the 2001 reform of the civil code and the 2004 reform of the
penal code eliminated references to patriarchal concepts such as morality,
chastity and honour, as well as abolished previous practices of discrimina-
tion towards unmarried women with children. It also recognised women’s
autonomy over their own bodies and sexuality, though the practice of ‘vir-
ginity testing’ – commonly used in the 1990s by government physicians
on prostitutes or women accused of extramarital sex (Parla 2001) – has not
been explicitly banned in all circumstances (Anil 2005; Ilkkaracan 2007).
In both countries, though especially in Morocco, practices and opinions
surrounding sexuality and gender roles have changed among the younger
generation; that being said, regulations regarding sexual activity remain
particularly strict.
UNION FORMATION AND PARTNER CHOICE 227
Turkey and Morocco differ markedly when it comes to the timing of
union formation. This is the case despite the countries’ common heritage
of a ‘culture of honour and shame’ (Peristiany 1965) that makes women’s
premarital virginity a matter of the family’s reputation (Parla 2001;
Ozyegin 2009) and despite the fact that marriage is practically universal.
According to the 2003 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, the me-
dian age of first-time marriage among women aged 25-29 was 21, while
for women aged 45-49 it was nineteen; this indicates a two-year increase
occurred over twenty years. Only 3 per cent of the women aged 40-44
never married (HUIPS 2004). The relatively young age at the first union
formation correlates with low levels of educational attainment. In
Morocco, by contrast, the changes began earlier and are more pronounced:
first-time marriage age has risen drastically in the last decades, with an age
increase of almost eight years since the 1960s (Ouadah-Bedidi & Vallin
2000). The median age at first marriage among women aged 25-29 in 2004
was 24 (Loudghiri 2003), which is comparable to that in some European
countries (Sobotka & Toulemon 2008). Many young men and women to-
day also remain single longer. Demographers see this as a sign that for
younger generations the universality of marriage – and hence the norm of
premarital virginity – are under challenge (Locoh & Ouadah-Bedidi 2010).
Because of the Moroccan law, the young generation cannot openly contest
norms on marriage and virginity, but ethnographic research, especially on
abortion and single motherhood, has shown that their actual hold is weak-
ening. Still, single mothers suffer from stigmatisation and social isolation
(Naamane-Guessous 1985).
Data on union formation in former Yugoslavia give an incomplete pic-
ture, as no fertility or family surveys have recently been conducted in those
countries. In addition, unmarried cohabitation is not recorded in the census
(Thornton & Philipov 2009). We can only present the mean first-time mar-
riage age in 1980 and 2000, having risen from 22.5 to 25 in Serbia and
Montenegro; from 22 to 25 in Croatia; and from 22 to 23 in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (between 1980 and 1990, data unavailable for 2000) (Billari
2005).
Partnership experiences of the TIES respondents
Across the board, TIES respondents are young adults who, at the time of
the survey, may or may not have already entered into a partnership. In the
section that follows, we define ‘union’ as simply the formation of a co-res-
idential partnership, without differentiating between marriages and cohabi-
tations. Tables 7.1a and 7.1b provide a first descriptive overview of young
adults who entered a first union.
Given that men and women from the same origin group and living in
the same city are roughly the same age, our comparison by sex is relevant.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































230 HAMEL, HUSCHEK, MILEWSKI & DE VALK
In line with previous studies, we mostly found that more women than men
had already formed a first union (tables 7.1a and 7.1b). With a few excep-
tions, this holds true for women of all origins in our study, indicating that,
regardless of people’s background, there are similar gender-related mecha-
nisms at work.
The direct comparison across groups and cities is not meaningful. This
is because there are too many potential explanations for variation between
cities with regard to the proportion of those who ever formed a union with-
in each group, as well as across groups in the same city. Possible influen-
tial factors include respective social norms about ‘ideal’ ages and stages in
a person’s life for forming a union, the variation in the respondents’ mean
age and differences in respondents’ level of education (see chapter 5). The
following subsections endeavour to more specifically assess these influen-
tial factors at different levels. It is worth mentioning that the very young
age structure of the Spanish sample is reflected in very low shares of per-
sons who have ever lived in a union. For this reason, the Spanish case is
excluded from the following analyses; case numbers are simply too small.
Age at first union formation
Although the descriptive findings yield some initial insights, they are lim-
ited in that they lack background information on when the young adults en-
tered a first union. We consequently analyse the role of age in the transi-
tion to a first union by using event-history techniques and presenting the
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, which yields the estimated share of per-
sons who enter a union and when they do so. This section analyses the role
of age in the transition to a first union for men and women, respectively. A
crucial indicator here is the median age at which 50 per cent of the re-
spondents have ever had formed a union. Tables 7.2a and 7.2b give de-
tailed information on the median ages.
Overall, we find that second-generation Turks are youngest when start-
ing a union and the comparison group is oldest. Those of Moroccan and
former Yugoslavian origin fall somewhere in between. This general pattern
by origin group holds for all countries. As expected, women are generally
younger upon entering their first union than men. The gender difference is,
on average, 1.7 years in the comparison groups and two and three years, re-
spectively, for second-generation Turks and Moroccans. At less than one
year, the gender gap is smallest for second-generation former Yugoslavians.
To facilitate the cross-country comparison, we also analysed the findings
for second-generation Turks separately by sex. Figures 7.1a and 7.1b pro-
vide an overview by country (with two cities collapsed) of the share of
men and women aged 15-30 who had not entered a first union at a given
age.
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In the two Austrian cities, the formation of the first union among sec-
ond-generation Turks is earliest (median age 23). The oldest union forma-
tion ages are found in Germany (25.5) and the two Swiss cities (25.8), thus
revealing a difference of 2.8 years between Austria and Switzerland. If we
focus solely on women, only in Austria is the age at first union comparable
to that of Turkey (around 21). In all other countries, young second-genera-
tion Turkish women form a union later than the average age in Turkey.
Interestingly, as figures 7.2a and 7.2b show, the results for the compari-
son groups are more heterogeneous across countries.
The cross-country comparison shows a different ranking of cities for the
comparison groups. We find the lowest median age for entering a first
union in Stockholm (24.7 years). As with second-generation Turks, the
Swiss and German cities’ comparison groups show the highest median age
for the first stable union (27.2 and 27.8, respectively).
In sum, the suggestion is that national and local contexts sway union
formation patterns in the Turkish second generation. This influence, how-
ever, is neither straightforward nor all-encompassing. The overall variation
in timing across countries is not reflected identically among the second
generations, though they do seem to follow the respective dominant pattern
to a degree. In Germany and Switzerland the correlation is closer, while in
Austria and Sweden, far less.
To better understand the influence of the national and city contexts on
second-generation Turks, figure 7.3a compares this group with the compar-
ison group in each country by sex. (For figures on second-generation
Moroccans, see figures 7.4 in appendix; for second-generation former
Yugoslavians, see figure 7.5 in appendix.)
Stockholm is a particularly interesting case for analysis here. In Sweden,
as in other Scandinavian countries, young people leave the parental home
earlier than in the rest of Europe (Van de Velde 2008b). This reflects the
social importance attached to an individual’s autonomy and independence,
though is undoubtedly also facilitated by generous levels of public finan-
cial support (Van de Velde 2008a). Such subsidies allow individuals to
leave the parental home even if they have not completed their education or
lack permanent employment. Combined with the fact that there are few
moral restrictions for unmarried couples, young adults in Sweden can
move in together more easily than in countries where access to independ-
ent housing may be more complicated. It is remarkable that in Stockholm
we see no difference in the median age for the transition to first union be-
tween second-generation Turks and the comparison group. We identify at
least three possible explanations for this. First, the Swedish welfare state
system reduces the role that different social backgrounds may have in ac-
cessing housing, thus offering opportunities that are exploited as much by
second-generation Turks as the comparison group. In this sense, the
Swedish welfare system produces a levelling-out effect by reducing
UNION FORMATION AND PARTNER CHOICE 235
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differences between poor and wealthy families across ethnic groups. A sec-
ond possible explanation is that young adults of Turkish parentage follow
the traditional Turkish pattern of early marriage, which is indeed facilitated
by – though not contingent on – the welfare system (Bernhardt, Gold-
scheider, Goldscheider & Bjeren 2007). In this respect, we therefore see
that second-generation Turks in Sweden do not differ from this group as
studied in other European countries. Meanwhile, such a parallel is not seen
in Sweden’s comparison group, who form first unions at a slightly younger
age than comparison groups in other European countries, thereby increas-
ing their union formation semblance with their Turkish peers. Yet a third
possible explanation for the correspondence in median age at transition into
first union between Sweden’s Turkish second generation and comparison
group is that at least part of this second-generation does not follow the
aforementioned early marriage pattern; like comparison group couples,
Turkish couples do form their own households quite young, but these are
unmarried cohabitational arrangements. We expect to draw some
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conclusions concerning these explanations in section 7.3. There we exam-
ine preferred types of union (marriage or cohabitation) and opinions on fe-
male premarital sexual activity, which gives insight into whether early
union formation may be associated with, or disconnected from, early mar-
riage and notions of chastity.
Following Stockholm, the French cities have the next-youngest age for
first union formation in the comparison groups (see figure 7.3b). As in
Sweden, access to housing in France is available for students in higher ed-
ucation (Corijn 2001). This provides opportunities for young people to co-
habitate.1 At the same time, France is also characterised by high levels of
unemployment among young adults, which can potentially generate a post-
ponement of first union formation. Second-generation Turkish men in the
French cities show almost the same first union entrance pattern as the com-
parison group, though their female counterparts deviate from the main
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trend, thus enlarging the gender gap among our Turkish respondents. The
following paragraphs examine this further.
In the two Austrian cities, both male and female second-generation Turks
enter a first union much earlier than males and females in the comparison
group (see figure 7.3c). Previous research on the majority group’s transition
to adulthood in Austria (Pfeiffer & Vera Nowak 2001) has revealed the in-
fluence of the educational path chosen. As referred to in German, the ‘dual
system of vocational education’, which consists of half-time education at
school and half-time on-the-job training at a company, offers good access
opportunities to a first job right after finishing one’s education and at a rela-
tively early age. Leaving the parental home and first union formation are
thus timed in quite close succession. The earlier first union formation
among second-generation Turks might at least partly reflect these respond-
ents’ much higher numbers in vocational education and the consequent ear-
lier completion of education (which also means not entering into the dual
system; for more details on educational choices, see chapter 5).
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Germany has one of the latest patterns of entry into union. Leaving the pa-
rental home and first union formation occur, as in Austria, in close succes-
sion and after access to paid employment (Hullen 2001). Second-genera-
tion Turkish women enter earlier into their first union than the comparison
group, but the gender difference is quite small compared to some other
countries.2
The Swiss case is similar to the German, albeit with a few differences
(see figure 7.3e). Like Germany, Switzerland has a dual school system.
Unlike in other European countries, however, first union timing for the
comparison group is not accounted for by entrance into the labour market.
Rather, it seems to be something chosen by the young adults themselves
(Thomsin, Le Goff & Sauvain-Dugerdil 2004). A relatively large share of
the comparison group remains outside a union until age 30. Young second-
generation Turkish women and men form their first union much earlier
than the comparison group. Whereas in Sweden we found mainly gender
differences and a relatively limited variation by origin, second-generation
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Turks in Switzerland have almost identical patterns of first union forma-
tion. The relatively small gender differences among the second-generation
Turks in Germany and Switzerland was not found in the other surveyed
countries.
Belgium and the Netherlands show much commonality across all groups
(see figures 7.6a and 7.6b in appendix). In both countries, second-genera-
tion Turkish women are the youngest to enter a first union; falling between
them and the comparison group males are second-generation Turkish males
and comparison group females. In the Netherlands, the union formation
pattern of second-generation Moroccan women is close to that of compari-
son group women. By age 30, around a third of these women (like their
male Moroccan and male comparison group peers) have still not formed a
first union.
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Factors influencing the transition to a first union
The second stage in the event-history analyses focuses on mechanisms
driving the start of a first union. We estimated piecewise-constant intensity
regression models. All analyses were performed separately for men and
women by origin group. Since we found largely similar patterns for men
and women, we present here only the findings for women of different ori-
gins (for findings for men, see table 7.12a in appendix).
Table 7.3a shows clear differences in entry to a first union for women
across the different countries.3 As presented above, comparison group
women in all countries enter the first union later than women in Sweden
(model 1). The transition to the first union occurs particularly late in
Germany.
Model 2 adds a number of control variables such as birth cohort, educa-
tion, religion, number of siblings, father’s education and age. Previous
studies have found that educational enrolment is associated with delaying
the first union. However, the effects of the educational level seem to be of
little importance in the comparison groups. Education only significantly
postpones first union formation when respondents are still enrolled in some
educational institution. Also, no effects were found for religious upbring-
ing, the presence of siblings or father’s education.
This picture looks different when we focus on second-generation Turks
in various European countries. The first model includes only the respond-
ents’ age and country of residence. Among second-generation Turkish
women, we found a postponed union formation tendency in France and, in
particular, Germany and Switzerland (model 1). As this pattern highly re-
sembles findings in the comparison groups, we see a potential correlation
with factors of context to which both the majority groups as well as the
second generations are exposed.
The second model introduces additional individual and family character-
istics, thus neutralising the potential effects of differences between cities in
the social composition of groups. For respondents of the same age, coming
from the same level of education, social background and situation regard-
ing educational enrolment, the likelihood of entering a first union remains
lower in Germany and Switzerland than in the other surveyed countries.
This indicates that in these countries national patterns of transition to adult-
hood are more influential. In all the countries, the likelihood of first union
formation is lower for the second generation’s younger birth cohort (i.e.
those born between 1981 and 1990) than the older cohort (i.e. those born
between 1970 and 1980). Being enrolled as a student is a significant factor
in postponing union formation for second-generation Turkish women. The
model shows no effect from the father’s educational level; a reason may
well be the very low educational level of the great majority of the fathers.
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Table 7.3a Relative risks in transition to a first union for comparison group and
second-generation Turkish women
Turkish second generation Comparison group
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Sweden (ref.) 1 1 1 1
France 0.88 0.82 0.65 ** 0.65 **
The Netherlands 1.17 0.98 0.57 *** 0.58 ***
Germany 0.72 * 0.47 *** 0.44 *** 0.35 ***
Austria 1.17 0.95 0.67 *** 0.62 **
Switzerland 0.68 * 0.58 ** 0.60 *** 0.57 ***
Belgium 1.12 0.89 0.55 *** 0.55 ***
Birth cohort
1971-1980 1 1
1981-1990 0.8 ** 1.05 **
Education
Primary/special education 0.88 1.29
Lower secondary 1 1




Tertiary 0.31 *** 0.76
Enrolment in education 0.19 *** 0.52 ***
Religion during childhood
Muslim (ref.) 1 n.a.
None, Jewish or other 1.04 1
Christian 0.72 1.01
Number of siblings
0 (ref.) 1 1
1 or 2 1.89 * 1.17
3+ 2.37 ** 1.18
Father's education




18-20 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 ***
20-25 0.012 *** 0.016 *** 0.013 *** 0.014 ***
25-30 0.011 *** 0.013 *** 0.017 *** 0.020 ***
30-35 0.013 *** 0.015 *** 0.013 *** 0.014 ***
Log likelihood -1390.7 -1151.7 -1332.8 -1227.0
*=5%; ** =1%; ***=0.1%
Note: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without signifi-
cant impact
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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The effect of an Islamic upbringing seems no different from that of
being brought up with another religion or in a non-religious context.
Family size, however, as indicated by the number of siblings, is clearly
related to union formation. Second-generation Turkish women with many
siblings are considerably more likely to have entered a union than those
with few or no siblings. This could indicate that families with more chil-
dren hold more traditional views on gender roles and the timing of union
formation. An alternative explanation could be that in large families do-
mestic overcrowding gives daughters an incentive to move out, thus living
with a partner sooner than those who have no siblings at home.
Our findings on second-generation Moroccans, as studied in the
Netherlands and Belgium, are summarised in the appendix (for women,
see table 7.12b; for men, see table 7.12c). Among the women in this
group, education was found to be an important factor: namely, higher lev-
els of educational attainment led to union formation postponement.
Chances of entering a union were again lower for the younger cohort of
second-generation Moroccan women. Other family characteristics did not
seem to be significant determinants.
Our findings on second-generation former Yugoslavian women, as
studied in Germany and Austria, are also summarised in the appendix (for
women, see table 7.12b; for men, see table 7.12c). Again, we find clear ed-
ucational differences that are fully consistent with what was found for the
second generation of other origins: enrolment in education and higher edu-
cational attainment are both associated with lower transition rates into a
union. Once again, we see that having more siblings significantly increases
the likelihood of entering a union. At the same time, the father’s education-
al level and religion do not have the expected effect and seem unrelated to
the first union formation of female second-generation former Yugoslavians.
In sum, educational attainment and sibling numbers are the most impor-
tant factors for the timing of first unions in all three second-generation
groups, but not for the comparison groups. The weaker role of education
for the comparison groups may have to do with the fact that postponing
union formation is a sort of generalised pattern in the majority population,
whereas the educated second generation may be forerunners at adopting
new union formation behaviour. The same applies to sibling numbers:
since having many siblings is quite an exception in the majority popula-
tion, this cannot play a role comparable to the one it does for second-gen-
eration women. For second-generation men, educational attainment seems
to have less impact on union formation behaviour.
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7.3 Type of first union: Marriage and unmarried cohabitation
Many young Europeans nowadays start a union by living together in an
unmarried partnership. Scholars have noted that young adults delay com-
mitments and are more individualised than in the past (Lesthaeghe & Van
de Kaa 1986), trends which have been linked to the emergence of less
standardised life courses and new types of partner relationships (Elzinga &
Liefbroer 2007). Directly entering into marriage has become much less
common and, in many European countries, unmarried cohabitation has es-
tablished itself as a recognised form of partnership alongside marriage.
Also, a substantial proportion of young adults continues to marry after hav-
ing cohabited with a partner for some time (Billari & Wilson 2001). The
extent of unmarried cohabitation, however, varies widely across Europe. It
is most common in Sweden, France and Germany (Billari & Wilson 2001).
By contrast, most immigrants originate from countries where the first
union is almost without exception a marital union. Few studies, however,
have focused on the type of union chosen specifically by the second gener-
ation in different contexts. De Valk (2007) has shown that premarital co-
habitation is the preferred option for a growing proportion of young adults
of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands, whereas Milewski and
Hamel (2010) have shown that young men and women of Turkish origin
in France do prefer marriage over consensual union. Are the young adults
interviewed for the TIES survey opting for unmarried cohabitation – as are
the majority populations where they live – or for marital union? Tables
7.4a and 7.4b provide a descriptive overview of the findings.
The vast majority of second-generation Turkish women’s first unions are
marital. Proportions of marital unions are highest in Belgium (95 per cent)
and France (90 per cent); this reveals the strong influence of Turkish norms
on the second generation’s affective life – notably in France, given that un-
married cohabitation is quite universal here. The lowest rate of marriage is
found in Switzerland, even though it remains high at 73 per cent. For sec-
ond-generation Turkish men, percentages are on the whole lower than for
women. The lowest shares are again found in Switzerland, where only 60
per cent live with a spouse, while the rate of consensual unions in the com-
parison group is not higher in this country than any others. Following
Switzerland, Sweden has the second-lowest country rate of marriage
among second-generation Turks. In other words, in these two countries,
young second-generation Turkish adults follow the ‘Turkish pattern’ of
marriage to a lesser extent than others.
For second-generation Moroccans – although marriage again accounts
for the majority of first unions – percentages of those cohabiting are sub-
stantial, particularly for men, and more so in the Netherlands than in
Belgium. The difference between the countries of residence is remarkable,
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with second-generation Moroccan men and women in the Netherlands
much more frequently cohabiting than their counterparts in Belgium.
Of the three origin groups, the least likely to form marital unions is the
second-generation former Yugoslavians (see table 4a). Although cohabita-
tion is much more common in this group than in the other two second gen-
erations, the shares of cohabitants are still below those in the respective
countries’ majority populations. Between one third and half of former
Yugoslavian second-generation men formed an unmarried cohabiting
union. For women, too, unmarried cohabitation is far from exceptional.
The proportion of cohabiting unions is slightly higher for both male and fe-
male respondents in Germany than in Austria.
Factors shaping the choice for marriage versus unmarried cohabitation
The choice for marriage versus unmarried cohabitation has been linked in
the literature to both individual preferences and parental socialisation. But
as Kalmijn (1998) has pointed out, opportunity structures also impact
union formation. It is relevant that state rules for acquiring a residency sta-
tus and citizenship may influence the second generation’s choice of type of
union if their partner is an immigrant. In the majority of European coun-
tries, marriage still confers more extensive rights than cohabitation; a legal
permit to stay is hard to obtain through other means. These legal issues
can be expected to be more significant for second-generation Moroccans
and Turks than for those of former Yugoslavian origin. At the same time,
cultural aspects may play a role in people’s preference for marriage, espe-
cially when it comes to the importance attached to female chastity. These
possible explanatory factors should be kept in mind when interpreting the
following findings on the preferences for marriage or cohabitation.
Our analyses of the second generation’s choice of union focuses mainly
on individual and family characteristics, as regularly applied in the litera-
ture. Table 7.5a shows findings of the logistic regression analyses. The first
model looks at the effect of respondents’ social characteristics (sex, place
of residence, cohort and educational level) on the likelihood of marriage
over cohabitation. The second model adds the respondents’ family charac-
teristics (religion practised during childhood, number of siblings and fa-
ther’s level of education). The two models are presented separately for the
comparison group and second-generation Turks.
The first model’s findings for the comparison groups show that women
are more likely than men to have formed a marital union, though the sig-
nificance of this observation is weak. We also find cross-national differen-
ces in likelihood of being married when differences in education level and
age of the studied populations across cities are neutralised. At the same
age and with the same education level, respondents from the comparison
group are more than twice as likely to be in a married union in Germany,
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Table 7.5a Factors influencing marriage versus unmarried cohabitation for Turkish
second-generation and comparison group, by group (odds ratios)
Turkish second generation Comparison group
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Men 1 1 1 1
Women 1.83 *** 1.8 *** 1.36 * 1.43 [0.007]
Sweden 1 1 1 1
France 1.52 1.22 0.08 *** 0.06 ***
The Netherlands 1.49 1.11 1.16 1.17
Germany 0.96 0.73 2.60 *** 2.44 **
Austria 0.99 0.93 1.63 1.49
Switzerland 0.62 * 0.56 [0.059] 2.16 ** 2.40 **
Belgium 4.30 *** 4.03 *** 2.04 * 2.06 *
Birth cohort
1971-1980 1 1 1 1
1981-1990 0.52 *** 0.52 *** 0.19 *** 0.18 ***
Education
Primary/special education 1.32 1.33 0.35 0.33
Lower secondary 1 1 1 1
Apprenticeship 1.49 1.52 [0.098] 1.33 1.37
Upper secondary/
apprenticeship
0.93 [0.086] 1.22 1.10 1.08
Tertiary 0.53 *** 0.70 0.93 1.03
Religion during childhood
Muslim 2.06 *** 21.4 **
None or other 1 1
Number of siblings
0 1 1
1 or 2 2.41 * 0.73 [0.095]
3+ 3.50 ** 0.97
Father's education
Primary or less 1 1
Secondary 0.92 0.95
Tertiary 0.32 *** 0.65
Log likelihood -609.5 -527.5 -787.9 -733.4
*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.
Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without signifi-
cant impact (not displayed here).
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
UNION FORMATION AND PARTNER CHOICE 249
Switzerland and Belgium than comparison group respondents in Sweden
or France. Differences between the other countries are not significant. We
also find that the younger cohort is less often married than the older
cohort, indicating that marriage is still losing its importance, though no
overall differences by education level are found. Introducing parental back-
ground and socialisation characteristics in model 2 does not change these
findings. In the comparison group choice of type of first union appears un-
related to either parental education or sibling numbers.
The factors influencing the likelihood of marriage are not exactly the
same for second-generation Turks. Women are more likely to have gotten
married than men in this group, but this gender gap is much more pro-
nounced than in the comparison group and appears to be highly significant.
Moreover, the fact remains after controlling for family background charac-
teristics in model 2. In sum, at the same age, with the same education lev-
el, same social background, same number of siblings and same religion
during childhood, second-generation Turks are far more likely to be mar-
ried in Belgium than in any other country (with Sweden as the reference
category). The higher proportion of marriages in Belgium is thus not due
to a higher proportion of lower-educated people there. Important factors
here could be the level of group cohesion, endogamy and, partially related
to this, likelihood of choosing a partner from Turkey. (We will come back
to this in the next paragraph.) Switzerland also appears to be a country
where the likelihood of marriage for young second-generation Turkish men
and women is lower than in Sweden. This reveals how the national norm
of unmarried cohabitation here influences the second generations’ practi-
ces, which does not seem to be the case in the other countries, where ob-
served variations of marriage rates are mainly due to variations in respond-
ents’ education levels across cities.
Our analyses, furthermore, point to the younger cohort of second-gener-
ation Turks as being less likely to be married, with the same holding true
for those with tertiary education. Thus, marriage is slightly tending to lose
its importance among second-generation Turks, though this process is less
pronounced here than in the comparison groups. As far as the variables in
model 2, both religion and number of siblings are factors that encourage
marriage; a Muslim upbringing increases the likelihood of marriage, as
does having three or more siblings. Both factors could be indicators for the
degree to which parents endorse more traditional values concerning union
formation. Including the father’s educational level in the analysis makes
the individual level variables less important. Those with a highly educated
father more often formed unmarried cohabiting unions.
The analyses were replicated for second-generation Moroccans and for-
mer Yugoslavians (see table 7.13 in appendix). Again, second-generation
Moroccans in Belgium have much higher chances of forming a married
union than their counterparts in the Netherlands (model 1). This finding
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remains robust after controlling for other factors in model 2. This suggests
that the Belgian context is an important additional explaining factor along-
side the characteristics of the diasporic community mentioned in the above
paragraph (Timmerman, Lodewijckx & Wets 2009). For second-generation
former Yugoslavians, we do not find country differences after controlling
for other factors.
Again, women in both Moroccan and former Yugoslavian second gener-
ations whom we surveyed were more likely to have been married than
men. Religion is a major explanatory factor for a person’s type of union;
being raised in a Muslim tradition significantly increases the likelihood of
having married. The same is true for having three or more siblings.
Our analyses show interesting gender differences that persist for all
groups and in all cities. At the same time, clear differences exist between
places of residence. With the available data it is hard to isolate the factors
at work here. Of potential relevance are an individual’s migration history,
the partner’s origin and the union formation behaviour of the majority pop-
ulation. Our data also suggest that individual orientation towards marriage
(as indicated by educational level and socialisation characteristics) remains
important for all groups and in all settings. A lower propensity to marry
found among the younger cohort may indicate a process of change that is
underway within each of the origin groups. As Lesthaeghe (2000) pointed
out, attitudes concerning family and union formation involve core values
that are inevitably slow to change. The substantial proportions in the sec-
ond generation who are already opting for cohabitation – with an even
larger proportions in the younger cohort – may well be an indication for
how union formation will evolve in the future among second-generation
young adults in Europe.
Leaving the parental home
To better understand how the first union is connected to other major events
in the transition to adulthood, we present reasons for leaving the parental
home. One of the key considerations for leaving the parental home among
young adults of the majority group in Europe was ‘living independently’.
Our findings on the type of partnerships are also reflected in the reasons
young adults gave for leaving the parental home.
Tables 7.6a and 7.6b indicate the percentage of young adults who stated
that they left home to form a union, either marriage or cohabitation, to be
independent, to study or work (as there were several answers possible, the
total sums up to more than 100 per cent). We provide information by ori-
gin, sex and country of residence. The majority of the comparison group
members chose ‘living independently’, ‘to study’ or ‘to work’ as their main
reasons for leaving the parental home (around 70 per cent). Differences be-
tween men and women are small.
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The scenario is radically different for second-generation Turks. Only 20
to 30 per cent left the parental home for these same reasons, the main
being union formation; this was particularly pronounced for women and
for entering marriage rather than cohabitation. However, second-generation
Turks in Sweden and Switzerland seem to be the forerunners of a new pat-
tern. ‘Living independently’ was the highest-scoring reason for second-
generation Turkish women in Switzerland (24 per cent); ‘to study’ was
highest-scoring for their counterparts in Sweden (13 per cent).
Young former Yugoslavian adults occupy an intermediate position be-
tween those described above. Cohabitation is the major reason for leaving
the parental home, but getting married is more common among them than
it is for the comparison group. Moroccans in the Netherlands (no data
available in Belgium on this issue) largely follow the Turkish patterns.
7.4 Partner choice: Different social factors at play
Surveys on immigrants or their descendants that explore partner choice
generally focus on intermarriage. This tradition can be traced back to
works on immigrant assimilation by sociologists in the Chicago School. In
the first half of the twentieth century, North American researchers consid-
ered frequency of intermarriage the most reliable indicator of assimilation
(Safi 2008), though it was not until 1964 that Gordon developed the first
theoretical exposition of the relationship between intermarriage and assimi-
lation. The implicit idea is that children of mixed couples have a weaker
attachment to their immigrant parents’ group of origin. It is also argued
that intermarriage is a consequence of dissolving boundaries between im-
migrant groups and the majority population, since members of the other
group are regarded as acceptable partners (Perlman & Waters 2004). As
Kalmijn (1998) has observed, however, it takes two to form a mixed cou-
ple. If one group is open to intermarriage though the other not, endogamy
continues to prevail in both groups. Contrasting with the Chicago School
research on intermarriage, more recent studies show that high rates of en-
dogamy may coincide with successful integration (which is, for instance,
the case of Jews and Asians in the United States). On the other hand, eco-
nomically vulnerable groups may have high rates of exogamy (as is the
case for the population of West Indian origin in the United Kingdom; see
Muttarak 2003). Though we know about relations between immigrants and
their partners from the majority population, there is still hardly any theoris-
ing on intermarriage between different immigrant groups. In sum, the de-
bate is still inconclusive about the interpretation of intermarriage and its
consequences (Song 2009).
The following section examines different factors in the choice of one’s
partner. They include educational and religious homogamy (Uunk 1996),
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where people meet future partners and what their ethnic or migrational
background is, indicating rates of intermarriage.
Educational homogamy
Sociologists and demographers have shown how choosing a partner is not
solely a personal matter (Girard 1964; Bozon & Héran 1989; Kalmijn
1991). The idea of partner selection based on a romantic model of mutual
love is, at best, incomplete and, at worst, an illusion: in many cases partner
choice is governed by broader contextual and social characteristics, such as
the individuals’ occupations and those of their parents. Girard (1964)
showed for France in the early 1960s how individuals generally preferred a
partner with similar personal background characteristics and with parents
whose occupations were close to his or her own parents’ place in the social
hierarchy of occupations. In general, high levels of socio-economic ho-
mogamy are frequently observed (Kalmijn 1998).
Analysts of social stratification argue that the personal characteristics of
couples are good indicators of how open or closed groups in society are.
The existence of exogamous couples (with respect to origin) and heteroga-
mous couples (with respect to occupation or education) is evidence that
groups see each other as equals. One of the main factors of stratification in
Western societies today is education. Recent studies on socio-economic ho-
mogamy are based on the partners’ educational level rather than their fam-
ily backgrounds (traditionally accounted for by the father’s occupation).
Indeed, the role social background plays in partner choice has decreased in
most industrialised countries (Ultee & Luijkx 1990). Our analyses are thus
also based on the educational levels of second-generation couples.
Educational experience has become an important proxy for cultural capital
and taste as well as socio-economic success – both of which impact partner
choice (see Kalmijn 1994).
Our analysis distinguishes three levels of education. Level 1 corresponds
to having left school after lower secondary level. Level 2 corresponds to
having had higher secondary education or an apprenticeship. Level 3 corre-
sponds to tertiary education. Tables 7.7a and 7.7b show the correlation of
the interviewees’ education (I) with their partners’ educational level (P).
Results are presented by sex and origin group for each country.
In all the countries’ comparison groups, educational homogamy exceeds
59 per cent. It is highest in Belgium and France, where, respectively, 77
per cent and 70 per cent of the couples have the same level of education.
Living in these two countries’ big cities appears to increase individuals’
likelihood of forming a couple within their own social milieu; it also indi-
cates relatively rigid social stratification. As shown in previous studies,
men tend to be more highly educated than their female partners. We ob-
serve this especially for the comparison group in the German and Swiss
UNION FORMATION AND PARTNER CHOICE 255







Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Austria I=P 53.3 54.5 53.9 70.8 72.8 71.8 52.6 65.5 59.1
(Vienna I>P 27.5 13.3 20.1 12.9 6.5 9.7 23.7 18.5 21.1
& Linz) I < P 19.3 32.2 26.0 16.3 20.7 18.5 23.7 16.0 19.8
N 77 101 178 85 94 179 57 68 125
Switzerland I=P 40.2 45.7 42.9 70.9 63.6 66.9 55.6 62.3 59.1
(Zurich I>P 32.2 20.8 26.5 13.9 13.4 13.6 25.0 14.0 19.3
& Basel) I < P 27.6 33.6 30.6 15.2 23.0 19.5 19.4 23.7 21.7
N 63 68 131 55 77 132 88 90 178
Germany I=P 50.3 57.0 54.5 73.2 55.6 63.7 64.6 56.1 60.4
(Berlin & I>P 42.2 13.4 25.8 24.7 23.2 23.8 30.5 26.1 28.1
Frankfurt) I < P 7.5 29.6 19.8 2.1 21.2 12.6 5.0 17.8 11.4
N 84 119 203 69 88 157 86 114 200
Sweden I=P 58.9 49.2 54.2 - - - 63.2 63.8 63.5
(Stockholm) I>P 26.9 36.3 31.5 - - - 21.7 32.3 27.7
I < P 14.2 14.5 14.3 - - - 15.2 3.9 8.8
N 55 57 112 - - - 61 80 141







Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total
Belgium I=P 41.6 45.4 43.6 43.5 50.9 47.7 76.7 64.6 70.0
(Brussels & I>P 46.0 33.6 39.7 32.7 29.3 30.7 11.9 30.2 22.0
Antwerp) I < P 12.3 20.9 16.7 23.9 19.9 21.6 11.4 5.2 8.0
N 157 137 294 68 146 214 78 117 195
France I=P 57.2 38.4 44.9 - - - 84.2 71.5 77.4
(Paris & I>P 29.2 31.3 30.5 - - - 5.0 23.0 14.7
Strasbourg) I < P 13.6 30.4 24.6 - - - 10.8 5.5 8.0
N 48 100 148 - - - 57 77 134
Netherlands I=P 48.0 56.5 52.7 47.6 38.8 42.0 63.1 56.2 59.6
(Amsterdam I>P 31.6 18.9 24.5 22.3 25.3 24.0 19.4 32.5 26.1
& Rotterdam) I < P 20.4 24.6 22.8 30.1 36.0 34.0 17.5 11.3 14.3
N 91 126 217 37 70 107 103 114 217
Notes for 7.7a and 7.7b: I = interviewee's level of education; P = partner’s level of education
I=P educational homogamy
I>P interviewee has higher level
I < P partner has higher level
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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cities. In Switzerland, for example, 25 per cent of the men versus only 14
per cent of the women are more highly educated than their partners. In
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, the situation is reversed:
more couples feature women as the more highly educated of the two. This
is particularly pronounced in Belgium and France, where the proportion of
hypergamous (marrying a partner of lower social status) women is, respec-
tively, three and five times higher than that of hypergamous men.4
In all countries, homogamous couples are much less common among
second-generation Turks. The differences are most marked in the French
and Belgian cities. While 84 per cent of the men and 71 per cent of the
women in the French comparison group live as homogamous couples, this
is only the case for 57 per cent of the men and 38 per cent among second-
generation Turks. Their counterparts in the Belgian cities are 41 per cent
for men and 45 per cent for women versus the comparison group’s 76 per
cent for men and 64 per cent for women. The same observation applies to
second-generation Moroccans living in the Dutch and Belgian cities.
Second-generation former Yugoslavians, however, stand out, having much
higher levels of homogamy than the comparison groups in Austria,
Germany and Switzerland. Yet, some caution is needed when interpreting
these differences. Research on social homogamy has shown that more
highly educated groups tend to be more homogamous than lower educated
groups. The differences we observe by origin may thus be the result of
structural effects arising from educational level variation across the groups
in each city (see chapter 5). These results on educational homogamy argue
for a more in-depth examination of how the second generation meets
partners.
Meeting place and family influences
The Choice of a Spouse survey conducted in 1959 by Girard at the French
National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) provided a quantitative
picture of the strength of social homogamy among French couples at that
time. Thirty years later, two other demographers from INED conducted the
Formation of Couples survey (Bozon & Héran 1989), which gave special
attention to partners’ friendship networks and where people met their part-
ners. This approach was also applied in other quantitative surveys on part-
ner choice (e.g. Lampard 2007; Kalmijn & Flap 2001). It revealed a strong
correlation between the places where people meet and the social back-
ground of the people who frequent them, as well as associations with spe-
cific values, norms or tastes.
Partner choice is also the result of interactions between young adults
and their parents. Most parents express expectations concerning the charac-
teristics of their child’s future partner, stressing, for example, the need to
find someone with a stable job. The origin of the partner may also be a
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topic for discussion within families. People usually know whether their pa-
rents would accept or refuse someone from a different origin group or reli-
gion. But parents in present-day Europe have lost much power to influ-
ence, if not control, their children’s choice. Nevertheless, most individuals
orient partner choice according to anticipated acceptability by their parents.
Social homogamy today is the result of new practices based on individuals
with the same social background and characteristics who likely belong to
the same networks and partake in the same activities, such as leisure pur-
suits. Since most choose partners from within their own network, they
often share social characteristics.
Bozon and Héran (1989) constructed a classification scheme of places
people meet their future partners, based on the type of meeting places most
frequently associated with homogamy. They showed that members of the
highest social classes tend to meet their partners in self-selective places,
such as at school or university, in clubs and political parties, at the work-
place, sports centres and holiday resorts. The workplace is an especially
significant way for civil servants to meet future partners. The working class
more often meet their partners in public places in the neighbourhood, at
shopping centres, parks, movie theatres and bars. A third category in the
scheme encompasses social networks of friends and family members.
Given the particular situation of second-generation Turks and
Moroccans, the TIES survey distinguished between the individual’s own
network (identified by the response ‘through friends’) from the family net-
work (‘through my parents’, ‘at a family gathering’ or ‘on holiday in my
parents’ home country’) when asking where respondents met their partners.
The family network responses would indicate a relatively strong, if indi-
rect, influence by the family on partner choice. The family network fosters
an environment that is proximate to the first generation’s own social mi-
lieu, where parental control can still be effective. The survey also included
the response ‘through an introduction by my parents’, an answer that hints
at parents’ direct influence. Tables 7.8a and 7.8b present the results for the
different meeting place categories.
In all the countries, 20 to 40 per cent of the comparison group members
met partners-to-be through mutual friends. Another third met their partners
at school or university, at work or in an association of some sort. In other
words, around two thirds found their partners in places qualified as either
private or self-selective, which corresponds to practices among the edu-
cated that result in high rates of social homogamy. Only around one fifth
of the introductions took place in public places such as cinemas and bars,
on the street and in the neighbourhood. Moreover, family influence appears
very limited: introduction to one’s future spouse by parents is almost non-
existent (less than 1 per cent), while the indirect family influence amounts
to 10 per cent. No significant gender differences are observed in the
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comparison group, except in Austria and Germany, where an indirect fam-
ily influence plays a more significant role for women.
For second-generation Turks, friends are either the second- or third-most
common way of meeting a partner. The most is at family gatherings,
through family networks and while on holiday in Turkey – these three
situations reflect an indirect family influence. The percentages for self-
selective places (i.e. school, university and workplace) vary between 10
and 20 per cent, thus being two to three times less frequent than for the
comparison groups. Direct parental influence is also visible in all countries.
It is especially high in Austria for both sexes (17 per cent for men and 12
per cent for women); only for women in Germany (16 per cent versus 5
per cent for men); and slightly less important in the Netherlands (8 per cent
for both sexes). In France, direct family influence is more frequent for
men, but overall only of marginal importance (4 per cent for men and 2
per cent for women); the same applies to Switzerland (less than 3 per cent
for both sexes).
In this regard, second-generation Moroccans prove quite similar to their
Turkish peers. Partners are met primarily through the family network (44
per cent), although direct family intervention is less important (5 per cent
for men and 1 per cent for women). Self-selective meeting places are re-
ported far less often by second-generation Moroccans (18 per cent versus
Turks’ 38 per cent). By contrast, second-generation former Yugoslavians in
Austrian, German and Swiss cities have very similar practices to those of
the comparison group; this observation is particularly stable across
countries.
In conclusion, we can account for the lower homogamy of Turkish and
Moroccan second-generation couples observed earlier. This is partly the re-
sult of, by contrast, higher educational levels in the comparison groups and
partly due to differences in the social network through which partners are
found. If they are immigrants from Turkey or Morocco, the likelihood that
they will have a different level of education than their second-generation
partners increases notably, since school systems differ.
The partner’s migration background
As noted earlier, the social and geographical space in which the offspring of
immigrants meet their future partners is effectively transnational. Segrega-
tion, xenophobia and racism in the country of residence may restrict their
pool of available partners from the majority population. The proportion of
mixed couples in the parents’ generation may also play an important role.
This section distinguishes three types of union: transnational unions
formed with an immigrant born in the parents’ country of origin (i.e.
Turkey, Morocco or former Yugoslavia); mixed unions formed with some-
one born in the surveyed country whose parents were also born in the
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surveyed country; and unions formed with a person who is not only also
of immigrant parentage but of the same origin. We will also examine to
what extent the size of the community of origin influences the types of
unions.
Regardless of country of residence, second-generation Turks have rarely
formed couples with members of the majority population. Those doing so
represent only 13 per cent in German cities, which is the highest rate of
any country. The Swiss, Dutch and Belgian cities have the lowest propor-
tion of mixed couples (3-6 per cent). Explanations for this considerably
high level of endogamy are varied: examples include the strong influence
exerted by parents; limits on the marriage market imposed by stigmatisa-
tion from the majority population (hence difficulty in finding a partner of
non-immigrant background); religious boundaries that discourage unions
with persons of another religious affiliation or none at all. Stringent boun-
daries do exist in European societies between groups of different religious
affiliation, especially between Muslims and Christians (Alba & Golden
1986; Kalmijn & Van Tubergen 2007). At the same time, this is not sur-
prising for the second generation; similar levels of endogamy can be found,
for example, among descendants of Mexican and Chinese immigrants in
Los Angeles (see Schneider, Chávez, Waters & DeSipio forthcoming).
Most Turkish partners of our respondents are Turkish-born. This is the
case for over 50 per cent in Sweden and Switzerland and even more than
the 60-70 per cent found in the Austrian, French, Dutch and Belgian cities.
Only the German outcomes constitute a remarkable exception to this pat-
tern, since transnational couples in the two cities only represent 12 per cent
of the couples. By contrast, 70 per cent chose a second-generation Turkish
partner as opposed to 20-30 per cent in the other countries. Germany has
the longest Turkish migration history and by far the largest Turkish com-
munity (Worbs 2003). For 2003, Worbs estimated a population of
1,322,500 adults of Turkish descent below age 35 in Germany. This makes
the case unique: young adults of Turkish descent in Germany can choose
potential partners from a much larger pool of second-generation peers with
the same immigrant background than in the other countries. In this respect,
marriage markets may function differently in the diverse countries (see also
Huschek, De Valk & Liefbroer 2010).
In relation to transnational marriages, a pronounced gender gap was ob-
served in the Belgian, Austrian and French cities. Here second-generation
Turkish women were more frequently in couples with a Turkish immigrant
than were men (in Belgium, 80 per cent of women versus 66 per cent of
men; in Austria, 68 per cent versus 55 per cent; in France, 70 per cent ver-
sus 36 per cent). This particularly large gender gap was not found in
Sweden, Germany or Switzerland.
Second-generation Moroccans are seemingly subjected to the same proc-
esses as those of their Turkish counterparts. Their chosen partners were
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mainly Moroccan immigrants, a pattern again more marked for women
than men. Second-generation former Yugoslavians present a more varie-
gated picture, depending on their city of residence. In the Swiss and
Austrian cities, half chose a partner born in former Yugoslavia (respec-
tively, 56 per cent and 44 per cent), but in German cities the principal trend
was to choose partners of native parentage (56 per cent).
Transnational unions and educational homogamy
This section examines whether the heterogamy of the couples can be
linked to the partner’s origin. Namely, do the immigrant partners have a
higher or a lower educational level than the respondents? Tables 7.10a and
7.10b present the educational level of the TIES respondents (I) compared
with that of their partners (P), according to their partners’ origin.
When second-generation Turks partner with the majority population,
they predominantly form educationally homogamous couples (50-60 per
cent of the mixed couples). Between 12 and 20 per cent are more highly
educated than their partners. Second-generation Turks rarely form a couple
with someone from the majority population who is more highly educated.
When the respondent is in a couple with a Turkish-born immigrant, the
proportion of educationally homogamous couples becomes slightly lower
(ranging from 36 per cent in Belgium to 56 per cent in the Netherlands).
This means that more respondents live in heterogamous couples. In most
cases, the respondent is less educated than the partner born in Turkey. This
may signify that only the most highly educated people in Turkey are eligi-
ble candidates in the eyes of the second generation living in Europe,
though it also can point to the fact that educational levels in Turkey are ris-
ing. Since all these couples live in Europe, it may also indicate that the
European background of the respondent and the higher educational level of
the Turkish partner create a sense of ‘homogamy’ for the couple. Second-
generation Moroccans and former Yugoslavians seem to be subject to the
same phenomenon.
Transnational unions and opinions on sexuality
Earlier in this chapter we hypothesised that certain union formation pat-
terns, such as type of union and partner choice, are also connected to cul-
tural values. The following section explores to what extent the norm of a
woman’s virginity at marriage is correlated with choice of a partner either
from the survey country or from the parents’ country of origin. As men-
tioned in the introduction to this chapter, this norm remains of importance
in Turkey and Morocco.
Between a quarter and almost two thirds of second-generation Turkish
respondents who live in couples consider women’s engagement in
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premarital sex as being ‘never acceptable’. For those living in Switzerland
or in Sweden, women’s chastity is becoming a minority norm, though it is
widely dominant in Austria and, albeit to a lesser extent, Germany. Young
second-generation Moroccan men and women have similar opinions, while
this position is endorsed by less than 4 per cent in the comparison groups.
In keeping with previous indicators, young second-generation former
Yugoslavian men and women come very close to the comparison groups.
In all cities, the share of those who attach a lot of importance to wom-
en’s chastity is higher if the partner comes from Turkey. The causal rela-
tion between both items cannot be established here: it may as well be that
the ‘brightness’ of boundaries between groups leads second-generation
Turks to choose a partner in Turkey, also making them more likely to ad-
here to values and norms dominant in their partners’ country of origin. At
the same time, second-generation Turkish respondents may have chosen a
partner from Turkey because they themselves adhere to these more tradi-
tional values, which they believe will have a stronger prevalence among
possible partners there.
The German case is quite interesting in this regard since the rate of
transnational unions is so much lower than in other countries. We would
therefore expect the importance attached to female virginity to be lower,
though it remains surprisingly high (45 per cent of second-generation
Turks claim that women’s engagement in premarital sexual activity is never
acceptable). It is, however, much lower than in transnational couples (60
per cent). These findings indicate that views on sexuality are still highly in-
fluenced by the values of the immigrant parents or the wider Turkish dia-
spora, even when marrying a second-generation Turkish partner. Even
though these findings reflect opinions and not practices – so there could
well be a difference between what is expressed in public and what is expe-
rienced in private – we have reasons to believe any such disparity is
small.5
The data on sexual norms are particularly important to understand the
meaning of both the timing and type of first union formation. Whereas the
share of marriages does not significantly vary between cities, the opinions
on female premarital sexual activity show remarkable variations. This may
give some clues on how to interpret earlier-than-average union formation
ages in Sweden and in Austria. In Sweden, this likely has to do with a cor-
respondence to the belief in young adults’ rights to autonomy and equal
rights for women – also including among second-generation Turks. By
contrast, Austria’s seemingly similar outcome is probably best explained
by just the opposite: a higher frequency of arranged marriages and wide-
spread traditional ideas about gender roles in the Turkish community.
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7.5 Conclusion
The findings of this chapter can be summarised under three main headings.
First, a strong common trend is observed among second-generation Turks
living in Europe. Offspring of Turkish immigrants do not follow the domi-
nant patterns of union formation in Turkey nor of the countries where they
live. Overall, we may conclude that the transition to first union shows sub-
stantial variation between European countries, both for comparison groups
and the second generation. Timing patterns between the different origin
groups vary much more in some countries than in others. Sweden is the
most extreme example, with a much sharper gender gap than origin variation
concerning age at first union formation. Men and women behave differently,
and these differences look exactly the same for second-generation Turks as
the comparison group. For all the other countries except Germany, we may
conclude that differences between men and women from the same origin
group are generally more pronounced than those between origin groups.
Second-generation Turks form their first union later than people do in
Turkey, though earlier than the comparison groups in their countries of res-
idence. We also found that marriage is no longer universal, but remains
much more common than cohabitation. Women’s virginity before marriage
remains widespread, but it is no longer a necessarily dominant norm. The
second-generation – women especially – often chooses a partner born in
Turkey (except in Germany, where they more often choose a fellow sec-
ond-generation partner) and, when they do so, it is likely for the partner to
be more highly educated than they are. Demographically, this is not really
surprising. However, it contradicts a commonplace image in political dis-
course and the media of Turks ‘importing’ low-educated brides and grooms
from the Turkish countryside.
Choosing a spouse born in Turkey is a key issue, especially for women.
This holds for all countries except Germany, where it is more common to
choose a partner from among local second-generation Turks. Yet interest-
ingly, our analyses on partner characteristics revealed that young second-
generation Turkish adults who find partners in Turkey are particularly wont
to find partners who are more highly educated than themselves. Although
this is not really surprising given that women generally marry men who
are slightly older and more highly educated, it also contradicts the afore-
mentioned stereotype of ‘importing’ a low-educated spouse.
It is important to recognise that the national contexts specific to the sur-
vey countries also show their effects. In each country, a minority within
the Turkish second generation follows the national patterns. This minority
is larger in some countries than others, primarily dependent on institutional
arrangements, economic situation and a social climate that favour female
autonomy and equal participation. This minority is particularly sizeable in
Sweden and Switzerland, but smaller in Austria, Belgium and Germany.
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Let it be noted that at the time of the survey the second generation was
still relatively young and many respondents had yet to enter partnerships
for the first time. In the years to come, this group who had postponed
union formation may in fact be making partner choices more similar to that
of their comparison groups peers. How these young adults negotiate their
life course choices in private and in the public spheres of education and
the labour market will be crucial to their own personal development and
that of European societies at large.
Notes
1 Unlike other countries, France showed a difference between cities (Milewski &
Hamel 2010). For second-generation Turks and their comparison group peers, first
union formation occurred later in Paris than in Strasbourg. This reflects a difference
in the composition of the surveyed population: Paris attracts more highly educated
persons, both immigrants and nationals, who tend to form couples later on. In addi-
tion, access to housing is especially difficult in the capital city, where rents are parti-
cularly high.
2 As in France, a difference is observed between the two cities, with first union forma-
tion occurring later in Berlin than in Frankfurt. The more difficult-to-access labour
market in the European capitals, as compared to the secondary cities, may account
for this (see chapter 6).
3 Our additional analyses (not shown) revealed that city differences play only a minor
role in female union formation behaviour.
4 In several European countries, women now have higher levels of educational attain-
ment than men, though they do not systematically get better jobs. Discrimination
when it comes to accessing employment and notably in their actual professional ca-
reers keeps them in less well-paid, less prestigious work for which they are overqua-
lified to begin with. Since men are generally more highly positioned than women on
the labour market and vis-à-vis social stratification, they tend to form couples with
women in lower positions. As a result, a man may form a couple with a woman who
holds the same socio-economic status as himself though is nonetheless better quali-
fied on the job market. Information about the jobs partners held when they first met
is not included in the TIES survey, so we cannot detail this phenomenon further.
5 The TIES survey asked respondents to specify their age upon first engaging in sex-
ual intercourse. The results indicate a strong correlation between respondents’ opi-
nions on sexual issues and their reported practices (Milewski & Hamel 2010).
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Table 7.12a Relative risks in transition to a first union for Moroccan and former
Yugoslavian second-generation men
Turkish second generation Comparison groups
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Sweden 1 1 1 1
France 0.66 * 0.67 0.70 * 0.81
The Netherlands 1.00 0.92 0.69 ** 0.79
Germany 0.76 0.52 ** 0.53 *** 0.58 **
Austria 1.37 * 1.13 0.67 * 0.73
Switzerland 0.79 0.81 0.58 *** 0.65 *
Belgium 1.12 0.91 0.56 *** 0.58 ***
Birth cohort
1971-1980 1 1
1981-1990 0.8 ** 0.80 **
Education
Primary/special education 0.78 0.78
Lower secondary 1 1
Apprenticeship 1.07 1.07
Upper secondary/apprenticeship 0.80 0.80
Tertiary 0.65 ** 0.65 **
Enrolment in education 0.32 *** 0.32 ***
Religion during childhood
Muslim 1 n.a.




1 or 2 1.22 1.22
3+ 1.50 1.50
Father's education





< 20 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.003 ***
20-25 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.008 *** 0.018 ***
25-30 0.014 *** 0.017 *** 0.014 *** 0.032 ***
30+ 0.007 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.023 ***
Log likelihood -1018.1 -916.5 -1087.5 -1008.9
*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.
Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without signifi-
cant impact (not displayed here).
Education of respondent is a time-varying covariate.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Variable Model 1 Model 2
The Netherlands 1 1 Germany 1 1
Belgium 1.63 *** 1.76 *** Austria 1.86 *** 1.81 ***
Birth cohort
1971-1980 1 1





Lower secondary 1 1
Apprenticeship 0.46 ** 0.65 *
Upper secondary/
apprenticeship
0.44 ** 0.47 **
Tertiary 0.11 *** 0.46 **








1 or 2 0.79 2.12 **
3+ 1.18 2.87 ***
Father's education
Primary or less 1 1
Secondary 1.17 0.78
Tertiary 1.07 0.92
Age in years Age in years
18-20 0.002 *** 0.005 *** 18-20 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
20-25 0.008 *** 0.018 *** 20-25 0.008 *** 0.006 ***
25-30 0.010 *** 0.020 *** 25-30 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
30-35 0.006 *** 0.018 *** 30-35 0.005 *** 0.004 ***
Log likelihood -431.9 -332.9 -364.9 -301.6
*=5%; ** =1%; ***=0.1%
Note: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without signifi-
cant impact (not displayed here).
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Variable Model 1 Model 2
The Netherlands 1 1 Germany 1 1






















1 or 2 0.76 1.83 **
3+ 1.17 2.36 ***
Father's education





< 20 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
20-25 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.005 ***
25-30 0.009 *** 0.007 *** 0.013 *** 0.010 ***
30+ 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.003 ***
Log likelihood -212.8 -185.2 -275.5 -219.5
*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.
Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without signifi-
cant impact (not displayed here).
Education of respondent is a time-varying covariate.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Variable Model 1 Model 2
Men 1 1 1 1
Women 2.9 *** 3.22 *** 1.53 * 1.52 [0.054]
The Netherlands 1 1 Germany 1 1
Belgium 2.89 ** 2.34 * Austria 0.93 0.74
Birth cohort
1971-1980 1 1 1 1




0.66 0.8 0.39 0.5
Lower secondary 1 1 1 1
Apprenticeship 1.21 1.34 1.51 1.67
Upper secondary/
apprenticeship
1.26 1.55 1.51 1.8
Tertiary 1.21 1.25 0.32 ** 0.33 **
Religion during
childhood
Muslim 2.55 * 4.89 **
Christian — 0.87
None or other 1 1
Number of siblings
0 1 1
1 or 2 4.02 1.81 [0.077]
3+ 8.03 2.01 [0.065]
Father's education
Primary or less 1 1
Secondary 0.36 * 0.63
Tertiary 1.33 1.29
Log likelihood -157.0 -131.0 -271.8 -260.5
*=5%; **=1%; ***=0.1%.
Notes: Education variables each contain a small number of missing values without signifi-
cant impact (not displayed here).
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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8 Identities
Urban belonging and intercultural relations
Jens Schneider, Tineke Fokkema, Raquel Matias, Snežana
Stojčić, Dušan Ugrina and Constanza Vera-Larrucea
8.1 Introduction: Theories, definitions and concepts
Identities are difficult to grasp – in more ways than one. Conceptually,
‘identity’ is probably one of the most fuzzy concepts constantly used in the
social and cultural sciences. For several disciplines it is a key term, notably
psychology, anthropology and cultural studies, but standard and encyclo-
paedic definitions are highly diverse, even within one discipline. We know
that every person has ‘an identity’, but we also know that people have mul-
tiple identities. The term’s root is the Latin word for ‘the same’ (idem),
which highlights a contradiction found in each definition of ‘identity’. The
notion of the uniqueness of each individual self seems to work against the
sameness acknowledged in our sharing central attributes (e.g. gender, age,
ethnicity) with other individuals and the fact that individuals forming
groups is an essential part of ‘being human’.
Terms such as ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘national identity’, even when in-
voked as attributes of an individual, only take on meaning when they are
shared with other individuals. As formulated by the French anthropologist
and psychologist George Devereux, each individual belongs to a diverse
range of meaningful categories (or ‘classes of attributes’) in which he or
she is just one among many others. However, the unique combination of
these categories is so specific that each individual is unequivocally identifi-
able and distinct from all others (Devereux 1978: 138). The broader the
range of categories, the better an individual can respond – and find a place
and position – in most diverse situations and contexts. It is this ability that
makes an identity ‘functional’ (Devereux 1978: 170ff).
Identity, belonging and citizenship
Identities are difficult to grasp because of the boundedness of their ‘enact-
ment’ to specific contexts and the different levels of enactment therein.
Identities can be defined as ‘labels’ for belonging to certain categories,
though these labels can be quite disconnected from actual cultural and so-
cial practices (Devereux 1978: 145; Brubaker 2004). The process of ‘label-
ling’ involves three different perspectives: the self-ascription of the individ-
ual, the habitus of the category (or the group itself) and the ‘outside world’
(non-group members). It can be presumed that the legitimacy of a label’s
use in specific contexts is dependent on, not least, the degree of consensus
across the three perspectives (Schneider 2002: 13). There are many empiri-
cal examples in which the consensus is not there. One of the most telling
has been the example of anti-Semitism in Europe and its almost complete
disconnection from ‘empirical evidence’. Anti-Semitism could not (nor did
it bother to try to) rely on ‘objective’ cultural differences between Jews
and the majority population (see e.g. Balibar 1990; Gilman 1992;
Borneman & Peck 1995; Rapaport 1997). With regard to the subject of this
book, we frequently observe relevant differences in the self-perception of
the second generation in Europe and how they are perceived by large sec-
tors of the majority society.1
Nonetheless, divergences in the criteria used to label identity formations
and politics in one way or another are seen as the norm, especially in com-
plex social settings such as cities. On the other hand, even when the label
itself is not controversial, in most cases its precise contents and implica-
tions are. Identity constructions for an important part constitute a discursive
field in which social and societal actors constantly negotiate their place
and position. Therefore, identities have also been described as ‘fluid’ and
‘liquid’ (e.g. Wright 2010), as being largely independent from fixed attrib-
utes, such as observable behaviours or physical characteristics in the widest
sense.
At the same time, identities are connected to, or closely intertwined
with, distinct cultural and social practices. These practices generally have
at least three different dimensions relevant to the enactment of belonging
and identification. The symbolic dimension refers as much to concrete
symbols (e.g. flags, uniforms, anthems) as to ‘symbolic performances’ of
group belonging (e.g. national holidays, ceremonious rites of passage). The
interactional dimension refers to the fact that, by definition, the individual
perception of ‘self’ requires the presence of ‘others’ (see e.g. Erdheim
1992: 21). The different categories of belonging (or ‘class memberships’)
thus receive their meaning from the particular social contexts in which they
are relevant (Devereux 1978: 138). But, as a consequence, this dimension
also describes the versatility and situational relevance of the multiple be-
longings of each individual: being a woman or a man, a father or a son, an
employer or an employee and so forth. Finally, the discursive dimension
refers to the definitional criteria for labels of belonging that are not specific
to individuals, but rather are based on social narratives established, repro-
duced and disseminated through ‘discursive formations’ in a given social
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setting (cf. Foucault 1972). This means that there are not only discursive
aspects in particular identity enactments, but that discourses also play a
central role in prefiguring the ‘field’ in which individuals and groups of in-
dividuals negotiate their place and position (see e.g. Bourdieu 1994: 50ff).
Discourses also reflect the structural characteristics of groups, societies and
cultures in all their aspects: power, hierarchies, zeitgeist, ‘the public opin-
ion’, ‘collective awareness’, etc. (Trudgill 1983; Fairclough 1992: 211).
As described in chapter 1, the TIES project compares the same second-
generation groups across different countries. Our main interest is identify-
ing the role that institutional arrangements play on specific outcomes in
different domains of structural participation in and as part of ‘the society’.
The most basic aspect of nation-state intervention with regard to individual
belonging, or lack thereof, is citizenship. This, in its traditional sense – for
the moment thus leaving aside notions such as cultural and social citizen-
ship – is intimately linked to the nation. The nation-state configures a
whole set of subjective aspects of what constitutes a ‘citizen’ and makes
him or her part of the national community. Some research indicates a close
connection between legal definitions of citizenship (and their repercussions
in other legal fields, such as alien law and family law) and the respective
‘master narratives’ on belonging and identity (see e.g. Borneman 1992;
Schneider 2007). The relation between citizenship and belonging has also
been indirectly acknowledged by scholars who talk about ‘collectively
shared identity’ (Benhabib 2007: 19), a ‘shared sense of political identity
among citizens’ (Bauböck 2006: 114) and ‘citizens’ loyalty’ (Sassen
2002). It is through citizenship that ‘belonging’ becomes ‘membership’,
with the formal and subjective characteristics being intimately related.
At the same time, citizenship theory today must account for new dynam-
ics experienced by groups comprising people who are considered citizens
without necessarily being ‘nationals’. This is what makes the study of the
second generations particularly interesting. These citizens do not necessa-
rily share the same cultural grounds as their peers of native parentage, thus
making the connection between citizenship and ethno-national belonging
no longer self-evident. Still, a need for more openness when it comes to
conceiving ‘membership’ or ‘citizenship’ has been reflected in the rise of
new terminologies, such as ‘cultural citizenship’ (e.g. Rosaldo 2003;
Benmayor, Torruellas & Juarbe 1992), ‘hybridity’ (e.g. Burke 2009;
Werbner & Modood 1997) and ‘hyphenation’ (e.g. Çağlar 1997).
Social integration and acculturation
Belonging is in itself an important indicator in that it is simultaneously a
precondition and an indication for a person’s emotional relatedness to his
or her ‘life world’. This relatedness to a place or community is based on
socialisation and enculturation processes that make an individual capable
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of adequately maintaining social relations and feeling ‘culturally intimate’
(Herzfeld 1997). These processes are part of the tribulations of adoles-
cence, in general, but the way they unfold for immigrants and their children
has frequently been seen as a particular challenge (see e.g. King & Koller
2006). From the receiving societies’ point of view – which, revealingly, is
also the dominant perspective in migration and integration studies – the
‘problem of integration’ experienced by children of immigrants has there-
fore always also been seen as a problem of adaptation and acculturation.
In the book Suicide: A study in sociology, first published in 1897,
Durkheim laid down the foundations of social integration theory
(Durkheim 1951; see Zhou & Bankston 1994). Writing in France during
the rapid industrialisation of Continental Europe, with large rural-to-urban
migration flows fanning fears of a new ‘dangerous underclass’ (Lucassen
2007), Durkheim argued that the better integration of individuals within a
given society increases its possibilities for controlling them. Although not
talking about international migration, Durkheim considered heterogeneity a
basic problem. He distinguished mechanical solidarity – based on common
values, behaviours, attitudes and beliefs – from organic solidarity, acknowl-
edging the complementary difference inherent in the modern division of la-
bour and thus discarding a demand for cultural uniformity. This idea was
taken up by Park in 1914 (609): ‘Solidarity of modern states depends less
on the homogeneity of the population than, as James Bryce has suggested,
upon the through-going mixture of heterogeneous elements’ (see also
Taylor 1988).
For Gordon (1964: 81), this acceptance of heterogeneity was ‘the key-
stone of the arch of assimilation’. Unless a new group of immigrants is al-
lowed to enter social relationships with the rather closed circles of the host
population, even high levels of acculturation will fail to translate into full
participation in society. For Gordon and others, acculturation was therefore
seen mainly as a function of the social structure rather than a goal or aim
on its own.2 An interesting question concerns to which degree the referent
of immigrant acculturation – i.e. the unit to which immigrants are supposed
to become ‘similar’ – can actually be operationalised for scientific analysis.
Terms such as ‘the mainstream’, ‘core’, ‘majority’ and ‘host society’ (or
simply ‘society’) serve to juxtapose immigrants (along with their culture or
country of origin, ethnic identity, group traits, etc.) with the non-immigrant
society (and ‘their’ culture). But if we wish to replace ‘a concept that
understands society as a big collective/collectivity by a concept of modern
world society, i.e. a society that is functionally differentiated in different
realms (…) and modern organizations’ (Luhmann 1997; cf. Bommes 2005;
Glick-Schiller, Basch & Blanc-Szanton 1995; Glick-Schiller & Wimmer
2002; Vertovec 1999), we also must adopt the position that ‘by taking roles
inside organisations and fulfilling the bundles of social expectations con-
nected to these roles, all individuals assimilate in order to enable their
288 SCHNEIDER, FOKKEMA, MATIAS, STOJČIĆ, UGRINA & VERA-LARRUCEA
participation in society and their survival’ (ibid.). Going back to the origins
of Durkheim’s work on social integration, the theoretical challenge is to
conceive of society as a multifaceted dynamic structure within which the
contours of people’s lives are negotiated among diverse groups of people
with unequal access to sources of power and persuasion (Tsing 2004). Part
of this inequality has generally been described as structural, having been
dealt with in this volume’s contributions on demography (chapter 4), edu-
cation (chapter 5) and work (chapter 6). The present chapter adds identity-
related issues to the mix.
Addressing identity issues in a survey such as TIES proves difficult be-
cause the aforementioned dimensions – symbolical, interactional and dis-
cursive – cannot really be concreticised. Surveys do not address individual
strategies for self-positioning nor, even less so, do they account for the in-
dividuals’ personal politics of identity. The statistical distribution of ‘feel-
ings of belonging’ in different domains and their degree of correlation with
background variables and interrelation with other relevant domains (e.g.
social relations, language, religion, social participation) are indicators of
the structural dimension within the identificational incorporation of chil-
dren of immigrants into urban societies in Europe. However, discursive as-
pects play a role, if only because surveys rely on language.3 In the face of
these complexities, the TIES survey concentrated on issues of belonging:
self-ascriptions to common categories of membership, such as ethnic
group, country and city of residence and religion. These items could relate
to common background variables (e.g. age, gender, education, parents’
socio-economic status) and self-reported cultural and social practices (e.g.
religious practice, language use and skills, participation in organisations).
As such, we do not test any particular ‘grand theory’ or hypothesis.
Today’s second generation is complex. That complexity has hardly been
done justice in most quantitative work, reducing its reality to three or four
‘modes of acculturation’. This chapter therefore opts for a more ‘explora-
tive’ approach to a reality that is extremely divergent across countries and
groups, offering interpretations and ‘thick descriptions’ (cf. Geertz 1973)
of data analyses rather than prefixed categorisations.
The TIES survey looks more closely at the category of city rather than
country, with the second generation being appreciated as an integral part of
city populations and in relation to urban society. European cities have be-
come highly diverse, and the array of cultural influences – being in one
way or another part of an immigration narrative – is steadily increasing, es-
pecially in the younger age cohorts. All our second-generation respondents
have, at least, a dual set of ethno-national references: to the city and coun-
try where they were born and raised into and their parents’ country of ori-
gin. A major danger in quantitative research lies in the relation between
the methodologically necessary a priori definition of a unit of analysis and
its a posteriori use as the main explanatory axis. The so-called ‘group
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hypothesis’ (see e.g. Crul & Schneider 2010: 1255), mostly referring to mi-
nority, ethnic or immigrant groups, does not question whether or to what
extent boundaries between ‘groups’ do actually correspond to the most sig-
nificant differences found in the total sample of respondents. The danger is
not only epistemological – in the sense of confounding explanans and ex-
planandum – but also analytical and interpretational: with ‘the group’ as a
fixed frame of interpretation, the analysis moves away from the focus on
structural conditions and the role of context. In a chapter addressing self-
identification it is thus a constant challenge to avoid the very automatisms
intrinsic to the application of the ‘group hypothesis’. We acknowledge this
even though our use of denominations, such as ‘Moroccans’ or ‘the
Turkish second generation’, is at the same time suggestive and unavoid-
able. It should therefore be kept in mind throughout the following analyses
that groups of respondents – who are classified according to the mere dem-
ographic criterion of their parents’ birth country (see chapter 3) – cannot
be equalled to ethnic groups.
8.2 Multiple belongings
Contrary to widespread folk and political ideas about identities, belonging
is never confined to just one category. It is also not necessarily put in ei-
ther-or terms.4 Moreover, as described above, the relevance of a feeling of
belonging is strongly contextual. It depends on the social environment and
on the specific place and time in which identity is ‘enacted’ (for example,
through a statement like ‘I am …’). But whatever ‘label’ happens to be
chosen in a specific situation or set of circumstances, it always represents a
combination of diverse possible meanings, firmly rooted in social dis-
course. These socially established meanings are sometimes internally con-
tradictory, but in any case offer different degrees of ‘legitimacy’ or accept-
ability for an individual to adhere to. As such, the TIES survey questions
about belonging not only allowed respondents’ simultaneous adherence to
different labels, but also to differentiate the degree of importance or rele-
vance for each. The ensuing section presents the results of our comparative
analysis of respondents’ expressed feelings of belonging within the main
categories addressed in the TIES survey.
National identity: Ethnic dimensions, discourse and citizenship
For much of the second generation in Europe, a sense of feeling of belong-
ing is complicated by the general discursive context of the survey country.
This not only refers to experiences of ‘othering’5 that range from simple
remarks to overtly xenophobic treatment and are quite frequent for persons
considered to ‘come from somewhere else.’6 The difficulty lies also in the
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‘habitual’ definitional criteria for belonging to the nation or the nation-
state. ‘Being German’ (or Dutch, French, etc.) can be defined according to
any one or all of the following criteria: nationality, ethnic origin and de-
scent (e.g. whether one is born to parents of ‘native’ ancestry), place of
birth, and the cultural context for socialisation and ‘enculturation’.
Social discourse rarely applies these criteria in a coherent way, nor are
they equally acceptable in all contexts. Nationality is important for political
discourse and as a precondition for political participation, but discourses of
‘othering’ and xenophobic behaviours do not ask to see their target’s pass-
port. Place of birth is also usually underemphasised in Europe, though it is
important, if not central, in ‘classic’ immigration countries such as the
United States, Australia and Brazil (see e.g. Schneider 2007). Of much
greater importance in everyday situations are the ‘ethnic descent’ and the
cultural context of socialisation – which, in turn, also influence the ac-
quaintance of an individual with regard to, for example, local dialects or
accents in language use. The respective roles of the various criteria for def-
inition can obviously differ majorly across countries. Germany and France
have been widely used as illustrations par excellence for different official
stances towards (and roles assigned to) the ‘ethnic origins’ of individuals
(Brubaker 1994; Dumont 1991; Schnapper 1996; Soysal 2004; White
1997).
Applied to the second generation, these criteria have different degrees of
legitimacy. The ethnic criterion is the most pivotal because it forms the ba-
sis of many folk apprehensions about what it’s supposed to mean ‘to be’
French, German, etc. At the same time, it is the least discursively legiti-
mised criterion for the native-born children of immigrants, hardly condu-
cive to being used by them unambiguously. Tables 8.1a and 8.1b show the
strength of feelings respondents claimed towards the country (or nation-
state) in which the survey was conducted, also being the country to which
at least one of their parents had migrated to.7
Unsurprisingly, all cities’ respective comparison groups show much
stronger feelings of national belonging than the second-generation respond-
ents. At the same time, in all cities there are more – and in some cities,
many more – second-generation respondents expressing ‘strong’ or ‘very
strong’ rather than ‘weak’, ‘very weak’ or ‘no’ feelings of belonging.
Looking at the Turkish respondents in particular, the numbers for those ex-
pressing ‘weak or no’ such feelings range from around 14 per cent in the
two Swiss cities to 25 per cent in Strasbourg. This means that talking about
a feeling of belonging to the country or nation one was born into is mainly
an issue falling somewhere between the evocation of ‘strong’ feelings and
an ‘ambiguous or neutral’ position.8
The range between these two answer categories is indeed very wide –
across countries and even between cities within one country. In the Turkish
second generation, ambiguous or neutral feelings are particularly high in
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both Austrian cities, in Vienna, Basel and Strasbourg (around 45 per cent);
they are lowest in Zurich and Frankfurt (around 30 per cent). These num-
bers should be viewed in light of differing discursive contexts and the
common attitudes fostered by respective societies concerning the question
of national belonging. Such is reflected in the responses of the comparison
groups. Their adherence to the label of ‘national belonging’ is particularly
low in the two Swiss cities, in Antwerp and Paris, with only around 62 per
cent expressing ‘strong’ feelings. In the other cities, the numbers are con-
siderably higher: 75 per cent or more (with Madrid even close to 100 per
cent).
Similar answers by second-generation respondents may therefore repre-
sent different degrees of correlation with the typical trend identifiable in a






Austria Vienna Strong feelings of belonging 32.9 58.2 74.0
Ambiguous/neutral 45.0 23.9 20.0
Weak or no feelings 22.1 17.9 6.0
N 249 251 250
Linz Strong feelings of belonging 44.4 63.1 78.2
Ambiguous/neutral 38.0 29.9 18.8
Weak or no feelings 17.6 7.1 3.0
N 205 241 234
Switzerland Zurich Strong feelings of belonging 55.0 53.2 62.4
Ambiguous/neutral 30.0 35.5 35.6
Weak or no feelings 15.0 11.3 2.0
N 200 231 202
Basel Strong feelings of belonging 43.2 58.3 61.5
Ambiguous/neutral 43.2 37.2 34.7
Weak or no feelings 13.7 4.4 3.8
N 241 180 265
Germany Berlin Strong feelings of belonging 45.5 74.3 79.6
Ambiguous/neutral 36.8 17.8 18.4
Weak or no feelings 17.8 7.9 2.0
N 253 202 250
Frankfurt Strong feelings of belonging 54.4 65.7 81.0
Ambiguous/neutral 28.4 26.0 15.4
Weak or no feelings 17.2 8.3 3.6
N 250 204 253
Sweden Stockholm Strong feelings of belonging 42.6 86.7
Ambiguous/neutral 36.7 12.4
Weak or no feelings 20.7 0.8
N 251 249
Columns total 100% within cities.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Belgium Antwerp Strong feelings of
belonging
42.2 50.0 61.8
Ambiguous/neutral 19.0 19.4 24.6
Weak or no feelings 38.8 30.6 13.6
N 358 311 301
Brussels Strong feelings of
belonging
53.1 46.8 70.2
Ambiguous/neutral 18.8 23.0 20.2
Weak or no feelings 28.2 30.2 9.7
N 243 246 256
Netherlands Amsterdam Strong feelings of
belonging
38.6 46.7 78.8
Ambiguous/neutral 38.6 33.7 16.2
Weak or no feelings 22.8 19.6 5.0
N 194 191 250
Rotterdam Strong feelings of
belonging
39.3 42.0 81.7
Ambiguous/neutral 36.9 38.0 14.5
Weak or no feelings 23.8 20.0 3.8
N 217 220 232




Weak or no feelings 8.0 12.2
N 237 246




Weak or no feelings 1.6 0.0
N 250 250




Weak or no feelings 16.9 7.3
N 247 174




Weak or no feelings 25.0 3.1
N 251 177
Columns total 100% within cities.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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country or city. In Spain, for example, the Moroccan second generation
has the highest percentage of ‘strong’ feelings among all second-generation
groups in the survey. They come close to the very uniformly high re-
sponses of the comparison group. At the other end of the spectrum, the
comparison group in Switzerland is the most sceptical about its own na-
tional belonging (62 per cent expressing ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ and 35
per cent ‘neither strong nor weak’ feelings). Yet, the highest score of all
cities for ‘strong’ feelings of national belonging among Turks is found in
Zurich. Here the gap between the Turkish group and the comparison group
is particularly small, at 7.4 per cent. The largest gaps are found in Vienna,
Stockholm, Strasbourg and the two Dutch cities, all showing a difference
of more than 40 per cent.
Switzerland is also the country where in both cities the respondents of
former Yugoslavian descent were the most ambiguous about their feelings
of belonging to the country (around 36 per cent). This was much higher
than their peers interviewed in Austria and Germany. The result points in
two possible directions. On the one hand, descendants of immigrants from
the former Yugoslavia seem to have generally closer outcomes to the re-
spective comparison groups than to the Turkish respondents, and this is in
fact the case in Switzerland. On the other hand, particularly in Switzerland,
they find themselves much more at the centre of debate on migration and
integration than in Austria or Germany, countries where such discussion is
much more focussed on Turks.
From this overview, teasing apart certain basic background variables
emerge to reveal several relevant factors. Especially meaningful here are
citizenship, the educational level of respondents, their degree of religiosity
and whether or not they report having experienced discrimination.
Citizenship is significant in most countries and cities, and it follows the
same basic pattern: those with only the survey country citizenship tend to
have higher numbers for ‘strong’ feelings and lower numbers for ‘ambigu-
ous or neutral’ and ‘weak or no’ feelings, followed by those with dual citi-
zenship. Those only possessing the nationality of their parents’ country of
origin show the lowest feelings of belonging. Because citizenship regula-
tions differ a lot from country to country, this category – notably for those
with only Turkish or Moroccan or former Yugoslavian nationality – is vir-
tually absent in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The cate-
gory of those with dual citizenship is also sometimes rather small, for ex-
ample, in France and Austria, albeit for very different reasons. On the flip-
side, over 80 per cent of the Turkish respondents in both Dutch cities and
in Antwerp hold dual citizenship (for details, see chapter 4).
Although not quite an accurate historical observation, mass immigration
is commonly considered a new phenomenon in Europe. The growing pres-
ence of a native-born second generation thus challenges established notions
of who is ‘native’ and who is an ‘immigrant’. Citizenship legislations in
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Europe have differed in their approaches to defining nationality and re-
sponding to the challenges posed by mass immigration since the early
1960s. For example, France is often presented as the prime example for ius
soli, the right to citizenship by birth; up until a decade ago in Germany pa-
rents’ nationality was the main identifier, ius sanguinis. This has diametric
effects: France automatically grants the second generation French citizen-
ship upon reaching adulthood; in Germany, this access was only until re-
cently restricted and subject to a specific application procedure. To a cer-
tain degree, such discrepancies are also reflected in society’s expressed per-
ceptions: in France, the second generation is expected to be part of general
civil society and, if even, to comprise an ethnic minority within it; in
Germany, they are considered to be part of ‘the immigrant community’,
not being ‘Germans’ sui generis. To illustrate, for second-generation Turks
in France it is a sort of ‘must’ to declare oneself French; the corresponding
statement for second-generation Turks in Germany is essentially a discur-
sive impossibility. Table 8.2 shows the results of a multivariate analysis
testing a number of possible determinants for this group’s strength of feel-
ings of belonging to the survey country.
Citizenship is only tied to national belonging, per se, for the small mi-
nority of our respondents who possess only a Turkish passport. However,
it does systematically correspond to other related factors: the intensity of
relations to the parents’ home country (measured by degree of transnation-
alism) and the intensity of religious practice. As our analyses indicate, a
small minority of more strongly religious second-generation Turks displays
very low levels of identification with the urban society they live in.
Significantly conducive to feelings of national belonging are the following:
language skills and use (specifically, the positive self-evaluation of one’s
writing skills in the survey country language and using it with siblings),
having or having had friends of non-Turkish origin during secondary
school and at present, a positive assessment of the overall development of
relations between the diasporic community and the majority society.
Resulting positive equations to feelings of national belonging are, however,
mainly jeopardised by respondents’ experiences of discrimination based on
parental origins. Interestingly, the effect is vastly independent from the ac-
tual magnitude of the problem: to mention the two extremes, it is as signif-
icant for the 77 per cent of second-generation Turks in Linz who reported
having experienced discrimination as for the corresponding 25 per cent of
second-generation Moroccans in Madrid.
Among the individual background factors, gender is the only that has a
significant effect in all countries: women show stronger feelings of belong-
ing to the country they were born into than do men. Other factors do not
appear to have a significant effect in table 8.2, as the outcomes in our
cross-country outlook do not point in the same direction. This is mainly
true for education and for participation in the labour market. In Austria,
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France and Germany, for example, the low educated express significantly
weaker feelings of national belonging than the better educated, but in the
Netherlands and, in particular, Switzerland, the correlation is inverse.
Working or studying also has a positive effect in some countries, when
Table 8.2 Determinants of the degree of national belonging among second-
generation Turks in six countries (N=2,079)
Male -0.15***
Educational attainment (ref. below intermediate level)
Intermediate level 0.08*
Highly educated -0.03




Feelings of belonging to Turkey -0.04





Citizenship (ref. country of residence only)
Dual -0.06
Parental home country only -0.38***
Writing skills language survey country (poor – excellent) 0.13***
Language used with siblings (mostly Turkish – mostly survey country language) 0.04*
Best friends during secondary school (of survey country origin only) 0.08**
Current best friends (of survey country origin only) 0.12***
Experiences of discrimination -0.14***
Degree of transnationalism2 -0.13***
Ethnic composition of neighbourhood of residence -0.06*
Perceived development of relations between majority population and
Turks/Moroccans/Former Yugoslavians in recent years










Notes: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †deviations from the grand mean
1For details on these categories, see chapter 9; in this analysis a simplified version was
used.
2For details on the construction of this category, see table 8.9.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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compared to the unemployed and those primarily occupied with domestic
activities and/or family life. This may serve as an indication that actively
participating in society can have a positive effect on one’s feeling of be-
longing to it.
‘Ethnic’ identity: Socio-cultural dimensions and ethnic minorities
By definition, our second-generation respondents possess a second ‘ethno-
national’ reference through having parents – at least one of them anyway –
who has had the migration experience and comes from a non-survey coun-
try of origin. Like belonging to the survey country, ‘being Turkish’ (or
Moroccan or former Yugoslavian) can mean different things for members
of the second generation:
– a citizen of the parental country of origin, i.e. holding that nationality
as one’s sole nationality or alongside the survey country’s nationality;
– a reference to one’s descent and name, i.e. the ‘ethnic criterion’;
– a reference to one’s early childhood cultural influences (e.g. mother
language, religious feasts, meals) being perceived as different from the
survey country’s dominant ‘ethno-culture’;
– a member of a group identified as such, even though this membership
may contradict self-perceptions (thus resulting in ‘reactive identifica-
tion’);
– for national minorities (e.g. Kurds), having parents who originate from
a country even though they themselves do not feel part of the dominant
‘ethno-nation’.
These criteria can play a role in individual self-definitions, but they are al-
so relevant in interaction and discourses. Social discourses generally corre-
spond with institutionalised forms of a definition, e.g. citizenship regula-
tions. They thus form a sort of ‘definitional habitus’, with implications for
the way different layers of identity work. In some survey countries, it im-
plies the discursive difficulty of simultaneously belonging to more than
one ‘ethno-national’ category. In other countries, belonging to an ‘ethnic
minority’ is an established discursive option and does not contradict a per-
son’s national belonging. Moreover, countries apply different rules for per-
sons being born in their territory or area of jurisdiction, which is also fre-
quently reflected in the identifiers used in social and political discourse (cf.
Schneider 2007).
Answers to our ‘ethnic’ belonging question could thus be interpreted as
much as an ‘ethno-national’ reference to the parents’ country of origin as a
reference to being part of an ethnic minority within the national setting of
the survey country. Table 8.3a and 8.3b presents the degree to which our
respondents felt ‘Turkish’ or ‘Moroccan’. The notable complexity of this
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question for our Yugoslavian respondents merits a separate paragraph in
which we discuss their ‘ethnic’ self-definitions.
In all cities a large majority of the second-generation respondents expresses
strong feelings of being Turkish or Moroccan, the numbers ranging from
51 per cent in Stockholm to 88 per cent in Strasbourg. Also, in most cities,
these numbers are close to those of the respective comparison groups with
regard to their own feelings of ‘national’ belonging, thus indicating similar
degrees of identification with the country’s respective main ‘ethno-nation-
al’ reference.
There are, however, some exceptions. In Stockholm, Zurich, Linz and
Berlin, the reference to Turkishness is particularly low (51-68 per cent).
One possibly relevant factor here is that in these cities the share of Kurds
Table 8.3a Feeling ‘Turkish’, per city and ethnic group
Turkish Comparison
group1
Austria Vienna Strong feelings of belonging 76.0 74.0
Ambiguous/neutral 20.4 20.0
Weak or no feelings 3.6 6.0
N 249 250
Linz Strong feelings of belonging 67.8 78.2
Ambiguous/neutral 20.5 18.8
Weak or no feelings 11.7 3.0
N 204 234
Switzerland Zurich Strong feelings of belonging 64.4 62.4
Ambiguous/neutral 24.2 35.6
Weak or no feelings 11.3 2.0
N 194 202
Basel Strong feelings of belonging 58.3 61.5
Ambiguous/neutral 28.9 34.7
Weak or no feelings 12.8 3.8
N 242 265
Germany Berlin Strong feelings of belonging 59.7 79.6
Ambiguous/neutral 20.6 18.4
Weak or no feelings 19.8 2.0
N 253 250
Frankfurt Strong feelings of belonging 72.8 81.0
Ambiguous/neutral 14.0 15.4
Weak or no feelings 13.2 3.6
N 250 253
Sweden Stockholm Strong feelings of belonging 51.3 86.7
Ambiguous/neutral 20.1 12.4
Weak or no feelings 28.6 0.8
N 234 249
Columns total 100% within cities.
1 Comparison group numbers refer to ‘national belonging’.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Belgium Antwerp Strong feelings of
belonging
86.3 80.6 61.8
Ambiguous/neutral 6.7 9.0 24.6
Weak or no feelings 7.0 10.3 13.6
N 358 311 301
Brussels Strong feelings of
belonging
75.2 74.5 70.2
Ambiguous/neutral 11.0 14.2 20.2
Weak or no feelings 13.8 11.3 9.7
N 244 246 256
Netherlands Amsterdam Strong feelings of
belonging
75.9 80.0 78.8
Ambiguous/neutral 17.2 15.6 16.2
Weak or no feelings 6.9 4.4 5.0
N 201 183 250
Rotterdam Strong feelings of
belonging
80.5 76.0 81.7
Ambiguous/neutral 14.6 16.0 14.5
Weak or no feelings 4.9 8.0 3.8
N 219 216 232




Weak or no feelings 9.7 12.2
N 236 246




Weak or no feelings 5.2 0.0
N 249 250




Weak or no feelings 3.5 7.3
N 247 174




Weak or no feelings 4.6 3.1
N 252 177
Columns total 100% within cities.
1 Comparison group numbers refer to ‘national belonging’.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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and other ethnic minorities among the ‘Turkish’ respondents is relatively
high (around 15-20 per cent; see paragraph on ethnic minorities below).
The respondents’ citizenship status shows a corresponding opposite ef-
fect to national belonging. In all countries, those holding only survey coun-
try nationality do identify less with being Turkish or Moroccan than those
with dual citizenship, and even more so than those holding only Turkish or
Moroccan nationality. As mentioned, Austria shows very low numbers for
respondents with dual citizenship and the overall effect is therefore rather
small; in Sweden and Switzerland, the effect is strong and significant. In
short, the effect is stronger when the total numbers of respondents with on-
ly the survey country’s citizenship (in a country or a second-generation
group) are smaller.
In most survey countries, feelings of being Turkish or Moroccan are not
related to most standard control variables. Women’s feelings of ethnic be-
longing are lower; this is significant in Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium,
Austria and France. The educational level of the respondents plays a signif-
icant role in Sweden, Germany, Austria and Switzerland: the better edu-
cated, the weaker the importance attached to being a Turk, a Moroccan or
someone from former Yugoslavia. In the four aforementioned countries, re-
spondents’ main professional activity also plays a role: feeling part of an
‘ethno-national’ group is particularly strong among the unemployed and, to
a lesser extent, those staying at home for the sake of domestic activities
and/or family life, while students are those with the weakest feelings of
‘ethnic’ belonging. Working people’s responses come closer to those of
students than the unemployed. As was the case with national belonging, it
seems that being involved in activities that imply leaving the house and
mixing with different kinds of people has a weakening effect on the impor-
tance attached to feeling Turkish or Serbian/Croatian/Albanian – at least in
the four aforementioned countries. It is, however, interesting to note that
both educational level and main occupation type seem to play no more
than an ephemeral role in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain.
A cross-cutting category: Religion
The TIES survey reveals the second generation’s general tendency to
strongly identify with the categories of ‘Turkish’ or ‘Moroccan’ and
‘Muslim’. In all countries, those who are self-reportedly more religious do
identify significantly more strongly with being Turkish or Moroccan than
their non-religious ‘co-ethnic’ peers. However, there is also considerable
variation among the respondents (confirmed by high standard deviation
numbers), though the variations are more significant for feeling Muslim
than for Turkish or Moroccan identity.
Yet, even the role of religious belief differs strongly across cities and
countries. The overall share of Turkish and Moroccan respondents who
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report having religious belief ranges between 57 per cent among Turks in
Switzerland and 89 per cent among Moroccans in the Netherlands. The
lowest number is for the Moroccan second generation, at 67 per cent in
Spain; the highest is for the Turkish group, at 88 per cent in the
Netherlands. Descendents of immigrants from former Yugoslavia range be-
tween 39 per cent in Germany and 66 per cent in Austria.9
It should be noted that ‘having a religion’ is not the same as identifying
with a specific religion. The issues overlap in the comparison groups, but
in their case there is hardly any connection to questions of ‘ethnic’ or ‘na-
tional’ belonging. The disconnect is quite different especially for the two
predominantly Muslim second-generation groups. Unsurprisingly, second-
generation Turks and Moroccans who state that they currently practise a
religion feel most strongly attached to Muslim identity; this applies in all
countries and cities and more to Sunni Muslims than practitioners of other
forms of Islam. However, it is interesting to note that, with the exception
of Paris and Basel, between 26 per cent and 41 per cent of respondents in
all survey cities who report not having religious belief still strongly identi-
fy as Muslims. This means that being Muslim – as an identity category –
is not necessarily linked to feelings of religiousness or certain degrees of
religious practice, but rather is an integral part of people’s self-definition as
Turkish or Moroccan (for details on religion, see chapter 9).
Again, educational attainment shows some influence in this regard.
Strong Muslim identities are less common among higher-educated respond-
ents. The very diverging levels of educational attainment across cities and
countries (see chapter 5) also affect identity feeling outcomes.
Interrelations of Turkish second-generation identity feelings in France,
Germany and the Netherlands
We now explore the intersections and relative positions of categories of be-
longing in multiple identifications in the Turkish second generation in three
countries. We make use of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), a
method that visualises relationships between different variables by map-
ping their attributes into a bi-dimensional matrix. The spatial position of
each object reflects the relative similarity to, or preference for, other ob-
jects with regard to the dimensions represented by the axes (for more de-
tails, see Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham 2006). The advantage of
MCA is that it allows: a) identifying those variables that really differentiate
the individuals for each issue while simultaneously controlling for relevant
correlations; and b) viewing the relative positions of more than two varia-
bles at the same time. The method is therefore particularly suited to capture
the complexity of identity constructions along the dimensions of simultane-
ousness and mutual exclusion.
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MCA is applied here to the following identity variables: Turkish,
Muslim, country, city, and European feelings of belonging among descend-
ants of Turkish immigrants in Germany, the Netherlands and France. It
was our purpose here to look for trends within each country. The six-point
answer scale for our belonging questions was formed around a centre posi-
tion of ambiguous or neutral feeling of belonging. Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3
show the position of each variable in the bi-dimensional space, allowing us
to interpret the relations between variables. On both axes, the distance from
the central crossing point (0.0) indicates the degree of differentiation be-
tween the individuals. The modalities more towards the centre of the graph
are those that are combined with all the other categories around.10
The respondents’ distribution is not the same across the three national
samples, nor is the relationship between the variables. In the German and
French samples, Turkish and Muslim feelings of belonging are found near
the centre position V. They thus do not contribute to differentiating the re-
spondents in the bi-dimensional space created, although they do in the
Dutch sample. Here they show a different combination for the identity var-
iables with the other identity categories. In the German and French sam-
ples, ‘weak’ and ‘indifferent’ feelings of belonging are clearly differentiat-
ing the individuals in all identity variables, and they also seem to combine
different types of identity feelings with similar intensities of belonging. By
Figure 8.1 Identity combinations for the Turkish second generation in Germany
Axis 1 Axis 2
Cronbach's alpha 0.654 0.614
Inertia 41.9% 39.3%
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Figure 8.2 Identity combinations for the Turkish second generation in France
Axis 1 Axis 2
Cronbach's alpha 0.56 0.449
Inertia 36.2% 31.2%
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Figure 8.3 Identity combinations for the Turkish second generation in the
Netherlands1
Axis 1 Axis 2
Cronbach's alpha 0.475 0.375
Inertia 38.8% 34.8%
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Note: In this graph, the European feeling of belonging category is supplementary
and therefore does not show a borderline.
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Figure 8.4 Distribution of the Turkish second generation across identity
combinations in Germany
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Figure 8.5 Distribution of the Turkish second generation across identity
combinations in France
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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contrast, for the Dutch sample, ‘weak’ and ‘indifferent’ identity feelings
seem to be closer to each other and less distinct, although when combining
different types of identity they show more contrast. Therefore, axis 1 for
the Dutch sample is mainly determined by Turkish and Muslim identity
feelings (‘ethnic identity’), while in the other two samples it is the lack of
differentiation between the three categories – national, local and European
– that combine to generate generalised feelings of exclusion versus inclu-
sion on axis 1. In the German and French graphs, quadrant IV represents
strong feelings of belonging in the national, local and European categories
and low feelings of ‘ethnic’ belonging (quadrant III in the Dutch graph).
Quadrant III represents the counterposition of strong feelings of ‘ethnic’
belonging together with weak feelings towards, or detachment from, the
other categories (quadrant II in the Dutch graph). Quadrant II indicates a
generalised stance of indifference towards all categories of belonging (in
the Dutch graph this is closer to quadrant I). Another significant position is
indicated by the V on the German and French graphs (quadrant IV in the
Dutch graph), which corresponds to strong identity feelings towards the
‘ethnic’ categories as much as the contextual identity categories.
Assessing the relative importance of these positions in the three national
samples, figures 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 show the distribution of the individuals
across the quadrants per country. The graphs indicate the numerical
Figure 8.6 Distribution of the Turkish second generation across identity
combinations in the Netherlands
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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prevalence of the different identity combinations in the respective Turkish
respondent groups.
Position V on the German and French graphs and quadrant IV in the
Dutch graph are the main areas where individual respondents are found.
These quadrants stand for combinations of rather strong identity feelings,
in general. This is particularly clear in the case of France, where we also
find significant numbers of respondents combining ‘ethnic’ identity with
‘indifference’ towards national, local and European identity categories.
In the Netherlands, the combination of strong ethnic and national, local
and European identification is prevalent (quadrant IV). It is followed by a
significant number of cases of respondents who combine strong ‘ethnic’
identification with ‘detachment’ from other categories of belonging (quad-
rant II). For the Turkish respondents in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, local
belonging can serve as an alternative to national and European belonging –
much more than it does in the French and German cities anyway.
In all three national samples, very few respondents are detached from
their Turkishness, but show up strong in other categories. The category of
persons not holding strong feelings of belonging to any of the identity cat-
egory is also marginal (quadrant II in the German and French graphs,
quadrant I in the Dutch graph).
Kurds and Moroccan minorities
One particular aspect of the divergent situation in the different cities is the
presence of minority groups with origins in Turkey and Morocco. For the
Turkish case, these include Kurdish, Suryoye, Armenian and Aramaic lan-
guage groups; in the Moroccan case, we refer to Riffi, Tachelhiyt and
Tamazight. The TIES sample, however, only allows for approximations.11
One aspect is language and, here in particular, language socialisation. The
group of individuals being raised in Kurdish is largest in Berlin (19 per
cent) and Basel (15 per cent), while much fewer respondents are found in
Stockholm, Paris and Zurich (not more than 5 per cent). The Suryoye
Syrian language group is only found in the TIES sample for Stockholm,
with about 12 per cent of the respondents.
Another question inquires into the strength of feeling Kurdish. Among
those respondents with at least fair knowledge of some Kurdish language,
only about half ‘strongly’ or ‘very strongly’ feel Kurdish, while a quarter
feels ‘ambiguous or neutral’ about it.12 We can combine both aspects so
that the definition comprises ‘Kurdishness’ as much by family origin and
language ability as by identification. ‘Being Kurdish’ in the following anal-
yses thus means having: a) at least an ambiguous feeling of Kurdish be-
longing among those who understand the Kurdish language ‘well or fairly
well’ or were raised in it and b) a strong feeling of Kurdish belonging
among those who were neither raised in the language nor understand it
306 SCHNEIDER, FOKKEMA, MATIAS, STOJČIĆ, UGRINA & VERA-LARRUCEA
well. Defined in such manner, the share of Kurdish respondents in Berlin
increases to 22 per cent of the total Turkish sample (in Frankfurt 10 per
cent) and in Basel to even half of all Turkish respondents (in Zurich 14 per
cent).
A significant portion of Kurdish respondents does not consider them-
selves Turkish. About a quarter of Kurds in Basel stated they have ‘weak
or no’ feelings of being Turkish; in Berlin, this applies to a third of Kurds.
In both cities, Kurdish identity is to a certain degree opposed to Turkish
identity – the two ‘labels’ being significantly negatively correlated –
although much more strongly so in Berlin than Basel.13 This also applies
to other ethnic minorities originally from Turkey, e.g. Assyrians in
Stockholm. On the whole, they seem to endorse more strongly their rela-
tion to the culture and social sphere of their parents’ Kurdish origins. They
are more likely to have travelled to Turkey and also show lower feelings
of national, local and European belonging (all weakly significant).
Contrary to what might be expected, Kurdish respondents do not more
often participate in a political organisation or party. However, Kurds do
see themselves considerably more at the left or far left of the political spec-
trum: almost 60 per cent of Kurds in Berlin (50 per cent in Basel) versus
one third of non-Kurdish Turkish respondents in both cities.
Berbers in Morocco represent a much larger share of the total popula-
tion, numbering 60 to 70 per cent, than do Kurds in Turkey, numbering
around 20 per cent. As a consequence, among Moroccan emigrants to
Western Europe and in the second generation, origins from Berber regions
are quite common; the most frequently spoken languages in the
Netherlands, Belgium and Spain are Tashelhit, Tamazight and, most wide-
spread of all, Tarifit. Among the TIES respondents, we therefore also find
many who identify as Berbers and/or were raised in one of the three
Berber languages that our questionnaire offered as answer categories.
Considering the large share of Berbers within the total Moroccan popu-
lation and the fact that European guest workers were frequently recruited
from rural areas in Morocco, the number of respondents identifying with
being Berber is relatively low. Only in Rotterdam does it reach slightly
more than 60 per cent, while staying around 50 per cent in Amsterdam,
Antwerp and Barcelona and comprising only one third of respondents in
Brussels and Madrid.
In Spain and the Netherlands, an identification with feeling Berber is
much stronger than a familiarity with any of its languages. In Amsterdam,
only one quarter grew up in a Berber home language environment, while
in Rotterdam the number reached one third of the respondents. In Spain,
this number drops down to 9 per cent for Barcelona and 3 per cent for
Madrid. Those who state they understand Berber at least fairly well num-
ber a bit higher in these four cities, likely indicating that its vernacular use
within the Moroccan diaspora goes beyond the mere family. This seems
IDENTITIES 307
less the case in Amsterdam, where more than half of the TIES Moroccan
second-generation respondents grew up with Berber – notably Tarifit –
being spoken in their families.
Unlike the Kurdish-Turkish issue, being at once Berber and Moroccan
seems hardly a contradiction. The two categories are rather positively re-
lated. This, despite the fact that official recognition of Berber as a language
in Morocco was only granted in 2010 and there have been repeated attempts
to ‘Arabise’ Berbers, being seen as the ‘indigenous’ people of the region.
Assessing sense of belonging post-Yugoslavia
Ethnic membership in what is now the former Yugoslavia is a good exam-
ple of a very fluid and recent ethno-genesis. What’s more, it occurred
under conditions of cross-cutting regional, linguistic and religious bounda-
ries that made clear – not to mention parsimonious – definitions of in-
group and out-group membership tremendously challenging. When the pa-
rents of the former Yugoslavian second generation migrated to Western
Europe they arrived as ‘Yugoslavian guest workers’, with little attention
paid to the fact that they came with multiple languages, religious beliefs
and senses of ethnic belonging. Meanwhile, in Yugoslavia, ethnic and reli-
gious categories also failed to show clearly marked boundaries, at least in
many areas.
To learn about ‘ethno-national’ feelings of belonging among children of
immigrants from today’s Yugoslavian successor states, the TIES survey
divided the supranational category of ‘Yugoslav’ into ethnic components.
We then examined which ethnic groups were contained within the sample
and how they could be meaningfully identified. As Barth observed in his
classic introduction to Ethnic groups and boundaries (1969), ethnic groups
are defined by the boundaries between them rather than by observable cul-
tural differences. The Yugoslavian case illustrates how dependent ethnic
definitions are on power relations and historical contingencies in a given
society.
In our own attempt at categorising the TIES survey respondents accord-
ing to their ethnic groups we looked for the relative importance of various
boundary-markers. Since most scholars agree that they are the two most
crucial markers for ethnic differentiation in former Yugoslavia, we decided
to use religion and language to define each respondent’s ‘ethnic heritage’.
However, in the Slovenian, Albanian and Macedonian cases, language is a
more important marker of ethnicity than religion; in the Croatian, Slavic
Muslim and Serb-Montenegrin cases, language is not a clear indicator, so
religion was taken as the primary boundary-marker. This method corre-
sponds to Gurr’s (1993: 3ff) assertion that ‘religion is salient to ethnicity if
it is a defining trait that sets a group apart in its own eyes and/or in the
eyes of others’.
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Our classification, as shown in table 8.4, comprises seven main ethnic
groups: Albanian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, Serbian, Slavic
Muslim and Slovenian. For the most part, these categories correspond to
those used in censuses during the region’s existence as the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We also had to create a category of ‘unde-
fined cases’, which became quite numerous. This comprises non-religious
respondents whose parents spoke Serbo-Croatian or Bosnian, two lan-
guages that cannot be exclusively associated with one particular ethnic
group. The category also includes those whose religion deviates from that
which is conventionally associated with their ethnic group (e.g. Catholic
Serbs or Orthodox Christian Croats), cases of mixed marriage and those re-
spondents who could not be defined for other reasons.
In the three countries where we surveyed ‘Yugoslavs’, respondents of
Serbian and Croatian descent form the two largest ethnic groups, also
being the two largest in the Yugoslavian successor states. In Germany and
Austria, Slavic Muslims form the third largest, but in Switzerland – despite
similar numbers for the latter – those of Albanian descent (mostly from
Kosovo and Macedonia) come in third. The difference between the three
countries is quite striking. Respondents of Albanian descent only comprise
about 1 per cent of the former Yugoslavian second-generation respondents
in Austria and Germany, but almost 18 per cent in Switzerland. Because
official statistics are mostly based on nationality, the number of Albanian-
speaking people from Yugoslavian successor states is hard to estimate.
Using language as their definitional criterion, some Swiss researchers have
suggested that Albanian speakers account for 45 per cent of all immigrants
originating from the areas of Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro (Haug,
Schuler & Wanner 2002). In terms of city differences, we see that 74 per
cent of respondents of Albanian descent in Switzerland live in Zurich.
Table 8.4 Distribution of former Yugoslavian ethnic groups, by country and city
Germany Switzerland Austria
Berlin Frankfurt Zurich Basel Vienna Linz
Serbs 41.1 40.2 28.0 40.0 44.3 33.5
Croats 22.3 19.6 24.3 24.2 18.2 36.0
Slavic Muslims 5.4 7.4 9.2 6.3 11.5 10.3
Albanians 1.0 2.5 23.8 10.5 0.8 1.2
Macedonians 2.0 3.4 1.3 2.1 2.0 0.0
Slovenes 1.0 2.5 1.3 1.6 4.0 4.0
Montenegrins 0.5 1.5 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.4
Undefined cases 26.7 23.0 11.3 15.3 18.6 16.1
N 202 204 239 190 253 242
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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There is a similar concentration for children of Croatian descent in Austria,
with more than two thirds living in Linz.
In terms of education, former Yugoslavian respondents are, on the
whole, performing better than our Turkish respondents, though less well
than the comparison group. In Germany and Austria, Croatian peers show
levels of education comparable to the comparison group. Differences
across the three countries are quite substantial. The respondents of Serbian
descent in Switzerland report better education levels than their ‘co-ethnics’
in Germany. This is also the case with Croatian respondents in Austria, as
compared to their peers in Germany; both effects correspond with overall
lower educational levels in Germany, as compared to Austria and
Switzerland.
Former Yugoslavia’s three main religions are Catholicism, Islam and
Orthodox Christianity. While respondents of Serbian and Croatian descent
are associated mainly with being Orthodox and Catholic, respectively, re-
spondents of Albanian descent are predominantly Muslim, though there are
also Albanian Catholics and Orthodox Christians (see table 8.11 in the ap-
pendix for further details on the religiosity of our respondents).
Such demographic characteristics point out differences along various
lines, though it seems clear that local and national contexts play a decisive
role in explaining them. The question is to what extent ‘ethnic’ or group
differences can also be seen as relevant for explaining variation within our
sample of former Yugoslavians respondents. Broadly speaking, we find the
largest dissimilarities in Austria, where the Croatian and Serbian second
generations, forming the two main groups, differ across several key charac-
teristics. In Germany, however, they only differ according to the degree of
their religious affiliation. In Switzerland, the two groups diverge in terms
of social relations, religious affiliation, perceived and experienced discrimi-
nation and citizenship. Respondents of Albanian descent in Switzerland
differ from the Croatian group in terms of knowledge of the language they
grew up with, educational level, social relations, religion and citizenship.
The following section analyses the role of various feelings of belonging
in the groups under consideration. Rather surprisingly, it can be said that
descendants of the different ‘Yugoslavian’ ethnic groups identify almost as
strongly with their respective birth country as the comparison group re-
spondents. Table 8.5 examines the correlations between ethnic belonging
and national and local belonging. It is worth noting that, in general, local
and national belonging are significantly positively correlated.
We see that ethnic and national belonging are significantly negatively
correlated for Serbian and Croatian respondents in two cities, Vienna and
Zurich. In Basel and Linz, the relationship is negative, but not significant
while, among respondents of Serbian descent in Berlin, we see the only
significantly positive correlation. Table 8.6 indicates that ethnic and local
belonging are less often juxtaposed in public and everyday discourses.
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Moreover, feelings of belonging to the city are sometimes even stronger in
all three second-generation groups than in the respective comparison
groups.
As was shown for the Turkish second generation, feelings of national
belonging depend on contextual factors such as citizenship and social rela-
tionships outside the diasporic community. In terms of citizenship, there is
significant variation across countries, which in great part has to do with
different citizenship regimes (see chapter 4). We also seem to see different
effects on former Yugoslavia’s respective ethnic groups. Differences are
strongest in Switzerland with, on one end, 45 per cent of respondents of
Croatian descent and 60 per cent of those of Serbian descent having dual
citizenship. On the other end, large shares of respondents only possess the
citizenship of their parents’ country of origin, being the case for 17 per
cent of Albanian respondents and 38 per cent of Croatian respondents.
Germany has the largest percentage who are naturalised, being about 94
per cent of respondents of Serbian descent.
In sum, these analyses present neither a homogeneous nor uniform im-
age. Results for the three ethnic subgroups in the former Yugoslavian sam-
ple are sufficiently divergent at city or national levels to argue in favour of
regarding these three ‘ethnicities’ as distinct diasporic ethno-national
groups rather than subsuming them under the increasingly obsolete label of
‘former Yugoslavia’. At the same time, their situation seems highly reliant
on specific local and national context factors. It is particularly interesting
Table 8.5 Correlation coefficients (Spearman-Rho) between ‘ethnic’ versus national







Vienna Croatian -0.380 ** -0.251 46
Serbian -0.494 *** -0.422 *** 108
Linz Croatian -0.020 0.205 84
Serbian -0.154 0.051 81
Zurich Croatian -0.327 * -0.113 58
Serbian -0.369 ** -0.185 65
Albanian -0.213 -0.003 55
Basel Croatian -0.221 -0.201 46
Serbian -0.178 -0.175 75
Albanian -0.240 -0.096 19
Berlin Croatian -0.001 -0.085 45
Serbian 0.360 ** 0.003 83
Frankfurt Croatian -0.103 -0.273 40
Serbian 0.023 -0.006 82
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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how the Serbian and Croatian second generations show such divergent out-
comes in almost all domains of the TIES survey. Given the fact that
Serbian and Croatian second generations in Germany do not play a major
role in the public discourse or fuel debate on integration issues, it is not un-
expected to find both groups in a seemingly more ‘comfortable’ position
than the Turkish second generation there. Concretely speaking, former
Yugoslavians report fewer experiences of discrimination, higher shares of
German citizenship and more friendships with peers of non-immigrant pa-
rentage. This is different in Austria and Switzerland, though again to vary-
ing degrees and in different manners. The comparatively strong demo-
graphic and discursive presence of an Albanian second generation in
Switzerland constitutes an additional major difference from Austria and
Germany.
8.3 Relations with and in the city
Since the 1960s, large-scale immigration in Europe has been mainly an ur-
ban phenomenon, although by no means restricted to the bigger cities. Yet,
it is the big cities that today draw the most attention in debates on issues
of integration and the rapid diversification of the population – city youth,
in particular. Since all our second-generation respondents, by definition,
were born in the survey countries, we observe an interesting effect in com-
parison to the group of respondents whose parents were born in the survey
country. Albeit to differing degrees, in all survey cities, second-generation
groups are more ‘native’ to their city of residence than their peers of non-
migrant parentage. By this, we mean that, by far, the majority was born
and raised in the city, while many comparison group members only came
to the city to study or work. The proportion of this ‘native’-vs.-newcomer
inversion varies from city to city. It ranges from around a ten-point differ-
ence in Berlin to over 40 points in the two Dutch cities.14
Local belonging
Many large cities today promote an inclusive discourse when it comes to
the increasing cultural diversity of their populations. However, this is rarely
accompanied by effective policies of recognising diversity. At the same
time, discourses of diversity tend to emphasise the difference between im-
migrant and ‘native’ cultures. On top of this, measures of effective discur-
sive and symbolic inclusion of the second generation are widely absent in
Europe.
These discourses stressing non-belonging or the ‘otherness’ of children
of immigrants mostly draw on national representations of belonging. As
such, local belonging, even though not independent of these national
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discourses, has the potential to function as an alternative for expressing a
sense of being part of the society one was raised into. It is therefore unsur-
prising that second-generation respondents in most cities express stronger
feelings of local rather than national belonging, while this difference is less
accentuated, if not reversed, in the comparison groups. Figure 8.7 shows
this for the case of the Moroccan second generation in six cities.
Figure 8.7 Moroccan second generation and the comparison group: Strong feelings
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Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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In all cities, the Moroccan second generation identifies stronger with the
city than with the nation, but the magnitude of the difference varies greatly.
It is smallest in Madrid and largest in the two Dutch cities. In the two
Spanish cities and in Antwerp, the underlying pattern is the same for the
Moroccans and the comparison groups; in Brussels and the Dutch cities,
the national level is more important for the comparison groups than the lo-
cal level. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, this translates into even stronger
feelings of city belonging in the Moroccan second generation than in the
comparison groups.15
Local belonging is discursively less contested when moving down to the
neighbourhood. At this level, second-generation respondents express their
high degrees of ‘nativeness’ through autobiographies of ‘sedimented’
childhood experiences and memories. Also due to the age range present in
the survey, the second generation not only resides in the same city where
they grew up, but very frequently in the same neighbourhoods as, and in
proximity to, parents, siblings and other relatives.
A number of items in the TIES survey ask for respondents’ relation to,
and perception of, the neighbourhood where he or she currently lives.
Some measure perceptions of disorder (such as crime rates and sanitation
problems); others aim to establish the respondents’ degree of involvement
with the neighbourhood and the people living there. In figure 8.8, four
items were combined to form an index of neighbourhood involvement: ‘I
feel attached to this neighbourhood’; ‘I feel comfortable in this neighbour-
hood’; ‘I feel responsible for this neighbourhood’s quality of life’; ‘I have
good relations with the neighbours’. The figure shows the results for the
Austrian and German cities in which all four items were asked.16
In all four cities, neighbourhood involvement is higher in both second-
generation groups than among the respective comparison groups at overall
similar levels. Close to two thirds of the Turkish and former Yugoslavian
second generation are highly involved in their neighbourhood of residence.
The ‘hunkering down’ effect as a reaction to increasing cultural or ethnic
diversity in one’s local community, as Putnam (2007: 158) observed for di-
versifying communities in the US, might be seen in the non-immigrant na-
tive population in certain areas, but it certainly does not apply to the chil-
dren born of immigrants in these areas.
The four cities have concentrations of immigrant populations and sec-
ond-generation groups in certain areas. It is thus possible that the high lev-
el of neighbourhood attachment is somehow related to the visible presence
of one’s ethno-national diaspora. Table 8.6 analyses the correlation be-
tween neighbourhood attachment and the perceived share of persons of
one’s own ethnic background there.
In all six cities displayed, the correlation is significantly positive only in
the comparison groups. These respondents indeed feel more attached to
their neighbourhood, when ‘ethnic Germans’ (or Austrians or Swiss) are
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clearly perceived as being dominant in the neighbourhood. For the former
Yugoslavian group in Vienna and for both second-generation groups in
Linz, the two items are even significantly negatively correlated, i.e. these
respondents are more likely to feel attached to the neighbourhood, when








































































































































































Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Note: ‘Turkish G2’ is ‘Turkish second generation’. ‘SSYU G2’ is ‘Former
Yugoslavian second generation’.
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there are fewer people of Turkish or former Yugoslavian background living
there. Also, the visibility of the group does not seem to play a role. A good
case in point here is Berlin with a strong Turkish presence in some neigh-
bourhoods, but hardly any visibility of the former Yugoslavian community.
Still, we see no sizable difference between the two second-generation
groups with regard to this question.
Intercultural relations and multiculturalism
It is in neighbourhoods and local social institutions or organisations where
people are most strongly confronted with the diversification of their life
worlds. The socially shared environment also provides an important part of
their social networks. This section analyses diversity encountered in two
basic areas: a) perceptions of diversity in one’s life world and reported in-
tercultural practices and b) opinions and attitudes towards a number of is-
sues related to the increasing diversification and pluri-culturality of cities
and neighbourhoods.
Table 8.7a and 8.7b reproduce a number of outcomes across cities and
countries in these two areas for the Turkish second generation and the re-
spective comparison groups. One important aspect in this field is spatial
segregation – reflected in social and media discourse with terms like
Table 8.6 Correlation between attachment to neighbourhood and perceived share
of persons of one’s own ethnic background therein (Spearman-Rho)
Berlin Turkish 0.012 (N=232)
Former Yugoslavian 0.066 (N=174)
Comparison group 0.322** (N=221)
Frankfurt Turkish 0.073 (N=233)
Former Yugoslavian 0.031 (N=181)
Comparison group 0.480** (N=237)
Vienna Turkish -0.015 (N=241)
Former Yugoslavian -0.328** (N=242)
Comparison group 0.197* (N=238)
Linz Turkish -0.233** (N=200)
Former Yugoslavian -0.260** (N=233)
Comparison group 0.262** (N=220)
Zurich Turkish 0.054 (N=198)
Former Yugoslavian -0.103 (N=231)
Comparison group 0.268** (N=196)
Basel Turkish 0.024 (N=247)
Former Yugoslavian -0.070 (N=186)
Comparison group 0.171* (N=258)
***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
316 SCHNEIDER, FOKKEMA, MATIAS, STOJČIĆ, UGRINA & VERA-LARRUCEA
‘ethnic ghettos’ or ‘parallel societies’. It is quite common for shares of cer-
tain ethnic groups to be overrated, especially when a neighbourhood is
‘ethnically coded’ – such as Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, also known as
‘Little Istanbul’ (cf. Lang 1995). Although high percentages of the Turkish
population do not factually exist in any neighbourhood in any of the TIES
cities, between 6 per cent (Zurich, Paris, Amsterdam) and 15 per cent
(most other cities) of this population estimate the share of Turks in their
neighbourhood as three quarters or more.17
The fact that ‘Turkish neighbourhoods’ are rather likely to be diverse
neighbourhoods is reflected in the numbers on the ethnic background of re-
spondents’ circle of closest friends. For a large majority of Turkish re-
spondents in both Belgian cities, both Swiss cities, in Paris and Stockholm,
at least two of three closest friends are not Turkish. In the other cities, the
numbers are much lower – between a quarter in Vienna and around 40 per
cent in Strasbourg, Linz and Frankfurt – though they are still around three
times higher than for the comparison groups in almost all cities. In fact, it
is the respective comparison groups who especially show the highest levels
of ‘segregation’ in these terms, i.e. living in non-diverse neighbourhoods,
having been to school with very few immigrant children and having the
least friendships with ethnic backgrounds other than their own. Another in-
teresting practice concerns going-out to venues frequented by many immi-
grant youth. The variation across cities is large, ranging from only around
10 per cent of the comparison groups in Stockholm and Vienna who regu-
larly frequent such places to almost half in Berlin and two thirds in Paris.
Education and how to deal with school diversity are sensitive issues in
many cities. One question in tables 8.7a and 8.7b therefore asks whether
respondents would send their children to a school with more than 50 per
cent immigrant children. The percentages of those willing to do so is sur-
prisingly large: between half and three quarters of the Turkish respondents,
but also around half (in most cities) and up to two thirds (in both French
cities) of the respective comparison groups (exceptions here are the two
Austrian cities with only about 20 per cent).
Both the Turkish second generation and the respective comparison
groups seem positive and optimistic about the multicultural realities of
their cities. By far, a large majority of all respondents (three quarters and
more) thinks that living alongside or together with other cultures is not
threatening, but rather enriching, or at least that it makes no difference.
Overall, the respondents of Turkish descent are more explicitly positive
than the respective comparison groups. Concerning development of inter-
cultural relations between Turks and the ‘ethnic majority’ population over
the past years, the Turkish respondents are more optimistic.
We also tested the correlation between whether, on the one hand, relations
between Turks and the majority population became more or less friendly,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































levels of discrimination against Turks and Muslims (not shown). All three
correlations are negatively significant in Germany, Austria, France and
Spain.
8.4 Between ‘home’ and the ‘country of origin’
The second generation is not torn between two cultures, nor caught be-
tween two worlds. For children of immigrants, ‘home’ is where they were
born and raised. Yet, differing from the experience of children of native-
born parentage, the second generation has another ‘ethno-national’ refer-
ence frame: their parents’ country (and culture) of origin. This second
frame manifests in their childhood memories not only thanks to frequent
summer travels, but also practices, for instance, eating favourite ethnic
dishes and celebrating cultural and religious holidays with family.
Language is also an important issue here. The parental home and its social
relations are mostly connected to the parental language of origin, while an-
other language reigns in life outside (e.g. social relations at school and ac-
tivities of leisure).
A dual set of reference frames for feelings of belonging does not present
a problem, per se. We mean this both at the individual level, psychologi-
cally speaking, but also socially, in the sense that ‘hyphenation’ or ‘hybrid-
ity’ could weaken the sense of community and feelings of belonging
among its members. As the introduction to this chapter indicated, a func-
tional individual identity requires multiple belongings, and there is no rea-
son why having access to two ‘ethno-national’ reference frames should be
an exception here. However, discursively and in the public perception,
ethno-national references are frequently connected to notions of exclusive-
ness and absoluteness. This is why dual nationality is not accepted in some
nation-states, while others forbid citizens from abandoning their nationality.
These notions evince the tension created by having a dual set of cultural
and identificational influences, something that the second generation grows
up having to deal with.
The role of language
‘Immigrants should learn the language of the immigration country.’ This is
probably the most universally iterated demand directed as much towards
integration policies as to the immigrants and their offspring themselves.
Now a key issue in debates on integration in Europe, language is not only
about the practicality of being able to communicate and thus work in the
local setting. Language also mediates enculturation and socialisation proc-
esses into specific sets of norms and values. In itself, it is one of the stron-
gest symbols of a person’s attachment and belonging to a group, a culture,
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an ethnos or a nation. Last but not least, language is the main carrier for
discourse – understood via Foucault (1972) as a ‘formational system’ pre-
figuring individual narratives and ways of expression – which provides the
main field for individuals and groups to find and/or negotiate a place and
position (see section 8.1).
As all our respondents were born and raised in the survey countries, we
expected them to have been exposed to both family and survey country
languages from early childhood onwards. It is therefore unsurprising that a
large majority of respondents states having been raised in the survey coun-
try language together with their parents’ native language. Only a small mi-
nority of the respondents was raised exclusively in the survey country lan-
guage (not more than 9 per cent). Those stating to have been raised only in
the parental home language are also a small number in most countries. In
Sweden and Switzerland, this applies to only 8 per cent of the Turkish
respondents; in Germany, no respondent chose this answer option.
Exceptions, however, are France and Belgium, where almost half the re-
spondents state having been raised exclusively in their parents’ native lan-
guage (the proportion proves even higher in Strasbourg than Paris).
Considering that 80 to 90 per cent of the respondents’ parents were exclu-
sively raised in a language other than that dominant in the survey country,
the large share of respondents being raised in both languages underscores
the second generation’s dynamic linguistic adaptation. This is remarkable
for a group that the literature has repeatedly portrayed as particularly ‘re-
sistant to linguistic assimilation’ (see e.g. Condon & Régnard 2010;
Ersanilli 2009; Esser 2006).
We found that differences in language socialisation are not connected to
gender and age, though education proved to be a major differentiator.
France, Germany and the Netherlands present interesting cases for contrast
in this regard. Paris showed many more cases of higher-educated Turkish
respondents being raised exclusively in their parents’ native language than
those with lower educational outcomes (51 per cent and 15 per cent, re-
spectively). The inverse held for both German cities: respondents with
higher education (15 per cent) outnumbered their lower-educated peers (2
per cent) as far as being raised exclusively in German.
Our respondents’ current skills in both the survey country’s and their pa-
rents’ language are, on the whole, very positively self-evaluated. Only a
small percentage of mostly low-educated respondents rate their survey
country language skills lower than ‘good’ (on a six-point scale from ‘bad’
to ‘excellent’). Although use of the survey country language within the
family and during the respondents’ childhood was more predominant in
Germany, this second generation’s self-evaluation is rather modest: less
than half showed enough self-confidence to deem their writing skills in
German ‘very good’ or ‘excellent’. By contrast, respondents in France
were notably positive about their survey country language skills – more
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than three quarters evaluated them as ‘very good’ or ‘excellent’ – even
though French played no major role in their intra-familial communication.
The respondents in the Netherlands follow closely, at above 70 per cent.
Unsurprisingly, in all cities, the respondents’ evaluations of their own
survey country language skills depend on their level of educational attain-
ment, with higher-educated respondents rating their skills better than the
lower educated did. The influence of education proved more significant in
Germany than the other countries. In Berlin and Frankfurt, respondents
with lower educational outcomes evaluate their writing skills in German as
‘very good or excellent’ four times less frequently than higher-educated re-
spondents (18 per cent versus 69 per cent). In the other cities, this differ-
ence is significant though much smaller: for instance, 62 per cent versus
84 per cent in Amsterdam and 57 per cent versus 81 per cent in
Rotterdam.
This general pattern is also reflected in respondents’ answers to ques-
tions about the main language they currently use to communicate with their
parents. The Turkish second generation in France most uses Turkish to
communicate with their parents, followed by their peers in the Netherlands
(both countries around 80 per cent) and then Germany (at least 71 per
cent). When it comes to language used with their siblings – i.e. interlocu-
tors likely to speak both languages as well as the respondents do –
France’s language assimilation issue comes to the fore: only 14 per cent
speak mainly or only Turkish with their siblings. This applies to 43 per
cent of the respondents in the Netherlands and 31 per cent in Germany.
Transnational connections
A couple of crucial factors are at stake for the second generation to engen-
der feelings of belonging to their parents’ ethno-national reference frame
and to interweave them with the simultaneous feeling that their country of
birth is ‘home’. One realm is the city and/or the neighbourhood where the
respondent was born and raised. Another, albeit interrelated, realm is the
set of social and cultural practices of ‘enacting’ these feelings of belonging
and their possible consequences for individual life trajectories. For most
members of the second generation, the parental country of origin is not a
foreign place: they have visited it repeatedly throughout their childhood,
relatives are there and they speak the language of the country and/or the
village well enough to communicate at ease there. Many respondents also
hold the nationality of their parents’ country of origin, which opens up
possibilities, both concretely and theoretically speaking.
To illustrate: take two young men of Turkish descent born in the same
city, Gelsenkirchen, Germany. Both became professional football players
in the German premier league and, after some successful years of play,
were both offered the opportunity to play in the national selection – of
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Germany or of Turkey. Hamit Altıntop chose the Turkish team. Mesut Özil
went for the German team. Altıntop, who actually never lived in Turkey,
played in the German premier league for several years. Özil became a
German national idol following the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa.
Both footballers now play for Spain’s Real Madrid (though speculating on
their careers further would, alas, go beyond the scope of this book). It is
difficult to imagine that these footballers’ decisions to play for one or an-
other team were compelled primarily by feelings of national belonging. At
the same time, we would like to emphasise that people’s practices, oppor-
tunities they are presented with and decisions they make cannot always be
so finely sifted from identity.
As tables 8.8a and 8.8b show, remittances and investments do not play a
major role in any of the three second-generation groups. On average,
around a quarter of all respondents have sent money to Turkey, Morocco
or Yugoslavian successor states in the past five years (ranging from 6 per
cent of the Moroccans in Madrid to 42 per cent of the Turks in
Strasbourg). Moreover, the amounts have mostly been small: on average,
less than E 500 (not in the table). Consequently, investments are infrequent,
though this could be due to our respondents’ relative youth and subsequent
smaller cash flow. Turkish second-generation respondents are slightly more
likely to have invested money than members of the other two groups, with
the highest share again found in Strasbourg.
The majority of respondents had visited their parents’ country of origin
once or twice in the past five years. Exceptions are both the Turkish and
the former Yugoslavian respondents in Switzerland, who made more fre-
quent trips, mostly for holidays and/or family visits.
Respondents were also asked about the option of moving to their pa-
rent’s country of origin to live there for an extended period of time. Again,
the share of those stating to plan to ‘certainly’ or ‘likely’ do so was high-
est, by far, in Strasbourg, at 38 per cent. In the other cities, it was never
higher than 26 per cent, which was in Linz; in Frankfurt, it went down to
5 per cent for both answer categories combined. On the whole, the Turkish
second generation is slightly more likely to imagine ‘returning’ to the
country of their ancestors than our Moroccan or Yugoslavian successor
state respondents.
Several of these transnational items were combined into a three-point in-
dex to indicate whether or not a respondent could be considered a transmi-
grant – i.e. measuring the degree of orientation towards, and relationship
with, the parents’ country of origin. The numerical distribution of this cate-
gory is shown in tables 8.8a and 8.8b. Table 8.9 shows the results of a lo-
gistic regression analysis for a couple of factors.
The analysis shows that there is a significant relationship between re-
spondents’ being transnationally oriented and their feelings of belonging.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































with greater feelings of belonging to the ‘ethno-national’ country and lower
feelings of belonging to their own country of birth and residence. This,
however, is not a statement about the direction of causality. The same ap-
plies to the role of parental language. Those having more intensive contact
with their parents’ home country show a more extensive use of, and higher
skills in, parental language (not significant). Again, this can be a reflection
of respondents having spent more time in Turkey, Morocco or the former
Yugoslavia and/or a motivation to go there more often in order to further
their linguistic skills. A very strong and significant factor is religiosity,
which – due to religion’s little relevance among the former Yugoslavian re-
spondents – mainly applies to respondents of Islamic belief. Being a trans-
migrant is more likely among active practitioners of Islam. This is consis-
tent with our other findings, indicating that more religious respondents –
especially those who practise Islam18 – have significantly lower degrees of
feelings of belonging to the birth country, higher shares of discriminatory




Having a partner 2.03**
Employed 1.12
Occupational status 1.00




Feelings of national belonging 0.74***
Feelings of belonging to ‘ethnic group’ 1.25*
Speaking skills in the language of parental home country 1.51***
Use of parental language within the family (index) 1.48
None/very few persons of non-immigrant background as friends 1.66**
Intensity of religious practice (index) 2.98**












***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †Deviations from the grand mean
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
330 SCHNEIDER, FOKKEMA, MATIAS, STOJČIĆ, UGRINA & VERA-LARRUCEA
experiences and fewer social relationships outside the diasporic
community.
High levels of transnational activities more often occur among our oldest
cohort of second-generation respondents and those living with a partner
(who are often from the same ethnic group, but may have been born in the
survey country or the parental home country; for details, see chapter 7).
There are no big differences between males and females. Moreover, it is
surprising that the respondents’ socio-economic status – measured by la-
bour force participation, occupational status and financial standing – has
no effect. In other words, economic integration does not seem to lead to ei-
ther fewer transnational ties, as conventional assimilation theories would
foresee, or to more engagement in transnational practices, as Itzigsohn and
Saucedo (2002) suggest.
Membership in transnational organisations
In debates about integration, the most frequently referenced indicator for
describing membership is political participation. The question is to which
extent the second generation follows their parents’ engagement in diasporic
community organisations or rather prefers the membership and political ac-
tivity of mainstream organisations, political parties, etc. Engaging in ethnic
organisations can be motivated by more than an individual’s socio-political
commitment. Participation in this kind of association may, for example, be
related to friendship and peer relations or the desire to develop useful
networks.
In general, the civic engagement and participation of the second genera-
tion is somewhat lower than in the respective comparison groups. Around
half of second-generation respondents and two thirds of the comparison
groups stated they were active in some sort of association, club or organi-
sation. As expected, the most frequently mentioned membership was in a
sports club. Between a fifth and half of the respondents in all four groups
cited one, depending mostly on the city and/or country context. Some of
these sports clubs have pronounced ethnic affiliations, such as the
European football clubs that began being founded in the 1970s mainly for
Turkish players and fans.19 Notably, in bigger cities with larger migrant
communities, ‘ethnic’ sports clubs and associations do play a certain role.
For example, in both Dutch cities and in Berlin, around a quarter of sec-
ond-generation Turks who were members stated that their sports club was
Turkish in orientation.
With regard to membership in ‘ethnically oriented’ associations, Islamic
organisations play the most prominent role. Again, overall membership
rates in ethnic associations are low, ranging from less than 2 per cent in
Paris to almost 20 per cent in Berlin (on the issue of the institutionalisation
of Islam in Europe, see also chapter 9).
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Finally, associations for art, music and other kinds of cultural activities
are relatively common in the second-generation groups (between 5 and 20
per cent). A minority of them is also related to their parental country of
origin or the respective ethnic community in the city. Although diasporic
organisations are frequently cultural associations, per se, they do also in-
clude political activities and maybe even ‘ethnically coded’ professional or
parental associations.
8.5 Conclusions
According to the findings of the TIES survey, the second generation be-
longs. The descendents of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and former
Yugoslavia are even often more autochthonous to our cities and neighbour-
hoods than their peers of non-migrant background. They are also more
likely to have family living close by, and they therefore also feel that they
belong. This, despite a number of discursive restrictions imposed on them
by the media, politics and everyday discourses (cf. Schneider 2001). For
most of our respondents, feeling Turkish and Dutch or Moroccan and
Belgian or Serbian and Swiss is not a contradiction. Yet, in the wider soci-
etal discourse it is. But even when their feelings of national belonging are
mostly ambiguous, the second generation clearly identifies with the local
place where they grew up and live – be it their city or neighbourhood.
Some factors are conducive to their sense of belonging to the society.
Others hinder it. The most relevant factors seem to be sense of discrimina-
tion, citizenship, religiosity and – though to different degrees and inter-
twined with other variables – education and labour market participation.
The second generation does not live in anything close to what is some-
times labelled a ‘parallel society’. By a large majority, second-generation
respondents have mixed circles of friends, they participate in the majority
society’s political parties and civic associations, they mostly do not live in
ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods and they also do not wish to live
in ethnic enclaves.
The second generation is also culturally ‘adapted’. Its members share
normative views on the relationship between state and religion. They have
a good command of the survey country’s dominant language, using it more
than their parents’ native language even in a family context. At least when
measured along similar lines of social and educational background, most
share similar viewpoints on social issues such as gender roles, premarital
sexual activity and the multiculturalism of society. But they also maintain
a strong relationship with their parents’ culture of origin by preserving and
using its language, being allegiant to the faith of their parents and main-
taining ties with their parental home country and family there.
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The issue of identity among the diverse second-generation groups in our
survey cities reflects the complex social reality in which they grew up and
must find their place and position. This equally refers to aspects of a coun-
try’s specific institutional arrangements (e.g. citizenship regulations and
corresponding administrative practices) or a city’s (e.g. housing policies)
and to the discursive setting. Even though national integration models can-
not explain ‘integration outcomes’ as such, it is probably in the area of
identity where they can have the most visible influence. The German and
Austrian model of non-distinction between national demos and ethnos and
its subsequent non-admission of native-born children of immigrants into
the ‘national community’ is reflected in comparatively high degrees of am-
biguity in the contextual categories of belonging here (nation and, to a
lesser extent, city) and their discursive juxtaposition to categories of be-
longing there (‘ethnicity’ and religion). By contrast, inasmuch as the sup-
posedly multiculturalist Swedish and Dutch models, along with the assimi-
lationist French model (even if in quite different discursive settings) pro-
vide more space for simultaneous modes of feeling of belonging, they are
not necessarily conceptualised in terms of here and there (cf. Schneider et
al. 2012).
Against many odds, the second-generation groups in the TIES survey
are part of the societies they were born into. They identify with these soci-
eties. However, as with education and work careers, there are also ‘non-
identifiers’, i.e. respondents who are particularly ambiguous or even nega-
tive about their feelings of belonging to the wider society. The actual size
of this group is difficult to determine because there proved to be no clear
measurement for them. For example, we can take the Turkish respondents
with ‘weak or no’ feelings of belonging to the city or country. The size of
this group ranges from 4 per cent in Paris and in the two Dutch cities to 15
per cent in Vienna and Antwerp. (It is no coincidence that we find the
highest percentages of individuals expressing doubt about their belonging
in the two countries – and, for that matter, cities – with the strongest pres-
ence of right-wing anti-Islamic populist discourse in politics. The numbers
for the other cities are 13 per cent for Linz and Brussels, 10 per cent for
Berlin and Strasbourg, 8 per cent for Basel, 7 per cent for Zurich, 6 per
cent for Stockholm and 5 per cent for Frankfurt.)
However, this does not mean that these respondents would fulfil the cri-
teria for individuals living in a ‘parallel society’ and being mostly or solely
connected to Turkey and the Turkish diaspora in their respective cities. To
name just a few examples: in all cities, the large majority of these ‘non-
identifiers’ still feels attached to their neighbourhoods; they also practically
rule out moving to Turkey as an alternative to their current living environ-
ment; and they do not necessarily identify strongly as Turks. As already in-
dicated, in many cases, weak feelings of belonging extend to all identity
categories. In some countries, the likelihood of being part of the ‘non-
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identifiers’ group rises when coming from a family with low-educated and
religious parents, being low educated and/or working in a low-skilled pro-
fession, though also being raised in certain neighbourhoods and having
been to a widely segregated school. But again, this relationship varies
greatly across cities and countries according to background variables. It is
a differentiator notably in Strasbourg and in both Austrian cities, but plays
practically no role in Paris or the two Dutch cities.
Finally, we do not wish to say that ‘non-identifiers’ are problematic, per
se. The issue would be better considered the other way round. The varia-
tion in outcomes across countries and cities that this group experiences
may suggest that they are the product of a society and discursive setting in
which equal opportunities and room for being ‘different’ (in whatever as-
pect) are not self-evident.
Notes
1 This has fuelled a considerable body of commentary and publications by authors
who are themselves from the second and 1.5 generations (1.5 referring to people
who immigrate to a new country before or during their early teens). For the second
generation in Germany, see e.g. Acevit and Bingöl (2005), Ateş (2006), Kermani
(2009), Şenocak (2011) and Tuschik (2000) among many more.
2 This is also the focus of current scholarly work on ‘assimilation’. For example, seg-
mented assimilation theory broadens the scope by observing how insertion into the
labour market and accompanying acculturation can occur along different lines of in-
corporation into different, largely separated segments of the population (e.g. Portes
& Zhou 1993; cf. Schneider & Crul 2010).
3 For the TIES survey, translation issues also had to be addressed, since our question-
naire had to be made available in the eight participating countries’ five dominant
languages.
4 Devereux (1978: 146) states that ethnic identity in its ‘purest form’ represents an
‘all-or-nothing-proposition’, in the sense that one cannot be just a little bit ‘French’,
‘Turkish’, etc. – the label is either there or not. But he also observes how, empirically,
ethnic identity is nearly always ‘contaminated’ by folk ideas about what makes a per-
son ‘French’, ‘Turkish’, etc. (ibid.: 140ff). From this empirical point of view, the TIES
approach to inquiring about ‘belonging’ comes close to the ‘folk’ way of declaring
oneself ‘French’ or ‘Turkish’.
5 The term ‘othering’ refers to the mechanism of marking a difference or boundary
between a supposed collective ‘self’ and ‘others’. This is primordially a question of
narratives and of symbolical inclusion/exclusion (cf. Fabian 1983; Schneider 2001,
2002; Sökefeld 2001).
6 Many testimonies and books on everyday racism cite ‘Where are you from?’ – a
question uttered in all kinds of situations – as one of the most disturbing and subtle
forms of othering people with a ‘different’ name or physical appearance (Kalpaka &
Räthzel 1990; Essed 1991; Schneider 2001; Kilomba 2008; Sow 2008; Ergün 2010
and many more).
7 Questions about belonging offered six answer categories: ‘no feelings at all’, ‘very
weak feelings’, ‘weak feelings’, ‘neither strong, nor weak feelings’, ‘strong feelings’
and ‘very strong feelings’. These categories were collapsed into three for the tables
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in this chapter: ‘no or weak’ (answer categories 1-3), ‘ambiguous or neutral’ (answer
category 4) and ‘strong’ (answer categories 5-6).
8 All descriptive tables in this chapter reproduce weighted results (for details on our
methodology, see chapter 3). In Belgium this question was preceded by a screening
question about whether the category at stake was even applicable. In tables 8.1a+b,
those who considered a category inapplicable were added to those opting for ‘very
weak’ or ‘weak’ feelings of belonging. The statistical effect produces a stronger polar-
isation away from the ‘ambiguous or neutral’ category.
9 The question about religious belonging was only posed to the comparison groups in
Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. With the exception of
Germany, in most countries, its non-response rate was quite high, or respondents
somehow missed the question because of routing problems in the questionnaire.
For this reason, we abstain from making direct comparisons concerning this topic
between the second-generation and comparison group respondents.
10 See table 8.10 in the appendix for a tabular description of this distribution. The
small table below each graph indicates the variance explained by the dimensions in-
cluded – the inertia. The choice of which dimensions would be included in the ana-
lysis was based on whether the inertia value was greater than 0.2. Another indicator
included is Cronbach’s alpha to assess the reliability of the analysis.
11 The same applies for trying to establish a reference population from other data
sources. The Berliner Gesellschaft für Kurdologie (2003) estimates the number of
Kurds in the city as 20,000 to 50,000. Not only is this a wide-ranging estimation,
but it also includes Kurds from Iraq, Iran and Syria (although likely to be small
numbers). Since statistics are based on citizenship, most of the Kurds get subsumed
into the categories of Turks and naturalised persons. The Kurdish community in
Basel, the largest in Switzerland, is estimated to be around 10,000 (NZZ Folio 11/93:
‘Über den Rhein nach Klein-Pazarcik: Die Basler Kurdenkolonie’; for information
on the Kurdish diaspora in diverse European countries, see also http://www.institut-
kurde.org).
12 Parents’ geographical origin does not serve as an additional indicator. Even among
respondents with parents from provinces with higher proportions of Kurdish popu-
lations, those being raised in Kurdish-speaking households do not represent more
than 35 per cent.
13 Berlin: Spearman-Rho of -.378, significant at p < 0.01; Basel: Spearman-Rho of -
.163, significant at p < .05.
14 The absolute numbers are difficult to compare. Note, for example, that Amsterdam
is part of a large urban conglomeration of cities and suburbs (known as the
Randstad), where many people live and from where they commute to work in
Amsterdam’s city centre. However, this conglomeration is not counted as part of the
city itself. By contrast, Berlin is surrounded by a vast, very low-populated countryside
with no major neighbouring city within a 100-kilometre radius.
15 A similar observation can be made for the Turkish second generation in both Dutch
cities and in Zurich as well as for the former Yugoslavian second generation in
Zurich, Basel and Linz.
16 In the other TIES cities, only two of these items were asked, though the results
nonetheless conform to this finding. Respondents could agree or disagree with the
statements on a five-point scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. In the
combined index, high, medium and low levels of involvement represent combined
agreement mean scores on these items in the upper, middle and lower third,
respectively.
17 In Brussels, this applies to almost one third of the Turkish respondents. Almost 30
per cent of our Moroccan respondents in Barcelona estimate the share of Moroccans
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in their neighbourhoods as being above three quarters of the local population. In
Madrid, that figure is only 17 per cent.
18 ‘Practicing Islam’ entails customs such as praying five times a day, making weekly
visits to the mosque, eating halal food and fasting during Ramadan.
19 The best known of these clubs is probably Türkyemspor Berlin, founded in 1978
and still located in the ‘Turkish’ district of Kreuzberg (see http://www.tuerkiyem-
spor.info).
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Appendix
Table 8.10 Distribution of the strength of feelings of belonging in five categories
among second-generation Turks in France, Germany and the
Netherlands











Paris Strong feelings of belonging 82.9 69.5 44.2 59.6 58.5
Ambiguous/neutral 13.6 15.9 16.9 23.5 26.5
Weak or no feelings 3.5 14.6 38.8 16.9 15.0
N 258 246 260 260 260
Strasbourg Strong feelings of belonging 88.3 87.3 31.7 30.4 51.5
Ambiguous/neutral 7.1 5.1 25.0 15.8 31.5
Weak or no feelings 4.6 7.6 43.3 30.4 17.0
Not concerned 23.3
N 239 236 240 240 241
Berlin Strong feelings of belonging 59.7 60.9 45.5 47.8 26.9
Ambiguous/neutral 20.6 19.4 36.8 36.0 41.1
Weak or no feelings 19.8 19.8 17.8 16.2 32.0
N 253 253 253 253 253
Frankfurt Strong feelings of belonging 72.8 72.0 54.4 47.6 38.0
Ambiguous/neutral 14.0 15.6 28.4 37.6 37.6
Weak or no feelings 13.2 12.4 17.2 14.8 24.4
N 250 250 250 250 250
Amsterdam Strong feelings of belonging 74.6 78.0 41.0 63.2 31.0
Ambiguous/neutral 17.9 12.0 35.9 25.8 29.8
Weak or no feelings 7.5 9.9 23.1 11.1 23.1
No answer 15.9
N 201 191 195 190 208
Rotterdam Strong feelings of belonging 81.3 80.3 36.8 67.1 31.6
Ambiguous/neutral 15.1 11.0 38.2 22.4 28.1
Weak or no feelings 3.7 8.7 25.0 10.5 27.7
No answer 12.6
N 219 218 220 219 231
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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% answer: yes % answer: yes
Vienna Croatian 91.3 50.0 -41.3 46
Serbian 71.4 61.6 -9.8 112
Comparison group 59.1 28.9 -30.2 247
Linz Croatian 74.7 54.0 -20.7 87
Serbian 91.3 87.7 -3.6 80
Comparison group 82.9 45.9 -37.0 234
Zurich Croatian 86.2 79.3 -6.9 58
Serbian 74.6 62.7 -11.9 67
Albanian 85.5 52.6 -32.9 57
Comparison group 70.8 33.7 -37.1 202
Basel Croatian 82.6 76.1 -6.5 46
Serbian 50.0 60.5 10.5 76
Albanian 75.0 60.0 -15.0 20
Comparison group 61.3 32.3 -29.0 266
Berlin Croatian 64.4 42.2 -22.2 45
Serbian 68.7 22.9 -45.8 83
Comparison group 47.2 22.4 -24.8 250
Frankfurt Croatian 70.0 55.0 -15.0 40
Serbian 80.5 41.5 -39.0 82
Comparison group 61.7 22.5 -39.2 253
Source: TIES 2007-2008
340 SCHNEIDER, FOKKEMA, MATIAS, STOJČIĆ, UGRINA & VERA-LARRUCEA
9 Ways of ‘being Muslim’
Religious identities of second-generation Turks
Karen Phalet, Fenella Fleischmann and Snežana Stojčić
9.1 Introduction
Large-scale immigration from Muslim-majority countries to highly secular-
ised North-Western European societies has raised questions about how the
European-born children of Muslim immigrants relate to and practise reli-
gion. On the one hand, second-generation Muslims are socialised into
Islam within their immigrant families and communities. On the other hand,
they grow up in societies where the majority is historically Christian,
highly secularised and, in a post-9/11 era, increasingly anti-Islamic (Bruce
2011). By secularisation, we refer to a robust downward trend in the im-
portance and impact of religion among Christian-majority populations
(Gorski & Altinordu 2008). In European societies, secularism is a norma-
tive ideology that represents religiosity as a foreign, backward and/or dan-
gerous force. Islam and its practitioners are particular targets of hostile
public attitudes towards religion (Allen & Nielsen 2002). From a majority
perspective, the religiosity of second-generation Muslims therefore appears
to be a bright boundary, one setting them apart from the so-called main-
stream and standing in the way of their successful integration (Fleisch-
mann & Phalet 2012).
By contrast, from the minority perspective of immigrants and their chil-
dren, religious traditions and ties are highly valued parts of cultural herit-
age and crucial sources of personal self-esteem, social support and cultural
continuity in their socio-cultural environment (Bankston & Zhou 1995;
Ebaugh & Chafetz 2000; Warner & Wittner 1998). Accordingly, Muslim
immigrant parents purposefully and effectively transmit Islamic religious
practices and beliefs to the next generation (Güngör, Fleischmann & Phalet
2011). The second generation is often highly committed to their Muslim
identity, which is experienced as central to their sense of self-understanding
(Duderija 2007; Fleischmann & Phalet 2012; Şirin, Bikmen, Mir, Fine,
Zaal & Katsiaficas 2008; Verkuyten & Yıldız 2009).
In view of the contrasting orientations of Muslim immigrant commun-
ities and European receiving societies, this chapter asks how second-gener-
ation Turks in Europe negotiate their religious identities. We distinguish
between attachment – i.e. the subjective importance of religion – and prac-
tice, such as praying or fasting. In addition, we examine how these identi-
ties relate to religious socialisation in immigrant families and communities
as well as experiences of religious discrimination in receiving societies.
Drawing on the TIES survey data, we investigate contextual variation in
ways of ‘being Muslim’, namely, the different patterns of religious attach-
ment and practices. We make a comparison of second-generation religion
in four countries, namely across Berlin, Frankfurt, Brussels, Antwerp,
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Stockholm. These seven cities represent dis-
tinct national patterns of the institutional incorporation of Islam and differ-
ent local dynamics of religious inter-group boundaries.
9.2 Religion in the second generation
Integration and secularisation
Are second-generation Turkish Muslims less religious than their immigrant
parents, or do they maintain and reaffirm their religious heritage? A secu-
larisation paradigm in the sociology of religion posits that the importance
and impact of religion will decline in modern societies, as evidenced from
the progressive separation of church and state as well as decreasing reli-
gious service attendance (Dobbelaere 1981). Despite continuing scholarly
debate about the exact nature, the universality and the irreversibility of sec-
ularisation, empirical trends in church attendance among Europe’s majority
populations show a marked decrease in people’s religious involvement
(Gorski & Altinordu 2008). Moreover, secularism has become the norm in
Europe as compared to the United States insofar as ‘Americans think that
they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that they are sup-
posed to be irreligious’ (Casanova 2003: 19). In stark contrast with visions
of immigrant religion in the US, in European societies, immigrant religious
traditions are commonly seen as a burden to be left behind in the process
of intergenerational integration (Foner & Alba 2008). In the European con-
text, the classic assimilation hypothesis predicting that immigrant lifestyles
and life chances will converge with those of natives over time and over
generations amounts to a secularisation hypothesis. From the perspective
of secularisation and assimilation, second-generation Muslims – especially
the more highly educated among them – are thus expected to become less
religious as they become exposed to a predominantly secular environment.
Research on Muslim minorities using large-scale surveys in the
Netherlands (Van Tubergen 2007; Phalet, Gijsberts & Hagendoorn 2008)
and in Belgium (Lesthaeghe & Neels 2000) mostly confirms the secular-
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isation hypothesis: the second generation and the more highly educated
Turkish Muslims among them tend to be less religious. Yet, significant
generational decline is selective. This means that some religious practices
and preferences are largely retained (e.g. stable preference for a Muslim
spouse). Moreover, it is contingent on life chances so that persistent educa-
tional disadvantage implies that religiosity is maintained at a rather high
level (Phalet et al. 2008). Recent analyses of religious trends among
Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany suggest intergenerational
stability thanks to the renewed religious involvement of some part of the
second generation as well as those with higher education (Diehl & König
2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers & Gijsberts 2010). In view of the mixed evi-
dence of secularisation, this study compares the Turkish second generation
across different receiving contexts. The secularisation hypothesis predicts a
significant loss of religion so that the second generation would count fewer
self-identified Muslims than its parents and more highly educated Muslims
would be less religious than their peers who lack higher qualifications.
Religious vitality among immigrants
Competing with secularisation is a hypothesis that emphasises religious vi-
tality in immigrant families and communities. Turkish immigrants come
from a Muslim-majority society where levels of religiosity are much higher
than those in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden (Norris &
Inglehart 2004). We thus wonder to what extent Turkish immigrants are
willing and able to pass on their Islamic traditions and practices to the next
generation, who grow up in historically Christian, highly secularised
European societies. Comparable to the notion of ethno-linguistic vitality in
socio-linguistic studies of minority languages (Harwood, Giles & Bourhis
1994; Giles, Bourhis & Taylor 1977), we define religious vitality as the
continuity of a minority religion through the family- and community-based
socialisation of the next generation. In this vein, religious studies have cor-
related strong family or co-ethnic ties among fellow believers with en-
hanced religious continuity across generations (Ellison & Sherkat 1990;
Ellison 1995; Sherkat 2001). Turkish immigrants have typically built local
ethnic communities with high levels of ethnic retention. We see them in,
for instance, their ethnic language usage and media consumption as well as
the strong co-ethnic ties that appear in local residential concentrations and
dense ethnic associations. Within Turkish immigrant families, strict paren-
tal control and pressure to conform ensure the effective intergenerational
transmission of traditional cultural values, such as conservative gender
roles and filial obligations (De Valk & Liefbroer 2007). More generally, re-
ligious studies have documented the impact of family socialisation that en-
courages the children of more religious parents to be more religious them-
selves later in life (Kelley & De Graaf 1997; Myers 1996). Along those
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lines, Güngör, Fleischmann and Phalet (2011) showed the parallel effects
of parental religious practice and Koran lessons during childhood have on
sustained religiosity among second-generation Turks in Belgium.
Interestingly, they found more effective religious transmission among
Turks than Moroccans. This observation is consistent with relatively high
overall levels of ethnic retention and social closure in Turkish immigrant
communities. Focusing on Turkish Muslims and extending our comparison
to other European cities, the religious vitality hypothesis expects the sec-
ond generation to mostly maintain its religious identity and practice; nota-
bly, those who, as children, were exposed to religious practice and instruc-
tion within their family and community will be most religious later on in
life.
Symbolic and reactive forms of religious identity
Looking beyond the binary of more-versus-less religiosity, contrasting reli-
gious orientations in immigrant communities and in the wider society
evoke questions concerning how second-generation Muslims experience
and express their religious identities. Some qualitative findings suggest a
generational shift away from one ‘Islam of the fathers’ towards new –
more reflective and differentiated – meanings and forms of religion in the
second generation. For example, qualitative case studies have documented
the search for religious roots, the emergence of novel practices and the
multiple meanings of religious belonging (Dassetto & Nonneman 1996;
Vertovec & Rogers 1998). In this spirit, we discern varying ways of being
Muslim as distinct identity options under the umbrella of a broadly shared,
strongly held Islamic identity.
One line of argument extends the present-day notion of ‘belonging with-
out believing’ to immigrant religion. Gans (1994) coined the term ‘sym-
bolic religiosity’ to denote second-generation religious identities that are
loosely connected to beliefs and practices – such as the observance of rules
and rites or acquaintance with religious creeds – in conjunction with a sim-
ilar notion of symbolic ethnicity. If symbolic religiosity applies to second-
generation Islam, European-born Muslims may embrace a common
Muslim identity. They would value it as a meaningful part of their cultural
attachments and self-understandings without necessarily observing reli-
gious rules (e.g. dietary restrictions) or practices (e.g. daily prayers).
Symbolic religiosity hence implies a decoupling of the subjective identifi-
cation of second-generation Muslims from Islamic practices.
An alternative ‘reactive religiosity’ argument posits the increased cen-
trality of religious ties and traditions in the second generation. We see this
notion extended among the most deprived second-generation groups in the
US (Portes & Rumbaut 2001) to the religious domain. Reactivity implies
that the children of immigrants distance themselves from the mainstream
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culture and society, reaffirming a distinctive ethno-religious tradition in re-
action to social exclusion and experiences of discrimination. In a similar
vein, some believe in the ‘ethnicisation’ of second-generation religion: eth-
nic communities are seen as exerting pressure to uphold challenged reli-
gious values and practices as part of an ethnic reaffirmation of their minor-
ity cultures and identities. Accordingly, Maliepaard et al. (2010) found that
religious and ethnic identities and practices are more closely associated to
one another in second-generation Dutch Muslims as compared to the first
generation. Moreover, there is some evidence of increased religious identi-
fication in the face of perceived religious discrimination among Turkish
Muslims in the Netherlands (Fleischmann, Phalet & Klein 2011; Verkuyten
& Yıldız 2007). This is consistent with experimental findings in social psy-
chology which show that the experience of discrimination strengthens
identification with the disadvantaged group and thus protects collective
self-worth and personal well-being (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt & Spears
2001). Since religion provides explicit guidelines for living ‘a good life’,
religious group identities may be a particularly attractive source for posi-
tive social identity, especially in the face of discrimination (Ysseldyk,
Matheson & Anisman 2010). In short, reactive religiosity implies that those
who experience more discrimination will identify more – or even more –
strongly as Muslims. In contrast with symbolic religiosity, the reactivity ar-
gument suggests that Muslims may turn to stricter religious observance as
a way to consolidate their threatened religious identity (Klein, Spears &
Reicher 2007; Phalet, Baysu & Verkuyten 2010).
9.3 Comparative TIES data
The relative scarcity of empirical evidence from large-scale surveys on the
religiosity of second-generation Muslims in European societies is mainly
due to data limitations. Previous studies have focused on mainly, if not on-
ly, the first generation. Furthermore, they use restrictive measures of reli-
gious affiliation and worship (e.g. going to the mosque) and/or are usually
single-country studies (Phalet et al. 2008; Smits, Ruiter & Van Tubergen
2010). Comparative approaches in this area remain an exception (but see
Connor 2010). The TIES data make it possible to investigate religious
identities and practices among the Turkish second generation from a com-
parative perspective, making use specifically of surveys conducted in
Germany (IMIS 2008), Belgium (CeSo-CSCP 2008), the Netherlands
(IMES-NIDI 2007-2008) and Sweden (CEIFO 2008). These four countries
were selected because they represent different institutional arrangements of
church-state relations, which create differential opportunity structures for
the practice of Islam by Muslim minorities (Fetzer & Soper 2005;
Fleischmann & Phalet 2012; Statham, Koopmans, Giugni & Passy 2005).
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Moreover, the seven cities differ in local boundary dynamics as a function
of ethnic segregation and social disadvantage along religious lines: such
boundaries are most rigidly defined in the German cities and rather less so
in the Belgian and Dutch cities and in Stockholm.
Most Turkish second-generation participants in Amsterdam and Brussels
were self-identified Muslims, as were large majorities of our samples in
Germany and Sweden (excluding Turkish Christians from the latter; see
figure 9.1). Because religion questions were only asked of participants
who self-identified as Muslims, the analyses do not include secular Turkish
participants. This resulted in comparison samples of Turkish Muslims in
Berlin (N=156), Frankfurt (N=185), Antwerp (N=330), Brussels (N=194),
Rotterdam (N=205), Amsterdam (N=166) and Stockholm (N=118).
It should be acknowledged that our study has a number of limitations,
including the differential selection of Muslims from ethnically defined
Turkish samples, the cross-sectional nature of the data and the comparabil-
ity of samples and measures across the different cities. Furthermore, the de-
sign did not allow us to completely separate out the role of community
forces from that of religious opportunities and discrimination on the side of
receiving societies. This last point will prove a challenging but very neces-
sary task for future research
9.4 Religious boundary dynamics
Religious boundaries
For the purposes of the present investigation, we asked if it mattered which
country or city one inhabits as a second-generation Turkish Muslim. In
other words, do the religious identities and practices of the second genera-
tion differ across Europe? As a heuristic framework, we focused on the in-
terplay between religious and social boundaries as this is shaped by differ-
ent institutional arrangements and societal structures. The comparative
cases in this study range from cities with more rigidly defined – i.e. less
permeable and more closely overlapping – religious and social boundaries
to those with more permeable, greater intersecting ones. Religious bounda-
ries can be seen as one instance of symbolic boundaries, alongside ethnic,
linguistic or cultural boundaries, that exclude immigrants and their off-
spring from mainstream societies (Lamont 2000). Lamont and Molnar
(2002) define symbolic boundaries as evaluative distinctions that separate
people into groups and that generate feelings of affinity, superiority or infe-
riority. Religion as a symbolic boundary-marker can be more salient and
rigidly defined or, alternatively, more flexible and negotiable, depending
on the public accommodation of religious diversity. Foner and Alba (2008)
argue that religion constitutes a bright boundary in most European soci-
eties, where Christian identities (albeit secularised) are a central part of
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national self-understandings and histories of nation formation, much like
race in the US. Also within Europe, countries differ in the institutional
pathways of church-state relations as well as ensuing forms and degrees of
incorporation of religious diversity – of Islam, in particular (Soper &
Fetzer 2007). Lamont and Molnar (2002) define social boundaries as being
distinct from symbolic boundaries, specifically as objectified social differ-
ences that are manifested in unequal access to resources and opportunities.
Symbolic and social boundaries are mutually constitutive; the former or-
ganise and justify social differences according to shared social networks,
values and lifestyles. Religious and social boundaries, however, can be
more overlapping or intersecting, depending on the degree to which soci-
eties are structured according to a religious divide between Muslims and
non-Muslims. What is more, religious boundaries are seen to be more per-
meable, fluid and/or blurred in societies or in local inter-group settings
where there is more upward social mobility and more social mixing across
ethno-religious boundaries. This is made evident, for instance, by
Muslims’ access to higher education and their integration into mixed
neighbourhoods and schools.
Our comparative study asks how religious boundary dynamics affect re-
ligious identity options or ways of being Muslim. In particular, we expect
more reactive religiosity and stricter ways of being Muslim in settings
where religious boundaries are more rigidly defined and where there is
more overlap with social boundaries. Conversely, we argue that loose,
Table 9.1 Religious and social boundaries: City profiles of second-generation Turks
Berlin Frankfurt Antwerp Brussels Rotterdam Amsterdam Stockholm
Selectivity:
Secular father Few Few Few Some Few Some Many

































Notes: Selectivity of the first generation refers to the presence of immigrant parents with a
secular background and/or secondary or higher qualifications in each city. Accommodation
refers to the degree of institutional incorporation of Islam in pre-existing state-church rela-
tions in the four countries. Social mobility is indicated by the rates of participants with high-
er qualifications in each city. Social mixing refers to the self-reported presence of native in-
habitants or pupils in participants' neighbourhoods and schools.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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eclectic or ultimately ‘symbolic’ forms of religion are most likely to appear
in settings where religious boundaries are more flexible and negotiable and
where they intersect with social boundaries. In addition, the comparison of
Turkish Muslims across national and local receiving contexts allows us to
test the boundary conditions of competing secularisation and religious vi-
tality hypotheses. Is secularisation – the intergenerational decline of reli-
gion among the higher educated – restricted to societal contexts that disre-
gard, if not reject, religious diversity, such as when Muslim minorities are
denied public recognition or are socially excluded? Similarly, does reli-
gious vitality – the effective socialisation of religion in immigrant families
and communities – require some degree of public acceptance and social in-
clusion in the wider society?
Selective immigration
Before turning to the different religious boundary dynamics across the
comparison cities, we briefly address the issue of differential selectivity
among first-generation Turks across cities. Differential selection of the first
generation will affect its children through the intergenerational transmis-
sion of, inter alia, parental human capital and religious traditions (Nauck
2000). Across the seven cities, most parents of Turkish Muslims comprised
unskilled or low-skilled immigrant workers and their spouses. The large
majority typically migrated for work or family reunification (this applied to
80 per cent of the fathers in Berlin; 84 per cent in Frankfurt; 86 per cent in
Stockholm; and over 90 per cent in the other cities). Accordingly, most fa-
thers arrived with little or no formal qualifications (around 60 per cent with
primary education or less in Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and Stockholm;
over 50 per cent in Rotterdam and Amsterdam; over 40 per cent in
Brussels).
Turkish parents generally came from the most religious strata of Turkish
society. We attribute this to the selective recruitment of guest workers from
the least developed rural areas in central and eastern Turkey, combined
with regional patterns of family reunion and family formation.
Nevertheless, the presence of secular parents differed considerably across
the seven cities, being largest in Stockholm, followed by Brussels and
Amsterdam, and being very small in Berlin, Frankfurt, Antwerp and
Rotterdam. Among these parents, refugee migration – and the related pres-
ence of Alevites and Orthodox Christians – was most significant in
Stockholm, less so in Berlin and Frankfurt, and marginal in the other
cities.
To sum up, second-generation Turkish Muslims proved comparable
across cities to the extent that the large majority of their parents came as
immigrant workers or spouses thereof from less developed regions in
Turkey. Nevertheless, the parental characteristics of participants across
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cities, suggest that some, such as Stockholm and Brussels, may have at-
tracted significant numbers of less religious and/or more qualified immi-
grants. Consequently, parents in those cities are less homogeneous in terms
of their religious orientation and social disadvantage. Those in Berlin,
Frankfurt and especially Stockholm are more often Alevite Muslims than
in the other cities; they are more often secular in Brussels, Amsterdam and
especially Stockholm. Finally, Brussels counts more Turkish Muslims with
parents holding secondary or higher education qualifications than other
cities.
Institutional accommodation of Islam
As mentioned in our introduction, the four comparison countries represent
different national histories of church-state relations. More recently, these
modes have been extended to new forms of religious diversity (Soper &
Fetzer 2007). As such, the position of Islam within the wider religious
landscape differs between European societies with significant Muslim pop-
ulations as a function of national institutional pathways (König 2007). We
hold that, from an institutional perspective, the accommodation of Islam
has been least thorough in Germany, more thorough in Belgium and
Sweden, and most thorough in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Phalet
2012).
A privileged judicial status of Germany’s Christian churches as corpora-
tions of public law means that they can profit from church taxes collected
by the state and subsequently distributed among them. To grant the same
status to Islamic organisations, German authorities require the establish-
ment of a centralised hierarchical organisational structure representing
Islam that is modelled on the Catholic and Protestant Churches’ organisa-
tion. In the absence of such structure, Islamic organisations are denied the
status of public law corporation and hence access to financial resources
from the state (Fetzer & Soper 2005). Although a number of Islamic organ-
isations have set up national federations that strongly resemble the author-
ity-advocated model, so far they have been denied recognition based on
the argument that they are not representative of Germany’s entire Muslim
population. The state-imposed establishment in 2007 of a Coordinating
Council of Muslims to represent the Islamic faith community vis-à-vis
German authorities remains contested by Muslim communities and lacks
legitimacy. In the absence of formal recognition, Islamic organisations in
Germany therefore remain marginalised relative to established churches.
In Belgium, the institutional status of Islam is formally equal to that of
the historically dominant Catholic Church and other recognised religions.
Yet, equality was only recently fully implemented. Although Islam was the
first religion, after Catholicism, to be officially recognised – a nominal ac-
knowledgement occurred in 1974 – Belgian Muslims had to wait until the
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turn of the millennium to see its practical application (Foblets &
Overbeeke 2002). To receive the state funding to which they were legally
entitled, Muslim minorities were required to set up a national Islamic coun-
cil that was to represent all Belgian Muslims vis-à-vis the Belgian state
and that would be held responsible for the actions of imams, whose serv-
ices were thereby financed. Only in the late 1990s was such a council ef-
fectively established. This was carried out on Belgian authorities’ initiative,
being a first step towards implementing the formal status of Islam as a na-
tional religion (Manco 2000). The very recent application of Islam’s equal
status implies that Islamic organisational structures are less fully developed
on the ground than they are in the Netherlands, to which we now turn.
In the early twentieth century, Dutch society, a historically multi-faith
one, was characterised by so-called pillarisation. This tried and tested sys-
tem of religious pluralism enabled the peaceful coexistence of separate
sovereign communities under one national roof. Specifically, Protestant,
Catholic, liberal and socialist ‘pillars’ operated independently from each
other, yet still enjoyed equal representation in national affairs. Each pillar
maintained its own institutions, such as schools, trade unions and broad-
casting companies, which were all funded by the state on an equitable ba-
sis. With increasing secularisation, the social barriers between pillarised
faith communities within the majority population have since largely broken
down. At the same time, the history of independent yet equal religious
communities has created the opportunity for Muslim minorities to develop
their own institutions, which operate on a par with Christian and other reli-
gious organisations (Doomernik 1995). Thus, Dutch Muslims have not on-
ly established numerous local mosque associations, but also set up state-
funded Islamic broadcasting networks and schools. From an institutional
perspective, then, Muslims have been granted formal equality with
Christian and other religious groups in the Netherlands and they have made
the most of opportunities offered by the Dutch system.
The situation in Sweden is formally comparable to that in the
Netherlands since Islam enjoys legal status on a par with other religions.
Moreover, Islamic institutions are entitled to state funding. Unlike the
Dutch case, however, Sweden has historically established a state church
presided over by the Swedish king. The centuries-old notion of nation and
church unity is still reflected today in the fact that, despite high levels of
secularisation, more than 80 per cent of the majority population are regis-
tered as members of the Swedish Lutheran Church (Alwall 2000).
Freedom of religion was granted in the constitution only in the second half
of the twentieth century. The state church’s privileged position has also
been dismantled since. Equalising their status with that of the Swedish
Lutheran Church, the state has officially recognised other religious groups:
first the Swedish Free Churches, later on Judaism and still later Islam
(Alwall 2002). This implies that Islamic and other religious organisations
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and their institutions are funded by the state commensurate to their mem-
bership size (Alwall 2002). What is more, Muslims have created state-
funded Islamic schools. As in the Netherlands, Islam in Sweden has been
granted formal equality with established churches. Because of the legacy
of the state-church system and the dominant status of the Swedish
Lutheran Church, however, Islam is still dominated by a quasi-monopoly
of the Swedish Lutheran Church.
Summing up, from an institutional perspective on religious diversity,
Islamic organisations in the Netherlands operate on a par with other reli-
gious organisations. In Sweden, formal equality and state support for
Islamic institutions are qualified by the continued dominance of the
Swedish Lutheran Church. In Belgium, formal equality with established
churches has only recently been implemented. In Germany, the position of
Islamic organisations is least established, notably in the absence of public
recognition (see table 9.1). Therefore, we expect to find, on the one hand,
the strictest forms of religious identity in the German cities. This is in
keeping with reactive religiosity, coming up against more differentiated
and possibly purely symbolic forms of religious identity in Belgian,
Swedish and Dutch cities. On the other hand, secularisation is also most
likely in the German cities, where Islam is formally excluded. Meanwhile
religious vitality is most likely in the Netherlands’ multi-faith society
where inclusive institutional arrangements have fostered religious practices
and community-building.
Social inclusion and exclusion
Beyond their formal recognition, social structures also differ between na-
tional and local contexts across Europe, so that the second generation is
less included and more excluded in some countries and cities than in
others. This is made evident by varying levels of ethnic segregation, educa-
tional and occupational attainment (Heath, Rothon & Kilpi 2008). At high
levels of social segregation and disadvantage, the maximal overlap of reli-
gious with social boundaries constitutes the most bright or impermeable in-
ter-group boundaries separating second-generation Turkish Muslims from
the mainstream. The cities represent different degrees of social mixing and
upward mobility across ethnic group boundaries, ranging from very high
to more moderate levels of ethnic segregation and persistent social disad-
vantage (see table 9.1). The TIES surveys asked participants to estimate
percentages of Turkish inhabitants in the neighbourhood where they lived
before leaving the parental home. Whereas self-reported residential segre-
gation was generally high, the highest levels were reported in Berlin and
Brussels, with over 50 per cent of the participants living in majority-
Turkish city blocks. Perceived segregation levels were high in Frankfurt
(42 per cent), Antwerp and Rotterdam (35 per cent). They were moderate
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in Amsterdam and Stockholm (30 per cent). In addition, the TIES surveys
inquired extensively into the educational careers of the second generation
(see chapter 5). This revealed more persistent educational disadvantage in
some cities and countries – despite the generally low education levels of
Turkish immigrant parents across cities. Specifically, Turkish Muslim par-
ticipants with higher (i.e. tertiary education) qualifications were almost ab-
sent in Berlin and Frankfurt, while they represented almost one third of our
sample in Stockholm and intermediate rates in the other cities (ranging
from 15 to 18 per cent).
All in all, the given profiles allow a tentative global ranking of the com-
parison cities from most overlapping to most intersecting religious and so-
cial boundaries. Turkish Muslim participants in Berlin and Frankfurt repre-
sent the most exclusionary end, with higher levels of segregation and per-
sistent disadvantage. Those in Stockholm clearly represent the opposite,
more inclusive end, with moderate levels of social mixing and upward mo-
bility. From the perspective of social exclusion, we therefore again expect
the strictest forms of religion in the German cities, as well as secularisation
among the very few higher educated. We expect religious vitality, along
with more differentiated forms of religious identity, in the other cities, es-
pecially Stockholm.
9.5 Secularisation or religious vitality?
Figure 9.1 shows the percentages of how Turks in each city responded to
being asked whether they had been raised with a religion, whether they
currently had a religion and, if so, which one. In line with previous obser-
vations of religious stability, the vast majority of participants in all cities
who were raised Muslim identified Islam as their current religion. We con-
clude that religious stability is clearly the main comparative finding. This
should be qualified, however: some Turks in Berlin and Frankfurt who
were raised as Muslims were no longer religious, whereas some Turkish
Muslims in Stockholm were not raised as Muslims.
A closer look at the religious affiliations of Turkish Muslims shows that
most participants were Sunnites, with around 20 per cent self-identifying
as Shiite or Alevi in Berlin and Frankfurt, and less than 5 per cent in the
other cities.1 One should keep in mind that religious Muslims are differen-
tially selected from the total samples of second-generation Turks in each
city. While there were very few non-Muslim participants in Antwerp and
Rotterdam (around 10 per cent), they were more numerous in Frankfurt,
Brussels and Amsterdam (around 20 to 25 per cent) and most numerous in
Berlin and Stockholm (around 40 to 50 per cent). The reasons for non-
overlapping ethnic and religious group boundaries vary: factors include the
reception of Christian Turkish refugees in Stockholm, the self-selection of
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secular Turkish immigrants in Brussels and Amsterdam and a more signifi-
cant loss of religion over generations in Berlin and Frankfurt. It should be
noted that the wording of the religion question in German refers more nar-
rowly to ‘being religious’ rather than ‘having a religion’ as in Dutch or
Swedish.
9.6 Ways of ‘being Muslim’
Religious dimensions
Looking beyond religious stability across generations, we explore distinct
ways of ‘being Muslim’ among second-generation Turks. In a first step,
we could reliably distinguish between affective and behavioural dimen-
sions of religious identity in repeated principal component analyses in each
city. As a first dimension, ‘religious attachment’ consists of four statements
that express participants’ personal commitment to their Muslim identity:
‘Being Muslim is an important part of myself’; ‘I often think about my
being Muslim’; ‘I see myself as a true Muslim’; ‘When someone says bad
things about Muslims I feel personally hurt’. Participants were asked to
rank these statements from (1) for totally disagree to (5) for totally agree.
The TIES surveys additionally inquired about the frequency of four reli-
gious habits: saying daily prayers, going to the mosque, fasting during
Ramadan and eating halal food. Rate of religious practice was rated from
Figure 9.1 Religious socialisation and current religion among second-generation
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(1) for never through (3) for occasional to (5) for regular observance.
Together, the habits form a second dimension: that of ‘religious practice’,
which refers to participants’ behavioural involvement in religious ritual
and dietary practices.2 Finally, bivariate correlations of religious attachment
with religious practice support our finding of clearly distinct attachment
and practice dimensions despite substantial overlap across cities (i.e.
Spearman’s ρ ranges from .42 to .64).
Private, selective and strict Muslims
In a next step, we inductively derived distinct ways of being Muslim from
the patterning of second-generation religious attachment and practices in
each city. Cluster analysis is well suited for this exploratory endeavour. To
allow for selective religious practice, we entered the four indicators of reli-
gious practice separately into K-means cluster analyses, along with a reli-
able composite index of religious attachment. In each of the cities, similar
clusters emerged, indicating three distinct patterns of Muslim identities that
we labelled ‘private’, ‘selective’ and ‘strict’ (see figures 9.2 though 9.4).
Across cities, a first cluster of private Muslims is characterised by moder-
ate to high levels of attachment; for instance, they fully agree that ‘Being a
Muslim is an important part of myself’. Strong attachment, however, typi-
cally goes together with low levels of any religious practice. Private
Muslims come closest to the decoupling of affective and behavioural di-
mensions, in line with symbolic religiosity. By contrast, so-called strict
Muslims combine strong religious attachment with high levels of adher-
ence to all four measured habits. For the strict, Muslim identity seems to
imply devout conformity to religious obligations and behavioural guide-
lines. Finally, selective Muslims differ from the strict in that they combine
high levels of attachment with more selective ways of practising their reli-
gion. Specifically, in this cluster we find high levels of fasting during
Ramadan and the observance of eating halal food, along with low levels of
praying and going to the mosque. Whereas the latter habits have a distinct
ritualistic character, the former’s primary meaning is that of communal
sharing and social belonging to the Muslim community rather than Islamic
praxis in the narrow sense.
Although very similar clusters for private, selective and strict types of
Muslim identities were replicated in all seven cities, local boundary dy-
namics also came into play so that boundaries between distinct types may
slightly shift between cities. For instance, private Muslims in Brussels,
Antwerp and Amsterdam (though not in other cities) reported eating halal
food most of the time. Interestingly, eating halal takes on different mean-
ings, from a ‘light’ variant of halal for private Muslims (e.g. avoiding pork
meat) to the most exigent variants for strict Muslims (e.g. requisite ritual
slaughtering of meat and taboos on many ingredients). Another example of
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local variation in behavioural norms concerns the boundary between selec-
tive and strict forms of practice. Thus, selective Muslims in Berlin and
Frankfurt typically report some prayer and mosque visits in addition to eat-
ing halal food and fasting during Ramadan. Meanwhile, in Stockholm, be-
havioural norms seem much less demanding so that even strict Muslims do
not report regular daily prayers.
To conclude, the emergence of a distinct private type of Muslim identity
in all seven cities supports the validity of a conceptual distinction between
affective and behavioural dimensions of religious identity. At the same
time, typically moderate levels of religious attachment among private
Muslims call into question an alleged decoupling of identity and practice,
as proposed by symbolic religiosity. By contrast – and in support of iden-
tity consolidation through behavioural involvement – some active involve-
ment in shared practices with other Muslims certainly strengthens the reli-
gious attachment of the second generation.
Religious boundaries
Our main research question is concerned with contextual variation in ways
of being Muslim. More precisely, we compared cities as inter-group set-
tings with more or less permeable religious boundaries. In support of a
contextual approach from local religious boundary dynamics, the distribu-
tion of second-generation Turks over the three clusters varies considerably
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between cities (see figure 9.5). Thus, strict Muslims constitute the largest
group, relative to selective and private Muslims in Berlin, Antwerp and
Rotterdam; in Frankfurt, strict and selective Muslims are roughly equally
represented (40 to 50 per cent strict Muslims in the four cities); Brussels
and Amsterdam count relatively more selective Muslims (around 50 per
cent) than strict ones; Stockholm is the only city where private Muslims
dominate numerically (over 50 per cent), and the share of this cluster in
Stockholm is substantially larger than in all other cities. Focusing on the
comparison of relative differences between the three Muslim types,3 pre-
liminary comparative findings are consistent with differential boundary dy-
namics between cities. Specifically, strict religious observance predomi-
nates in cities with bright religious boundaries, in particular Berlin and
Frankfurt, as well as the cities of Antwerp and Rotterdam, which share the
presence of a widely supported and very vocal far-right party. Conversely,
selective religious practice seems to be the rule in cities with more perme-
able boundaries, notably Stockholm, and, to a lesser extent, also Brussels
and Amsterdam. Apparently, more demanding behavioural implications of
Muslim identity are reinforced by – and, in turn, are reinforcing – bright
religious boundaries in highly exclusionary local inter-group settings. Here,
the emphasis is on the strict observance of religious rules and rites, thus
drawing a marked distinction between insiders and outsiders of the moral
community of ‘good’ Muslims. In local inter-group contexts that are less
severely exclusionary, however, the behavioural implications of second-
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generation Muslim identities are less demanding, with an emphasis on so-
cial belonging and communal sharing. In these inter-group contexts then,
selective religious practices are enabled by – and simultaneously are ena-
bling – religious boundary-blurring.
9.7 Religious socialisation or reactive identity?
In light of generally high levels of religious attachment and involvement
among second-generation Turkish Muslims across cities, we must ask
which group processes could be driving generational continuity in the reli-
gious domain. To assess the role of religious socialisation within immigrant
communities, on the one hand, and experiences of discrimination by non-
Muslims, on the other, we examined correlations with religious attachment
and practices among our respective samples.
Religious socialisation
How effectively was the minority religion of the first generation transmit-
ted to the next generation in local Muslim families and communities? As
seen in figure 9.1, a large majority of Turkish Muslim participants across
cities was raised with Islam. Accordingly, frequencies of parental mosque
visits during childhood appeared comparably high across cities, reflecting
rather similar levels of religiosity among the first generation of Turkish
Muslims. Specifically, more than 60 per cent of the parents in Berlin,
Frankfurt and Antwerp were reported to make weekly mosque visits when
participants were children; this is followed by 45 per cent and Rotterdam,
41 per cent in Amsterdam, 38 per cent in Stockholm and 36 per cent in
Brussels. At the same time, Muslim participants across cities differed con-
siderably in terms of religious education. Thus, attending Koran lessons
was the rule for Turkish Muslim children in Antwerp, Amsterdam and
Rotterdam (with 75 per cent attendance or more), but less common in
Berlin and Frankfurt (with attendance rates > 50 per cent) and even less
common in Stockholm and Brussels ( < 50 per cent).
Were second-generation Muslims whose parents more regularly practised
and/or who attended Koran lessons as a child more strongly attached to –
and actively involved in – Islam? To test net correlations of second-genera-
tion religious attachment and practice with religious socialisation, we con-
ducted multiple regressions with parental religious practice and teaching
during childhood as predictors in each city. When controlling for gender,
age and education, we found significant net effects of religious socialisa-
tion on both religious identification and practice dimensions in all seven
cities (see tables 9.7 and 9.8 in the appendix). Turkish Muslim participants
whose parents regularly went to the mosque and who were sent to Koran
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lessons as a child were not only more strongly attached to their Muslim
identity as young adults, but they were also more actively involved in the
religious life of their community. We had to conclude that religious social-
isation within Turkish migrant families is a robust predictor of second-gen-
eration religious identities across cities. This is a general finding despite
contextual variation in parental religious practice and religious teaching
among Muslim participants in the seven cities. Furthermore, the strength of
correlation with current religious identities also varied between cities.4
Relatedly, did religious socialisation make a difference between private,
selective and strict ways of being Muslim? Figures 9.6 and 9.7 show the
bivariate associations of religious socialisation with distinct ways of being
Muslim. Across cities, our observations attest to the importance of reli-
gious upbringing for the ways in which the Turkish second generation ex-
perience and express their Muslim identity in young adulthood. There is an
obvious trend towards the increasing importance of religion during social-
isation for private, selective and strict Muslims.5 Thus, the strict more often
grew up in a family where the parents went to the mosque weekly; a ma-
jority attended Koran lessons as a child. In contrast, early exposure to reli-
gious education and having parents as religious role models during child-
hood were much less frequent among private Muslims. While selective
Muslim most closely resembled private Muslims in terms of their fathers’
mosque attendance, they were most similar to strict Muslims in terms of
Koran lesson attendance. This suggests that community-based religious
Figure 9.6 Childhood religious socialisation of private, selective and strict Muslim
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teaching effectively supports the continued religious involvement of sec-
ond-generation Muslims. Participants who attended Koran lessons as a
child were much less likely to be private Muslims as young adults. As
Koran classes are most often organised by local mosque associations, this
finding attests to the key role of local (and transnational) communities of
co-religionists in the transmission of Islam to the next generation of
European-born Muslims. In addition, parental religious practice directly in-
dexes Turkish immigrant families’ religious socialisation. Our observations
suggest that parental ritual practice is decisive for sustained ritual practice
in the second generation.
To conclude, despite differences between cities in the prevalence of fam-
ily- and community-based religious socialisation, and despite differential
effects of both types of religious socialisation on practice in young adult-
hood, the overall trend is clear. The more important the role religion played
in a participant’s childhood, the more likely he or she is to be a practising
Muslim today. This observation is repeated for all seven cities. It highlights
the key function religious ties and resources within Turkish migrant fami-
lies and communities have in explaining the continued religious involve-
ment of the second generation. Our observations suggest that a common
emphasis on public recognition or state-sponsored religion in the European
comparative literature seems one-sided. In addition, more programmatic
cross-national research is needed into the role of religion in local and trans-
national community-building among European-born Muslims.
Figure 9.7 Childhood religious socialisation of private, selective and strict Muslim
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Reactive identity
From our comparative overview of diversity patterns and policies across
cities, it became apparent that religion in European societies constitutes a
bright inter-group boundary. Indeed, religious inter-group boundaries have
remained firmly in place despite formal civic inclusion of the second gen-
eration. Against a background of social disadvantage and public hostility
in inter-group relations with non-Muslims, we asked to what extent the ex-
perience of discrimination is part of the social realities of Muslim partici-
pants in the seven cities. Overall, we found high levels of consensus and
little variation across cities with regard to the public perception of group
discrimination against Muslims. Thus, over 90 per cent of the second-gen-
eration Turkish respondents in each city agree that Muslims as a group are,
as our survey put it, subject to ‘hostile or unfair treatment because of their
origin or background’, with responses ranging from ‘some’ to ‘most of the
time’ on a five-point Likert scale. Furthermore, varying percentages of
Muslim participants across cities reported some personal experience of dis-
crimination. Personal discrimination was similarly defined as ‘hostile or
unfair treatment because of one’s origin or background’, with responses
ranging from ‘never’ to ‘most of the time’ on a five-point Likert scale. No
time period was specified, so that participants could also report experiences
of discrimination during childhood or adolescence. In reply to our ques-
tion, a clear majority of Muslim participants reported at least one experi-
ence of personal discrimination in Berlin (76 per cent), Frankfurt (82 per
cent), Brussels and Antwerp (both 60 per cent); this was the case for
roughly half of the participants in Amsterdam (49 per cent), Rotterdam (43
per cent) and Stockholm (53 per cent). Lastly, all participants who reported
one or more personal experiences of discrimination also answered a fol-
low-up question about the perceived grounds of discrimination. Fixed re-
sponse categories included religion, ethnicity, race, language, gender and
social class. Participants could tick more than one corresponding box. In
keeping with variation from less to more permeable religious boundaries,
the cities dramatically differed in terms of the salience of religion in per-
sonal experiences of discrimination. Thus, religion was most frequently
perceived as ground for discrimination by Muslim participants in Berlin
(37 per cent) and Frankfurt (42 per cent), and least frequently in
Stockholm (only 6 per cent), with the other cities falling somewhere in be-
tween (around 20 per cent). It should be added that participants across
cities perceived their Turkish origin as the most obvious ground for dis-
crimination. As both ethnic and religious parts of minority identity are
closely entwined, the religion question indicates the relative salience of
one’s Muslim identity – as distinct from one’s Turkish identity – in the
context of negative experiences of inter-group encounters.
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Are second-generation Muslims who experience more discrimination,
personally or against Muslims in general, more strongly attached to and
more actively involved in their religion? While the social realities of partic-
ipants across cities are marked by the experience of discrimination, the evi-
dence of an alternative explanation of second-generation religion as ‘reac-
tive identity’ is mixed (see table 9.8 and 9.9 in the appendix). The correla-
tions of religious identities with religious attachment and practice were
tested in linear multiple regressions with self-reported frequencies of group
discrimination against Muslims, personal discrimination experiences and
religious or other grounds of discrimination as predictors. Specifically, the
effects of experienced discrimination were estimated net of gender, age and
levels of education, in addition to religious socialisation. Only in Berlin,
Frankfurt, Antwerp and Stockholm (and not in the other cities) were expe-
riences of discrimination significantly related to religious attachment. Only
in Antwerp were Muslim participants who reported more personal experi-
ences of religious discrimination not only more strongly attached to their
Muslim identity, but also more actively involved in religious practice. To
conclude, there is some support for reactive identity in response to experi-
enced unfairness and hostility in inter-group relations for the affective at-
tachment dimension. Yet, there is little evidence of a similar linear effect
of experienced discrimination on religious practice among the second
generation.
In a last step, we examined differences between types of Muslims in
terms of average levels of discrimination. Does experienced discrimination
make a difference between private, selective and strict ways of being
Muslim? In the absence of a linear increase of religious practice with more
frequent experiences of discrimination in most cities, it is very well possi-
ble that certain ways of being Muslim are distinctly more ‘reactive’ than
others. Thus, perceived unfairness or hostility in inter-group relations
might be related to a shift away from private religiosity and towards more
communal definitions of Muslim identity as a shared faith and a common
fate. Furthermore, ‘reactive identity’ might be most applicable to strict def-
initions of religious identity and its behavioural implications, which en-
force the most bright inter-group boundaries between religious insiders and
outsiders. Since discrimination on religious grounds is most consistently
associated with religious identity, we focus here on differences in personal
religious discrimination between private, selective and strict Muslims.
Despite considerable variation in their frequencies, we found similar corre-
lations of experienced religious discrimination with distinct ways of being
Muslim across cities (see figure 9.8). With the exception of Amsterdam
and Stockholm, we see a general trend: levels of experienced discrimina-
tion increase from private to selective Muslims and, further, from selective
to strict Muslims.6 However, in view of the cross-sectional nature of the
data and the endogeneity of experiences of discrimination – which depend
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as much on awareness of injustice as on actual exposure to injustice – cau-
tion is warranted in interpreting the causal direction of mutual associations
between experiences of discrimination and ways of being Muslim. Thus,
prior experiences of discrimination may drive people to increased identifi-
cation as Muslim and more consequence in religious practices. Yet, it is
equally plausible that more religious Muslims are more aware of religious
discrimination. Moreover, visibly devout Muslims are also more likely to
encounter discriminatory treatment to the extent that they adopt behaviou-
ral codes (e.g. avoiding eye contact or shaking hands with the opposite
sex) and/or dress codes (e.g. wearing headscarves or beards) that signal a
salient, distinctively Muslim identity in inter-group encounters with non-
Muslims.
To conclude, our findings are suggestive of the potentially reactive na-
ture of second-generation Muslim identities in some, if not most, of the
cities. At the same time, correlations with religious discrimination are gen-
erally weaker and less consistently replicated across cities than the correla-
tions with religious socialisation. We therefore conclude that religious so-
cialisation within immigrant families and communities has a decisive im-
pact, while religious discrimination may further reinforce the religious
identities of the second generation.
Figure 9.8 Reports of religious discrimination experiences among private, selective
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9.8 Discussion
This chapter develops a comparative approach to the religious identities of
the second generation of Turkish Muslims (excluding secular and Christian
Turkish participants in TIES) in seven European cities. All seven cities at-
tracted large numbers of Turkish immigrant workers in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, who have in common predominantly rural, low-educated pre-
migration backgounds. Across cities, Turkish immigrants have developed
vibrant Muslim communities that support the continued religious involve-
ment of the next generation.
At the same time the cities differ in their degrees of facilitating social
mobility and social mixing, with the most social mobility and mixing in
Stockholm; the least in Berlin and Frankfurt; and the Belgian and Dutch
cities falling somewhere in between. The four countries in our study are
highly secularised societies with historically established Christian churches.
Yet, they represent different institutional pathways of religious accommo-
dation: Sweden’s state church, Germany’s cooperative separation of church
and state and Belgium’s and the Netherlands’ historical religious pluralism.
Extending a contextual approach of second-generation religion from inter-
group boundary dynamics, we conceive of the cities as different inter-
group settings with more or less permeable religious boundaries.7 Our cen-
tral question was how the second generation of European-born Muslims
negotiates their religious identities in the context of inter-group tension or
hostility in majority-non-Muslim societies. Contrary to the secularisation
hypothesis, comparative evidence of remarkably effective religious trans-
mission from Muslim parents to children supports earlier findings of reli-
gious continuity in Turkish migrant families, albeit with some qualifica-
tions for those in Berlin and Frankfurt. Looking beyond generational con-
tinuity versus loss of religion, our main research question here was
concerned with qualitatively distinct ways of being Muslim under the um-
brella of a common Muslim identity for all. In support of internal diversity
in terms of qualitatively distinct ways of being Muslim, cluster analyses of
second-generation religious identities in the seven cities revealed three sim-
ilar types of Muslim identity across cities. While private Muslims are at-
tached to their Muslim identity without engaging in religious practice, strict
Muslims connect strong religious attachments with devout observance of
dietary and ritual practices, such as praying and going to the mosque.
Finally, selective Muslims observe dietary practices, such as fasting dur-
ing Ramadan and eating halal food, in the absence of regular ritual practi-
ces, such as praying and going to the mosque. Importantly, selective
Muslims are strongly attached to religion in a way that is similar to strict
Muslims. It should be added that the typology leaves some room for local
boundary dynamics, with slightly different patterns of selective practice in
different cities. Most importantly, the findings attest to the availability of
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multiple identity options for second-generation Muslims in Europe under
the common heading of a ‘Muslim identity’ in all seven cities. What is
more, our own discoveries speak to an alleged decoupling of religious
identity and practice, as suggested by notions of ‘symbolic religiosity’ and
‘belonging without believing’.
One direction in which we looked for explanations of second-generation
religious identities was the internal dynamics of immigrant families and
communities. In particular, we looked into processes of religious socialisa-
tion within Muslim communities. The importance of generational transmis-
sion as an explanation of continued religious attachment and involvement
in the second generation received very strong support in all seven cities.
Thus, most participants who indicated Islam as their current religion were
raised with Islam as children. Moreover, both parental role models and
community-based religious education contributed to the effective intergen-
erational transmission of religious traditions. It is noteworthy that both pa-
rental religious practice and the religious education of children depend on
a ‘religious supply side’, which is mainly ensured by Turkish mosque asso-
ciations with transnational links to Turkey and their European headquarters
in Germany. To complement more extensive comparative research on na-
tional differences in the public accommodation of religion, more research
is needed into the impact of local and transnational religious communities
and organisations on second-generation Muslim identities.
An alternative explanatory ground for the generally stable and strong re-
ligious identities among the second generation refers to the quality of inter-
group relations between Muslim minorities and majority-secular or
Christian groups in European societies. Extending research on reactive eth-
nicity, we looked for evidence of reactive religiosity – correlating religious
attachment and practice with experiences of discrimination. To summarise,
our findings are mixed: experiences of ethnic and religious discrimination
are undoubtedly part of the daily lives of Turkish Muslim participants in
all cities. However, linear correlations of second-generation religion with
these experiences appear to be partial at best – i.e. they mostly affect reli-
gious attachment rather than practice – and they are significant only in
some cities. Finally, with respect to distinct ways of being Muslim, across
cities, the strict were most likely to report personal experiences of discrimi-
nation on religious grounds. Importantly, it seems plausible that the corre-
lation goes two ways: strict Muslims might be simultaneously more aware
of, as well as more often exposed to, unfair or hostile treatment in inter-
group encounters with non-Muslims. To conclude, the reactive religion hy-
pothesis receives more consistent support in cities with bright religious
boundaries, such as Berlin and Antwerp. Here quasi-consensual public per-
ceptions of unfairness and hostility in inter-group relations are routinely re-
inforced by personal experiences of religious discrimination. Across all
cities, however, the religious vitality hypothesis does most of the
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explanatory work, as second-generation religion is supported by strong pri-
mary ties within immigrant families and communities.
To contextualise religious identities, we contrasted cities with the most
bright religious boundaries such as Berlin and Frankfurt as well as, to a
lesser extent, Antwerp and Rotterdam, with cities such as Stockholm as
well as, to a lesser extent, Brussels and Amsterdam. We inquired into how
predominant ways of being Muslim vary according to city contexts as local
inter-group settings. According to our expectation that more permeable in-
ter-group boundaries lead to more selective religious practices or even to
religious attachment without practice, we find that a private Muslim iden-
tity is most frequent in Stockholm, where inter-group boundaries are miti-
gated by significant degrees of social mixing and upward mobility.
Conversely, in Berlin and Frankfurt and, to a lesser extent, in Antwerp and
Rotterdam, Turkish immigrant groups are more explicitly set apart by
bright religious boundaries. Accordingly, in these cities, roughly half or
more participants opted for a strict Muslim identity. Finally, selective prac-
tice was the predominant pattern among Muslims in Brussels and
Amsterdam, where inter-group relations are less marked by religious ten-
sion than in their respective twin cities of Antwerp and Rotterdam.
Interestingly, varying patterns of religiosity among second-generation
Muslims appear to be organised at the local rather than the national level.
For instance, we found striking commonalities in second-generation reli-
gious identities between Antwerp and Rotterdam, two industrial economic
centres with strong anti-immigrant constituencies on the far-right of the po-
litical spectrum.
To conclude, our comparisons highlight how religious identities – in the
plural indeed – emerge from contextual variation in religious socialisation
within immigrant communities as well as varying experiences of inter-
group tension or conflict along religious lines in different city contexts.
They complement a common top-down approach of religious diversity
from national differences in European state institutions and policies.
Notes
1 Selectivity of the first generation refers to the presence of immigrant parents with
an urban background and/or secondary or higher education qualifications in each
city. Accommodation refers to the degree of institutional incorporation of Islam in
pre-existing state-church relations in the four countries. Social mobility is indicated
by the rates of participants with higher qualifications in each city. Social mixing re-
fers to the self-reported presence of native inhabitants or pupils in participants’
neighbourhoods and schools.
2 Interestingly, the residual category ‘Muslim Other’ was the modal self-identification
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (over 50 per cent); it was less often used in Brussels
and Antwerp (around 25 per cent); and it was marginal in other cities. It is unclear
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whether this category mainly reflects indifference, ignorance about religious tradi-
tions or, alternatively, whether it signals resistance towards particular labels or reluc-
tance to subdivide what is seen as a common Muslim identity.
3 Religious attachment and practice form reliable and clearly distinct dimensions
across cities: internal consistencies  range from .65 to .86 for attachment and from
.64 to .87 for practice; bivariate correlations range from .42 to .63 between religious
attachment and practice.
4 Relative differences in predominant ways of being Muslim between cities are not ex-
plained by socio-demographic differences between Muslim samples, as religious
identities are not consistently associated with gender, age or education. Specifically,
strict Muslims are significantly more often male in Brussels, Antwerp, Amsterdam
and Stockholm; strict Muslims tend to be less educated in Frankfurt and
Amsterdam. In Brussels, younger participants are more often private Muslims; in
Antwerp, younger Muslims are more often strict Muslims.
5 It is likely that the proportion of ‘private Muslims’ is especially underestimated in
Berlin and Frankfurt relative to the other five cities. Due to the different wording
(see note 3) of the filter question in German, respondents well may have declared
themselves as ‘not religious’.
6 For religious attachment, explained variances by the regression models (see adjusted
R in tables A7 and A8) varied from around 10 per cent in Antwerp, Brussels,
Amsterdam and Rotterdam to 25 per cent or more in Berlin, Frankfurt and
Stockholm; for religious practices, explained variances were somewhat larger, ran-
ging from 25 per cent to 45 per cent across cities (except for a mere 5 per cent in
Brussels).
7 Differences in parental religious practice between strict and both selective and pri-
vate Muslims were significant in all cities on the basis of one-way analyses of var-
iance (F-tests) and pairwise comparisons of means (t-tests). Differences in religious
education between private and both selective and strict Muslims were significant in
all cities on the basis of bivariate comparisons of proportions who attended Koran
lessons (x2 tests).
8 Differences in personal religious discrimination between strict and both selective
and private Muslims are significant in five cities (Frankfurt, Brussels, Antwerp,
Amsterdam and Rotterdam) on the basis of pairwise comparisons of proportions
who mention religion as a ground for discrimination (x2 tests).
9 The fact that Sweden seems to provide the most open context for the accommoda-
tion of non-Christian beliefs, while, at the same time, not having the most pluralistic
form of institutionalisation, can be taken as an indication that other contextual fac-
tors also intervene – for example, educational opportunities and the presence of wel-
fare state provisions.
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Appendix
Table 9.2 Migration motives: Percentages of Turkish Muslim parents who migrated
for family and work reasons
Berlin Frankfurt Brussels Antwerp Amsterdam Rotterdam Stockholm
Work father 62.4 69.0 64.7 67.0 67.3 62.6 41.0
Family father 17.2 15.2 29.5 25.5 24.7 26.5 45.3
Work mother 2.5 4.9 7.3 6.3 3.1 2.5 7.8
Family mother 77.9 79.9 85.9 86.7 91.5 91.3 82.6
Source: TIES 2007-2008
Table 9.3 Economic development in sending areas: Percentages of Turkish Muslim
parents originating from rural Turkey (only including parents who lived in
Turkey until at least age 15)
Berlin Frankfurt Brussels Antwerp Amsterdam Rotterdam Stockholm
Village father 36.7 45.2 55.0 47.6 56.6 53.7 45.3
Village mother 42.4 46.0 62.3 50.0 53.0 52.2 47.9
Source: TIES 2007-2008
Table 9.4 Formal qualifications in Turkey: Percentages of Turkish Muslim parents
with primary education or less
Berlin* Frankfurt* Brussels Antwerp Amsterdam* Rotterdam* Stockholm
Primary or
less father
66.0 61.1 42.4 59.7 55.0 51.4 64.1
Primary or
less mother
71.8 64.9 57.9 72.3 72.4 72.0 67.4
*German and Dutch percentages do not distinguish qualifications imported from Turkey
from those obtained after migration.
Source: TIES 2007-2008
370 PHALET, FLEISCHMANN & STOJČIĆ
Table 9.5 Self-reported school segregation: Percentages of Muslim second-
generation Turks with 50% or more pupils of immigrant origin in primary
and secondary schools
Berlin Frankfurt Brussels Antwerp Amsterdam Rotterdam Stockholm
>50% immigrants
primary
58.9 51.4 76 50.3 64.6 69.5 72.4
>50% immigrants
secondary
58.3 55.7 66.7 49.3 76.7 73.0 68.2
Source: TIES 2007-2008
Table 9.6 Self-reported ethnic segregation: Percentages of Muslim second-
generation Turks currently living in neighbourhoods with 50% or more
Turkish residents
Berlin Frankfurt Brussels Antwerp Amsterdam Rotterdam Stockholm
>50% Turks 62.1 42.7 61.1 35.5 29.2 35.0 30.4
Source: TIES 2007-2008
Table 9.7 Upward mobility: Percentage of Muslim second-generation Turks who are
attending or have completed tertiary education
Berlin Frankfurt Brussels Antwerp Amsterdam Rotterdam Stockholm
Tertiary education 2.6 4.9 18.3 17.5 19.8 15.2 30.8
Source: TIES 2007-2008
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10 Conclusions and implications
The integration context matters
Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider
10.1 Introduction
Throughout this book, we pursued several lines of comparison across
countries, between and across cities and for multiple origin groups. We
found major differences between groups as well as remarkable variation
within the same origin group across cities and countries. In our conclusion,
we make use of the preceding chapters’ various outcomes to look at one
origin group in more detail. For this purpose we selected second-generation
Turks, as they are significantly present in seven of the eight countries that
the TIES survey covered. This group’s ubiquity enabled robust comparison
and, at the same time, contemplation on the integration context and its spe-
cific bearing on the second generation as a whole.
Deviating from our approach in others chapters, here we focus on abso-
lute differences between Turks across countries rather than relative differ-
ences between this group and respondents of native-born parentage. Our
aim is to assess what kind of context best affords opportunities for the
Turkish second generation’s upward mobility. We seek to pinpoint what
helps them succeed and what hinders them across countries.
The sometimes major variation in outcomes provides evidence that inte-
gration contexts across countries and cities offer radically differing oppor-
tunities. This realisation ushers in new explanatory factors and takes some
weight off individual or group factors. As the previous chapters showed,
the contextual conditions created by institutions (e.g. arrangements in
school and on the labour market, citizenship and welfare policies) are of
paramount importance.
However, we do not mean to totally dismiss the impact of individual
and family characteristics. Several chapters in this volume underscore, for
example, the relevance of parental background characteristics. Yet, the im-
pact of individual and family-related factors often only becomes apparent
in the interplay of specific conditions of the local and national integration
contexts. This chapter therefore casts the spotlight on the integration con-
text and its interplay with available resources in the family.
10.2 A comparison of second-generation Turks with low-
educated parents across seven countries
Much of the variation we see between countries is rooted in general macro-
level institutional differences in the structure of the labour market or how
educational systems are organised. The aforementioned interplay of contex-
tual conditions only comes to the fore when meso- and micro-levels are
also considered. For instance, we probed into what kind of help and sup-
port respondents received from parents, siblings and other significant peo-
ple in the community and at school. We asked: how do individuals and
families operate and navigate within a certain school system? How do their
social networks help them find work? Analysing the micro and the meso,
we see both the restraints of the integration context and the windows of op-
portunities available to individuals and families. Integration context theory
forms the basis of our approach, as chapter 2 discussed in detail (see also
Crul & Schneider 2010).
Another striking observation in this volume is that ‘integration out-
comes’ sometimes highly differ across thematic fields. Second-generation
Turks in Sweden, for instance, show very favourable results in education,
as compared to those in other countries. Meanwhile, in terms of national
identity, a large group of them only weakly identifies as much with being
Swedish as with having a sense of belonging to their home city,
Stockholm. This puts into question models that predict overall negative or
positive integration outcomes. The lived reality of the second generation is
not a straightforward result of national integration models, but the result of
more complex processes. Thus, on the one hand and following Bourdieu
(1984), we prefer to conceive of the fields of education, the labour market
and social life as relatively autonomous, each with its own structure and
set of power relations. As we found, the opportunities in these fields are
very different across cities and countries. On the other hand, the fields are
not totally insular. For example, educational results obviously affect labour
market access and working careers, though how they do so differs from
one country to the other. We therefore ask: how does identity formation re-
late to education? How do social relationships impact people’s position on
the labour market? How are such relationships affected by a country’s or a
city’s climate of acceptance of cultural diversity and immigration?
The TIES project offered us the unique possibility to compare the chil-
dren of Turkish immigrants born across thirteen cities in seven European
countries. That said, the internal heterogeneity of these communities pre-
sented a challenge as we strived to make accurate assessments. For starters,
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the parents of our second-generation respondents do not share the same
background. They have different ethnic, regional, religious and socio-eco-
nomic characteristics. Some parents came from large cities in Turkey, but
others from the remotest rural parts. By far, most parents were labour mi-
grants, but some also came as political refugees.
For proper comparison, we had to account for such incongruities in the
Turkish survey sample.1 As chapter 5 on education showed, in almost all
countries, parental educational background was a differentiator, with the
most important cut-off point being a parent’s completion of at least a few
years of lower secondary school. The school careers of children with bet-
ter-educated parents usually resembled those of the comparison group’s
children more closely than those of lower-educated Turks. As such, our
analysis in this concluding chapter has a focus exclusively on those re-
spondents with low-educated parents (i.e. with a few years of lower secon-
dary school at most). This rules out, in particular, many children of immi-
grants from large Turkish cities and those who came to Europe as refugees,
thus encompassing significant groups of children of professionals in Paris
and Christian Turks in Sweden. By contrast, most Alevites and Kurds are
included in the sub-sample because their parents have low education levels.
Our narrow scope considerably reduces the diversity in parental back-
ground characteristics across the countries. It means that those counted as
second-generation Turks in this sub-sample actually had very similar so-
cio-economic starting positions in the seven countries, thus allowing us to
concentrate specifically on contextual factors to explain differences in
outcomes.
Unlike elsewhere in this book, the findings in this chapter therefore do
not give a representative picture of the second-generation Turks in the thir-
teen European cities. Many results would look far more positive if they
were based on the entire Turkish origin sample. Nevertheless, the results
do give an accurate overview of the situation of low-educated Turkish la-
bour migrants’ children in those cities. Moreover, looking at this group
with the most adverse starting position is advantageous in that it tests the
‘integration capacity’ of national and local institutional settings to a maxi-
mum. The approach clearly indexes the structural opportunities and ob-
stacles presented by the different integration contexts.
10.3 Educational position
An enormous amount of studies has been published around the theme of
education and the children of immigrants (for an overview, see Holdaway,
Crul & Roberts 2009). Their emphasis has mostly been on comparing
such children with a group of children of native-born parentage or with
other ethnic minority groups. Gaps between ethnic groups are mostly
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attributed to differences in class and culture. Looking at social class goes
back to a longer established tradition of research on children from work-
ing-class families. Cultural differences in relation to education are often
operationalised in the value parents attach to education and the role pa-
rents assign to teachers and schools. In this chapter, class plays but a mi-
nor part because, as mentioned, we look solely at second-generation Turks
with low-educated parents. Comparing children in similar socio-economic
positions across countries directed us to the relevance of other explanatory
factors.
Of all the thematic fields, school outcomes showed the most extreme
differences. In chapter 5, we distinguished four typical outcomes based on
percentages of early school leavers (those who have a lower secondary
school degree at most), higher education students and the group in the mid-
dle (those who reached apprenticeships or upper secondary school). The
Turkish second generations in France and Sweden show the most promis-
ing educational results, with low percentages of early school leavers and a
considerable group of high achievers. These systems are successful not on-
ly in producing high shares of well-educated young people, but also in pre-
venting dropout in lower and upper secondary education, which results in
insufficient credentials. Second-generation Turks in Germany and, to a
lesser extent, Belgium and Austria, have the least promising educational
outcomes. These systems produce a considerable group of early school
leavers, and the number of those who make it to higher education is worry-
ingly low. A third stream is represented by second-generation Turks in
Switzerland, where there are neither many early school leavers nor a lot of
high achievers. Finally, second-generation Turks in Netherlands can be
characterised as the most polarised group, with a disconcertingly large
group of early school leavers and an equally large group of high achievers.
Table 10.1 Educational level among second-generation Turks with low-educated








Austria 32.3 52.5 15.2
Belgium 34.1 48.4 17.5
Switzerland 13.0 72.0 15.0
Germany 33.1 61.9 5.0
France 16.1 47.5 36.4
The Netherlands 25.9 47.2 26.9
Sweden 9.0 61.8 29.2
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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In Germany, Austria and Belgium, one third of second-generation Turks
with low-educated parents can be classified as early school leavers. In the
Netherlands, this contingency comprises one fourth. This is an important
negative indicator, as having nothing more than a lower secondary school
degree precludes securing any job but one of the lowest ranking. These
countries’ percentages of very high early school leavers must be interpreted
as failure to be successfully integrated into the national educational system.
Compared to their parents, this group shows hardly any educational
progress.
However, in France, Sweden and the Netherlands, we find a group of
between a quarter and a third of respondents who has reached or already
completed higher education. This group has very successfully managed its
way through the educational system. From an intergenerational perspective,
they have taken an enormous, impressive step forward. Most parents of
these successful students have attended primary school at most.
The largest group represented in all countries falls in the middle category.
This contingency is still a lot better educated than its parents, although they
will probably not fill top-ranking positions in society. Depending on
whether they get skilled or white-collar jobs, they would, however, have
taken a considerable step forward in relation to their parents and thus suc-
cessfully fulfilled the ambitions of the first generation’s emigration project.
Reconstructing our respondents’ educational careers, as we did in chap-
ter 5, revealed three pivotal points: the selection after primary school into
either a vocational track or an academic lower secondary track; the selec-
tion of an apprenticeship versus upper secondary school education; and the
transition into higher education. These turning points, to a large degree, de-
termine ultimate school outcomes. We also identified three types of deter-
mining characteristics: institutional; individual; and family. Among the
most relevant institutional factors, we identified were: the organisation of
preschool; early versus late tracking; upstreaming and downstreaming op-
tions in secondary school; existence of a long alternative route to higher
education through the vocational column; organisation of the transition into
an apprenticeship; and organisation of the transition from upper secondary
school into higher education.
Outcomes nevertheless also depended on what school systems asked for
from both pupils and parents. Parents were expected to play an active role
in some, while, in others, this was much less crucial. The Swedish and the
German cases are opposites here. In both countries, we found a consider-
able group of Turkish parents who rarely or never talked about school with
their children. In the literature, this is generally presented as a facet of cul-
tural heritage from rural Turkey, where parental involvement in school was
not something to be expected. But, as table 10.2 shows, depending on the
context, parental attitudes can have varying influences on their children’s
school careers.
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To put it simply, more than in any other country, second-generation Turks
in Germany are penalised because their parents do not – or are unable to –
support their school careers. In the German system, this reduces chances to
almost zero for even the brightest children of lower-educated Turks to enter
tertiary education. By contrast, in other systems like France’s and
Sweden’s, children of average learning ability and from similar family sit-
uations do make it into the tertiary education.
At the lower end of the educational hierarchy we thus see very large per-
centages of early school leavers in Germany and Austria. In these two
countries, almost half of second-generation Turks were placed in
Hauptschule, the lowest-qualifying, least prestigious lower secondary
school track. The risk of not finishing the track proved very high. The like-
lihood of dropout loomed as they tried to make the transition into an ap-
prenticeship, something especially difficult for students who had to find
one on their own. Lack of coaching and/or parental guidance here resulted
in high numbers of early school leavers. But we wondered, did children of
native parentage who also followed Hauptschule suffer from the same
problems? Their numbers of early school leavers are, however, much low-
er. The most extreme disparities are seen in Germany, Austria and
Switzerland, where twice as many second-generation Turks become early
school leavers than children of native parentage.
At the other end of the spectrum a comparable picture emerges. Again,
in all countries, second-generation Turks are less likely than respondents of
native-born parentage to enter higher education, even when they have com-
pleted an academic track. In this case, Belgium and Sweden show almost
twice as many respondents of native-born parentage entering higher educa-
tion than second-generation Turks from the same academic secondary
school track. Most problems occur in the transition from upper secondary
to post-secondary education.
Table 10.2 Educational attainment of second-generation Turks with low-educated







Austria 47.4 43.6 9.0
Belgium 34.7 40.0 25.3
Switzerland 15.2 72.7 12.1
Germany 48.0 49.7 2.3
France 16.7 54.8 28.6
The Netherlands 39.7 39.7 20.7
Sweden 0.0 69.2 30.8
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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At the same time, more than students of native-born parentage do, they
make use of an alternative, often longer, route through the vocational track
into higher education. This trend is particularly visible – and shows effec-
tive results – in Austria, the Netherlands and France.
Second-generation Turks cannot fall back on the same level of parental
support and networks as their peers with native-born parents. We see this
effect when parents cannot prevent their children from being streamed into
a lower vocational track and or help them seek an apprenticeship (some-
thing compounded by the fact that second-generation respondents do not
receive equal treatment from employers). Even for second-generation
Turks on the academic track, a lack of family resources and support more
often results in downstreaming, dropout and not continuing into higher ed-
ucation. Only among a select number of averagely performing yet persis-
tent students does a family’s avid encouragement of higher education (even
if it means taking a longer route) seem to affect their careers positively.
National and local educational opportunity structures are thus crucial for
children of immigrants and their real-life chances, not least because they
also determine in how far family background characteristics foresee ulti-
mate educational outcomes.
10.4 Labour market positions
Entering the labour market is generally the step meant to follow education.
The relevant questions here concern how educational credentials are trans-
ferable into labour market access, and to which degree the large differences
found in educational outcomes also translated into different work careers.
On the urban labour market, second-generation Turks must compete with
peers from other ethnic backgrounds. In a system that produces many
young people with degrees in higher education, the value of a diploma
may be different from one obtained in a country where only a minority of
the population enters a higher education institution.
The tables in this section compare the job status level of our respondents
who finished school and found employment. Table 10.3 presents Turkish
respondents with, at most, a lower secondary education diploma. Sweden
and Switzerland are excluded because their total number of early school
leavers already on the labour market was too small for comparison. As ex-
pected, early school leavers are mainly active in unskilled and skilled jobs.
In the countries with the highest shares of early school leavers, Germany,
Austria and the Netherlands, more than half were working in unskilled
jobs. At the same time, almost half of them were hired for skilled or pro-
fessional jobs; in Belgium and France, this group even amounts to two
thirds.
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Table 10.4 shows the job status level of respondents with middle educa-
tional levels. In Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, the position of
those respondents who completed apprenticeships is especially better than
that of their lower-educated peers. This group is mostly found in skilled
jobs.
Most remarkable is that about half the group holding a diploma in upper
secondary education in France and Sweden is found in unskilled jobs.
Zooming in on the situation, we find that both cases concern specific stu-
dents. In France, three quarters of them had actually followed the vocation-
al track leading to a BEP or CAP diploma.2 In Sweden, four out of five
students in this group had followed a vocational programme in gymnasi-
um. In both countries, these tracks form the lowest category in the educa-
tional system and therefore carry little prestige. The systems do sometimes
foresee a practical component, but a very minor one at that, which leaves
their students ill-prepared for the realities of the labour market. Students
with a BEP or CAP in France and a (vocational) gymnasium diploma in
Sweden enter an unskilled position as often as early school leavers in the
Netherlands and Germany. In retrospect, we realise that these degrees in
France and Sweden could be categorised similarly to lower vocational de-
grees in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria.
Table 10.3 Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who completed, at
most, lower secondary education and their job status (in %)
Unskilled Skilled Professional
Austria 55.8 30.2 14.0
Belgium 32.1 56.6 11.3
Switzerland X X X
Germany 57.1 34.3 8.6
France 30.3 54.5 15.2
The Netherlands 55.0 39.0 6.0
Sweden X X X
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Table 10.4 Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who completed an
apprenticeship or upper secondary education and their job status (in %)
Unskilled Skilled Professional
Austria 8.1 75.7 16.2
Belgium 31.6 54.5 13.9
Switzerland 6.1 45.1 48.8
Germany 25.2 58.5 16.3
France 45.8 41.0 13.3
The Netherlands 22.5 57.7 19.8
Sweden 56.7 26.7 16.7
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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As expected, second-generation Turks with a post-secondary or a tertiary
education degree show the best returns on the labour market, even though,
particularly in Belgium and Sweden, there is still a considerable number of
respondents working far below their educational level in unskilled jobs
(see table 10.5). Moreover, comparing them with respondents of native-
born parentage who have the same educational credentials, we see that, on
average, the latter are more likely to be found in jobs of a higher status. As
chapter 6 on the labour market shows, this is mostly the result of their
being older and thus possessing more work experience. In all cases except
Germany, differences are no longer significant when findings are controlled
for age and experience. However, their direction remains the same: on
average, Turkish respondents with the same educational attainment tend to
work in jobs with a lower prestige.
Alongside job status, levels of unemployment and labour market inactiv-
ity are important indicators of successful integration into the workforce.
Overall, labour market participation among second-generation Turks with
low-educated parents is high, somewhere between 75 and 90 per cent. It is
lowest in Germany, followed by the Netherlands and Austria. But in
Germany and Austria, labour market participation is also comparatively
low among the respondents of native-born parentage. As table 10.6 shows,
women are particularly affected by non-participation in the workforce,
Table 10.5 Second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents) who completed
post-secondary or tertiary education and their job status (in %)
Unskilled Skilled Professional
Austria 0 62.5 37.5
Belgium 18.4 40.8 40.8
Switzerland 7.7 23.1 69.2
Germany X X X
France 6.7 36.7 56.7
The Netherlands 12.1 25.3 62.2
Sweden 16.7 8.3 75.0
Note: Germany is not included in this table beause the number of higher-educated respond-
ents with low-educated parents is too small for comparison.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
Table 10.6 Second-generation Turkish women (with low-educated parents) who are
no longer in school and are non-active on the labour market (in %)




32.3 27.7 14.3 38.2 22.5 33.6 20.0
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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being especially much more likely to spend time in domestic activities
and/or family life.
Second-generation Turkish women are part of a larger trend here. In
Germany and Austria, a considerable group of women of native-born pa-
rentage also does not enter the labour market. This is mainly attributed to
having children: regardless of ethnic background, women with young chil-
dren in these two countries either never enter the labour market or leave it
upon becoming mothers. Financial and practical arrangements around day
care and preschool facilities and the predominantly half-day school system
in primary education make it difficult to combine work with raising young
children in Germany and Austria. The main difference here is that second-
generation Turkish women more often do not enter the labour market at
all, while women of native-born parentage often have worked before hav-
ing children. As observed in chapter 7 on union formation, this concerns,
not least, respondents’ mean age at marriage. Many second-generation
Turkish female respondents in Germany and Austria left school early
(some at age fifteen) to help out in their parental households, then get mar-
ried and start their own households, all while still relatively young them-
selves. Women of native-born parentage more often postponed marriage
and children, thereby having had a much better chance to work before hav-
ing children.
In the Netherlands and Belgium, second-generation Turkish women
leave school, on average, later than their peers in Germany and Austria,
and they more often enter the labour market for a period of time before
getting married. The Netherlands is known for its large part-time sector,
although, as seen in table 10.6, this does not lead to greater labour market
participation among this demographic. In the Netherlands, after-school and
day care facilities are expensive, proving sensible only if women earn a
salary high enough to at least cover the costs. This keeps a considerable
group of female early school leavers off the Dutch labour market – more
than half of them.
Switzerland’s outcomes demand some special attention from us, as its
percentage of women who are non-active on the labour market is low and
there is only a very small difference with women of native-born parentage.
When controlling for individual characteristics in chapter 6, we saw how
second-generation Turkish women in Switzerland are even slightly more
active on the labour market than women of native parentage. Further analy-
sis of this group reveals two factors that set their situation distinctly apart
from that of the Netherlands and Germany: many women work part-time,
usually in skilled or white-collar jobs (a by-product of Switzerland’s low
percentages of early school leavers). Since these jobs are generally well-
paying, it is attractive for them to work part-time in combination with car-
ing for their family. In addition, as chapter 7 shows, these women also tend
to marry later than those in other countries, thus being able to enter the
384 MAURICE CRUL & JENS SCHNEIDER
labour market before marriage, similar to women from the comparison
group.
Particularly high labour market participation from second-generation
Turkish women is also found in Sweden. It is no coincidence that the
country is known for its extensive welfare arrangements. The Swedish
after-school child care service system was intentionally designed to allow
both women and men to work fulltime. Although second-generation
Turkish women make slightly less use of these provisions than women of
native-born parentage, compared to other countries, their full-time labour
market participation is very high.
Women’s labour market participation thus depends on the opportunity
structure in a given country with respect to practical solutions for combin-
ing work and child-rearing. Unsurprisingly, these structural conditions
sometimes go hand in hand with how people regard these issues. The TIES
survey asked all respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement ‘Women should not work while their children are still young’. In
Germany, three quarters of respondents supported this statement, compared
to only about a third in Switzerland and a third in Sweden. Germany’s re-
sults could imply a conservative stance – that mothers of young children
should not work – or simply a realistic appreciation of the great difficulties
parents of young children face when both partners work. What can cer-
tainly be said is that the welfare arrangements in Germany (and, as it were,
in Austria) do not promote change in persisting negative attitudes about
working women. Meanwhile in Sweden and Switzerland, Turkish second-
generation mothers avail of the opportunities offered to combine a paid job
with family care.
Unemployment is also an important indicator for labour market partici-
pation, as it highlights the difficulties of integrating into the workforce.
Unemployment levels among second-generation Turks are high in almost
all cities, especially when compared to their respective comparison group.
In the worst cases, one in five respondents no longer in education is unem-
ployed; in the somewhat better cases, it is one in ten. Unlike most other in-
dicators of structural integration, the differences between cities within one
country can be immense. It seems that the local labour market situation,
especially pertaining to job availability, influences the unemployment level
to a significant extent. The two smallest cities in our survey, Basel and
Table 10.7 Unemployment rates of second-generation Turks with low-educated
parents, by two cities in each country (in %)
Austria Belgium Switzerland Germany France Netherlands Sweden
Capital city 22.7 32.1 17.3 15.6 11.5 13.7 12.9
Second city 10.4 17.6 1.5 8.0 19.0 16.5 X
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Linz, and medium-size Frankfurt offer the most favourable local labour
markets.
Like job status, educational level also has a large impact on unemploy-
ment risk. As table 10.8 shows, early school leavers are two to three times
more frequently unemployed than better-educated respondents. This also
means that countries with high numbers of early school leavers are overall
more affected by unemployment in the Turkish second generation.
Early school leavers are particularly vulnerable on the labour market.
However, they are not necessarily the only group who is unable to transfer
educational attainment into workforce participation, as the cases of higher-
educated second-generation Turks in Sweden and Belgium clearly show. In
all cities, second-generation Turks are more often unemployed than their
peers of native-born parentage. In Germany, Austria and Belgium, these
differences can mostly be explained by lower educational credentials. In
Brussels, for example, the local employment situation is very difficult for
people with an educational profile like that which predominates the
Turkish second generation. In a number of cities, however, actual outcomes
differ from what we would expect based on educational credentials. In
Stockholm, Zurich, Paris, Antwerp and in both Dutch cities, second-gener-
ation Turks do much worse than we would expect. As seen in chapter 6,
differences in Stockholm and Paris could partly be traced back to age and
gender effects across the sampled groups. With these effects controlled,
second-generation Turks are still more often unemployed, but the differ-
ence is no longer significant. Yet for the two cities in the Netherlands and
in Antwerp and Zurich, significant differences remain after controlling for
individual characteristics. In these cities, unequal treatment or discrimina-
tion could be a relevant factor. Another possible explanation is that access
to middle- and higher-level jobs greatly depends on specific social and
family networks, which are less accessible to the children of immigrants
than to their peers with native-born parents.
Table 10.8 Unemployment rates of second-generation Turks with low-educated
parents, by education credentials (in %)
Early school leavers Apprenticeship Higher education
Austria 27.8 3.6 5.1
Belgium 33.8 17.7 15.5
Switzerland 17.6 6.7 7.1
Germany 31.1 5.3 0.0
France 26.7 13.3 9.1
The Netherlands 17.5 15.5 10.0
Sweden 12.5 10.5 18.8
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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Interestingly, the difference in unemployment between second-genera-
tion Turks and comparison group members is small or almost non-existent
when looking at those with low education. For jobs at the foot of the la-
bour pyramid, second-generation Turks apparently do not suffer from much
discrimination because respondents of native-born parentage little desire
this work. They probably also have good access to these jobs through their
own networks. However, in Sweden, France and the Netherlands, the con-
siderable groups of second-generation Turks who are high achievers do
want to move into middle- and higher-level jobs, and here they face a dif-
ferent kind of competition. It seems that if given a choice, many employers
prefer respondents of native-born parentage. Certain segments of the labour
market seem more open for Turks, while others are more difficult to enter.
Such market segmentation poses significant hindrances for the more suc-
cessful share of the second generation to validate its educational credentials
in the workforce.
In sum, labour market outcomes present a polarised situation. Between a
quarter and a third of second-generation youth no longer in full-time
school is either unemployed or non-active on the labour market. Unless
their partner has a paid job, they must live off welfare state provisions.
They also tend to reside in the most depraved neighbourhoods, their chil-
dren are likely to go to the worst performing schools and their family in-
comes are close to official poverty levels. The size of this marginal group
differs across Europe, but it is substantial in every country. Germany is the
country with the largest Turkish community – more than half of the
Turkish diaspora in Europe lives in Germany – but it also has one of the
largest groups on the lower rungs of the ladder. The German case substan-
tially weighs down our overall evaluation of the position of second-genera-
tion Turks with low-educated parents in Europe.
At the same time, we may conclude that between half and two thirds of
second-generation Turks have experienced upward social mobility, as com-
pared to their parents. Compared to their mothers, women have taken the
greatest step forward. Young second-generation Turkish women whose
mothers only attended a few years of primary school or were even illiterate
are now working in skilled, white-collar and professional jobs. Education
is the key here: better credentials ease people’s way up. The upwardly mo-
bile children of Turkish immigrants generally have much brighter prospects
than their peers who stagnated at low educational levels. They also more
often marry well-educated partners with full-time jobs, which results in
substantially higher family incomes. This affords them the chance to move
out of their rather depraved neighbourhoods and/or buy their own home.
This group’s children will grow up in far more favourable conditions than
their parents and also face better circumstances than the children of low-
educated second-generation Turks.
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10.5 Social relations and identification
Identification, belonging and social segregation take centre stage in debates
on integration in Europe. As chapter 8 on identity argued, these issues are
not only about relations between minority groups versus the ‘majority’.
Successful integration in middle-sized and large cities must also be as-
sessed more and more in terms of people’s capacity to cross ethnic bounda-
ries and deal with others from a wide range of cultural backgrounds. Being
integrated into multi-ethnic networks and feeling at ease in a multi-cultural
environment is an important asset for feeling at home in an increasingly di-
verse city.
Measuring for this, two indicators in the TIES survey inquire into the
ethnic background of respondents’ three closest friends at age fifteen and
three closest friends at the time of the interview. Table 10.9 shows the per-
centage of Turkish respondents who cited having, as fifteen year olds, only
friends of Turkish origin (column 1) and the percentages of those with eth-
nically mixed friendships (column 2 and 3). The outcomes show clear dif-
ferences between the cities.
In all cities,3 more than half of second-generation Turks had best friends
of another ethnic background at age fifteen; in most, non-Turkish peers
comprised the majority of closest friends (column 3). Ethnically mixed
friendship groups have become the reality in many European cities. As also
shown in chapter 8, the second generation seems to lead the way in this
tendency (with even more resonance among second-generation Moroccans
and former Yugoslavians), while youth of native-born parentage had the
least ethnically mixed friendship group at the same age.
Table 10.9 Share of non-Turkish three closest friends at age fifteen among second-







Vienna 36.3 26.8 36.9
Linz 29.2 34.9 35.8
Zurich 4.6 4.6 90.8
Basel 10.0 15.8 74.2
Berlin 49.1 27.5 23.4
Frankfurt 27.0 29.6 43.4
Paris 13.5 14.2 72.3
Strasbourg 20.6 21.1 58.3
Amsterdam 25.8 22.0 52.3
Rotterdam 45.8 19.1 35.1
Stockholm 15.1 17.0 67.9
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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The most mixed friendship groups were found in Zurich, Basel and
Paris. This partly has to do with these cities’ size and types of Turkish
community. In Zurich (as well as Basel), community members are very
spread out, living all over the city. In Paris, Turks are relatively small com-
pared to other ethnic groups. In Stockholm, we see internal divisions in the
Turkish community, one encompassing sizable populations of Christian
Turks and Kurds from Turkey that subsequently form their own smaller
communities. The city with the largest Turkish community in Europe is
Berlin, where it is demographically simply more feasible to interact exclu-
sively with fellow Turks. But another factor is the community’s concentra-
tion in a limited number of neighbourhoods. This is the case in Vienna and
Rotterdam. Second-generation Turks in Strasbourg are also concentrated in
certain neighbourhoods, but because of the city’s less rigorous secondary
education tracking, this group more often had ethnically mixed friendship
groups at age fifteen. In Berlin and Vienna, education proves noticeably in-
fluential: we find a significant effect of the lower vocational education
track, which greatly increases the likelihood that respondents will be
friends only or predominantly with peers of Turkish descent.
The differences across the cities are less substantial when it comes to
closest friends of native-born parentage. As table 10.10 shows, somewhere
between a third and half of second-generation Turks in the eleven cities an-
alysed here cited no friends of native-born parentage at age fifteen. From
this, we indirectly deduce that a large share of their non-Turkish friends
were youngsters of other ethnic minority groups.
The situation in the two Swiss cities seems to offer the best circumstan-
ces to ‘blur’ boundaries (Alba 2009) between the majority group and the
children of Turkish immigrants, while the boundaries seem to have been
Table 10.10 Share of friends of native-born parentage at age fifteen among second-





Two or three friends
of native parentage
Vienna 53.5 38.9 7.6
Linz 43.4 37.7 18.9
Zurich 32.2 40.2 27.6
Basel 33.2 36.7 30.0
Berlin 56.1 31.0 12.9
Frankfurt 38.2 36.8 25.0
Paris 42.2 26.0 31.8
Strasbourg 41.7 37.2 21.1
Amsterdam 54.5 32.6 12.9
Rotterdam 69.5 22.1 8.4
Stockholm 49.1 34.0 17.0
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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brightest for youth in Rotterdam, Vienna and Berlin. In combination, tables
10.9 and 10.10 reveal three types of outcomes: a) growing up mostly with
Turkish peers (Rotterdam, Vienna, Linz, Berlin and Frankfurt); b) growing
up in a ‘non-white’, ethnically mixed environment and friendship group
(Amsterdam, Paris, Strasbourg and Stockholm); and c) Zurich and Basel
present a case with native-born parentage youth being part of a wider eth-
nically mixed circle of friends.
The picture does not change much when it comes to the ethnic back-
ground of respondents’ current three closest friends. As adults, second-gen-
eration Turks in Berlin and Vienna also have the most Turkish circles of
friends. Meanwhile, in Stockholm and Zurich, multi-ethnic friendship
groups are more frequent. In most cities, friendship circles have become
more Turkish over time, especially so in Strasbourg and Zurich. Notably
influential factors again include the size of the Turkish community in abso-
lute numbers, its concentration in certain neighbourhoods and socio-eco-
nomic position. The least favourable socio-economic indicators are in
Berlin and Vienna, where we find that unemployed respondents and those
not actively looking for a job (mostly women) significantly more often
have solely Turkish closest friends. The fact that they do not participate in
environments conducive to encountering a broad array of people, such as
the labour market and higher educational institutions, seems to foster
mainly in-group relations vis-à-vis their own community. Their situation
contrasts with the better-educated second-generation Turks in Stockholm
and Paris (and, to a lesser extent, in the two Swiss cities). Socio-economi-
cally, these groups do much better, and are also in more frequent contact
with other ethnicities (including those of native-born parentage).
Partner choice is another important indicator for social relations and, fol-
lowing Gordon’s model of ‘straight-line assimilation’, it has often been
presented as a sort of litmus test for integration. We agree with Song
(2009) that this is an overstatement: marriage within one’s own ethno-na-
tional group is not necessarily the ultimate expression of segregation or
failed integration, as much as marrying a partner of native-born parentage
does not automatically lead to becoming a recognised member of the ma-
jority group. Intermarriage can, however, obviously be interpreted as an-
other way of boundary-crossing, but international comparisons reveal how,
in most diasporic groups, intermarriage rates in the second generation tend
to be low (cf. Schneider, Chavez, Waters & DeSipio 2012). The TIES re-
sults for second-generation Turks show a very consistent pattern across the
seven countries. The overwhelming majority marries a partner from the
same ethno-national origin group (between 86 per cent in France and 97
per cent in Sweden). This applies not only to respondents with low-edu-
cated parents (for more details, see chapter 7), and it includes partners born
in Turkey as much as partners who are fellow second-generation Turks.
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Closely tied up with the second generation’s social relations and how
they relate to the society they were born into are identity formation and
feelings of belonging. Chapter 7 discusses factors influencing their feelings
of belonging to national categories (being French, Swedish, Dutch, etc.).
Looking specifically at Turkish respondents with low-educated parents, ta-
ble 10.11 analyses the prevalence of weak identification with the majority
society.
The table shows a considerable share of respondents with weak and very
weak feelings in all countries. These similar numbers indicate that several
key factors – respondents being overwhelmingly citizens of the survey
countries, having closest friends of native-born parentage and socio-eco-
nomic scores – seem to make no substantial difference here. As shown,
Sweden’s respondents score high on all three measurements, though their
degree of non-identification with being Swedish is comparatively high. At
the other end, we have rather positive identification results in Germany,
where respondents rank so poorly in educational and labour market results,
as well as have high instances of Turkish-only friends. Only in Switzerland
do second-generation Turks fulfil our expectation of having a less problem-
atic sense of national belonging, combined with high levels of interacting
with people of native-born parentage and a reasonable overall socio-eco-
nomic position.
Our assumption is that, on the one hand, people have a personal need to
feel at home somewhere and to connect to those around them. On the other
hand, it makes a difference whether people accept them. We therefore ex-
pect respondents’ assessment of their interaction with people of native-born
parentage to play an important intermediary role with respect to whether
they can feel at home and feel they ‘belong’. As such, the TIES survey
asked second-generation Turks about their feelings towards the population
of native-born parentage. Most did not have cold feelings. Those who had
cold or neutral (being the middle position between cold and warm) feelings
significantly more often expressed a weak national identity; those who had
warm feelings more often expressed a strong national identity. We found
the warmest feelings towards people of native-born parentage among sec-
ond-generation Turks in Germany and Switzerland – between half and two
Table 10.11 Weak or very weak feelings of national belonging among second-
generation Turks with low-educated parents (in %)
Austria Switzerland Germany France The Netherlands Sweden
Weak or very weak 25.7 15.4 19.8 23.9 24.8 23.6
Note: Because this set of questions was organised differently in Belgium, the Belgian results
are excluded.
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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third expressed such feelings – while the Dutch and Austrian contexts were
least warm – with only a third expressing such feelings. As we can interpo-
late from how respondents feel towards others, notably those coming from
a different ethnic background, boundary-drawing mechanisms seem to
have a major impact on the strength of one’s national identity.
To claim national belonging as a Muslim or a second-generation Turk is
rather problematic in all seven countries. It is a contested identity, particu-
larly because of the highly pronounced ‘ethnic’ component in the defini-
tion of ‘ethno-national’ identity. For this reason, in many countries, it was
more conducive to identify with one’s city of residence – yielding a much
more open identity – and is something also often promoted by cities them-
selves. Second-generation Turks in Stockholm and in the two Dutch cities,
especially, identified much more with their city than with the nation. The
group showing weak city identity, as compared to weak national identity,
was only half as big in both Sweden and the Netherlands. Similarly strong
feelings of city belonging were found in Switzerland and France, as table
10.12 shows.
In six out of the eleven cities we surveyed, second-generation Turks
showed a stronger identification with the city than did their respective
comparison groups. In the five other cities, we found the same result when
going down to the neighbourhood level. This shows that weak national
identity does not mean that this group would not feel ‘at home’ where they
grew up and live.
For a considerable share of second-generation Turks, the strongest form
of identification was ethno-national origin. Their low rates of intermarriage
and fewer cases of respondents with mixed friendship groups, notably the
case in Germany and Austria, can lead to a depiction of this group as one
with a high degree of social cohesion, limited contacts with the majority
society and low identification with the nation they live in. Similar findings
have fuelled the debate about a supposed Turkish Parallelgesellschaft.
This public image, however, needs some fine-tuning according to other
findings that provide contrast or at least nuance. The TIES survey found
that second-generation Turks more often than youth of native-born
Table 10.12 City identity strength among second-generation Turks with low-
educated parents (in %)
City identity Austria Switzerland Germany France Netherlands Sweden
Strong or
very strong
Capital city 29.1 63.4 36.8 51.0 63.4 64.8
Second city 38.5 58.3 40.8 32.9 63.6 X
Weak or
very weak
Capital city 31.1 13.4 19.3 21.9 7.3 13.6
Second city 18.3 14.2 19.1 45.7 12.9 X
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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parentage have friendship groups comprising people with different ethnic
backgrounds from their own. The Turkish community’s tight social cohe-
sion is well documented, although we found that when they live more
spread out over a city or are demographically less visible as a group, Turks
much more often engage in friendships with other ethnicities. Employment
and higher labour market segments, as they are starting to become accessi-
ble to second-generation Turks, also foster more diverse social relations.
Weak identification is a reaction to context, depending on feelings of being
welcome and accepted by youth of native-born parentage, but also on the
perceived degree that all relevant institutions and sectors of society stand
open to them. City identity generally offers a more open and inclusive
identity category, therefore attracting much higher levels of identification.
Second-generation Turks strongly feel that they are Berliners, Amster-
dammers and Viennese. In some cases, they feel this more so than their
peers of native-born parentage.
10.6 Culture and religion
The European media and the political debate covered by it seem to feed on
reports of ‘culture clashes’ and incompatible religions that come head to
head. As observed in chapters 8 and 9, respectively on identity and reli-
gion, we see the greatest differences between youth of Turkish (and other
immigrant) origin and those of native-born parentage when it comes to is-
sues of faith. Between two thirds and three quarters of comparison group
respondents claimed to have no religion. This is the result of a major secu-
larisation process that happened in cities within one or two generations,
although a lot of these respondents still grew up with religion in their fami-
lies. By contrast, religion is important for the majority of second-genera-
tion Turks. In the Netherlands, we find the largest gap (71 per cent) be-
tween religious second-generation Turkish youth and non-religious youth
of native-born parentage. The smallest gap is in Switzerland (26 per cent)
Table 10.13 Second-generation Turks with low-educated parents and youth of
native-born parentage who say they practise a religion (in %)




86.3 91.3 58.9 72.4 94.0 91.3 71.9
Youth of native
parentage
37.0 30.1 32.9 22.5 42.9 20.5 12.4
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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due to there being both more religious respondents of native-born parent-
age and more non-religious second-generation Turks.
In general, Islam, by far the most common religion among second-gener-
ation Turks in Europe, imposes more rules on a person’s daily life than
most common forms of Christianity, notably including restrictions on food
and alcohol consumption as well as sexual activity. The prominence of al-
cohol at parties, bars, clubs and in the general nightlife scene among young
European urbanites creates potential social discrepancies between religious
and areligious youth within the Turkish second generation itself as well as
between them and youth of native-born parentage.
In all cities, a minority of second-generation Turks state having no reli-
gion, some because they were not raised in a religion, while others state
they no longer have a religion. In Sweden and Germany, this is true for a
quarter; in Switzerland, for almost half. It is important to see the areligious
group in light of Turkey’s longstanding secular tradition. In many aspects,
debate concerning the role of Islam in society is much more polarised in
Turkey than in Europe. Political parties, TV stations and newspapers are
fiercely divided over the issue. The secular and the religious largely live
separate lives, particularly in Turkish cities though this is also reflected in
the deep fissures within the Turkish diaspora in Europe. As discussed in
chapter 8, non-religious groups in Europe tend to live in more varied
neighbourhoods, interact in more diverse circles of friends and distribute
their time in different places throughout the city. The two groups also have
highly disparate opinions when it comes to the central domains in which
religion imposes restrictions, such as eating habits, premarital sex and gen-
der equality.
With a vibrant music and dance club scene, Berlin is the capital of secu-
lar Turkish nightlife and culture, something that resonates in other
European cities. Successful Turkish DJs from Berlin get booked in all ma-
jor European cities and Berlin’s Turkish gay and lesbian scene is renowned
continent-wide. However, the Turkish community’s diversity – one facet
being its lively Berlin scene – is mainly commented and reflected upon by
second-generation Turks themselves, as evidenced in internet forums and
via social media catering to Turkish youth. The greater public discourse is
ignorant of this internal multifacetedness, simply conflating Turks with re-
ligious Muslims.
At the same time, most second-generation Turks do see themselves as
Muslims. The TIES survey was able to show in greater depth what this
means for second-generation Turkish Muslims across European cities. As
argued in chapter 9, ‘being religious’ leaves much room for interpretation.
Of those who call themselves Muslim in France, Sweden, Switzerland and
Belgium, a third or more say they never pray. One in five of the religious
respondents in these countries never go to a mosque. In Switzerland, two
thirds of these respondents do not actively practise their religion. Some say
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they take part in Ramadan festivities, but that is about all they do as far as
Islamic practice goes. Second-generation Turks in Austria, the Netherlands
and Germany seem to be the most actively practising Muslims. About three
quarters of respondents in Vienna follow the Islamic customs of observing
Ramadan, eating halal food, doing daily prayers and going to the mosque
either strictly or quite regularly. In Amsterdam, this group comprises two
thirds of the respondents; in Berlin and Frankfurt, about a third. The most
publicly visible marker of female Muslim religiosity is the headscarf.
About half of religious second-generation Turkish women in Austria,
Germany and the Netherlands said they wear a headscarf outside the home.
By contrast, in the two Swiss cities, only one in ten women stating they
practise a religion wear a headscarf; in France, this number is one in five.
In the public debate we see a preoccupation about the role that ‘political’
Islam plays in the Muslim diaspora in Europe. This is often juxtaposed
with the idea of a ‘modern’, ‘Western’ Islam. Although what is actually
meant by ‘modern’ remains murky, one recurring discursive theme is the
separation of state and church (or in this case, mosque) – where religion is
seen as a private matter between a religious person and God. We delved in-
to this issue in the TIES survey via two particular questions. On the one
hand, if respondents agreed with the statement that religion should be the
ultimate political authority, we labelled their strain of Islam ‘political’. If
respondents did not agree with the statement that Islam is the only and ulti-
mate political authority and agreed with the statement that religion should
be a private matter between a religious person and God, we labelled their
strain of Islam ‘modern’. Of the religious second-generation Turks with
low-educated parents we interviewed in seven countries, between half (in
Germany) and four fifths (in Sweden) could be labelled ‘modern’. A much
smaller group we identified as adhering to ‘political’ Islam. The latter were
usually very observant in their religious practices and often held more con-
servative views on gender roles and other social aspects.
The group in favour of a more ‘political’ Islam is, by far, largest in
Germany, with 28 per cent of respondents identifying in this way,4 women
and men being equally represented. Almost half this group expressed a
weak feeling of belonging to Germany, but a strong Turkish identity. The
women in this group often did not participate on the labour market. Half of
the group also reported having experienced hostility because of their reli-
Table 10.14 Religious second-generation Turks (with low-educated parents)
practising ‘modern’ or ‘political’ Islam (in %)
Austria Belgium Switzerland Germany France Netherlands Sweden
‘Modern’ Islam 64.6 64.7 85.5 57.9 77.1 63.9 89.9
‘Political’ Islam 11.8 17.2 7.7 27.9 14.3 10.4 5.6
Source: TIES survey 2007-2008
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gious beliefs – this is significantly more than among ‘modern’ religious
second-generation Turks in Germany.5 While both higher- and lower-edu-
cated second-generation Turks identify as Muslim, the attraction to ‘politi-
cal’ Islam is significantly correlated to educational levels. Contrary to the
prevalent media image of highly educated second-generation youth being
involved in ‘political’ Islam, this type of Islam is noticeably more rooted
among the low-educated group members. In Berlin, the city with the high-
est share of respondents advocating a ‘political’ Islam, almost half (43 per
cent) of the early school leavers belong to this group; this was true for 6
per cent of the better educated. The second-largest group was in Vienna,
where the figures are 18 per cent for early school leavers and 3 per cent
for the higher educated.
A second important factor is the institutionalisation of Islam. In
Germany, we found that second-generation Turks whose fathers more often
went to the mosque and who were sent to attend Koran school were more
often advocates of ‘political’ Islam. But in the Netherlands, we saw a re-
verse trend. Children of fathers who frequently went to the mosque and
who sent them to Koran school were more moderate and less often advo-
cated this strain of Islam. We thus conclude that religious institutions in
the two countries have opposite effects. It would be worth investigating
why this is so. Could it be a result of the Dutch government’s support and
funding of Turkish Islamic organisations, in contrast to Germany’s leaving
this almost entirely for the Turkish and the Saudi Arabian governments to
do?
Another important component of the public debate on Islam concerns
questions of gender equality and sexual freedom. The TIES survey results
show that being religious impacts respondents’ opinions on these issues in-
deed. But we also find incongruity within the religious group itself, partic-
ularly in the realm of sexuality. For example, almost half of the ‘modern’
Muslim respondents agreed that it is fine for women to engage in premari-
tal sexual activity under certain circumstances. Questions about gender
equality produced a similar pattern. Those who adhere to a ‘modern’ Islam
share similar thoughts with their peers of native-born parentage in response
to statements such as ‘Education for girls is less important than for boys’
and ‘Women should not be in leading positions over men in the work-
place’. The conviction that men and women are equal is firmly rooted
within the majority of the second generation – including the large majority
of practising Muslims. This does not, however, negate the fact that each
country has a group, comprising between 10 and 25 per cent or respon-
dents, holding quite different opinions about women than those held by the
majority of city youth overall.6 In Switzerland and Sweden, this group is
smallest, one reason possibly being that the two countries’ Turkish com-
munities are more diverse than elsewhere: both comprise many Alevites
and Christian Turks, who generally show more progressive attitudes.
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Germany’s large nonreligious group practically holds the same opinions as
their comparison group, though they seem to have little influence on their
religious peers; Germany’s community seems quite polarised, especially in
Berlin. In all countries, it is the higher educated who hold the most pro-
gressive opinions on these issues. The more conservative views seen in
Austria and Germany are an indirect result of their much higher shares of
low-educated second-generation Turks.
10.7 The integration of the Turkish second generation in Europe
The overall socio-economic position of the Turkish second generation in
Europe is thus perplexing. In terms of immigrant ‘success stories’, is the
glass half full or half empty? Both perspectives could be defended with the
data presented above. A considerable group of second-generation Turks oc-
cupies a rather marginal position in society, its members being non-active
on the labour market, unemployed or stuck in unskilled jobs. They do not
show much social mobility relative to their parents. In Germany, the coun-
try with the largest Turkish community, this demographic forms about one
third of second-generation Turks with low-educated parents. It is this more
negative example of integration – or lack thereof – that is often reflected in
the media and politics.
However, it can also be argued that the glass is half full. In all seven
countries, between half to two thirds of the Turkish second generation oc-
cupy a stable lower- to upper-middle-class position. This group has moved
considerably high up on the social ladder relative to their parents. Some
members have taken a spectacular step in just one generation. This more
positive – and, in fact, predominant – picture gets considerably less atten-
tion than the more negative one concerning a smaller group.
This book has endeavoured to answer an even more important question
than whether the glass is half full or half empty. The TIES results demon-
strate that the integration context is paramount here, for the institutional ar-
rangements in the ‘receiving society’ are what create the very capacity of a
group to find its place and position. At the same time, our results show that
no one particular integration context is the most favourable for – to go with
the metaphor – filling the glass. Across and within the thematic fields cov-
ered in this volume, some countries show more favourable results than
others. There are a number of institutional arrangements that, in sum, have
the potential to merit being labelled ‘good practice’. An early start in an
educational institution and a late selection between vocational and aca-
demic tracks prove crucial for school success. An inclusive apprenticeship
system smoothens the way to working life. Alternative or long routes
through the vocational column make it possible to reach higher education
at later ages, even for those from more disadvantaged familial starting
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positions. Comprehensive school systems are not always more inclusive
than stratified systems because they, too, create a bottom category of pupils
who has difficulties accessing good labour market positions. Especially for
this group, a well-developed apprenticeship system would be valuable. In
all countries, unemployment is particularly high among early school leav-
ers; school systems producing high percentages of them also produce high
unemployment. At all costs, youth should thus be encouraged to pursue ed-
ucation until they obtain at least a degree above lower secondary
education.
Differences in institutional arrangements on the labour market result in
varied labour market outcomes. Welfare state arrangements that allow
women to combine paid and care work stimulate labour market participa-
tion among a group who has traditionally not entered the workforce. But,
we also found traces of evidence for a special form of labour market seg-
mentation: second-generation Turks with higher education diplomas have
difficulties entering professional jobs. A glass ceiling for children of immi-
grants now seems visible. The evidence for this is still weak because the
second generation is just entering the labour market and it’s possible they
simply need more time to make a full-on entry. Nonetheless, these first in-
dications – supported by the rapidly rising number of highly educated sec-
ond-generation Turks looking for jobs in Turkey and other non-EU econo-
mies – are alarming because these are students who made it into higher ed-
ucation ‘against all odds’ (Crul, Zhou, Lee, Schnell & Keskiner 2012). If
even they feel excluded from local and national labour markets, a poten-
tially powerful negative message is being transmitted to their younger sib-
lings and cousins in the community.
For over 25 years, a main explanatory factor for the low socio-economic
status of certain groups of immigrants and their children was the low
socio-economic background of their parents and their supposed ‘distance
from education’ (what has been referred to in German as Bildungsferne).
Our comparison across countries, however, shows that children whose pa-
rents share the same socio-economic characteristics and display the same
attitudes towards school institutions and education, in general, still show
radically different outcomes. Children of low-educated immigrants who are
unable to give homework help (much less talk about the importance of
school) almost certainly end up as early school leavers in one national con-
text; yet, in another, they make it into higher education by leaps and
bounds. This type of contrast evinces the relevance of the integration con-
text when seeking explanations for deficits in structural participation.
The most compelling evidence for this is found in the ways that school
systems and labour markets select. This should not come as much of a sur-
prise, since young people spend between thirteen and twenty years in edu-
cation. Institutional arrangements in school and work leave a huge impact,
diminishing differences based on group or parental characteristics in
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Sweden and France and increasing them in Germany and Austria. Lower-
class children of native-born parentage are often affected by this same sys-
tem logic. However, we found what we called a ‘multiplier effect’. When
school system factors, like late start or early selection, work negatively for
lower-class children of native-born parentage, they have even more nega-
tive effects on children of immigrants. On the flipside, when school sys-
tems provide extra opportunities, for example, by offering a long route or
‘second chances’, the second generation profits even more from the facili-
ties than do children of native-born parentage. For the negative effect, the
explanations are relatively simple: besides their low education levels, im-
migrant parents need to bridge language gaps and negotiate unfamiliarity
with the local school system. Systems that demand parents provide practi-
cal help, guidance and informed choices penalise those children who lack
such support. Factors producing the positive multiplier effect have been far
less studied. We suppose that they are mainly found in immigrants’ and
their children’s high aspirations, persistence and sometimes more sensitive
awareness of, and appreciation for, life opportunities. Others have labelled
this the ‘second generation advantage’ (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters &
Holdaway 2008) and ‘immigrant optimism’ (Kao 2004) – potential resour-
ces still lacking sufficient recognition by policymakers, educational practi-
tioners and potential employers.
In terms of social relations and identity, we also identified the influence
of the integration context. In general, context has a weaker penetration on
the more private indicators (partner choice) and group-based indicators
(‘ethno-national’ feelings of belonging) while, in more public domains
(inter-ethnic relations and national feelings of belong), context matters
more.
Populist parties across Europe have argued that young Muslims place re-
ligious beliefs above everything else, with little attachment to the society
and nation they were born into and live in. Our results prove contrary,
showing that only a minority feels weakly connected to the nation-state
and claims religious authority above political authority. Populists and anti-
Islamists hold multiculturalism responsible for allowing an activist funda-
mentalist Islam to flourish in Europe. However, we found the largest group
of respondents advocating some sort of ‘political’ Islam in Germany, which
is one of the countries with the least developed multicultural policies and
lowest level of equal state provisions for mosques and teaching Islam at
school. By contrast, in Sweden, the country with the most prominent multi-
cultural policies and welfare state provisions, the group advocating ‘politi-
cal’ Islam is actually smallest. Second-generation Turks in Germany also
most often report religious-based hostility; those in Sweden do so the least.
‘Political’ Islam thus seems to thrive least in a tolerant ‘multiculturalist’
environment.
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This TIES evidence is doubly relevant for Europe’s debate on integra-
tion. First, the national comparison holds a mirror up to each country’s per-
formance. We must look to see in which areas countries score well and
where they lag behind. Are certain integration problems inherent to particu-
lar group characteristics or could different policies (at least partly) prevent
them? Secondly, with one of the biggest social engineering projects in his-
tory underway – the building of the European Union – successful integra-
tion policies become more pertinent. So far, the EU has mostly concen-
trated its efforts in creating a common migration policy. Integration poli-
cies have remained the remit of national and local governments. The EU,
however, has an example to set. Pressure to adopt good integration practi-
ces will only continue to grow in a globalised world where migration is a
permanent, omnipresent phenomenon. A demand for sound studies on the
integration context will rise the more we see our past failures for what they
are and feel the urgency to implement best practices.
10.8 The changing face of European cities
Nowadays, the observation that Western European cities are becoming in-
creasingly diverse compels almost everybody to think of ethnic diversity.
Metropolises across the continent that each harbour at least 150 national-
ities are no longer an exception, but the rule. Religious diversity, with
Islam as Europe’s most prominent ‘new’ religion, changes the urban land-
scape, too. These trends index the presence of the global within the local,
i.e. the internationalisation of the city. Alongside these ‘new’ forms of di-
versity, cities accommodate older forms of plurality, manifested in hetero-
geneity across class, age, gender and sexual orientation. The growing di-
versity in large European cites thus challenges the clearly defined ‘mono-
ethnic mainstream’ once represented by people of ‘native white’ descent.
In the US, many metropolitan areas with a longer history of migration have
evolved into ‘majority-minority’ cities: no single ethnic group – including
‘native whites’ – can claim a numeric majority anymore. Larger European
cities are rapidly moving in the same direction. This has major ramifica-
tions for how we understand ‘integration’. It poses the question of to what
degree, and for how much longer, ‘native whites’ can be the yardstick for
measuring the integration of other ethnic groups?
Demographic change is one important element of the changing face of
European cities. Another is the increasing diversification within and among
immigrants and their children. The sizable group of successful second-gen-
eration members identified in the TIES survey in many aspects resembles
the prototypical ‘yuppies’ of native-born parentage. Something similar oc-
curs at the other end of the social ladder: unemployed early school leavers
of native-born parents tend to live their lives more and more among peers
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of immigrant origin and have economically, socially and linguistically al-
ready begun to resemble – and sometimes emulate – them.
First-generation labour migrants almost always were positioned at the
bottom of society. This is no longer true for their native-born children.
That fact challenges our ideas about who is well integrated and who is not.
According to this volume’s education and labour market outcomes, failed
integration into an education system is the result of leaving school prema-
turely. Along these lines, a second-generation Turkish student in higher ed-
ucation is thus better integrated than a student of native origin who only
holds a secondary school diploma. The same applies to the labour market.
Someone of native-born parentage who does unskilled work on a tempo-
rary contract is considered less integrated into the labour market than a
second-generation Turkish professional with a fixed contract. The increas-
ing likelihood that ethnic minorities will be hierarchically ranked above
‘majority’ group members challenges dominant ideas of ‘integration prob-
lems’. Taking cues from a share of the scientific literature, we are used to
defining the children of immigrants as ‘well integrated’ if and when they
occupy similar positions to the children of native-born parents. But then,
how do we interpret a situation in which children of immigrants outper-
form children of native-born parentage at school and/or at work?
Enrolled in the tertiary education institutions that grant Bachelor’s de-
grees in the Dutch survey cities, between one third and half of the students
are, according to the latest figures, of immigrant descent. Over the last ten
years, their percentage had doubled, resulting in more and more second-
generation youth becoming visible in the workforce as managers in com-
mercial businesses, policymakers in the local civic administration and as
professionals in the education and health sectors. With the entrance of the
second generation into those positions, a gradual shift of power becomes
visible. The next generation will reap the fruits, gaining access to crucial
network contacts and resources important for succeeding in society.
Immigrant parents generally did not have the opportunity to build up well-
functioning ties to relations beyond their ‘ethnic niches’. This is quickly
changing. The successful second generation is now in the position to hire
their own staff. We can only imagine that people of native descent who
cannot accept being supervised or led by them will themselves experience
serious integration problems. A new focus of study vis-à-vis the majority-
minority dichotomy would therefore do well to look at individuals from
the former majority population who are unable or unwilling to adapt to the
transformations taking place.
Another set of interesting questions arises when we extend this type of
reasoning to the realm of culture and social relationships. In Europe, the
theory of ‘multiculturalism’ was developed during an era with a still clear-
cut majority group. The main question in the multiculturalism debate was
if the majority group would or would not grant minority groups certain
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rights, despite their cultural differences. In the new majority-of-minorities
reality, the numerical basis for this hierarchy disappears. Individuals – from
a wide variety of ethnicities – will bring beliefs and values to the table that
can only be negotiated with other groups, because no group will possess
the critical mass or majority status to impose their will onto others. This
new cosmopolitan mix of cultural beliefs and values that is part of the city
identity will increasingly deviate from the national identity that still incor-
porates strong ‘mono-ethnic’ elements into its definitional criteria. Locally
rooted urban identities prove to offer an alternative that is open to the new
diversity of the city. Our research shows that the second generation is more
often born and raised in European metropolises than children of native-
born parentage. The latter have more often arrived as out-of-towners, stu-
dents and workers who must adapt to ‘big city life’ and the competences
required by a ‘super-diverse’ urban environment (cf. Vertovec 2006). In an
acceleratingly mobile existence, ‘world cities’ have gained importance over
nation-states. What, therefore, should be the benchmark with which we
measure the integration of both second generations and people of native-
born parentage? Is it more important to feel a sense of belonging to one’s
city of residence or to feel French, German, Turkish, Moroccan, etc.?
In much research, successful integration (also referred to as assimilation
and adaptation) is measured through social relationships with people of na-
tive parentage. If social relationships are cultivated within one’s own ethnic
group, they are deemed ‘failed’ integration; if relationships are cultivated
with members of native parentage they show ‘successful’ integration. Can
we, however, still take relationships with people of native parentage as the
yard stick for integration in such increasingly diverse cities? Among young
people in Europe’s major cities, the group of native parentage may still be
largest in relative terms, though no longer in absolute terms. In cities like
Stockholm, Zurich and Paris, our results revealed that the majority of our
respondents’ friendship groups is multi-ethnic. And we can see that the
second generation is taking the lead here. They are the ones who more
often and more easily cross and blur ethnic boundaries. In this regard,
young people of native-born parentage show the most serious ‘integration
problems’. More often than any second-generation group, the ‘majority’
seems to be in a mono-ethnic world, inhabiting an impervious parallel to
the increasingly diversifying society around them.
Notes
1 It should be remembered that the TIES sampling criterion for the ‘Turkish’ group
was for respondents to have one or both parents born in the state territory of
Turkey. This selection makes no statement whatsoever on the linguistic, religious or
identificational backgrounds of the parents.
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2 For details on educational levels and degrees, see EDU codes in chapter 5’s
appendix.
3 Brussels and Antwerp are not accounted for because this cluster of questions was
not asked in Belgium.
4 The two statements – that religion should be a private matter and that Islam is the
only and ultimate political authority – do significantly negatively correlate in most
countries. In Germany, however, a quarter of those respondents agreeing that reli-
gion should be a private matter between a religious person and God simultaneously
sees religion as the only and ultimate political authority. This finding, amounting to
25 per cent of the respondents, is more frequent than in the other countries
surveyed.
5 In general, reports of religiously motivated hostility are much more frequent in
Germany than in the other countries; among the other religious respondents, one
third reported experiencing them. In the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria, that
share is one in five respondents; in Belgium, one in ten; and in Stockholm, only
one in 25.
6 In Germany, which shows the highest percentages of agreement with the two state-
ments in the Turkish second generation, we find that one in ten comparison group
members in the 18-35 age range also agrees with them. This is much higher than in
all other countries.
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